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ABSTRACT
Since the beginning of the decade, the structure of the industry has been changing
rapidly as airlines from various parts of the world have been forming alliances. These
alliances transcend the traditional types of co-operation which have always existed in
the industry and constitute a strategy designed to give the partners a competitive edge.
However, many of these alliances are failing. This can be attributed to a poor
understanding of the managerial and operational characteristics of airline alliances.
This research attempts to correct this deficiency by identifying and analysing the
factors which are important to airline alliance success.
In order to set the background of the research, the various ways in which firms have
traditionally been linked are reviewed. The evolution of co-operation in the airline
industry in the US, Europe and Asia is traced and the forces which have driven airlines
to adopt the alliance strategy are identified. The various collaborative strategies of
airlines are described.
The definition of alliance success is critical to this research. Various definitions are
explored and the ones considered most appropriate for this study are taken as alliance
stability and alliance operational performance. The issues to be considered in ensuring
airline alliance stability are qualitatively analysed. Among the most important ones are
a pragmatic and careful approach in the formation process of the alliance, an
understanding of the relationship between the partners with particular importance given
to commitment and the generation of trust, and recognition of the evolutionary process
of alliances as the priorities of the partners change over time.
The operational objectives of airline alliances are identified and classified as either
market-related or production-related. Market-related objectives include economies of
scope and density, and market power. Alliance performance is mathematically
modelled using linear and logit regression techniques. The results of the analyses point
to the following: network size and network complementarity, network integration,
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connection quality, the type of flight (on-line, code-shared or interline) and alliance
frequency of service as important alliance success factors. The reaction of competitors
is also found to determine the benefits of airline collaboration.
On the production side, the objective of allying is to decrease unit costs and increase
efficiency by combining certain operational areas. A case study of Austrian Airlines is
performed to identify the cost and productivity areas which have benefited from
alliance formation. Graphical analysis shows that benefits were reaped mostly in the
areas of labour productivity and aircraft utilisation. This implies that these are the areas
which should be targeted when making use of the alliance strategy. Unit costs were not
found to be greatly affected by alliance formation.
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NOTATION
ASK
	
Available seat-kilometre
CAB Civil Aeronautics Board
CPI
	
Consumer Price Index
CRS
	
Computer Reservations System
DoT
	
Department of Transportation
EC
	
European Commission
EU
	
European Commission
FFP
	
Frequent Flyer Programme
GDP Gross Domestic Product
IATA International Air Transport Association
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organisation
O-D
	
Origin-Destination
RPK Revenue passenger-kilometre
Airline codes
AA	 American Airlines
AF	 Air France
Al	 Air India
AN	 Ansett Australia
AY	 Finnair
AZ	 Alitalia
BA	 British Airways
BM	 British Midland
CI	 China Airlines
CO	 Continental Airlines
CX	 Cathay Pacific
DL	 Delta Airlines
GA	 Garuda Indonesia
lB	 IBERIA
JL	 Japan Airlines (JAL)
KE	 Korean Air
KL	 KLM Royal Dutch Airlines
LG	 Luxair
Notation
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Notation
MH	 Malaysia Airlines
NH	 All Nippon Airways (ANA)
NW	 Northwest Airlines
NZ	 Air New Zealand
OA	 Olympic Airways
OS	 Austrian Airlines
QF	 Qantas Airways
SK	 Scandinavian Airlines System (SAS)
SN SABENA
SQ	 Singapore International Airways (SIA)
SR	 SWISSAIR
TG	 Thai Airways International
TW Trans World Airlines (TWA)
UA	 United Airlines
US	 USAir
VN	 Vietnam Airlines
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BACKGROUND
This part provides the background information on which this thesis is constructed. The
need for the research is first considered and its aims are outlined. The various types of
interfirm agreements are then described and the ways in which they have been
classified are reviewed. Finally, the history of co-operation in the airline industry is
analysed.
Chapter 1: Introduction
1. INTRODUCTION
Introduction
T
he aim of this chapter is to provide an introduction to the thesis. The
emergence of co-operation in the airline industry is briefly described with a
contrast made with the newly-formed strategic alliances. An explanation for
the formation of strategic alliance formation is provided. The need for the research is
given and its aims are outlined. The chapter ends with the layout of the thesis.
1.1Airline Co-operation
Co-operation between airlines in the world has existed ever since the inception of the
airline industry. Houtte (1993) even argues that co-operation is one of the main
characteristic that distinguishes the airline industry from other sectors of the economy.
Agreements have in most cases been translated into technical co-operation: the
exchange, leasing and pooling of aircraft and aircraft parts and the maintenance of
aircraft and engines. One form of co-operation which was deemed necessary owing to
the tight regulatory framework in which airlines were (and still are) forced to operate
is interlining. Being largely confined to their home states, airlines had very limited
networks and therefore had (and were encouraged by regulatory agencies) to enter into
interline agreements so that the passenger could be taken to his/her final destination.
What differentiates previous types of agreements with contemporary airline alliances
is mainly that they have become increasingly strategic. In other words, the degree of
commitment in, and the importance carried by, alliances in the corporate portfolio of
airlines has increased dramatically since the beginning of this decade. Airlines now
consider. alliances as an effective means of acquiring a competitive edge over their
competitors and expect their alliances to yield substantial payoffs in terms of
increased traffic flows and eventually have a positive effect on their bottom line.
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Alliances can also be essential for survival as the British Airways-USAir partnership
demonstrates. From the point of view of USAir, the $400 mn. investment into it by
British Airways occurred at a time when the carrier was considering Chapter 11
bankruptcy status to remain in operation.
Compared to past agreements, the area of focus of current alliances has changed.
Indeed, while co-operation was previously geared to technical aspects, alliances are
becoming increasingly market-motivated. Marketing practices such as code-sharing
(the use of an airline's two-letter code on another airline's flight), block-spacing (the
purchase and marketing of a number of seats on another airline's flight), franchising,
joint scheduling, and combined Frequent Flyer Programmes (FFPs), are now
widespread in the airline industry. Owing to its ability to expand networks at
relatively low costs, code-sharing is now increasingly superseding interlining and it is
a feature of most airline alliances. Burton and Hanlon (1995) point out that while past
co-operation occurred between airlines operating on the same routes for pooling to be
possible, airlines are now seeking partners based in other world regions to achieve
market access. Examples of widely-publicised airline alliances designed to achieve
marketing objectives are the British Airways-USAir, KLM-Northwest Airlines and
Lufthansa-United Airlines partnerships, the European Quality Alliance (Swissair
Austrian Airlines and Sabena'), the Global Excellence (Swissair, Delta Airlines and
Singapore International Airlines), the failed Alcazar alliance which was meant to add
KLM to the European Quality Alliance, and the newly-announced British Airways-
American Airlines tie-up.
The phenomenon of alliance formation struck the airline industry at the beginning of
this decade. In the 1980s, another phenomenon which nevertheless confined itself to
the US airline industry was that of airline mergers. These two trends are comparable
in that they were both motivated by the desire of airlines to grow and expand their
networks. The growth imperative comes from increases in the intensity of the
'Sabena replaced SAS in mid-1995.
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competitive environment as brought about by industry deregulation 2 and the
globalisation of markets. However, the situation in the US differs greatly from that in
the rest of the world. While mergers are acceptable in the US 3 (and now in Europe
following the adoption of the Third Package), there are a number of legal and
nationalistic barriers to mergers/take-overs of airlines based in different countries.
Those barriers are extremely difficult to overcome and constitute one of the main
reasons why airlines have chosen the alliance strategy as a way of expansion instead
of mergers. In addition, airlines have discovered that alliances are a less costly means
of enjoying the benefits of mergers and take-overs, and have the advantage that the
problems of the partner need not to be shouldered as is the case with mergers and
take-overs.
1.2 The Need For The Research
Since the beginning of this decade, there has been a growing realisation of the
advantages that airline alliances can provide. This has given rise to a state akin to
panic as many airlines have scrambled to find a partner before all the attractive ones
were taken up (Bullard, 1994). Consequently, the number of alliances has risen
rapidly to reach about 400 in June 1 996g. However, the number of successful airline
alliances is way below that figure. The air transport literature is replete with alliances
which are performing below expectation. An indication of the dissatisfaction of
airlines with their alliances is the high rate at which partners are dropped. The success
rate of airline alliances has been studied by the Boston Consulting Group (BCG) using
alliance survival as the success criterion5. In general, the study indicates that the
success rate of alliances is very low. Intercontinental alliances have higher failure
rates than those which are either domestic or regional in geographical scope. Non-
equity alliances were also found to be highly prone to failure. The lack of success of
2Deregulation of the domestic airline industry was brought about in the US in 1978 by the Airline Deregulation Act. Gradual
deregulation, termed liberalisation, has been implemented in Europe since 1990 by the First, Second and Third Packages. The
last phase of deregulation will take place in 1997 when cabotage will be allowed.
'Provided antitrust regulations are not violated.
See Airline Business. June 1996.
It should however be noted that alliance survival is not necessarily a good indicator of alliance success, especially when there
are high exit barriers such as expensive 'divorce' costs.
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strategic alliances was also observed by Doganis (1993). In an analysis the effects of
European liberalisation, he points out that the marketing alliances between European
carriers have not yielded the expected benefits, and that most of them have been short-
lived. Notorious examples of alliances which have failed or which are currently
experiencing problems for various reasons are the former European Quality Alliance,
Alcazar, the Latin-American alliances of Iberia, British Airways-USAir and KLM-
Northwest Airlines.
Why are airline alliances unable to yield the expected benefits and even survive? The
fact that airline alliance formation is a relatively new phenomenon is one of the main
reasons for their failure. Indeed, the understanding of the managerial and operational
characteristics of airline alliances is piecemeal and is reflected in the paucity of
academic research about alliances in the airline industry. Research in that field does
not seem to have kept in pace with the rapid progression of the airline alliance
phenomenon. Furthermore, any study produced has focused primarily on airlines'
motivations for entering into alliances, and on the effects of those alliances on the
market and on consumer welfare (see Youssef, 1992; Youssef and Hansen, 1994)
rather than on how to make the alliances stable and produce the expected benefits.
1.3 The Aims Of The Research
With the increasing number of alliances, it is felt that the airline alliance phenomenon
is getting out of control and many, if not most, airlines are starting to co-operate
without properly understanding what they are getting into. The aim of this research is
to fill this gap by contributing to a better understanding of the structural and
operational issues in airline alliances. Stated formally, its objective will be:
The analysis of the critical factors which contribute to airline alliance
success
Focus will be primarily on the internal stability of airline alliances and on their goals,
namely the access to new markets, the increase in market share and cost
rationalisation. The basic methodology will be to select a number of successful and
failed airline alliances and analyse them to extract those factors which have
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contributed in bringing about the intended goals. The study can effectively be used as
a management tool that will help managers when they design their alliances to
increase the probability of success. It is recognised that no exact answers can be
provided as each airline alliance is unique and can be driven by different motives.
However, the research can provide managers with guidelines which they will find
useful in their decision-making process when selecting their potential partners and
operationally structuring the alliance. The study is all the more important as the
relaxation of legal constraints to mergers and take-overs is not anticipated in the near
future. Consequently, the importance of the alliance strategy as a means of growth and
of achieving greater competitiveness will be maintained and most probably increase
with time. This mandates a proper understanding of the characteristics of airline
alliances.
The study also brings together the widely-dispersed extant knowledge on airline
alliances, and investigates the adaptability of alliance theories developed in the social
and business disciplines to the airline industry. It is thus hoped that the groundwork
set in this study will be used as a springboard in the future when deeper research is
made into the subject of airline alliances.
The alliance phenomenon is far from subsiding. Indeed, nearly every single day, there
are news of broken alliances or of alliance newly formed. The changes are occurring
so rapidly that it is sometimes difficult to keep in pace with them. It is therefore
important to define a cut-off point in time after which any developments in the state of
the airline industry as far as alliances are concerned will not be taken into
consideration. That cut-off point is taken as June 1996 as the results of the study are
scheduled to be submitted in October 1996.
1.4 Thesis Structure
This thesis is divided into four main parts. Part I aims to provide the reader with an
introduction to alliances both inside and outside of the airline industry. Chapter two
provides a general definition of the strategic alliance. The various types of alliances in
existence are detailed and an attempt is made to define the scope of the strategic
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alliance and how it differs from the other alliance types. The different means of
alliance classification which have been devised in other academic research are then
reviewed to show how strategic alliances differ from other types of partnerships and
how that organisational form can generate controversy. This exercise also enables the
location of contemporary airline alliances on the alliance spectrum. Chapter three
analyses the evolution of co-operation in the airline industry. Focus is on the
experience in the US following airline deregulation with a contrast made with the
European and Asian regions.
Part II deals with the new types of alliances which are being formed between airlines.
Chapter four examines the change in the structure of the airline industry world-wide
as a result of alliance formation. The legal and consumer welfare implications of
alliances are examined. Chapter five is devoted to the socio-economic and political
pressures underlying the formation of strategic alliances. Two major theories are
reviewed, followed by an examination of their applicability in explaining the trend of
alliance formation in the airline industry. This leads on to an alternative theory of
airline alliance formation focusing on the socio-economic and political occurrences
which are characteristic of the airline industry. Chapter six describes the ways in
which alliances are used to yield benefits.
Part III is concerned with the modelling of airline alliance success. In Chapter seven,
the research approach is developed and the reasons for the selection of that particular
approach are detailed. Chapter eight considers the management aspects in alliances.
Much is borrowed from the extant literature on alliances to gain an understanding on
how airline alliances should be managed. The steps that need to be taken in the
formation process of alliances are reviewed. This is followed by an analysis of the
structure of the relationships between the firms involved in an alliance. The different
types of compatibility that need to be considered in the choice of a suitable alliance
partner are discussed.
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Chapter nine addresses alliance performance in terms of the achievement of its
operational goals. These goals are identified and a means of classifying them is
devised so as to enable their measurement.
Chapter ten deals with the marketing goals of strategic airline alliances. The focus is
on the goal of accessing new markets and benefiting from traffic feed. How those
goals are achieved in practice is analysed. The methodology used to measure the
degree of goal achievement and to isolate alliance effects is then described. Selection
and measurement of variables to be incorporated into the model are explained.
Alliance success is then mathematically modelled using the technique of multiple
linear regression.
In Chapter eleven , the focus is on the goal of gaining market share. As in Chapter ten,
the method by which alliances enable this in practice is described and the means by
which success is measured is detailed. Success is then mathematically modelled using
both linear multiple regression and the logit techniques.
Chapter twelve deals with cost reduction via airline alliances. The fields where
collaboration can lead to lower unit costs are identified and a graphical analysis of
unit costs of Austrian Airlines is performed to reveal any changes caused by the
formation of the European Quality Alliance.
Finally, Part IV which consists of Chapter thirteen, presents the conclusions that can
be drawn from the research, any recommendations that can be made, and outlines
proposals for further research.
The plan of the thesis is summarised in Figure 1.1. This figure is presented at the start
of each part so that one can see where one has reached in the thesis.
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1.5 Conclusion
Co-operation between airlines in all parts of the world is becoming increasingly
strategic. The number of cross-border airline alliances is increasing rapidly. However,
the success rate of the alliances is very low implying that airlines lack the necessary
expertise to design and operate their alliances appropriately. This research will try to
help them by identifying the factors which can lead to alliance success. In addition, this
thesis will produce an integrated framework bringing together the knowledge about
airline alliances and analyse the adaptability of outside alliance theories to the airline
industzy.
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2. TYPES OF I1NTERFIRM AGREEMENTS
Introduction
T
he strategic alliance is a relatively new type of organisational form which is
rapidly replacing the Porterian firm (Porter, 1985) isolated in its business
environment. Owing to their recent emergence, there is some confusion as
to what alliances really are. Confusion particularly prevails as to how alliances differ
from mergers and acquisitions. The purpose of this chapter is to identify the different
types of alliances in existence and analyse how they differ from one another. The
various parameters by which alliances can be classified are defined. Thus, it will be
clear to the reader as to what an alliance really is.
2.1The Need For A Definition
The term 'strategic alliance' is often loosely used to describe any type of partnership
existing between two or more firms. For example, Cravens and Shipp (1993) note that
vertical supplier-producer relationships are also classified as strategic alliances in
many cases. Also, there exists a certain degree of confusion between the terms
'strategic alliance' and 'joint venture'. This is apparent in the works of Lei and
Slocum (1988) who also consider licensing arrangements and consortia, keiretsu and
chaebols as strategic alliances, of Harrigan (1987) and of Lorange and Roos (1992)
who use the terms 'strategic alliance' and 'joint venture' interchangeably. Since this
research is concerned wholly with strategic alliances in the airline industry, it is
essential to have a clear understanding of the scope of a strategic alliance and this is
best done by contrasting it with other types of existing partnerships.
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2.2 Types Of Alliances
Strategic alliances form part of a broader class of organisational forms which have
been termed as either hybrid organisational arrangements (Powell, 1987; Borys and
Jemison, 1989), interorganisational relationships (Oliver, 1990; Van de Ven and Ring,
1994), networks (Thorelli, 1986), collaborative business arrangements (Burton, 1994).
coalitions (Porter and Fuller, 1985), quasifirms and transorganisational systems
(Achrol and Scheer, 1990). Within this group fall mergers and acquisitions, joint
ventures, formal and informal co-operative ventures, supplier-manufacturer and
manufacturer-distributor collaborations. These different types of alliances are
described in the next sections. Examples of alliances in the airline industry are also
presented wherever relevant.
2.2.1 Acquisitions and mergers
An acquisition occurs when a firm takes over another one with the consequent loss of
the corporate identity of the latter. It offers full control over the purchased firm.
Acquisitions are used mainly to obtain another firm's core skills or resources. Mergers
are slightly different from acquisitions in that two or more companies accept to
combine together their operations to yield a brand-new company. The difference can
be said to lie in the approach; an acquisition is the more offensive of the two. The
combination of forces is intended to strengthen the competitive advantage of the
merging firms. There is a tendency to use the two terms interchangeably in the
business literature.
Acquisitions and mergers became widespread in the US airline industry in the years
following deregulation. These mergers were driven mainly by the need to grow since
size was considered to carry with it economic efficiency via economies of scale6.
Economies of scope were also responsible for the growth imperative. In Europe, the
only notable airline mergers/acquisitions occurred between British Airways and
6 
Economies of scale refer to the decrease in unit costs with an increase in firm size (output). Economies of scope arise when it
is less costly to combine two or more product lines in one firm rather than produce separately. Economies of scale and scope in
the context of the airline industry are considered in depth in Chapter 9.
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British Caledonian and Dan Air, and between Air France and UTA. Mergers and
acquisitions in the airline industry are considered in greater detail in Chapter 3.
2.2.2 Joint ventures
A joint venture consists of the formation of a separate independent organisation by the
venture partners to carry out certain defined tasks. The new entity operates
independently of its parents, though it benefits from inputs from them. Part of its
outputs may flow back from the joint venture to the parents. Joint ventures are usually
used to exploit a new product market opportunity, provide access to new markets,
share costs and financial risks, gain a share of local manufacturing profits, or acquire
knowledge and technology for the core business (Cravens and Shipp, 1993). A typical
example of a joint venture is the CFM International jet engine alliance formed by
General Electric (GE) in the US and SNECMA in France.
Airlines formed as joint ventures are not common in the industry. One example is Air
Russia which was a joint venture between British Airways and Aeroflot. The joint
venture failed owing to its inability to operate within the uncertain legal and political
climate prevailing in the CIS states (Neims, 1992). Another is EuroBerlin jointly
created by Air France and Lufthansa. Some joint ventures have been set up by
companies which are not necessarily airlines. For example, Royal Air Cambodge is a
$10 million joint venture between the Cambodian Government and Malaysian
Helicopter Services. Another example is Air Micronesia which results from
collaboration between Continental Airlines and United Micronesia Development
Association.
Airlines have a greater tendency to form joint ventures which take responsibility for
only part of their operations. Singapore Airlines (SIA), for example, has two joint
ventures with Beijing Capital International Airport specialising in catering and cargo
and ground-handling services. The ground handling joint venture also involves China
Southern. Another example is AirLanka Catering Services which is a joint venture
between AirLanka and Thai Airways.
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2.2.3 Strategic alliances
Formal and informal co-operative ventures constitute the core of what are known
today as strategic alliances. The majority of airline alliances in existence today fall
into this category. Formal alliances incorporate a binding agreement, usually in the
form of a legal document which holds the firms together. Informal alliances, on the
other hand, are held solely by a verbal agreement between the two parties. In contrast
to the other types of partnerships described previously, the partners retain their
corporate identities and make major commitments to safeguard their unique cultures,
skills and independence. The strategic alliance therefore does not exist as a formal
organisation, but as a system of interpartner roles and responsibilities supported by a
boundary-spanning network of co-ordination, liaison and decision-making linkages
(Achrol and Scheer, 1990). The term 'strategic' implies that the partnership has a
long-term perspective, a focus on a sizeable and important market and provides the
companies with new capabilities (Hartnell, 1994). Equity purchases may occur;
however, their involvement goes beyond the reaping of financial benefits. Instead, the
equity stake is meant to cement the relationship together. Though equity stakes do not
allow the investor to affect its partner's policies for its own interests exclusively, it
can allow partial control over the partner in case the equity investment is substantial.
Strategic alliances in the airline industry are discussed extensively in Chapter 4.
2.2.4 Vertical alliances
Supplier-manufacturer and manufacturer-distributor collaborations are vertical
partnerships whereby the parties involved develop certain exclusive ties so as to
benefit from a number of advantages, mainly economies of scale and access to
markets without having to develop their own distribution channels. In the airline
industry, vertical alliances have mostly been between airlines and travel and tourism
companies such as hotel chains, car hire firms, and travel agents. Another type of
vertical co-operation is between tour operators, travel agents and charter airlines.
Broad-based enduring alliances with airframe or engine manufacturers have however
been scarce. Burton and 1-lanlon (1994) note that vertical alliances in the airline
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industry have generally been unsuccessful because they consume large amounts of the
airlines' capital and managerial resources. Indeed, during the recent economic
downturn, many airlines had to abandon their non-core businesses in order to survive.
Air France, for instance, divested from the Meridien hotel chain.
The different types of alliances which have been discussed are illustrated in Figure
2.1. This figure inherently classifies the alliances as either horizontal or vertical.
However, the difference between the various alliances is deeper and more
fundamental. Indeed, other more meaningful parameters differentiate between the
types of interfirm agreements listed. In the next sections, these defining dimensions
and the classifications which they yield are presented.
MANUFACTURER
Vertical alliance
Merger/Acquisition	 Strategic alliance
AIRLINE F AIRLINE	 AIRLINE
Vertical alliance
AIRLINE/
Other company
TRAVEL/	 JOINT
TOURISM COMPANY	 VENTURE
Figure 2.1 Types of airline partnerships
Adaptedfrom Cra'vens and Shipp (1993)
2.3 Alliance Classifications
2.3.1 Linear classifications
Horizontal arrangements have usually been viewed as business relations lying
between the twin pillars on which contemporary social science rest: markets (where
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resources are allocated through bargaining over price) and hierarchies-total
internalisation (where resources are allocated through authority relations and where
co-ordination is achieved internally by managerial orders, commands, bureaucracy
and strategic plans) (Thorelli, 1986; Powell, 1987). Such a classification gives, what
Burton (1994) calls, 'the linear continuum model' of the relationship between
markets, hierarchies and alliances. The model is shown in Figure 2.2.
In Figure 2.2, the alliances are classified according to the degree of integration which
decreases from the 'hierarchy' end to the 'market' end. Mergers and acquisitions
entail total integration of the firms. Hence, this alliance type lies closest to the
hierarchy end of the spectrum. Joint ventures are designed to fulfil specific functions
and co-operation is only between the departments which specialise in those functions.
The level of integration is therefore lower than in mergers.
High	 DEGREE OFJNTEGRATJON	 Low
Mergers &
	
Joint	 Formal co-operative Informal co-operative
acquisitions	 ventures	 ventures	 ventures
HIERARCHY	 MARKET
Figure 2.2 Alliance classification in terms of level of integration
Adaptedfrom Lorange and Roos (1993)
Strategic alliances are even closer to the market end of the alliance spectrum as the co-
operating firms strive to keep their identities and limit the level of integration to
specific operations.
Contractor and Lorange (1988) also adopt the linear continuum model though the
defining parameter is the degree of interdependency between the firms involved (see
Figure 2.3). Strategic alliances can here be observed to involve a low degree of
interdependency between the partnering firms. Airline alliances are a case in point.
Indeed, in none of the airline alliances existing today between maj or airlines will the
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partners depend on each other for core resources or to such an extent as to be disabled
were their partner to go out of business.
hIGH INTERDEPENDENCE
Mergers and acquisitions
Joint ventures
Formal co-operative ventures
Informal co-operative ventures
LOW iNTERDEPENDENCE
Figure 2.3 Alliance classification in terms of level of interdependence
Source. Contractor and Lorange (1988)
2.3.2 Matrix class jfications
Lorange and Roos (1993) argue that an inherent assumption in the two previous
classifications is that the partners attach the same importance to integration and
interdependence, that is they have a commonly shared vantage point. According to
them, this assumption is erroneous; each partner has its own perspective regarding its
strategic position which is likely to differ from the other party's perspective.
This can lead to diverging views on the integration issue and on the amount and types
of resource interdependencies to be striven for. They therefore propose an alternative
classification scheme based along two dimensions: how much resources the partners
are prepared to invest into the alliance and how much to retrieve from it. The amount
of resources input may be sufficient either for short-term or long-term operation of the
alliance. As for the output generated by the alliance, it may either be taken by the
partners or be retained by the alliance itself and reinvested in its operations. The
emerging classification framework is depicted in Figure 2.4.
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Parents' input of resources
Short-term	 Long-term
operations	 operations
To parents POOLJRTIUM
Output
retrieval	 i1Retained	
ENTURE JOINRE
Figure 2.4 Matrix classification of partnerships (I)
Source: Lorange and Roos (1992)
A criticism that can be made about this classification is that it limits itself to four
archetypes of partnerships which are in effect variations of the joint venture. No
mention whatsoever is made of formal and informal co-operative alliances. Some
improvement to that effect is brought about by Cravens and Shipp (1993) who provide
a similar matrix classification framework. In this case, the whole spectrum of
partnerships is included and the dimensions which differentiate between the alliances
are the environmental turbulence and the skill/resource gaps. Cravens and Shipp
(1993) argue that increases in those two influences lead companies to adopt alliances
r.
as a strategic tool. The interaction of the two influences is depicted in Figure 2.5.
Environmental turbulence refers to rapidly-changing conditions to which firms find
difficult to adapt. Environmental diversity, on the other hand, refers to differences
between the elements of an environment, those elements being people, organisations
and social forces (Acbrol, 1991). Cravens and Shipp (1993) state that when companies
are confronted to environmental turbulence and diversity, they can respond by either
altering their internal organisation structures or by partnering with other firms. When
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skill or resource gaps are identified, the company can either purchase them through
lacquisitions/mergers or have access to them via alliances.
Environmental turbulence
Short-term	 Long-term
operations	 operations
To parents	 AND	 I STRATEGIC
Skilllresource
gaps
Retained	 IN HOUSE
EGYJENTURE
Figure 2.5 Matrix classification of partnerships (II)
Source: Cravens and Shipp (1993)
Faulkner (1995) improves on the two-dimensional classification by adding a third
dimension: the number of partners involved in the alliance. As the number of partners
increases beyond two, a consortium is created. This kind of partnership is useful in the
management and completion of large-scale projects. A well-known consortium in the
aviation industry is Airbus involving Aerospatiale, Deutsche Aerospace Airbus,
British Aerospace and CASA.
2.3.3 Alternative classification
Burton (1994) also criticises the 'linear continuum model' of alliances and comes up
with an alternative classification which he terms 'the business relations triangle' (see
Figure 2.6). His argument is that alliances are conceptually different from markets and
hierarchies in that they involve significant amounts of relational exchange. Indeed,
while markets and hierarchies rely exclusively on transactions and contracts
(transactional exchange), the additional element of trust comes into alliances to
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prevent opportunistic behaviour and exploitation from occurring. For that reason.
alliances have to be conceived '...as conceptually distinct entities, based on different
foundations, and raising different problems, to either markets or hierarchies....'
(Burton, 1994; p. 29).
ALLIANCE Co-ordination via
HIERARCHY
	
MARKET
Co-ordination via managerial
	
Co-ordination via purely
decision in a single chain of command
	
transactional exchanges
Figure 2.6 Burton's business relations triangle
Source: Burton (1994)
2.4 Classification of Airline Alliances
Which classification adapts itself best to airline alliances, and where are the latter
situated on the spectra defined by the differentiating dimensions? To answer this
question, one needs to identif' the various airline alliance types in existence. This is
done in greater detail in the subsequent chapters. However, at this stage, most airline
alliances can be considered to fall into the broad category of formal and informal co-
operative ventures. Indeed, due to regulatory barriers characteristic of the airline
industry, it is difficult for airlines from different countries to merge (see Chapter 5).
and joint ventures are not popular among airlines. The airline alliances are best
defined in terms of the degree of integration between the partners. At one extreme is
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the KLM-Northwest alliance which benefits from antitrust immunity 7
 and in which the
partners try to integrate their products as much as possible without however losing
their individual corporate identities. At the other extreme are a large number of loose
agreements which consist of code-sharing or block-spacing on only one route (for
example, the block-spacing agreement between Virgin Atlantic and Delta Airlines).
Thus, it would seem that the linear continuum alliance model best fits the current
airline alliances.
2.5 Conclusion
The term 'strategic alliance' is very often used loosely to identify any type of
interfirm agreement. However, a strategic alliance is in fact a certain type of co-
operation whereby the partners integrate their operations to varying degrees without
however merging and losing their corporate identities. Strategic alliances are very
common in the airline industry where majority stakes taken by foreign interests are
generally considered inadmissible.
Airline mergers have confined themselves to domestic markets. Joint ventures do exist
in the airline industry; however, they are in very small number. Vertical alliances
between manufacturers and airlines are also in small number and do not live long.
Most common of vertical alliances are those in the charter industry, between tour
operators, travel agents and charter airlines. Current airline alliances are mostly of the
formal or informal types and vary in the level of integration of the parters' activities.
Having identified the various alliance types, the following chapter will analyse the
evolution of co-operation in the airline industry. This will show that different types of
alliance were favoured at different times, the type selected depending mostly on the
socio-economic and political climate prevailing at that particular time.
See Chapter 4.
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3. PAST CO-OPERATION IN THE AIRLINE
INDUSTRY
Introduction
C
0-operation 1S not an entirely new concept to airlines. Houtte (1993, p. 275)
even argues that '...widespread co-operation is one of the main
characteristics which distinguishes the airline industry from most other
sectors of the economy.' Indeed, ever since the inception of the airline industry, airlines
have co-operated with each other to various degrees of collaboration. In certain cases,
they have even been forced to do so by regulatory bodies. Inter-airline co-operation is
effectively the result of the tight regulatory framework within which airlines had, and
still have to, operate.
The purpose of this chapter is to review the types of airline agreements which have
prevailed in the past. The factors which have influenced the particular choices of
partnerships are examined. This will provide a suitable background allowing one to
visualise bow the current airline alliances are different from the ones which existed
previously. The chapter is divided into two main parts. The first part addresses the
issue of mergers which occurred in the airline industry in the past. The second part
considers other airline collaborative ventures which have not reached the high level of
integration characteristic of mergers. This part is further subdivided into commercial
and non-commercial agreements.
3.1 Total Integration
In sharp contrast to other industries, mergers between airlines can only occur on a
regional basis. This is because of current regulations which have their roots mainly in
nationalism. Airline mergers first occurred in the US in the period following
deregulation. The industry consolidation which ensued was very rapid. Mergers in the
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rest of the world occurred at a much slower pace and the impact on the industry in the
various regions was not as far-reaching as in the US. This is because no other market
approaches the size of the US and is able to support the number of carriers operating
there. In the African and Latin-American regions, airline mergers were virtually
inexistent. The following sections examine airline merger trends and analyse how they
were related to political environments prevailing then.
3.1.1 The USpre-deregulation period
Airline co-operation in the US can be traced as far back as the 1940's when the Civil
Aeronautics Board (CAB) was in existence. At that time, the US air transport industry
was highly regulated with airlines classified by the CAB as either trunk, local service
and commuter carriers. Each carrier type was assigned to a particular type of market
and it was practically impossible for carriers to switch from one market type to another.
Trunk carriers operated the medium to long haul interstate routes; local service carriers
operated the low density routes to the small- to medium-sized communities, and the
commuter airlines served the very small communities. Owing to the CAB restrictive
policies, most US airlines had linear route structures which did not allow them to
practice self-feed. Therefore, feeder agreements between the small carriers serving the
low-density markets with the turboprop aircraft and larger airlines operating the jet
aircraft proliferated and were encouraged by the CAB (Pickrell, 1991).
3.1.2 The US post-deregulation period
After airline deregulation which occurred in 1978, the situation changed dramatically.
Initially, the number of competitors to the trunk carriers increased as the local service
and commuter carriers entered long-haul routes. However, this general increase in the
level of competition was brought to an end at around 1984 when a wave of airline
failures and mergers hit the industry. Fifty-one airline mergers took place between
1979 and 1989 (Dempsey and Goetz, 1992) with the principal merger period lying
between 1984 and 1989 (Graham, 1995). Figure 3.1 shows the major airline mergers
which occurred in the US since 1978.
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UnitedJ	 UNITED
PanAmI	 I	 I
A. Wisconsin
Northwest I	 I NORTHWEST
North Central
Southern
Hugues A.
Figure 3.1 Major airline mergers after US deregulation
Source: Dempsey and Goetz (1992), p. 49
Notes:
'London routes, 2Latin-American routes; 3Transpacific, Latin American and London routes; 4European routes and N. Y. shuttle;
5Philadelphia gates and Canadian routes
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The mergers were driven mainly by the need to grow which was believed to carry with
it economic efficiency via economies of scale, scope and density, lower production
costs and market power.
Flub-and-spoke networks which replaced the linear route structure after deregulation
were also responsible for the industry consolidation. Airlines realised that hub
domination was a requisite for market power and merged with competitors operating at
their hubs both to achieve quasi-monopoly status and to eliminate competition. This
was apparent in the Northwest/Republic and Trans World/Ozark mergers where the
merging carriers were the two largest competitors at the Minneapolis/St. Paul, Detroit
and St. Louis airports (Wells, 1989). Airlines also realised that they needed multiple
hubs located at strategic positions in order to offer a comprehensive network of
services throughout the US to consumers. Rather than incurring the costs of developing
the hubs themselves, they preferred to acquire those of the other airlines via mergers
(Williams, 1994). Another driver to consolidation is the financial distress which many
airlines (such as Eastern, People Express and Frontier) got into after deregulation. The
substantial assets of these airlines combined with their depressed values made them
attractive take-over targets for other airlines (Pickrell, 1991).
The increase in merger activity during that period was greatly helped by the extremely
pro-merger policy adopted by the US Department of Transportation (DOT) after it
assumed the CAB's jurisdiction over mergers, acquisitions and consolidations on
December 31, 1984. So much that the DoT has been qualified as the department '...that
never met a merger it didn't like' (Jennings, 1996a; p. 74)
After the linear route structure was replaced by the hub-and-spoke system, US airlines
realised the importance of traffic feed to increase load factors on flights departing from
hubs. Therefore, it was important for them to gather the traffic from small communities
at their hubs. However, it was not viable for the trunk and former local service carriers
to serve the thin routes from those communities with their large jet aircraft.
Furthermore, they lacked the necessary expertise to operate in these market types. In
order to secure traffic feed, they formed marketing alliances with small carriers
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operating the appropriate aircraft types. In most cases, code-sharing 8 formed part of the
agreement, and the smaller airlines usually carried the name and livery of their larger
partners. Some US majors (for example, American Airlines) preferred to own their
feeder commuters outright. At the beginning of 1983, the number of major-regional
code-share agreements stood at 10. As at January 1, 1985, the number had risen to 17
and in 1986, there were 60 code-share agreements (Oster and Pickrell, 1987).
Currently, nearly all US commuters are aligned to one or more major airlines and carry
their codes. Table 3.1 lists some of those tie-ups.
Major	 Code-share partner
Continental Airlines
American Airlines
Continental Commuter
Continental Express
OP Express
Skywest Airlines
Frontier Airlines
American Eagle
Simmons Airlines
Flagship Airlines
Wings West Airlines
Executive Airlines
Delta Airlines The Delta Connection
Atlantic Southeast Airlines
Comair
Business Express Airlines
Skywest Airlines
Scenic Airlines
USAir	 USAir Express
Piedmont airlines
Mesa Airlines
Allegheny Commuter Airlines
Trans States Airlines
CC Air
Jetstream International Airlines
Trans World Express
Chautauqua Airlines
Commutair
United Airlines United Express
Mesa Airlines
WestAir Airlines
Table 3.1 US majors' commuter partners
Source: Humphreys (1994b), ABC Guide (June 1994)
Note: Common brand identity in italics
Code-sharing is examined in detail in Chapter 6.
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Major	 Code-share partner
United Airlines (cont 'ci) Air Wisconsin
Atlantic Coast Airlines
Great Lakes Aviation
TWA Trans World Erpress
Trans States Airlines
Trans World Express
Air Midwest
Resort Air
Resort Commuter
Northwest Airlines	 Northwest Air/ink
Mesaba Aviation
Horizon Airlines
Trans States Airlines
Business Express
Express Airlines
Table 3.1 (conl'd)
3.1.3 The European experience
As already mentioned, the number of mergers which occurred in Europe is much lower
than in the US, mainly because of Europe's fragmented political structure and stringent
regulations. The three main airline mergers in Europe involved British Airways-British
Caledonian, British Airways-Dan Air and Air France-Air Inter-UTA. The acquisition
of British Caledonian (BCal) by British Airways occurred in 1988. It was approved by
the European Commission even though it resulted in high market shares on individual
routes and airports. British Airways' rationale for the merger was the acquisition of
BCa1's routes to southern US, Middle East and Europe, and to foreclose competition
from SAS in the UK (Stodden, 1988). In acquiring BCa1, British Airways increased its
power in the UK marketplace. Its position was further strengthened when it took over
Dan Air. That acquisition was not examined by the European Commission as Dan
Air's turnover was less than ECU 250 million per year.
Air France acquired UTA, and at the same time, Air Inter in 1990. These formed part
of Air France's attempts to create a single entity which would dominate the French
marketplace and be in a better competitive position when European Liberalisation
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occurred. The European Commission approved the merger on the conditions that Air
France sold its shares in TAT, relinquished slots at Paris Charles de Gaulle airport, and
allowed at least one other French carrier to serve about half of all internal French routes.
According to a Cranfield study (1996), the third condition has not been fulfilled.
The Third Package of Liberalisation introduced in January 1993 effectively replaced
national ownership by the concept of Community ownership. Theoretically, this meant
that airlines in the European Union could merge. However, theory does not seem to
have been followed by practice. The only substantial stakes taken by one airline into
another are those of British Airways into TAT (49.9%), DeutscheBA (49%), SAS-
British Midland (40%) and KLM-Air UK (45%). Two possible explanations can be
offered for this state of affairs. First, European airlines are only starting to recover from
the effects of the economic recession. They may therefore not have the financial
resources enabling them to buy out other airlines. Second, the merger of airlines from
different European countries has implications for the bilateral agreements which the
airlines involved have with third countries. Indeed, a third country could revoke its
bilateral agreement with a European country whose airline has been taken over under
the pretext that it is not substantially owned and majority controlled by the citizens of
that state9.
3.1.4 The Asian/Pacjfic experience
Airline mergers in the Asian-Pacific region have been very sparse mainly because of
tight regulatory controls. Governments in those regions also favour the separation of
markets into the domestic and international categories which are then operated by
separate carriers. That was the case of Australia where Qantas was allocated the
international routes while Australian Airlines and Ansett operated domestically.
However, in 1992, the Australian Government allowed the merger of Qantas and
Australian Airlines to go ahead. The surprise decision came as the government tried to
clear itself of a political morass and to bring the country's high budget deficit to
The implications of bilateral agrements on cross-border mergers are examined in greater detail in Chapter 5.
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acceptable levels (Deans, 1992). Another similar merger occurred in Thailand when
Thai was permitted to merge with the domestic carrier, Thai Airways.
3.2 Partial Integration
Owing to the tight regulatory controls which eliminate the possibility of cross-border
mergers, airlines have been forced to collaborate along only certain lines to benefit from
economies accruing from size and to extend their networks. Co-operation can be
classified as either commercial or non-commercial, though some overlap does exist
between the two categories. On the commercial side, the most prevalent type of co-
operation which is still in existence today is interlining. Non-commercial collaboration
usually translates into the pooling of resources and technical co-operation. Common to
both the conunercial and non-commercial aspects of co-operation is the joint
development and ownership of Computer Reservations Systems (CRS). Unlike total
integration which confined itself to the US and Europe, partial integration of operations
took place between airlines all over the world. Each of the items of collaboration are
considered next.
3.2.1 The interline system
The major outcome of the Paris Convention in 1919 is the official recognition that states
have sovereign rights in the air space above their territory. As a consequence, airlines
were confined to their home states and their governments had to negotiate with
governments of other countries to allow their operation between the two countries
concerned. The global networks of airlines were therefore very limited and it would
have been impossible for them to offer passengers and shippers a world-wide transport
system without the interlining system. This particular system consists of agreements as
to the sale, endorsement and acceptance of tickets between airlines so that passengers
and cargo can transfer from one airline to the other on the way to the final destination.
Parallel to the interlining system runs the International Air Transport Association
(IATA) multilateral forum for the co-ordination of tariffs on a world-wide basis. This
allows international tariffs to be developed and leads to a more homogeneous tariff
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structure in which all airlines offer comparable products. In addition, co-ordination of
tariffs allows airlines to maintain artificial relationships between tariffs on routes to
nearby points and between tariffs on direct and indirect services. However, this
procedure can be anti-competitive and is sometimes allowed only under specific
conditions (Houtte, 1993).
The interline system used to be viewed as a very important constituent of international
air transport (Taneja, 1984). However, in the new types of alliances, partners interline
preferentially with each other via code-sharing. With the increasing number of code-
sharing agreements being seale&°, the interline system seems to be under threat and is
gradually disappearing.
3.2.2 Pooling
Pooling, also known as joint operation, is a commercial agreement between two (or
more) airlines whereby only one airline operates the service and its partner shares in
both the costs and risks of that service. Doganis (1991) identifies two types of pooling
that were prevalent in the airline industry: the revenue-cost pool and the revenue-
sharing pool. In the revenue-cost pool, only one airline operates the service and the
costs and revenues are shared between the partners according to a pre-arranged
formula. In the revenue-sharing pool, all the airlines in the partnership operate the
service and the total revenue is shared among them according to the capacity they offer
on the route. Examples of pooling agreements which existed in 1990 are British
Midland-Sabena on the Birmingham-Brussels route and Aer Lingus and Lufthansa on
the Dublin-Manchester and Birmingham-Frankfurt routes.
The main advantage of pooling comes in the control of frequency and capacity and the
avoidance of predatory pricing (Grumbridge, 1966). Weak carriers are ensured of
survival as they are guaranteed of their share of capacity and revenue especially when
they are competing with a stronger carrier. Pooling also allows the partners to
rationalise their schedules such that departing flights are not grouped at peak times, but
'° See Chapter 4.
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distributed evenly throughout the day. This type of co-operation is particularly useful
when the market is too thin for the viable operation of more than one carrier.
Pooling agreements have been outlawed in the US under the Sherman and Clayton
antitrust acts 11
 because of their potential for anti-competitive behaviour. In Europe,
most airlines gave up their pooling agreements after the First Liberalisation Package in
1987 (Doganis, 1991). This is because the European Commission restricted pooling to
routes which were not previously operated by the parties or by other airlines, and to
low density routes' 2. Furthermore, the operating airline must not have a strong presence
in the market in the catchment areas of the airports involved' 3 and it must be relatively
small' 4. Revenue poois were considered as anti-competitive by the European
Commission which set stringent rules as to the amount and direction of the transfer of
revenue. These restrictions made pooling unattractive to European airlines and lead to
the gradual phase out of this type of co-operation.
3.2.3 Technical collaboration
Most common areas of technical co-operation are listed in Houtte (1993). They are
summarised as.
(1) The introduction or uniform application of mandatory or recommended technical
standards for aircraft, aircraft parts, equipment and aircraft supplies;
(2) The introduction or uniform application of technical standards for fixed
installations for aircraft;
(3) The exchange, leasing, pooling and maintenance of aircraft, aircraft parts,
equipment and fixed installations, and the joint purchase of aircraft parts;
(4) The introduction, operation and maintenance of technical communication networks;
(5) The exchange, pooling or training of personnel for technical or operational
purposes;
"See Chapter 4.
12 Capacity below 30,000 seats per year in each direction, or below 60,000 on longer routes.
13 Less than 90,000 seats per year.
' 4 Community turnover of less than 400m ECU.
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(6) The organisation and execution of successive or supplementary air transport
operations;
(7) The consolidation of individual consignments.
In Europe, two main airline consortia, ATLAS and KSSU were created around twenty-
five years ago to take the maintenance and overhaul of the fleets of the constituent
airlines in charge. These consortia achieved extensive collaboration in aircraft arid
engine maintenance. They are quite interesting cases of airline technical co-operation
and it is worth examining their development and operation in some detail.
3.2.3.1 The A TLAS consortium
The ATLAS maintenance consortium was created in 1969 and comprised Air France,
Alitalia, Iberia' 5 , Lufthansa and Sabena. The need for such a maintenance and overhaul
grouping arose with the arrival of wide-bodied aircraft such as the Boeing 747 and
McDonnell Douglas DC-lO. The airlines realised that undertaking the maintenance of
those aircraft individually would be extremely expensive. The creation of a consortium
would allow them to spread the cost of the capital outlay by allowing individual
members to specialise. Economies of scale would be reaped as buildings, facilities and
labour were utilised optimally, and investment costs for spares would be reduced. The
division of responsibility in the ATLAS consortium is given in Table 3.2.
Since its creation, the collaboration between the airlines has brought substantial
benefits to all of them. However, the ATLAS group was recently disbanded because
the partners reached the adequate size and acquired the necessary level of expertise to
perform the maintenance and overhaul work on their own. The downside of co-
operation was also becoming more important. Such disadvantages included the
increasingly cumbersome decision-making processes, and the increasing transportation
and communication costs, as well as the very long-term commitment. However, co-
operation in maintenance and overhaul is still being practised by the members of the
Iberia joined the group in 1972.
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ATLAS consortium, though at a bilateral level, and the possibility of reconstituting the
group still exists (Reed, 1 994a).
Airline	 Responsibility
Air France	 Boeing 747 maintenance
Production centre for A300 maintenance
Component holding for Boeing 747
Maintenance of GE CF6 engines
Alitalia	 DC1O maintenance
APU 700 maintenance
Component holding for Boeing 747
Component holding for DC 10, A300 and A3 10
Iberia Production centre for Boeing 747 maintenance
P&W JT9D-7Q and Olympus engine overhaul
Component holding for DC1O, A300 and A310
Lufthansa
	 A300 maintenance
P&W JT9D-7A overhaul
Component holding for DC1O, A300 and A310
Sabena	 A3 10 maintenance
P&W JT9D-7R maintenance
APU maintenance
Component holding for Boeing 747
Component holding for DC 10, A300 and A3 10
Table 3.2 Division of responsibility in the ATLAS consortium
Extracted from Aviation Week & Space Technology, February 8, 1988 and
Air Transport World, November 1994
3.2.3.2 The KSSU consortium
Origins of the KSS maintenance and overhaul consortium can be traced back as far as
1958 when SAS and Swissair decided to co-operate on the maintenance of DC-8s,
Caravelles and Coronados. The aircraft were jointly specified to facilitate maintenance
functions. The consortium was officially formed in 1969 when KLM joined in. In
1970, the group was enlarged with the adherence of UTA and was renamed KSSU.
However, it reverted back to KSS when Air France took over UTA in 1990.
Maintenance of the Boeing 747, DC-8 and DC-9 was distributed among the partners.
The division of responsibility in the KSSU group is given in Table 3.3.
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Airline	 Responsibility
KLM	 Boeing 747 maintenance
GE CF6 maintenance
SAS	 P&W JT9D maintenance
Swissair	 General overhaul of fuselage
MD-il, DC-b and A310 maintenance
UTA	 Maintenance of undercarriages of wide-body aircraft
Overhaul of APUs
Table 3.3 Division of responsibility in the KSSU consortium
Extracted from Aviation Week & Space Technology, February 8, 1988
and Air Transport World, November 1994
Similar to ATLAS, KSS was formed to reduce the outlays of the individual airlines in
plant and equipment, while at the same time, developing an expertise in their allocated
maintenance functions. Savings are also made via economies of scale in production,
reduction in capital costs, and the pooling of spare parts. KSS is still in existence;
however, new agreements have recently been signed to update the pricing system
applied in the group and to take into account the changes in the airline industry which
have occurred since the group's creation. (Reed, 1994a)
3.2.4 CRS development and ownership
Though CRSs were developed in the late 1950s, they started to be used as a
competitive weapon about thirty years later. Sabre and Apollo were the first
reservations systems and were owned by American and United respectively. As the use
of those CRSs by travel agents proliferated, airlines observed that such systems were
providing their owners with considerable market power. Among other things,
American and United were gaining a considerable amount of confidential information
which gave them a competitive edge over those airlines renting their systems. The need
was therefore felt for airlines to set up their own reservation systems. However,
developing one's own CRS necessitates huge financial investments which most airlines
could not spare. Consequently, during the 1980s, a number of airlines co-operated to
develop CRSs which would compete with Sabre and Apollo. Worldspan, for example,
was the result of co-operation between Delta, Northwest and TWA.
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With the globalisation of markets and the growing CRS maintenance costs, extensive
technical and marketing links have developed between the existing CRSs. Airlines
have also sought to sell off part of the CRSs or merge them with CRSs in other regions
of the world. Mergers have also been driven by the substantial economies of scale
which CRSs exhibit (Humphreys, 1994a). Galileo International, for example, was
formed in 1992 as a result of a merger between Apollo and Galileo. The ownership
structure of the CRSs as they stood in 1992 is shown in Figure 3.2.
The market shares of some of the CRSs are given in Figure 3.3 to allow one to gauge
their relative strengths. Sabre seems to have retained part of the supremacy it possessed
originally. However, it has been overtaken by the Galileo International. The other
CRSs have relatively low market shares compared to these two giants, indicating that
the CRS industry is a concentrated one. Burton and Hanlon (1994) argue that the trend
towards mergers in the travel trade will be a driving force towards further consolidation
of the CRS industry. According to Williams (1994) three major global CRSs will
eventually emerge.
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EUROPE
Amadeus
Air France
Lufthansa
Iberia
Sabena
NORTH AMERICA
Sabre
American Airlines
ASIA-PACIFIC
Axess
JAL
Korean
Galileo International
Abacus
Cathay Pacific
Singapore Airlines
Malaysian Airlines
Philippine Airlines
Royal Brunei
China Airlines
Dragonair
All Nippon airways
Tradewinds
Fantasia
Qantas System One
Continental Airlines
Covia/Apollo
United Airlines
USAir
Galileo
British Airways
KLM
Alitalia
Swissair
Austrian Airlines
Aer Lingus
Air Portugal
Olympic Airways
Injini	 Worldspan
All Nippon Airways 	 Delta Airlines
TWA
Northwest Airlines
Southern Cross	 Gemini
Australian Airlines 	 Canadian Int'l
Ansett	 Air Canada
Figure 3.2 Structure of CRS ownership and inter-relationships
Source: L4TA (1993)
Note: - marketing/technical links
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Figure 3.3 Market share of selected CRSs as of September 1993
Data source: Humphreys (1994a)
3.3 Conclusion
This chapter has shown that co-operation between airlines is not a new phenomenon.
Airline have integrated their operations to various extents in the past. At one extreme is
total integration, the merger. This could only take place within domestic/regional
boundaries because of merger regulations which prohibited cross-border mergers. Such
regulations are still in existence today. Most airline mergers took place only in the US,
and to a lesser extent, in the remaining parts of the world. Mergers in the US were
driven by deregulation and the resulting hub-and-spoke route networks. In Europe, the
motivation for merging came from the need to dominate markets in preparation for
liberalisation.
Partial integration of operations is more widespread around the globe. On the
commercial side, interlining was, and still is, very common and was encouraged by the
regulatory authorities. It compensated for the fragmented structure of the industry.
Non-commercial collaboration included pooling of resources and co-operation in
technical fields. The high development costs of CRSs has required airlines to co-operate
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up their reservations systems. The economies of scale which these systems exhibit is
encouraging the merger of CRSs based in different world regions.
How are these co-operative ventures different from the airline alliances which are
emerging in this decade? What are the factors which have caused airlines to feel
dissatisfied with their current alliances and therefore try to co-operate more extensively?
These are the questions which will be addressed in the next part of this thesis.
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This part analyses how the structure of the airline industry differs from what it was
five years ago. The current situation is first presented. The forces which have driven
airlines to ally are then identified and discussed. Finally, the details of co-operation
between airlines are analysed.
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4. TIlE CURRENT SITUATION
Introduction
S
ince the beginning of this decade, the structure of the airline industry is in a
state of flux. With increasing recognition of the value of co-operation,
alliances are becoming a common feature of the air transport landscape.
These alliances are linkages between the firms at various operational levels. They go
beyond the usual interlining agreement to encompass certain marketing and cost-
reducing features. The involvement of equity stakes is becoming increasingly
prevalent in the partnerships. However, they all fall short of mergers owing mainly to
regulatory constraints.
The aim of this chapter is to provide a clear and complete picture of the current airline
alliance situation by gathering and analysing the dispersed pieces of information about
airline alliances. It is divided into three main parts. In the first part, various statistics
based on published surveys are presented to give an idea of the growing importance of
alliances in the airline industry. A classification scheme is devised to identify the
different types of alliances in existence. In the second part, the strategic rationale for a
selected number of alliances are analysed. The degree of success achieved by the
alliances and the problems that they are experiencing are presented. The final part of
the chapter focuses on the competitive and legislative implications of airline alliances.
Treaties and studies which have dealt with the benefits and effects of alliances are also
reviewed.
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4.1 The Growing Importance of Airline Alliances
Evidence that the trend towards airline alliance formation is gaining momentum is
found in surveys carried out by KPMG/IATA, Boston Consulting Group (BCG) and
the Airline Business periodical. The KPMGIIATA (1996) survey was carried out
among Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) of 24 airlines in 1992 and in 1995. In 1992,
only three of them stated that their airline had entered into a strategic alliance with
another carrier. By 1995, all of the airlines were strategically linked in some way to
another carrier. The results of the 1995 survey are presented in Table 4.1.
Type of relationship	 Responses
Code-sharing
Block-spacing
Combined FFPs
Joint marketing relationships
Equity investment in another carrier
Equity investment held by another carrier
Franchise agreement
20 of24
16 of 24
17 of 24
14 of24
14 of24
11 of24
4 of 24
Table 4.1 Results of KPMGIIATA survey on airline
alliances
Source: KPMG/IATA (1996)
Note: The types of relationships are detailed in Chapter 6
Most of the CFOs believed that the airline industry was on a trend towards further
consolidation and that the eventual result would be the global domination of five to
ten major groupings.
The BCG has tracked the change in the number of airline alliances since 1991. The
results of its study are given in Figure 4.1. The total number of alliances' 6 doubled in
the period from 1991 to 1995 (from 200 to 401), with the increase being more
predominant in the domestic and regional sectors. The increase in alliances in the
domestic sector stems from the desire by major carriers to secure traffic feed. The
large increase in regional alliances can be attributed to the relaxation of national and
regional controls regarding airline link-ups. The smallest change occurred in the
16 Simple interlining agreements are not considered.
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intercontinental sector, reflecting the slow pace at which global deregulation is
progressing (Lindquist, 1996).
Doninstic	 Regional	 Intercontinental	 Total
Mlildce geograjthical scope
Figure 4.1 Breakdown of airline alliances by geographical scope (1995)
Source: Lindquist (1996)
The Airline Business periodical has also conducted extensive surveys in an attempt to
follow the progress of the alliance phenomenon". However, these were commenced in
1994 so that only three editions exist. Nevertheless, they do provide an indication of
the rate at which the number of airline alliances is growing. Figure 4.2 shows how the
total number of alliances in the world has changed over the period 1994 to 1996. The
total number of alliances increased from 280 in 1994 to 324 in 1995 (16% increase)
and to 389 in 1996 (an increase of 20% over 1995). The change in the alliance number
was brought about both by the increase in the number of alliances per airline and by an
increase in the number of airlines adopting the alliance strategy.
17 The surveys are published in Airline Businins July 1994, June 1995 and June 1996 issuin. Only the aflianoin bdwean major
carrurs are mciudet
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FIgure 4.2 Progression of the airline alliance phenomenon
Source: Airline Business, June 1996
Figure 4.3 investigates the progression of the alliance phenomenon at a more
disaggregate level.
300
US& Canada Latin America 	 Europe	 Asia/Pacific	 Africa	 Middle East
Carrier base
FIgure 4.3 Alliance growth by region
Data ertractedfrom Airline Business, July 1994, June 1995 and June 1996 issues
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From Figure 4.3, one can deduce that the largest number of alliances involve a
European or Asian/Pacific carrier. The largest increase in the number of alliances
occurred in Europe from 1995 to 1996, followed by Asia/Pacific and the US. In other
world regions, the number of alliances decreased slightly (Latin America and Africa) or
remained unchanged (Middle East) over the period 1995 to 1996.
In order to control for the different number of airlines in each region considered, the
average number of alliances per airline is calculated. The results are given in Figure
4.4. In terms of alliance activity, two groups can be distinguished. The upper group
consists of airlines from US and Canada, Europe and Asia/Pacific. In 1994 and 1995,
US and Canadian carriers had the highest number of alliances per airline. However, in
1996, European carriers took the lead with an average of 8.3 alliances per airline as
compared to an average of 7.2 for US and Canadian carriers. In third position come
Asian/Pacific carriers with an average of 6.3 alliances per airline.
9
I
 8
7
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5
4
3
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0
US & Canada Latin America	 Europe	 Asia/Pacific	 Africa	 Mickile Ea
Carrier base
Figure 4.4 Change in the number of aHiances per airline
Data extractedfrom Airline Business, July 1994, June 1995 and June 1996 issues
The lower group includes airlines from the less-developed parts of the world, Latin
America and Africa, as well as from the Middle East. Airlines in those regions have
0. Dq,artmait of Air Tran,ct, Cranfield Univasily
_____________________________________________Chapter 4: The current situation
an average number of alliances lying in the range 2-3. These results tend to show that
the need to go global has not yet been felt by airlines in the lower group. The urge is
however very prevalent in the upper group of airlines.
4.2 Airline Alliance Classifications
The above analysis takes a broad view of alliances, that is any linkage between two or
more airlines is considered to be an alliance. However, each and every airline alliance
differs in terms of nature and content. For a better understanding of airline alliances, a
classification scheme based on the scope and type of co-operation, and the degree of
financial involvement is devised. The scheme is shown in Figure 4.5.
Figure 4.5 Airline alliance classification
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4.2.1 Strategic v/s tactical alliances
Strategic alliances are so termed because co-operation exists in a wide range of activities
ranging from sales and marketing to purchasing and maintenance. Furthermore, the
alliances are designed to give the allies a competitive edge over their competitors and
the benefits are expected to be reaped in the long term (Hartnell, 1994). Most notable
examples of strategic airline alliances which have been widely documented and
commented upon are the EQA consisting of Sabena (which has replaced SAS), Swissair
and Austrian Airlines, the Alcazar project which intended to unite KLM with the EQA
but which never came to fruition, the Global Excellence with Swissair, Delta and SIA,
the SAS-Continental, British Airways (BA)-USAir, KLM-Northwest and Lufthansa-
United tie-ups and, more recently, the BA-American Airlines (AA) link-up.
Tactical alliances, on the other hand, are very narrow and focus on only one field of co-
operation, for example, code-sharing on one route (for example, between Air Mauritius
and Austrian Airlines on the Vienna-Mauritius route, and between Luxair and CSA on
the Prague-Luxembourg route). These alliances are mainly designed to reap benefits in
the short term though they could act as stepping stones to wider-ranging alliances. From
the surveys conducted by The Airline Business, one can observe that the number of
tactical alliances in existence far outweighs that of strategic ones. This can be attributed
to the rapid payoffs which can be gained from them and the relative ease with which
they can be managed.
Even less important than tactical partnerships are alliances involving only a passive
equity involvement. BA and Air France have a number of such alliances with a number
of African airlines. The reasons for those alliances are mainly political in nature and
stem from the colonial ties which the UK and France have with those African countries.
4.2.2 Market-oriented v/s cost-oriented alliances
Airline alliances can also be classified as either market-oriented or cost-oriented.
Market-oriented alliances are geared mainly towards improving the product being
offered to consumers in order to increase traffic flows, load factors and market share.
Such alliances involve mainly code-sharing and other marketing practices such as
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25
20
115
.10
5
0
___________________________________________Chapter 4: The current situation
consumers in order to increase traffic flows, load factors and market share. Such
alliances involve mainly code-sharing and other marketing practices such as schedule
co-ordination, block-spacing and FFP combination. Cost-oriented alliances, on the
other hand, are designed to reduce costs via joint services, reciprocal sales,
maintenance joint ventures, and sharing of assets. The two types of alliances in Europe,
the US and Asia/Pacific are distinguished in Figure 4.6, Figure 4.7 and Figure 4.8
respectively.
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ligure 4.6 Breakdown of alliances of European airlines by type (1995)
Data source: Airline Business, June 1995
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Figure 4.7 Breakdown of alliances of US airlines by type (1995)
Data source: Airline Business, June 1995
See nle for Figure 4.6
Figure 4.8 Breakdown of alliances of AsianlPacific airlines by type (1995)
Data source: Airline Business, June 1995
See n*e for Figure 4.6
From the figures, one can conclude that most of the European airlines (with the
exception of Air France and Lufthansa) use alliances mainly as marketing tools aimed
0. Dq,amnit of Air Transpoct, Cranfield univsity
1994
1995
1996
__________________________________________Chapter 4: The current situation
at increasing the amount of passenger traffic on their networks. The total number of
marketing alliances for the sample of airlines is 117, which is one and a half times that
of cost-oriented alliances (78). Air France is particularly geared to using cost-reducing
alliances which is consistent with its current precarious financial situation. The
preference for marketing alliances also holds for US airlines where the number of
marketing alliances is 54 and the number of cost-reducing alliances is only 12 in total.
However, where Asia/Pacific airlines are concerned, the number of cost-oriented
alliances (74) exceeds that of marketing alliances (56), though not by many. A possible
explanation could be that European and US airlines are more interested in accessing
new markets considering the near-saturation of markets in those regions. This is not
the case of Asia which is forecast to have the highest growth rate in the future.
Therefore, Asian airlines prefer concentrating on cost-reducing strategies.
4.2.3 Equity v/s non-equity alliances
One particular characteristic of contemporary airline alliances is the increasing
prevalence of equity stakes. This is apparent in Figure 4.9 which shows the change in
the number of equity alliances from 1994 to 1996.
52	 54	 56	 58	 60	 62	 64
Number of equity airline alliances
Figure 4.9 Change in the number of airline equity alliances
Source: Airline Business, June 1996
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Austrian Airlines
BA
Iberia
Table 4.2 gives the main equity stakes of selected European airlines as of 1996.
European airline
	
Airline bought into	 % stake Date acquired
Tyrolean Airways	 42.9
Brymon	 100
DeutscheBA	 49.0
GB Airways	 49.0
Qantas	 25.0
TAT European	 49.9
USA1r	 24.6
n/a'
August 1993
March 1993
February 1995
March 1993
September 1992
January 1993
A. Argentinas2
Aviaco
Ladeco
Royal Air Maroc
Viasa
Viva
KLM	 Air UK3
ALM Antillean
Martinair Holland4
Kenya Airways
Northwest Airlines
Transavia
Lufthansa 	Lauda Air5
Luxair
SAS
	
British Midland
Spanair
Swissair	 Austrian Airlines
Crossair
Delta Airlines
Sabena
SIA
5.0
	
1990
32.9
	
1948
25.0
	
April 1991
20.0
	
n/a
45.0
	
August 1991
99.5
	
1990
45.0	 1987
40.0	 n/a
50.0	 1964
26.0	 December 1995
19.9	 1989
80	 1992
39.7	 January 1993
13.0	 December 1992
40.0	 December 1988
49.0	 n/a
	
10.0
	
May 1989
	
67.0	 n/a
	
4.6
	
September 1989
	
49.0
	
July 1995
	
0.6
	
August 1991
Table 4.2 Major equity stakes of selected European airlines (1996)
Source: Airline Business, July 1996
Notes:
tflO 
available
2lberia was forced to transfer most of its 83% stake to a holding company controlled by its
government parent Teneo to satisfy EU conditions for state aid approval
Raised from 14.9% in March 1995
4Raised from 29.8% this year
5Raised from 26.5% in 1994
The advantages of equity in airline alliances are currently unclear. Proponents of
equity purchases-namely BA-argue that such financial transactions are essential to
cement the relationship. Commitment to the alliance's success is enhanced and, where
the equity stake is substantial, a certain degree of control over the partners is possible.
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Commitment to the alliance's success is enhanced and, where the equity stake is
substantial, a certain degree of control over the partners is possible. Commitment to
partner survival is exemplified by the following comment from a KLM official about its
alliance with Northwest: '....if we did not have the equity, we would've let [Northwest]
go into bankruptcy' (Jennings. 1996b; p. 24). The belief also runs through the airline
community that non-equity equity alliances tend to be short-lived (Debbage, 1994;
Burton and Hanlon, 1995). Evidence from the BCG tends to support this belief (see
Figure 4.10).
Domestic	 Regional	 Intercontinental	 Total
Alliance geographical scope
Figure 4.10 Percentage of alliances formed in 199111992 still in existence in 1995
Source: Lindquist (1996)
On the other hand, opponents to the involvement of equity purchases argue that they are
signs of unhealthy agreements and are a symptom of airlines in distress. They consider
equity investments as wasted management time and inappropriate use of investors'
money (Jennings, 1990). The very equity stake which held the KLM-Northwest alliance
together does seem to be responsible for driving them apart now.
Indeed, the fact that Northwest tried to limit the equity which KLM could take in it has
undermined trust in the relationship and is the reason why the alliance is slowly breaking.
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So much that Al Checchi and Gary Wilson, respectively Chairman and CEO of
Northwest airlines, believe that '...the notion of equity in an alliance is at least a
hindrance and at most a distinct liability' (Jennings, 1996a; p. 24).
Regardless of those diverging opinions, it does seem that equity is being increasingly
considered as a main ingredient of airline alliances. This may be a precursor to single
entity multinational airlines as predicted by Gialloretto (1988) and Freud (1995) (see
Figure 4.11).
National & Regional	 GlobalPrivatisation	 Deregulation	 Consolidation
1980s	 1990s	 2010s
Tune
Figure 4.11 Steps in the formation of global mega-carriers
Adapted from Gialloretto (1988) and Freud (1995)
4.3 Major Airline Groupings, Past And Present
Since the beginning of the decade, airlines were in some kind of a 'trial' phase in which
partners were selected, allied to and then rejected when the alliance did not yield the
expected benefits. Recently, the situation seems to have become slightly more stable as
airlines have found and settled down with what they consider to be suitable partners.
Five major airline groupings have emerged from the alliance shakeout. They are
identified in Table 4.3.
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Airline grouping	 Main constituent airlines Airline base
EQA and Global Excellence
The Lufthansa grouping
The KLM grouping
The BA grouping
The Iberia grouping
Swissair
Austrian Airlines
Sabena
Delta Airlines
SIA
SAS
Thai Airways Int'l
United Airlines
Yang
SAA
Air UK
Northwest Airlines
Transavia
DeutscheBA
TAT European
Qantas
USAir
American Airlines'
A. Argentinas
Viasa
Ladeco
Switzerland
Austria
Belgium
US
Singapore
Scandinavia
Thailand
US
Brazil
South Africa
UK
US
Netherlands
Germany
France
Australia
US
US
Argentina
Venezuela
Chile
Table 4.3 Main airline groupings
Note: 'The alliance will take effect as from April 1, 1991.
In the next section, the development of these alliances as well as their global scope and
strategic rationale is analysed.
4.3.1 The EQA and the Global Excellence
The EQA was one of the first strategic airline alliances to be created. It came to
existence in October 1989 and consisted of Swissair, SAS and Finnair at that time.
Austrian Airlines joined the group later in the year. The structure of the EQA was again
modified in 1991 with the withdrawal of Finnair. The remaining airlines bought small
equity stakes from one another to cement the alliance together. From 1991 to 1994, the
EQA structure remained unchanged. Though the alliance seemed to be yielding
benefits, SAS suddenly left the EQA in 1994 to step up its co-operation with
Lufthansa. SAS explained its withdrawal by its desire to ally with a large carrier rather
than with mid-sized carriers. In addition, the EQA was not moving fast enough to its
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liking. To fill the gap left by SAS, Swissair bought a substantial stake (49.5%) in
Sabenain 1995.
The basic goal of the EQA was to solidify the positions of its constituent airlines in
Europe by allowing each one to achieve critical mass, without however involving their
merger. The alliance between the mid-sized carriers was deemed essential for their
survival after European liberalisation as domination by the European majors was
foreseen. Initially, co-operation prevailed in the technical, commercial and route
planning sectors. The alliance then evolved to marketing aspects to allow the carriers
access to one another's markets via more efficient hub connections.
The EQA, as it stands today, is built around the partner airlines' respective hubs:
Geneva, Zurich, Vienna and Brussels. This multi-hub strategy offers the potential for
a large number of connections, thus expanding the individual networks of the airlines.
Sabena allows Swissair to gain a foothold in the European Union (EU) while Swissair
provides Sabena and Austrian Airlines access to the Middle East and Indian sub-
continent. Swissair also provides Sabena with much-needed capital. Austrian Airlines
broadens the partners' access to the Micklle East and is the l3tidge towith Estext
Europe. Details of the co-operation between the EQA members are given in Table 4.4.
Partner airlines	 Co-operation details
Swissair Austrian Airlines Code-sharing from Vienna to Zurich and Geneva, and from Zurich
to Linz, Salzburg, Graz, Klagenfurt and lnnsbruck. Shuttle services
on Zurich-Vienna. Catering, handling and maintenance joint
ventures. FFP co-operation.
Swissair Sabena Code-sharing on Brussels-Geneva and Brussels-Zurich. Co-
operation on sales and reservations, ground services, information
systems, freight and FFPs.
Austrian	 Sabena	 Block-space agreement and code-sharing on Vienna-Brussels. FFP
Airlines	 co-operation.
Table 4.4 Collaboration details of EQA members
Source: Airline Business, June 1996
The Global Excellence was also formed in 1989. The alliance initially bound the
airlines together by equity stakes of around 5%. The Global Excellence gives the
constituent airlines a hub-and-spoke pattern in the intercontinental arena with a
presence in three important regions, namely Europe, the US and Asia/Pacific.
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Swissair	 Delta Airlines
Swissair	 SIA
Delta	 SIA
Delta	 Austrian Airlines
Delta	 Sabena
Previously, agreements were on a bilateral basis between Swissair and the two other
airlines. This has changed with recent collaboration between Delta Airlines and
Singapore Airlines (SIA). Integration of the EQA and Global Excellence is also
progressing with co-operation occurring between Austrian Airlines and Delta Airlines,
and with SIA. Recently, the EQA and Global Excellence have received antitrust
immunity from the US authorities, which grants them greater freedom in their
collaboration. Details of collaboration within the Global Excellence and between the
Global Excellence and the EQA are given in Table 4.5.
Partner airlines	 Co-operation details
Code-sharing from Zurich to New York JFK, Atlanta and
Cincinnati, on Geneva-New York JFK and on intra-European routes
to Stuttgart, Frankfurt and Munich via Zurich. Schedule co-
ordination, FFP co-operation and joint handling. Trilateral code-
share agreement with Austrian Airlines on Vienna-Geneva-
Washington. Joint purchasing with SIA.
Co-ordination of schedules, code-sharing, joint handling and FFP
link.
Code-sharing and block-spacing on SIA's Singapore-New York JFK
service via Europe. Joint purchasing with Swissair.
Code-sharing on Vienna-New York, Vienna-Atlanta and on intra-
European flights from Vienna to Hamburg, Kiev and Odessa.
Trilaterai code-share agreement with Swissair on Vienna-Geneva-
Washington.
Block-spacing and code-sharing from Brussels to Atlanta, New
York, Chicago and Boston, and on flights to Gennany via Brussels.
Table 4.5 Collaboration details of Global Excellence and EQA members
Source: Airline Business, June 1996
The combined route network of the EQA and Global Excellence cover the US, Europe
and Asia/Pacific, with a presence in Africa via Swissair and Sabena (see Figure 4.12).
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Figure 4.12 EQA and Global Excellence world-wide coverage
4.3.1.1 The Alcazar project
At this point, it is worth to briefly look at the notorious Alcazar alliance which failed in
1993. The Alcazar project which came to life in April 1993 intended to add KLM to
the EQA to create '....a fourth airline force, able to mix it successfully with [Europe's]
three giants-Air France, BA and Lufthansa-to compete with the US and Asian carriers
and......withstand the cold blast of Common Market aviation liberalisation' (Reed,
1994a p. 33). Indeed, Alcazar would have been Europe's second largest airline
immediately after BA, with consolidated annual sales of about $15 billion and
passenger traffic of 32 million yearly (Sparaco, 1993). Its traffic system would have
been based on a multi-hub network around Amsterdam, Copenhagen, Geneva, Oslo,
Stockhohn, Vienna and Zurich, hence enabling it to offer customers services to 200
on-line destinations.
The project collapsed for one main reason which was divergence on the choice on US
partner. KLM stood by Northwest Airlines since that alliance was advantaged by
antitrust immunity. Swissair, on the other hand, was unwilling to give up Delta
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Airlines for it was in better financial shape than Northwest Airlines and also because
it had a much more extensive network into Europe (Reed, 1 994a). Furthermore,
Singapore Airlines, Swissair's partner in the Global Excellence alliance, could have
terminated its alliance with Swissair had Northwest Airlines been adopted as
Alcazar's US partner.
4.3.2 British Airways' global alliances
4.3.2.1 British Airways-USAir
Since 1992, one of BA's objectives has been 'To secure a leading share of air travel
business world-wide with a significant presence in all major geographical markets'
(BA Financial Report, 1992). The first step towards achieving this goal was the
alliance with USAir which was first announced in July 1992. Under the original
agreement, BA would take a $750 million stake in USAir in convertible bonds. These
would give BA 44% of USAir's current common equity including 21% of the voting
stock. BA would also gain four seats on USAir's board of directors. Following
objections by American, United and Delta, the deal was not approved. In January
1993, BA came back with another deal which would give it a 19.9% stake in USAir
for $300 million. The deal was approved and since then, the stake of BA has increased
to 24.6%.
The alliance with USAir offers BA access to the US domestic market. The
transatlantic flights of the European carrier connect with USAir domestic services at
seven points, Los Angeles, Charlotte, Washington-Dulles, Baltimore, Philadelphia,
New York-JFK and Boston. BA then code-shares with USAir on 64 intra-US routes
from these points. BA's transatlantic flights also benefit greatly from traffic feed since
USA1r's network is concentrated primarily on the US East coast from which two-
thirds of US transatlantic passengers originate their trips (McKenna, 1992). In spite of
the soundness of the strategy, the alliance has run into trouble because of the
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worsening financial difficulties of USAir. This has lead BA to suspend further
investment in USAir until its financial results improve and concrete cost-cutting
measures are implemented. Recently, USAir has issued a lawsuit against BA
concerning its proposed alliance with American Airlines. According to USAir, that
alliance is anti-competitive and is a breach to the exclusivity contract which BA
signed with it.
4.3.2.2 British Airways-TAT and British A irways-DeutscheBA
The alliance between BA and TAT was sealed in the fall of 1992 when BA acquired a
49.9% stake in TAT for $15 million (Wood, 1994). BA has the option to acquire the
company wholly in 1997. The objective of BA in allying with TAT is to provide
competition with Air France in its domestic market and to expand into continental
Europe after liberalisation. TAT views the alliance with BA as a means of speeding up
its efforts to grow from a regional carrier providing domestic service to an
international one.
Negotiations between BA and DeutscheBA' 9 (DBA) were initiated in February 1992
and the agreement was reached in March of the same year. The amount of the
investment has not been revealed though it is estimated to range from $5 million to
$10 million for a 49% stake. DBA is the successor of BA's Internal German Services
(IGS) which was set up in 1946 and reserved German routes for the victorious powers
of World War II. Following German reunification, the IGS was gradually eliminated
and DBA enables BA to maintain its presence in Germany and compete effectively
with Lufthansa.
Both TAT and DBA constitute important pieces in BA's strategy of creating low-cost
pan-European carriers capable of building up its dominant position in 1997 when full
cabotage rights will be extended to EU airlines. Though co-operation is only with BA
for the time being, there are plans for TAT and DBA to collaborate in the future.
Financial losses were estimated at $685 million in 1994 (Nuutinen, 1995) and a total of $2.4 billion from 1989 to 1994
(Jennings, 1994).
Previously Delta Air Regionalflugverkehr GmbH.
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4.3.2.3 British Airways-Qantas
The alliance between BA and Qantas was sealed in March 1993 when BA purchased
25% of Qantas for A$665 million. At that time, Qantas was in the process of
privatisation and BA beat SIA in the bid for the stake. The alliance offers BA access to
the Asian/Pacific region which is forecast to have the highest growth rate. The
networks of the two airlines join at a number of points: Frankfurt, Paris and Rome in
Europe, Harare and Johannesburg in Africa, Vancouver, San Francisco, Los Angeles
and Buenos Aires in the Americas, and Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta, Singapore, Bangkok,
Hong Kong, Manila, Seoul, Fukukoa, Nagoya and Tokyo in Asia. In June 1995, the
two airlines were allowed to co-ordinate schedules and pricing on the Australia-Europe
route by the Australian Trade Practices Commission.
4.3.2.4 British Airways-American Airlines
The alliance between BA and AA was signed in June 1996 and intends to become
effective as of April 1997. This followed months of speculation as to whether BA
would ally with KLM or AA. The agreement is conditional on the US Government
granting antitrust immunity to the alliance, allowing them to co-ordinate their
operations and to market closely. However, the US has agreed to grant immunity to the
alliance conditional to an 'Open Skies' agreement with the UK, allowing US airlines to
fly freely to any point in the UK including London Heathrow. The alliance has the
potential to offer joint fares on 36, 000 routes between their networks; code-sharing can
allow them to offer travellers a global system (Walters, 1996). Together with USAir,
AA can offer BA access to a major part of the US domestic market.
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The details of co-operation in the alliances of BA are given in Table 4.6.
Partner airlines	 Co-operation details
BA	 DeutscheBA	 Joint FFP. World-wide marketing and sales representation. Co-
operation on engineering, purchasing and information technology.
TAT European	 Joint FFP. World-wide marketing and sales representation. Co.
Airlines	 operation on engineering, purchasing and information technology.
Qantas Joint FFP and use of airport lounges and sales offices. Round the world
fare with USAir. Reciprocal ground handling and catering. Global
freight co-operation. Joint purchasing. Code-sharing between Auckland
and Los Angeles on Qantas Aircraft. Close co-operation on UK-
Australia services.
USAir
American Airlines'
Joint FFP. Wet leasing from LondonlGatwick to Pittsburgh. Charlotte
and Baltimore. Code-sharing to 64 US destinations. Round the world
fare with Qantas. Plans for joint marketing, purchasing and information
technology. Engineering co-operation.
Proposals for code-sharing and joint scheduling. Joint FFP.
Table 4.6 Collaboration details of BA' alliances
Source: Airline Business, June 1996
Notes:
Franchise agreements are excluded
'The alliance is not yet operational
The alliances of BA have enabled the airline to become a truly-global carrier. Indeed,
BA has a presence in all major markets (except Asia) as one can see in Figure 4.13.
Figure 4.13 BA' global alliances
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Apart from these major alliances, BA has a number of other minor tactical alliances
which are not listed here. In addition, BA has been pushing its franchising strategy in
the UK and Europe. BA's franchising agreements are considered in Chapter 6.
4.3.3 Latin-American alliances of Iberia
Iberia's alliances with the Latin-American carriers, Aerolineas Argentinas, Viasa and
Ladeco were formed in the period 1990-1991 with Iberia purchasing equity stakes in
them. The need for alliances stenimed from the fact that Iberia is a mid-sized European
carrier which needed to find a competitive edge to survive in a deregulated
environment increasingly dominated by global alliances. Aerolineas Argentinas, Viasa
and Ladeco were a logical choice for investment by Iberia because of the strong
cultural, ethnic and linguistic ties between Spain and Argentina, Venezuela and Chile.
The focus of Iberia's strategy was to provide an efficient link between Latin America
and Europe and beyond via its hubs in Madrid and Miami (see Figure 4.14). Madrid is
in an advantageous geographical position on Europe's south-western flank and is a
popular stop-over point for Latin-American visitors to Europe. Hence, it is the only
European city which can support daily service to several Latin American destinations.
The Miami hub could be used to capture a substantial portion of the North-South traffic
between Latin America and the US (Debbage, 1994). Having an extensive coverage of
the Latin American region would also make Iberia an attractive alliance partner for
European majors.
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Santiago	 Buenoa Aires
}igure 4.14 Iberia's Latin-American alliances
The essence of the collaboration between Iberia and its Latin-American partners is
given in Table 4.7.
Partner airlines	 Co-operation details
Ibaia	 A. Argaitinas	 Managanit xsltraa. Code-sharing, joint route cperaticm and joint
FFP.
Viasa	 Managnant coutra. Code-sharing, joint route 	 atiou, freight -
opaatiou, joint FFP and sthedule a-ordinaticai.
Lado	 Code-sharing, joint route opeiatiou and joint FFP.
Table 4.7 Collaboration details of Iberia's alliances
Source: Airline Business, June 1996
In spite of the sound logic behind them, the alliances of Iberia are not successfiul. This
is mainly because both it and its partners have continued to lose enormous amounts of
money. In 1992, Aerolineas Argentinas lost $190.4 million, Viasa lost $52 million
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(Whitaker, 1993), while Ladeco lost $21 million from 1990 to 1992 and $2.6 million in
the first half of 1993 (Jennings, 1993). All three have required equity infusions, loans
and guarantees which have lead to an increase in Iberia's financial exposure. Iberia
itself has been bleeding money heavily since the Gulf War: $824 million between 1990
and 1992 (Whitaker, 1993). It has also benefited from state aid on the condition that its
stake in Aerolineas Argentinas be substantially reduced. Its ability to continue its
alliance strategy in Latin America is therefore very much in question.
4.3.4 KLM-North west Airlines
The KLM-Northwest alliance was created in 1989 when $400 million were invested for
20% of Northwest's common stock and 10.5% of the voting stock in Wings Holdings,
the owner of Northwest Airlines. The objective of KLM was to access new markets
and benefit from traffic feed originating from the US. The KLM-Northwest alliance
was unique at that time in that it was the first alliance to be granted antitrust immunity.
The alliance is hailed by many analysts as a model of a successful one as it has helped
both airlines to effectively cut costs and increase profits. Northwest has been able to
turn its net loss of $115.3 million in 1993 to a profit of $295.5m in 1994, thanks to its
alliance with KLM (McGrath, 1995). The alliance between KLM and Northwest
involves code-sharing and comprehensive marketing agreements on the North Atlantic,
in the domestic US and in Europe. Certain flights are jointly operated, FFPs are linked
and the airlines practice joint ground handling, sales, catering, maintenance and
purchasing.
However, the alliance has recently run into problems when Northwest Airlines was
recently mentioned as a potential target for merger with USAir. Northwest adopted a
scheme to prevent KLM from raising its stake in the US carrier from 18.8% of the
voting rights to 25% claiming that KLM posed a 'creeping control threat' 2° to it. KLM
eventually issued a lawsuit against Northwest major shareholders for breach of
contract. This succession of events has damaged the relationship between KLM and
20 Flight International, 10-16 January 1996, p. 13.
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Northwest. However, both airlines maintain that the alliance is still working at the
operational level.
4.3.5 The alliances of Lufthansa
Similarly to BA, Lufthansa has recently been forging alliances in order to have a
significant global presence (see Figure 4.15). However, unlike BA, the alliances of the
German airline do not involve equity purchases. The alliances with Yang and United
were the first ones to be formed back in 1993 with the goal of accessing the Americas.
Before that, Lufthansa had the choice between United and American as its strategic
partner. The final decision came when the US and Gennan Governments concluded
their negotiations for new liberal bilaterals between the two countries. These
partnerships were followed by Thai Airways in 1994 to secure a presence in Asia, and
by SAS and South African Airways (SAA) in 1995 to strengthen Lufthansa's presence
in Europe and Africa respectively. The details of Lufthansa's partnerships are given in
Table 4.8.
Vadg
Figure 4.15 Lufthansa's global alliances
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Partner airlines	 Co-operation details
Lufthansa SAS Code-sharing between Germany and Scandinavia. Joint FFP, ground
handling and through check-in. Shared passenger lounges and
terminal facilities.
Thai Code-sharing between Thailand and Germany and beyond. Shared
passenger lounges and terminal facilities. Advanced seat reservation
and through check-in on code-share flights. Joint FFP and
development of Bangkok as a joint cargo hub with joint cargo
services through south-east Asia, Australia and New Zealand.
Trilateral agreement with United Airlines.
Varig	 Code-sharing from Frankfurt to Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo. Joint
FFPs and through check-in.
SAA Code-share flights on Johannesburg and Cape Town to Frankfurt,
Munich and Dusseldorf. Joint FFP, ground handling and shared
passenger lounges.
United Airlines	 Comprehensive marketing and multiple code-share agreements
between Germany and the US.
Table 4.8 Collaboration details of Lufthansa's alliances
Source: Airline Business, June 1996
Early this year, the US and Germany signed an 'Open Skies' agreement and the
Luflhansa-United alliance has recently secured antitrust protection. P'.part from the
airlines listed above, Lufthansa has a number of tactical alliances with other airlines
throughout the world. Lufthansa is currently the second carrier having the greatest
number of alliances (26) coming after the Air France Group (31) (Gallagher, 1996).
4.3.6 The alliances of SAS
SAS was one of the first airlines to recognise the importance of strategic alliances.
Therefore, under the direction of Jan Carizon, links were created with a number of
airlines as far back as 1987. The airline started on a spree of investments: 24.6% of
Airlines of Britain, 40% of LanChile, 49% of Spanair, 5% of Swissair, 5% of Austrian
Airlines and 18.4% of Continental Airlines. Marketing alliances were also created
with All Nippon Airways (ANA), Canadian Airlines and Thai Airways. The intention
was to turn SAS into a global carrier which could survive in spite of its relatively
small size, its disadvantaged position on the outskirts of Europe and its small
domestic population (Feldman, 1991).
However, the global strategy did not work as expected and SAS has had to shed many
of its partners (see Figure 4.16). That was mainly because of the financial difficulties
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which the partners were experiencing. Continental Airlines, for example, filed for
bankruptcy protection in 1990, which lead SAS to write off its $100 million
investment. The stake in LanChile was sold in 1994 for about half the value of the
initial investment. Recently came the break from the EQA. Currently, the only major
alliances of SAS are with Lufthansa, United, British Midland and Thai Airways.
-	 Drupped partari
Cur ntpurthei
	
1	 Swthufr
	
1	
mm
Figure 4.16 Past and present strategic alliances of SAS
4.4 Comparison of Alliances
With the formation of global groupings, it seems that the air transport industry is
heading towards a situation where competition will be between global alliances rather
than individual carriers. It would be interesting to investigate how current and defunct
alliances compare with one another in terms of size and global coverage. In this
section, the comparison of alliance size is made on the basis of number of aircraft,
number of passengers carried, and total revenue passenger-kilometres (R.PK). Global
0. Dq,artmait of Air Tranpoit, Cranfidd
	
65
chapter 4: The current situation
coverage is measured as the sum of the points in the networks of the partner airlines
taking into account duplicated points.
The size of current strategic airline alliances is given in Figure 4.17, Figure 4.18 and
Figure 4.19. The former EQA which incorporated SAS, the Alcazar alliance and the
potential BA grouping with AA are also included for comparative purposes.
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Figure 4.17 Fleet size of strategic airline alliances
Source: JATA WATS, 1995
Nes:
SKJSRJOS and Alcazar are no longar in existance
BA/US/QF/AA is still awaiting approval
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fIgure 4.18 Total passengers carried by strategic alliances
Source: IA TA WATS, 1995
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Figure 4.19 Total output of strategic airline alliances
Source: L4TA WATS, 1995
Seen for Figure 4.17
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From those figures, one can observe that the Lufthansa strategic grouping is the largest
in terms of all three measures, followed by that of Swissair (EQA and Global
Excellence) and of BA. However, were the BA-AA alliance formed, the BA grouping
would then be the largest. The KLM and SAS groupings fall in the medium-sized
category while the former EQA and the Iberia grouping fall in the category of small
alliances. Even the inclusion of KLM in the EQA to form Alcazar would not have
promoted it to a medium-sized global alliance. This could be one of the reasons why
SAS has preferred to opt out of the EQA and consolidate its alliance with Lufthansa.
However, Alcazar would have been a major force in Europe as it is quite sizeable when
compared to EU majors (see Figure 4.20).
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Figure 4.20 Comparison of Alcazar with European majors
Source: L4TA WA2E 1995
Comparison in terms of global coverage is possible from Figure 4.21. Again, of the
existing alliances, the Lufthansa grouping has the largest global network. It is followed
by the EQA and Global Excellence and the BA grouping. However, addition of AA to
the latter promotes it to first place, with 166 more points than the Lufthansa grouping.
Alcazar would have had a coverage comparable to that of the current BA grouping.
This would have been brought about by KLM since the coverage of the
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former EQA is quite small. The KLM and SAS groupings also have a small global
coverage because the main partners cover only Europe and the US. Finally comes the
Theria grouping which has the smallest coverage of all the strategic alliances.
Is there any correlation between alliance size and scope, and alliance success? In terms
of traffic flows and revenues, the large alliances (BA and Lufthansa) are said to be
yielding benefits, though quantification of the benefits is notoriously lacking. The
medium-sized and small alliances seem to be slow in performing with however the
notable exception of KLM. Indeed, the Swissair-Austrian Airlines alliance, the Global
Excellence and the SAS grouping have been in existence for seven years. However,
evidence of their benefits in the air transport press is scarce.
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Figure 4.21 Global coverage of strategic alliances (1996)
Source: ABC Guide (1996)
See nces for Figure 4.17
Only KLM-Northwest has been widely-publicised as successful. This can be mainly
attributed to the antitrust immunity which the alliance enjoys2l. The SAS-Continental
21 Sedicn 4.5.2 e,plains how antitnid immunity i ccnlributeto alliance suc
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alliance does not benefit from such protection which could partly explain why it has
not fared so well. The EQA and Global Excellence have recently obtained antitrust
immunity and this could help them perform adequately and at a satisfactory rate. The
Iberia grouping has been the least successful of all though this was caused mainly by
the financial difficulties of the partners.
4.5 Airline Alliance Issues
Up to here, this chapter has described the evolution of airline alliances and has
analysed the most prominent ones in some depth. In this section, the socio-political
and economic effects of alliance formation with respect to both airlines and
consumers are examined. The results of two major studies on the benefits of three
strategic alliances are also presented and discussed.
4.5.1 Political issues
Most of the political wrangling with regard to airline alliances revolves around the
issue of code-sharing. Basically, code-sharing is the use by one airline of its IATA
designator code on flights operated by another carrier. It makes an interline service
look like an online service on a CRS display. Started innocently in the 1 960s, code-
sharing has become intricately involved in bilateral negotiations between the US and
European countries and is being effectively used as an instrument of the US
international aviation policy (Shenton, 1994a). This results from the fact that code-
sharing has come to be considered virtually as a traffic right (de Groot, 1994) which
can be used as a bargaining tool. The US-UK bilateral in which code-sharing to
certain US destinations was offered to BA in exchange for access to Heathrow for
United Airlines and AA is a good example of that. Another example is the liberal US-
Netherlands bilateral which allows the KLM-Northwest extensive code-sharing to
destinations in the US and Europe.
The practice of code-sharing is detailed in Chapter 6.
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In the light of the stepped-up interest of foreign carriers in securing code-sharing
rights in the US, Geliman Research Associates (GRA, 1994) have proposed to make
use of code-sharing to obtain access for US carriers in foreign countries. This view
was echoed by the US General Accounting Office (GAO, 1995) in its study on code-
sharing benefits. The GAO study also notes that foreign governments have been more
prone to grant code-sharing rights to US airlines than to allow direct service by them.
This, according to the GAO, makes code-sharing an even more attractive means of
gaining access to international markets.
However, the use of code-sharing in that way acts in opposition to the US previously
prescribed limitations on code-sharing, one of which is that the code-sharing airline
must have the required traffic rights (Shenton, 1994a). De Groot (1994) points out that
using code-sharing as a traffic right could be detrimental to the entire fabric of the
airline industry and should therefore be controlled. He takes the example of Germany
which decided to impose frequency limitations on code-sharing and also to all
potential connecting services. This, he argues, is in opposition to the current interline
practice in place and to the traditional frequency regimes present in bilateral
agreements. Both de Groot (1994) and Goldman (1995) argue that code-sharing is a
marketing instrument which should be free of regulation and government interference.
4.5.2 Competition issues
Promotion of competition is considered to be very important in the airline industry
because it works towards the advantage of consumers. Therefore, alliances between
airlines are usually scrutinised to identif' the potential for collusion. In the EU,
alliances are subject to Articles 85 and 8624 of the Treaty of Rome and are granted
exemptions (under Article 8 5(3)) to allow their operation.
Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome reads as follows:
I The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market: all agreements between undertakings, decisions
by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as
their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common market, and in particular those
which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
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In the US, alliances are subject to antitrust regulations. Recently, the issue of antitrust
immunity has gained importance and is viewed as an essential condition for alliance
success as concluded from the KLM-Northwest example. Exemption from antitrust
regulations enables the partners to set prices together, fix schedules, set up revenue
pooling and market their product jointly; effectively, they can act as if they were a
single airline. To date, the KLM-Northwest, Global Excellence and Lufihansa-United
alliances are protected from antitrust regulations. BA-AA have applied for it in
exchange for 'Open Skies' between the respective European countries and the US.
The potential anti-competitive effects of alliances is a source of controversy in the
airline industry. Those in favour of alliances argue that they promote competition by
facilitating market entry and consequently lead to higher frequencies, better scheduling
and lower fares. On the other hand, those against alliances argue that they do exactly
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a
competitive disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by other parties of supplementary obligations
which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such
contracts.
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be automatically void.
3. The provisions ofparagraph I may, however, be declared inapplicable in the case of
any agreement or category of agreement between undertakings;
any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings;
any concerted practice or category of concerted practices;
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promote technical or economic
progress, while allowing consumers afair share of the resulting benefit, and which does not:
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of these
objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the
products in question (Adkins, 1994; p. 24).
Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome states:
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common market or in a substantial
part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market insofar as ii may affect trade between
Member States. Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, there by placing them at
a competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations
which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of the contracts.
(Adkins, 1994; p. 75-76)
The US antitrust laws are embodied in the Sherman and Clayton Acts passed in 1890 and 1914 respectively. Section 1 of the
Sherman Act states:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among several states or with foreign nations, is hereby declared illegal.
Section 2 of the Act states:
Every person, who shall monopolise, or attempt to monopolise, or combine or conspire with any other person
or persons, to monopolise any part of the trade or commerce among several states, or with foreign nations,
shall be deemed guilty of a felony.
The Clayton Act was passed to add clarity to antitrust law, Price discrimination, exclusive dealing, tying agreements, mergers
and interlocking directorates were specifically identified as illegal if they substantially reduced competition or tended to create a
monopoly.
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the opposite. Whether alliances are anti-competitive or not depends on the structure of
the market. If a large number of competitors operate in the market with the market
share distributed evenly among them, then the alliance will not be in a position to raise
fares. If however the market is highly concentrated, then an alliance can allow the
partners to gain control. This is particularly so when the only carriers on the route are
those designated under the bilateral. For example, Swissair and SAS, formerly EQA
partners, co-operated on the Copenhagen-Zurich route which lead to the termination of
Fifth-Freedom service provided by Thai Airways and Alitalia in 1991. Transatlantic
alliances are also causing alarm. Many expect that the BA-AA alliance which enjoys
60% of the US-UK market will raise fares on that route after the alliance is formed. On
the transatlantic, an interesting situation seems to be developing whereby competition
is more between transatlantic alliances than between individual carriers. Indeed,
competition between Lufthansa-United, KLM-Northwest, BA-USAir/AA, and to a
lesser extent SAS-Continental and Delta-Swissair/Sabena/Austrian Airlines is hotting
up. In general, competition between gateways is gradually decreasing while
competition in origin-destination (O-D) markets is increasing.
4.5.2.1 Code-sharing and competition
The key issue concerning airline competition is code-sharing which is the backbone of
all strategic airline alliances. Though generally in favour of code-sharing, the US DoT
is concerned about the harmful effects of this practice especially where the marketplace
becomes dominated by a few large carriers that are not effectively competing with each
other or which prevent market entry by other airlines (GAO, 1994). For that reason, it
has created the Office of Aviation and International Economics to monitor the long-
term effects of code-sharing. In addition, certain conditions are imposed upon the code-
sharing partners. For example, the BA-USAir code-share was allowed only after USAir
agreed to relinquish to other US carriers its operating authority over the code-shared
routes where it was an existing or potential competitor to BA (Burton and Hanlon,
1995). The EU is also in favour of code-sharing since it improves capacity utilisation
and can therefore improve the performance of airlines (Comite des Sages, 1994).
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Through the use of CRS rules and Articles 85 and 86, the EU considers that it is
possible to regulate code-sharing to safeguard its anti-competitive effects26.
In order to assess the effect of code-sharing on competition within the EU, the change
in the level of competition on routes where BA, KLM and Lufthansa practice code-
sharing is monitored. These airlines are selected as they are the leaders in the use of
intra-EU code-sharing. Only direct routes originating from London (Heathrow and
Gatwick), Amsterdam and Frankfurt are considered. The level of competition is
measured by the average number of competitors (n) for the sample of code-shared
routes. The periods June 1991 (when code-sharing was virtually non-existent on intra-
EU routes) and June 1996 are compared. The results are given in Figure 4.22. In all
three cases, code-sharing can be observed to lead to a decrease in the level of
competition.
Figure 4.22 Change in the level of competition on intra-EU code-shared routes
Source: ABC Guide, June 1991 and June 1996
26 For an extensive analysis of the circumstances under which code-sharing and various other types of airline co-operation can be
sanctioned under Articles 85 and 86, the reader is referred to Houtte (1993) and Atkins (1994).
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4.5.2.2 Code-sharing and CRS
Code-sharing can negatively affect competition through CRSs. Indeed, code-sharing is
used by alliances to clutter CRS screens by double or even triple listings27
 of the same
flight. This pushes competitors' flights onto the next screen which is rarely consulted
by travel agents28 . Consequently, the code-share flights are selected even though flight
options which are better in terms of connection time, flying time or fares exist. The US
GAO therefore recommends that the EU rules on CRS display whereby a code-share
flight can be listed only twice should be adopted by the US DoT. British Midland has
also issued a code of conduct to eliminate the confusion felt by consumers regarding
code-sharing. The points in the code of conduct are given in Table 4.9.
All code-share arrangements must meet the criteria that they increase the range of competition and choice available
to the travelling public
Code-share partners should endeavour to deliver a level of service compatible with an on-line connection operation
Time-tables, brochures, advertising and promotional material should identif' the involvement of a code-share partner
The customer must be informed of the identity of the code-share flight operator, and of any change in gauge, before
any booking is made
The identity of the code-share flight operator must be retained in the PNR
As an absolute minimum, the identity of the code-share flight operator must appear on the ticket. Ideally, the code-
share partner's flight prefix and number should be replaced by those of the code-share flight operator
When an itinerary is printed, the code-share flight operator's flight prefix and number is mandatory, whereas the
code-share partner's flight prefix may be omitted
When a boarding card/baggage tag is printed, the code-share flight operator's flight prefix and number must replace
those of the code-share partner
9
	
Marketing airlines must maintain the ultimate responsibility for passenger satisfaction at all times
10
	
All carriers' staff involved in the delivery of code-share operations must be fully briefed and trained to support all
aspects of the code-share product
Table 4.9 British Midland's proposed code of conduct for code-sharing
Source: 0 'Donovan (1995)
4.5.2.3 Code-sharing and consumers
The practice of code-sharing becomes even more controversial when viewed in relation
to consumers. Here again, two schools of thought exist. On the one hand, proponents of
code-sharing argue that it offers a number of advantages to consumers, such as a better
service, excellent connections, shared frequent flyer programmes and lower fares. The
27 For example, the flight from Los Angeles to Amsterdam as provided by the KLM-Northwest alliance is listed as follows:
NW36 to Boston, NW38 Boston-Amsterdam
KL 8036 to Boston, KL 638 Boston-Amsterdam
NW36 to Boston, KL 638 Boston-Amsterdam (Shenton, 1994a)
28 Studies have shown that travel agents book flights on the first CRS screens as often as 90% of the time (GAO, 1995).
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US DoT finds that '....code-share arrangements have become an important element of
the aviation landscape, improving the variety and convenience of service options
available to the public and enhancing the marketing and efficiency of air carrier
operations' (GAO, 1994)29. On the other hand, code-sharing detractors argue that such a
practice is effectively equivalent to passenger deception (de Groot, 1994; Humphreys,
1994; Shenton, 1994a). Indeed, passengers are not given the real identity of the airline
on which they will travel. This can lead to problems when boarding, especially at
connecting airports where the code-share partner can not be located. Passengers can
also feel dissatisfied when the service quality on the partner's flight does not match
that on the airline's flight. This has lead the DoT in 1994 to propose that the identity of
the airline which undertakes the flight should be communicated in writing to the
consumer. Furthermore, the DoT requires that code-shared flights should be identified
by an asterisk on CRS displays. However, de Groot (1994) argues that this is not
sufficient because the DoT restricted itself to information disclosure, but did not
consider the discrepancy between the advertised product and that offered in practice.
4.5.3 Consumer-related issues
From the above discussion, it can be gathered that alliances can determine the level of
service and the fares offered to consumers. A demonstration of the effects was carried
out by Youssef (1992) with the SAS-Swissair alliance as example. The results of the
study are presented below.
4.5.3.1 Effects on service quality
Youssef considered two aspects of service: (1) quantity of service which includes the
number of destinations served, the number of city-pair markets served, service
frequency, and average market service frequency, and (2) quality of service which
includes average connection time and best connection time. On the whole, the alliance
was observed to have lead to an improvement in the quantity of service. The quality of
29 Data limitations prevented the US GAO from assessing the impact of code-sharing on fares. However, airline executives
interviewed argue that code-sharing could result in lower fares in the long run as cost efficiencies are passed on to the consumer
and as competition between alliances increases.
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service also improved with substantial decreases in average connection time and best
connection time. However, when the effects at individual hubs were analysed, there
appeared to have been a deterioration of service at Oslo, while service had improved at
Copenhagen and Stockholm. Youssef also found that markets with short connection
times experienced little or no change in connection time. However, markets with long
connection times experienced substantial improvements. Service quality and quantity
improvements came mainly from better scheduling of connecting flights and increased
inter-hub frequency.
4.5.3.2 Effect on fares
In examining the effect of equity alliances on fares, Youssef tried to find a significant
difference between the fare changes in alliance and non-alliance city pair markets. For
markets originating from SAS hubs, there was a statistically significant difference in
the fare changes so that the alliance had effectively lead to a real increase in fares.
However, this was not the case for Swissair's hubs. When the services from SAS' and
Swissair's hubs were combined to increase the sample size, the presence of the alliance
as a factor explaining fare increases was again significant. Overall, alliance markets
experienced a 1.5% fare increase over non-alliance markets.
While Youssef found that fares in alliance non-stop inter-hub routes had risen much
more than fares in corresponding non-alliance routes in the same region, his study also
showed that fares had fallen in connecting services via the airlines' hubs. Burton and
Hanlon (1994) therefore argue that consumer welfare can be raised by alliance
formation if the alliance pro-competitive effects outweigh the anti-competitive ones,
and believe that in many instances, that is the case. Furthermore, they point out that
hub-to-hub routes are likely to be short-haul while hub-to-destination routes tend to be
long-haul. Consequently, the consumer gains in terms of costs per seat-mile on the
hub-to-destination routes will be more than enough to offset losses on the inter-hub
routes. However, this argument can be challenged if applied to intercontinental
alliances. In the case of KLM-Northwest for example, the hub-to-hub routes
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(Amsterdam-BostonlDetroitlMinneapolis) are much longer than the hub-to-destination
routes, especially where the destinations are in the US.
From his findings, Youssef concludes that there should ideally be some fare regulation
and greater competition in the inter-hub markets (by permitting liberal Fifth-Freedom
service and encouraging new entrants) to break the monopoly of the alliance in those
markets. However, he recognises that this would not be a practical solution as fare
regulation in the past has lead to poor results. In addition, the hub-and-spoke networks
of the alliance carriers will confer them enough market power to prevent entry of new
competitors and therefore keep market concentration high. Burton and Hanlon (1995)
identify a dilemma when it comes to entry of competitors in the alliance's markets:
while entry will be advantageous to consumers, there is the danger that it can negate
the economies of density derived from the alliance's hub-and-spoke system, hence
leading to a rise in marginal cost per passenger in connecting markets. While this
higher cost can be offset by the increased competition level on the market where entry
has occurred, lack of additional competition on other through markets can causes fares
to rise there. In brief, disbenefits across the whole network of the alliance can result
from competitor entry on only one route.
4.5.4 Benefits of alliances-the GRA and GAO studies
Since the airline alliance phenomenon is a very recent one, quantitative studies on them
are very sparse. Apart from the study by Youssef, the only other studies are those
carried out by the US GAO and GRA Inc. They are discussed in some detail below.
4.5.4.1 The GRA report
Since 1987, regulation requires any code-sharing venture between US and foreign
airlines to be approved by the US DoT. Over the years, the DoT has approved a
number of such alliances after some type of examination. However, there has been
growing criticism that the DoT has allowed code-sharing.operations without having a
full understanding of them since there have been no broad-based studies of the effects
of code-sharing on the US airline industry. For that reason, the DoT has commissioned
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the GRA to study the effects of code-sharing. The study was to fulfil four objectives,
namely
(1) Develop a means of measuring the impacts of code-sharing on the level and
distribution of traffic among carriers;
(2) Examine the effects of code-sharing on the costs and profitability of airlines;
(3) Assess the effects of code-sharing on the consumers of airline services; and
(4) Project the future use and impact of code-sharing over the next twenty years.
The methodology developed by the GRA to measure the impacts of code-sharing was
based on an econometric market share model. The model was identified by regressing
observed market shares of the options available in each market against a set of
explanatory variables which included seat shares, average time between departures,
fare, average elapsed time of flights, a service quality proxy and a set of carrier-specific
dummies. The exercise used data for the first quarter of 1994 from BA/USAir and
KLM!Northwest code-sharing markets since those alliances were the most developed
ones at that time.
However, the model carried with it a certain number of limitations as recognised by the
GRA. First of all, it assumed a fixed market size; market stimulation as a result of
improved service quality is considered to be virtually non-existent. Secondly, the
model did not incorporate the response of competing carriers to code-sharing. Thirdly,
the model could not be used to measure code-sharing impacts in small markets behind
gateways owing to data limitations.
The results of GRA's analysis (Table 4.10) indicate that substantial benefits are to be
gained from code-sharing. Indeed, the use of code-sharing increases market share
across all markets sampled by approximately 8 percentage points and 11 percentage
points for BA/USAir and KLM/Northwest respectively.
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Estimated market share (%)
BA/USA1r KLM/Northwest
Without code-sharing	 2.9	 34.4
With code-sharing	 11.2	 45.0
Table 4.10 Estimated benefits of code-sharing
Source: GRA, Inc. (1994)
The model was also used to predict the monetary benefits accruing to the carriers
involved in the partnership, as well as the benefits going to the consumers. Annualised
impacts of the BA/USAir and KLM/Northwest code-sharing alliances based on the first
quarter of 1994 are given in Table 4.11.
Carrier	 Revenue ($mn)	 Cost ($mn)	 Airline	 Consumer
surplus ($mn)	 surplus ($mn)
USAir	 7.9	 2.3	 5.6	 US: 4.9
BA
	
45.8	 18.6	 27.2	 Foreign: 5.4
XLM	 18.6	 8.0	 10.6	 US: 13.0
Northwest	 24.6	 8.5	 16.1	 Foreign: 14.1
Table 4.11. Estimated benefits of the BA/USA1r and KLMfNorthwest code-sharing alliances
Source: GRA, Inc. (1994)
These results show that the BA/USAir alliance has largely benefited BA rather than
USAir. This is because the agreement allows only BA to market certain USAir flights
as its own and not vice versa. Furthermore, it is BA that does all the long-haul flights
between USAir hubs and London-Gatwick'°. However, the disproportionate benefits
flowing to BA have to be viewed in the light of its $400mn investment in USAir when
the latter was in great need of cash injections. The GRA model also revealed that the
BA/USA1r alliance was benefiting foreign carriers ($26.4mn) at the expense of US
carriers (-$21.lmn). The distribution of profits is more balanced in the case of the
KLM!Northwest partnership. The alliance also benefited both foreign ($O.4mn) and US
carriers ($2.Omn). The example of the KLMlNorthwest alliance indicates that US
carriers can benefit substantially from code-sharing even with a carrier from a small
30 With aircraft wet-leased from USAir.
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country. Both alliances are observed to have benefited consumers, both US and
foreign.
The impression of the GRA (though not formally spelt out) is that code-sharing is here
to stay for the next twenty years or more. The GRA recognises that growth in markets
can make point-to-point service attractive, and consequently decrease the
attractiveness of code-sharing. However, there are a number of forces which will
continue to encourage airlines to adopt the code-sharing strategy. One of them is the
economies of scope and density which accrue to large networks. Since network size
can not be currently increased by mergers and acquisitions, airlines will tend to use
code-sharing as a tool to expand their networks. International hubbing and spoking is
another factor favouring code-sharing. According to the GRA, code-sharing increases
the value of a concentrated hub-and-spoke network in that it makes it easier to connect
it to another network. Thus code-sharing is again an effective means of building large
networks to reap economies. The GRA therefore predicts that foreign carriers will
tend to concentrate services at the hubs of their US code-sharing partners. However,
whether this will be accompanied by a reduction of service at the other non-code-
sharing hubs remains to be seen. The GRA also predicts that code-sharing will
become increasingly prevalent in Asia for this is the fastest-growing region. As US
airlines attempt to partake in those traffic flows, they will form more aria more coàe-
sharing alliances with Asian carriers.
The GRA study had been largely criticised namely by Shenton (1 994b) and Jennings
(1995). Shenton argues that it tends to inflate the importance of code-sharing. This is
achieved by failing to compare the benefits of code-sharing with airlines' revenues
and profits which are much larger. For example, the $37.5mn benefit to consumers is
negligible compared to the $1 Obn which they spend on transatlantic tickets. Also,
benefits to the airlines studied is estimated to $7.7m which is negligible compared to
their transatlantic revenues. To Shenton, the GRA study has effectively shown that
benefits that are derived from code-sharing are very small. According to him, the real
value of code-sharing comes in the other alliance practices accompanying code-
sharing, such as the effective integration of operations.
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Another of Shenton's criticism is that the GRA treats the negative effects of code-
sharing as unimportant. Passenger deception, CRS screen clutter, and the anti-
competitive effects of code-sharing are all mentioned in the study. However, little
consideration is given on how to redress these problems. The final criticism concerns
the theory used by the GRA used in defining its econometric model: that traffic from
one system to the other occurs via two hubs, with code-sharing partners feeding the
hubs at both ends. According to Shenton, this is not ideal to the consumer as the
alliance forces himlher to make double connections. Then, hubs are becoming
increasingly congested in Europe so that a hub bypass system could be attractive.
Finally, many airlines in Asia are not interested in the double hub strategy; rather,
they favour gateway-to-gateway code-sharing.
According to Jennings (1995), the GRA study is too restrictive and can not be
extrapolated to real life. Indeed, only 46 markets operated by two airline alliances are
analysed, no account is made of the influence of non-US airline competition, market
growth is not considered, and US airline competitive reactions are not taken into
account. Jennings argues that the GRA study gained acceptance by the US DoT only
because it supported DoT's favourable view about code-sharing.
4.5.4.2 The US GAO report
The US GAO study on airline alliances was commissioned by the US Chairmen and
Ranking Minority Members of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation and its Subcommittee on Aviation. It was spurred by the increasing
number of code-sharing alliances being formed between US and foreign airlines
which were allowing the latter access to the domestic US market. The objectives of
the GAO study were to assess (1) the benefits, in terms of increased passenger
numbers and revenues reaped by the alliance partners (both US and foreign), and (2)
the impact that the alliances had on other US airlines and consumers. A third objective
was to identify and examine other alliance issues which had been omitted from the US
DoT policy statement and regulatory actions recently proposed.
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The study was performed by analysing data provided by US and foreign airlines on
passenger traffic and revenues, and by interviewing officials from the Justice
Department as well as airport representatives. Representatives of 7 US and 13 foreign
airlines were interviewed to gather their opinions and also to enable access to internal
data. This was deemed necessary because the data provided by DoT carried with it
severe limitations, namely non-differentiation between code-sharing passengers and
'normal' passengers. Furthermore, foreign airlines allied to US airlines are not
required to report data on code-share traffic though that traffic either originates or is
bound to the US. Air transportation officials from foreign countries were interviewed
to obtain a foreign perspective concerning the issues examined. The implications of
alliances on CRS listings were analysed via extensive interviews of travel agency
officials and EU representatives. This was complemented by an examination of DoT's
policy statement and proposed rules concerning consumer notification and of DoT's
previous orders approving code-sharing alliances.
In its assessment of the benefits of alliances to the partners, the GAO report presents
the estimates of the increases in passenger traffic and revenues in 1994 for three
strategic airlines which make extensive use of code-sharing: KLM-Northwest
Airlines, BA-USAir, and Lufthansa-United Airlines. These estimates are given in
Table 4.12. Incidentally, one can observe that these results differ quite markedly from
those of the GRA.
KLM	 NWA	 BA USA1r Lufthansa UAL
Increase in	 150	 200	 68	 n/p	 n/p	 220
passenger traffic (000)
Increase in	 100	 125-175	 100	 20	 n/p	 n/p
revenues ($mn)
Table 4.12. Benefits of strategic airline alliances to participating airlines
Source: GAO (1995)
(nip: figures not provided)
The • KLM-Northwest alliance was found to be the one producing quite sizeable
benefits for both parties. This was attributed to the broad scope of the code-sharing
network of the alliance. In addition, the KLM-Northwest alliance benefits from
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antitrust immunity which allows it to achieve a high level of integration without fear
of legal action from competitors. The airlines in the partnership were observed to
benefit fairly equally from the alliance. This is because resulting benefits are divided
on the basis of an agreed prorated formula that takes into account the number of miles
flown under the alliance, and also because both airlines fly long-haul routes as part of
the alliance.
The BA-USAir alliance, on the other hand, was found to benefit BA more that USAir.
This is because under the current arrangement, only BA lists USAir's flights as its
own and keeps most of the revenues resulting from code-sharing. BA also benefits
extensively from increased interlining traffic from USAir-USAir/BA interline traffic
increased by 60% from December 1993 to December 1994 (GAO, 1995). The $20m
additional revenues to USAir come mainly from increased interline traffic resulting
from FFP links with BA and also from the wet lease of three aircraft to BA for
transatlantic operations.
The Lufthansa-United alliance involves extensive use of code-sharing linking 25 US
cities to 30 European and Middle East cities. According to Lufthansa and United
representatives, the alliance is generating substantial revenues for both airlines. As the
level of integration rises, United predicts code-sharing to bring up to 1000 additional
passengers a day.
All three alliances claimed that the additional traffic and revenue was the result of
increased competition between alliances and other airlines as well as with other
alliances. However, representatives of other airlines flying internationally stated that
the additional traffic to the alliances had been diverted from them, and was causing a
decrease in their revenue. Unfortunately, data was not available to the GAO to enable
them to quantify the extent of those losses. The lack of appropriate data also prevented
the GAO to determine whether US airlines were losing more than foreign airlines, and
whether increased competition had lead to increased consumer benefits in terms of
lower fares.
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The GAO also studied other alliances which were more restrictive in nature than the
strategic alliances. These were termed regional and point-specific alliances in that they
connect a limited number of routes. Examples of such alliances are the United-Ansett
and United-British Midland tie-ups, and the code-sharing alliance of Delta Airlines
with Virgin. The GAO study indicates that such partnerships do yield payoffs.
However, these benefits vary depending on the level of integration. Point-to-point
alliances are prone to failure because the airlines end up competing with each other
rather than effectively integrating their operations.
From the study, the GAO came up with five recommendations:
(1) US airlines should be required to identify passengers who travel on code-shared
flights and report which airline operated the code-shared flights. This will be useful
for future studies on the effects of code-sharing and alliances;
(2) Recommendation 1. should be extended to foreign airlines code-sharing with US
airlines;
(3) The DoT's economic unit newly formed to examine alliance effects should use
DoT's data and airlines' data to determine the effects of alliances on consumer
welfare prior to approval of all code-sharing alliances involving US airlines. It has not
been possible for the GAO to perform this analysis because of the inappropriateness
of the DoT existing data;
(4) The KLM-Northwest alliance should be used to determine whether antitrust
immunity could be made available for alliances in markets that allow for significantly
increased access for US airlines. The main reason viewed by many for the success of
the KLM-Northwest alliance is the immunity from antitrust regulation which it
enjoys31 . Thus, antitrust immunity could be used as an incentive to open up foreign
markets for US airlines;
(5) The number of listings of the same code-shared flights in CRSs should be limited
to two. This recommendation comes as a result of an examination of DoT's policy
statement where the GAO found no mention of a limit on the number of times a flight
' DoT and Justice Department officials argue that the two carriers could have achieved the high level of integration without
antitrust immunity as they are not significant competitors on most routes. However, fear of legal reprisal from competitors
could have hindered their advance.
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is listed on CRSs. The GAO reviewed the first screen for 17 international city-pairs on
the Worldspan and Apollo systems and found that 19 percent of them contained
multiple listings of the same flight. In many cases, competing flights, which were
better than the code-shared flights in terms of fares or elapsed time, were pushed to
the next screen.
Jennings (1995) considers the GAO study to be the most in-depth study on code-
sharing to date. According to her, the study takes a broader perspective than the GRA
study which is more academic in nature. However, she recognises that unlike the
GRA, the GAO had access to better data. The GAO report effectively shows that
code-sharing is producing benefits in terms of revenue and market share, and it
recognises that some of the benefits could come from non-code-share sources such as
increased interline traffic. The GAO study also quantifies the losses of US airlines
caused by the BA-USAir and KLM-Northwest alliances. Jennings points out that this
opposes DoT's belief that code-sharing is a perfect marketing tool in ensuring airline
rights around the world.
4.6 Conclusion
Since the beginning of the decade, the phenomenon of airline alliances has been
progressing rapidly. Most of the alliances involve European and US carriers. US and
European alliances are mostly centred on marketing benefits, while Asian carriers
focus more on cost-cutting strategies. The involvement of equity purchases is
becoming increasingly common because it is considered as the 'glue' which holds the
alliance together.
Over the past years, the rate at which airlines changed partners was quite high.
However, this trend seems to have slowed down as airlines have settled with adequate
partners. Five main groupings have evolved.
Airline alliances bring totally new issues to the airline industry. Increasingly, they are
becoming embroiled into political negotiations. The US in particular is using antitrust
immunity for alliances as a means to promote its 'Open Skies' aviation policy.
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Antitrust protection is very much sought by current alliances between US and
European airlines because it is believed to be key to alliance success.
Opinions about the effect of alliances on competition diverge. However, on intra-EU
routes, the number of competitors on code-shared routes fell, indicating that code-
sharing is harmful to competition. It seems that the situation is slowly evolving
towards competition between global alliances rather than between individual carriers
as the need to be affiliated to an alliances becomes urgent (Oum et a!, 1993).
One study has shown that alliances generally lead to service improvements in terms of
service frequency and connect times. However, fares are very likely to rise. Two
studies have investigated the effects of code-sharing between US and European
carriers. Both indicate that code-sharing leads to substantial benefits to the airlines
concerned in terms of market share and revenues. Whether these benefits were evenly
distributed between the airlines depended on how the alliances were structured.
Having described the change in the structure of the airline industry, one can wonder
why airlines have suddenly adopted the collaborative strategy. Furthermore, if the
need to co-operate and operate globally was felt, why did airlines not merge? The next
chapter will attempt to answer these questions.
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5. FORCES DRIVING AIRLINE ALLIANCE
FORMATION
Introduction
T
he purpose of this chapter is to identify the factors which have lead airlines
to increase their dependence on the collaborative strategy. An understanding
of those forces is essential to explain why airlines have chosen to form
alliances instead of adopting the other inter-firm organisational forms which were
presented in the previous part of this thesis. In addition, an assessment of how strong
those drives are will give an indication of whether airline alliances will continue to
exist in the future, or. whether they are a transitional inter-organisational form
preceding the formation of global mega-carriers.
The chapter is organised into two main parts. In the first part, the general theories
which have been developed in the business and social sciences to explain the
formation of alliances are reviewed. The applicability of the theories to the airline
industry is then analysed. In the second part of the chapter, an alternative model of
airline alliance formation which incorporates regional and world-wide socio-political
and economic occurrences is proposed.
5.1General Theories of Alliance Formation
What are the forces which have lead firms to adopt the collaborative strategy in
preference to the go-it-alone strategy? The business literature on alliances is replete
with answers to this question. All views are encompassed in what are considered as
two of the most prominent treatments of the trend of alliance formation: the
'knowledge-link' theory of Badaracco (1991) and the 'globalisation' theory of Obmae
(1989). Both theories are presented in this chapter. One will observe that they tend to
be biased towards manufacturing industries, pivoting mainly on technology
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advancements. This is one of the impediments to their applicability to airline
alliances.
5.1.1 The 'knowledge link' theory
The knowledge-link theory of Badaracco (1991) explains the emergence of
partnerships by the need to share and exploit what Badaracco terms 'embedded
knowledge'. He defines this as expertise characteristic of the firm possessing it and
which can not be easily transferred to other firms though it has strong commercial
value and is very much sought by them. The non-transferability of embedded
knowledge then leads firms to form alliances (knowledge links) and the firms are thus
able to exploit their knowledge complementarities.
Burton (1994) has criticised the knowledge-link theory arguing that it is not sufficient
in and by itself to explain the contemporary proliferation of strategic alliances. Indeed,
the desire to have access to the embedded knowledge of another firm does not
necessarily warrant the formation of alliances. Mergers and acquisitions could also
provide access to such knowledge. In fact, mergers and acquisitions could be better
options to alliances in that the firm secures exclusive access to the embedded
knowledge of the partner. This argument would indicate that an alliance is the second
option and is selected only when the merger strategy is economically or politically
constrained. Burton takes the BMW-Rover example to illustrate his point. In order to
access the embedded knowledge of small-car engines and off-the-road vehicles
possessed by Rover, BMW went for an outright acquisition of Rover instead of
seeking an alliance with it.
5.1.2 The 'globalisation' theory
The globalisation theory developed by Ohmae (1989) rests upon the argument that it
is the sheer scale of contemporary global industries and markets that requires the
adoption of alliances. A graphical representation of the theory is given in Figure 5.1.
Basically, the theory identifies three factors which have contributed to bring about the
urge to co-operate in firms. These are: (1) The 'Californiazation of needs' (Ohmae's
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terminology), (2) the dispersion of technology, and (3) the growing importance of
fixed costs.
Globalising	 Dispersed
consumers
	 changing
technology
Shorter
product
life cycles
MORE
ALLIANCES
Figure 5.1 Ohmae's gtobalisation theory of alliance formation
Source: Burton (1994)
The term 'Californiazation of needs' refers to the convergence of consumer needs and
preferences so that everyone in the world wants to live similar lifestyles and therefore
desires the same kinds of products 32. This global market integration is the result of a
more efficient dissipation of the same information world-wide and of technology
advances coupled with new requirements of users which raise lifestyles to similar
standards (Lewis, 1990). The technology advances in communication and
transportation have eased the movement of information and goods and also of
technology transfer.
Today's technological products have reached such a high level of sophistication that
their manufacture requires access to numerous critical technologies in which a single
32
Hence the term 'Californiazation' referring to the increasing desire of everybody to shop in California.
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firm can not maintain a leading competence simultaneously. As technology becomes
dispersed among a number of companies. co-operation becomes essential for the
development of new products. The increasing technological interdependence and the
convergence of consumer needs and incomes in the leading regions of the world has
lead to collaboration in research and development (R & D) so that duplication of
efforts is minimised and global scale can be achieved (Lewis, 1990).
Ohmae also argues that as products become global, they incur immense fixed costs.
Increased automation has transformed manufacturing into more of a fixed-cost than a
variable-cost activity. So is the same for R & D and for the building of global brand
reputation and global sales and distribution networks. Ohmae therefore concludes that
'....this new logic forces managers to amortise their fixed costs over a much larger
market base.....This logic mandates entente-alliances that both enable and facilitate
global contribution-based strategies' (Ohmae, 1992; p. 41). The advantages of
partnerships go even further as they also enable managers to define strategies that will
allow them to maximise the contribution of their respective fixed costs. Ohmae
concludes his article by arguing that the globalisation wave is far from over and only
properly-managed alliances will enable firms to wither the uncertainties it brings
along in the business world.
A salient omission in the two theories of alliance proliferation is the heightened level
of competition world-wide (Kanter, 1989; Jorde and Teece, 1989). Change is indeed
happening in the business world at an accelerating rate owing to the cumulative
impacts of technology, improvements in information technology, transportation
sytems and management systems (Jarillo, 1993). This is complemented by trends
towards deregulation and privatisation which leave companies to fend for themselves.
Thus, such levels of competition have currently been reached that more than cost-
cutting is warranted in order to remain competitive, not to mention survive. The
solution has been to adopt a radical organisational change (Jarillo, 1993), the result of
which is the emergence of strategic alliances. A similar view is adopted by Howarth
(1994) after analysing high-tech companies in Australia.
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5.2 Alliances v/s Other Means of Value Creation
The two alliance theories have identified the forces which have driven airlines to ally.
However, one could ask why is it that finns have selected alliances instead of organic
growth or mergers when subjected to these forces. The following sections attempt to
provide an answer to this question by analysing the limits of organic growth and of
mergers.
5.2.1 Limits to organic growth
Organic growth refers to increasing firm size and scope by using internally-generated
resources. Doz (1993) identifies two limits to organic growth: its slowness and the
resistance to strategic change which is inherent to it. He argues that in a relatively
stable environment characterised by comparatively little overall organic growth, the
opportunities for fast corporate growth are scarce, the resources take too long to
mobilise and the learning processes required to develop new competencies are too
slow. Conversely, in a rapidly-changing environment, a position reached through
organic growth can be lost very easily as such companies are unable to readjust their
perspectives and accumulated skills fast enough to suit the new conditions. It therefore
becomes extremely difficult to engage successfully in a major strategic
transformation.
5.2.2 Limits to mergers and acquisitions
Doz (1993) observes that strategic alliances are created simply because restrictions
exist regarding mergers and acquisitions. He identifies five such restrictions:
(1) Public policy restrictions imposed by governments to protect their 'national
champions'. This is particularly true in the airline industry;
(2) Antitrust restrictions to prevent monopolies from arising;
(3) The absolute size and complex patterns of ownership of the companies targeted for
merger or acquisition;
(4) The difficulty to put a price on the acquisition candidate; and
(5) The increasing scarcity of attractive acquisition candidates.
ODepartment of Air Transport, Cranfield University	 92
_______________________________Chapter 5: Forces driving airline alliance formation
Furthermore, he notes that mergers and acquisitions often fail owing to a series of
problems which arise when post-merger integration is attempted. This is particularly
so when a management interface is created between the two companies. He argues
that, in most cases, that interface is poorly designed and is not always appropriate to
the nature of the benefits sought from the venture. Furthermore, mergers and
acquisitions burden the resulting enterprise with excessive fixed costs, cumbersome
management structures and a large debt (Achrol and Scheer, 1990).
Jordan (1988) has studied airline mergers in the US and Canada to find out whether
their potential benefits are achieved. One of his fmdings is that mergers lead to
increased unit costs and had negative effects on profits, unless measures were taken to
rationalise the combined network rapidly after the merger was formed. Another
conclusion of his analysis was that the traffic carried by the combined entity either
declined or grew at a slower rate than that of similar unmerged carriers. These
findings show that airline mergers can lead to several problems which affect traffic
volumes and profits adversely. Furthermore, the assumption that mergers yield
increased market power Without incurring substantial costs is misleading.
5.2.3 The attractiveness of strategic alliances
Confronted to all those restrictions and the high failure rates of mergers and
acquisitions, the best alternative for managers has been to develop strategic alliances.
Without having to experience the huge expenses carried by an acquisition, they have
been able to create a mix of resources that meets their separate and mutual objectives.
Indeed, strategic alliances decrease valuation uncertainties and thus the risk of
overvaluation. They provide a relatively low-cost opportunity to learn about the value
of the partner's skills and resources before having to make a major commitment. In
addition, the very process of collaborating can reveal better ways of creating value
without incurring huge costs. Acquiring or merging with a company requires the
shouldering of that company's problems as well as benefiting from its strengths. This
is not so in alliances which can allow the reaping of the benefits exclusively while the
individual problems of the partners are not shared. In the same way, partnerships may
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solve the problem of unnecessary assets accompanying mergers and acquisitions.
Alliances are also more flexible than acquisitions where control is concerned. Though
an acquisition offers full control to the purchaser, it incurs the costs of resentment and
lack of motivation on the part of the personnel of the acquired firm. A loss of key
executives can result (Lewis, 1990). Thus, the value of the acquired firm can fall if its
people constitute one of its major assets, thus negating the goal of the take-over. An
alliance, on the other hand, can offer shared control and will not incur such costs.
5.3 Applicability of General Alliance Theories to the Airline Industry
Are the general theories outlined above capable of explaining the proliferation of
airline alliances? To answer this question, the applicability of the knowledge-link and
globalisation theories to the airline industry is examined. The issue of airline mergers
and organic growth is considered later on when formulating the alternative model of
airline alliance formation.
5.3.1 Relevance of the knowledge-link theory
It would seem that Badaracco's theory is less appropriate in explaining the
proliferation of airline alliances than is Ohmae's theory. Indeed, the former is based
on knowledge which is of greater relevance to manufacturing industries where the cost
of acquiring expertise is reaching tremendous proportions. The airline industry is a
service industry and is not so much concerned with knowledge. Instead, airlines are
more concerned with the existing assets of their potential partners such as existing
network size and hub location which will enable them to achieve economies of scope
and density. Where knowledge could become important is in the alliances between
major and domestic/regional carriers. The latter have the expertise to operate the thin
short-haul routes which the majors do not possess, but which they can acquire by
allying with them. However, it would seem that the major airlines are not interested in
gaining the knowledge in order to eventually operate the routes themselves. Instead,
they are more content in letting the domestic/regional airlines to their markets and
continue benefiting from feed. Badaracco's theory may become relevant in the case of
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alliances between majors geared towards maintenance functions. However, in the
current alliances, the airlines are more interested in making use of the maintenance
infrastructure of their partners to avoid the fixed costs of setting up their own
maintenance facility rather than in acquiring their maintenance expertise. Viewed
from that perspective, these alliances effectively fall under the fixed-cost portion of
Ohmae's theory.
5.3.2 Relevance of the globalisation theory
Of the three pillars on which rest Ohmae's globalisation theory, the growing
importance of fixed costs can be considered to be the most relevant to the emergence
of airline alliances. Dispersion of technology is recognised to have been the unique
driving force behind certain airline alliances in the past (Burton and Hanlon, 1995),
examples being KSSU and ATLAS which were set up to manage the maintenance
functions of the airlines in the partnership. However, such arrangements are now
subset of broader marketing alliances.
In order to test the applicability of Ohmae's theory to the airline industry, the fixed
costs of selected allied airlines in Europe, the US, and the Asia/Pacific region is
computed over a period ranging from 1983 to 1993. Costs are in real 1983 terms and
are presented as an index (1983 1.00) in Figure 5.2. From the latter, the trend of
increasing fixed costs of airlines in all three world regions over the last decade is
obvious. As from 1990, fixed costs either start increasing at a slower rate (Asia/Pacific
and US) or to decrease (Europe), possibly as a result of alliance formation. This
analysis shows that the fixed cost portion of Ohmae's theory holds for airline
alliances.
33
The selection process was based mainly on data availability. The selected European airlines are : British Airways, British
Midland, Lufthansa, Iberia, Austrian Airlines, Air France, TAT, Swissair, SAS and KLM. The selected Asian/Pacific airlines
are: Qantas, Malaysian Airlines, SIA, Thai, and Japan Airlines. The selected North American airlines are: American Airlines,
Continental Airlines, Delta Airlines, Northwest, United, USAir, Canadian Airlines International and Air Canada. Cost data was
obtained from the ICAO Digest of Statistics-Financial Data, and Consumer Price Indices were extracted from the
European/International Data and Statistics, Euromoney Plc. Missing cost data was estimated from a time series linear
regression. The models for each of the airlines had a high explanatory power with R2 values ranging from 63% (Singapore
Airlines) to 97% (Japan Airlines). F-statistics were highly significant. Only exceptions were Lufthansa, Air Canada and Air
France with R2 values of 31%, 52% and 42% respectively.
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Figure 5.2 Variation of airline fixed costs
Data extracted from the ICAO Digest of Statistics
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Basing himself on the work of economists Baumol et a! (1982) on perfectly
contestable markets, Burton (1994) argues that sunk costs would be more relevant to
Ohniae's theoiy. A source of sunk costs in the airline industiy could be the aircraft
fleet. However, even then, an airline can lease aircraft instead of purchasing them
outright. Moreover, if the airline does purchase aircraft, it can sell them anywhere in
the world if they are no longer required. Therefore, costs in aircraft acquisition are not
strictly sunk in nature. Burton and Hanlon (1995) also observe that, apart from
aircraft, global advertising and CRS developement, there are practically no other
sources of sunk costs in the airline industiy: airport authorities provide runways and
terminals, air traffic control and navigation services are either under the control of
governments or private companies so that airlines do not have to invest in
infrastructure. Therefore, the sunk cost element is only a small proportion of total
airline costs. This argument leads to the conclusion that Ohmae's theory, in and by
itself can not explain airline alliance formation totally. Other underlying forces to the
emergence of airline alliances exist. They are identified in the alternative model of
airline alliance formation which follows.
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5.4 Alternative Model of Airline Alliance Formation
The approach adopted in trying to explain the formation of strategic airline alliances is
to analyse the environment in which airlines operate to identify the socio-political and
economic generators of change. This follows from Hawley (1950) who argues that the
activities of each and every organisation are attempts to adjust to their environment.
The waves of deregulation and liberalisation in certain parts of the world, airline
privatisation, the globalisation of air transport, and world-wide economic changes are
identified as the external phenomena which interact to create an environment
conducive to airline alliance formation. The interaction, conceptualised in Figure 5.3,
theorises that those processes have acted along three dimensions: enhanced
competition, increased environmental uncertainty, and escalating costs.
Deregulationl
liberalisation
Regulatory
baniera
Increased
environmental
uncertainty
I IncreasedPrivatisation	 I competition
AIRLINE ALLIANCE
FORMATION
Globalisation
Increasing
costs
Nationalist
Worldwide	 barriers
economic
changes
Figure 5.3 Conceptual model of the formation of airline alliances
The constituent parts of the model and their relationship with alliance formation are
discussed next.
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5.4.1 Air transport deregulation and liberalisation
Deregulation of air transport is in progression throughout the world. Initiated in the
US by the Airline Deregulation Act in 1978, it was followed by deregulation of
domestic services in the UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. It has recently been
phased into Europe, albeit in a toned-down version, via the three Liberalisation
Packages. Even countries in the tightly-regulated Asian/Pacific region are starting to
move towards deregulation (Cheng, 1992). For example, Singapore has adopted a
national policy of liberalisation and strongly supports the liberalisation of market
access and the ceasing of government intervention in the determination of the airlines
to have access to routes. Taiwan adopted a national aviation policy of limited
deregulation in 1989. Vietnam is progressing towards opening its skies and allowing
foreign airlines into its markets. Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)
countries, including Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines and Borneo have
accepted to take measures to partially liberalise their national airline industry and
accept liberal bilateral air transport agreements. Though these changes have occurred
mostly on a national basis, they are a precursor of future changes bearing more
international tendencies.
Basically, deregulation policies introduce free pricing, full access to routes and full
freedom to start an airline provided financial soundness and safety requirements are
met. Via free access and liberal pricing, deregulation and liberalisation effectively
lead to a stepped-up competitive environment. Free access sharpens the threat posed
by new entrants: in the ten-year period following US deregulation, 210 new airlines
were certificated in the US (Pugh, 1989). However, the US experience has shown that
these new airlines are either swallowed up by the majors or go out of business very
soon. In Europe, liberalisation has not lead to the creation of a large number of new
airlines as was expected. Nevertheless, the threat of entry itself can be argued to
contribute in creating a more competitive environment, according to the
'contestability' theory advanced by Baumol et a! (1982). Entry is also possible by the
existing carriers in order to compete with incumbents on attractive routes. The
increase in competition also results from the liberal pricing policy to a great extent.
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After breaking monopolies on markets, airlines are able to undercut competitors' fares
in order to gain market share. In many cases, this has resulted in excess capacity and
uneconomic pricing which have caused yields to spiral downwards.
After deregulating its own domestic market, the US attempted to export the 'Open
Skies' idea world-wide (GAO, 1995). As a consequence, over twenty countries signed
liberal bilaterals with the US (Dresner and Tretheway, 1992). These agreements
allowed the carriers freedom in the fields of capacity, route entry and pricing. This
lead to an increase in competition on international routes and started the globalisation
of air transport. The issues of 'Open Skies' and alliance formation have recently
become intertwined as the US uses antitrust immunity for alliances in exchange for
'Open Skies'. The KLM-Northwest alliance, for example, was granted antitrust
immunity only after the Netherlands opened its skies to US carriers. Likewise, the
issue of 'Open Skies' forms part of the negotiations for approving and granting
antitrust immunity to the British Airways-American Airlines alliance.
5.4.2 Environmental uncertainty
Prior to deregulation, the air transport industry was relatively stable and predictable
owing to clearly-defined rules. The advent of deregulation and liberalisation
eliminated this element of stability and brought in dynamism and uncertainty. The
consequent unpredictable and dynamic nature of the environment affected the airlines'
decision-making capabilities negatively (Spekman and Sawhney, 1990).
In a dynamic environment, managers may suffer from response uncertainty in that
they lack knowledge of the response options available to them (Milliken, 1987). This
can lead them to imitate or copy the strategic response of their competitors as they
assume that rival airlines have figured out what the appropriate response to the
changing environment is (diMaggio and Powell, 1983). This can explain the
proliferation of airline alliances, some of which are lacking in a clear rationale and
strategic objective.
ODepartment of Air Transport, Cranfield University
Chapter 5: Forces driving airline alliance form ati on
5.4.3 Airline privatisation
The withdrawal of governments from airline ownership is a recent trend which is
gathering momentum in the industry. This is obvious in Figure 5.4 which depicts the
change in the average government stake in airlines in different world regions.
Figure 5.4 Change in the average government stake in airlines
Data extractedfrom the Airline Business, various issues
There are a number of airlines in various parts of the world that have already gone
public or in which state ownership is being gradually reduced, examples being British
Airways, Lufthansa and Alitalia in Europe, AeroPem and Mexicana in Latin America,
Japan Airlines, Singapore Airlines and Air New Zealand in the Asian/Pacific region and
Kenya Airways in Africa.
What brought about the recent wave of airline privatisation? One reason could be that
governments are waiy of injecting large amounts of capital in such a capital-intensive
industry, and therefore try to escape the responsibility of supporting the state airline
(Wheatcroft, 1990). Furthermore, airlines still under state ownership are renown to be
inefficient and non-commercially oriented, and are usually ridden by heavy debts. On
the other hand, private airlines are more efficient and can react better in a deregulated
environment (Prodromidis and Frangos, 1995). Iberia, Olympic Airways and Air
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France are notable examples of state-owned airlines in Europe which are experiencing
serious fmancial problems. This state of affairs is attributed mostly to extensive
government interference leading to conflicting management objectives and also to the
assurance that financial losses will be eliminated by government subsidies. Once
privatised, airlines will become more accountable to non-government shareholders.
Managerial and operational efficiency will then become important as the airlines are
constantly pressured to produce profits. Other advantages of privatisation are the
immediate broadening of the shareholder base and the greater freedom enjoyed by the
airline to raise capital to buy aircraft (Beng, 1989).
5.4.4 Globalisation of air transport
Globalisation is defined by Landreth (1992) as a firm's ability to take advantage of
global markets. The globalisation of the air transport industry is a recent development
which Gialloretto (1988) and Kasper (1988) consider to be a natural outcome of the
development of carriers because of the saturation of domestic markets. Indeed, airlines
are currently experiencing great difficulty in growing domestically and are naturally
turning to the international markets to partake in the major international traffic flows
for growth, namely the transatlantic market, the Pacific market, the intra-Asian
market, the Asia-Europe market and the intra-European market (Coombs, 1993). The
imperative to become global is particularly serious in the case of US airlines which,
according to Gialloretto (1988, p. 172) '....turned their minds to international
expansion with a vengeance...' This is evident in Figure 5.5 which shows how the
proportion of international traffic of American and United has increased over fifteen
years.
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Figure 5.5 International growth of American and United
Data extractedfrom JATA WoridAir Transport Statistics, 1980-1994
To tap into international markets requires Fifth and Sixth Freedom rights which are not
easy to obtain. Affiancing enables carriers to bypass the time-consuming negotiations
and gain access to the routes which will form part of their global network. Another
impediment to global operations is the formation of economic and political blocks in
various parts of the world: the EU, the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), the Andean Pact in Latin America, ASEAN in Asia and the African Civil
Aviation Commission (AFCAC) in Africa. Forseen consolidation of airlines in those
blocks, the eventual right of airlines of member states to establish services between any
points within the single market thus created, the possibility of the central negotiation of
air service agreements on behalf of all member states and interline preference all give
the perception that the blocks will eventually evolve to air transport fortresses.
Benefits can be captured by operating in such markets. Access to them can be achieved
by alliances with airlines within the blocks.
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5.4.5 Increased competition
The above discussion has shown how deregulation and liberalisation, globalisation
and airline privatisation have lead to a more competitive environment. Alliances
constitute one of the tools which airlines have used to cope with the stepped-up level
of competition they started experiencing. Indeed airlines had to improve the product
they offered to their customers while simultaneously minimising the cost of doing so.
The improved product consists mainly of a better choice of destinations offered to the
consumer, higher service frequencies and better scheduling. Alliances offer them the
ability to achieve that goal at low costs since it is the existing network assets of the
partner which are drawn upon. Thus, alliances are very convenient for airlines to
improve their competitiveness substantially at minimum costs and in a relatively short
time.
Another advantage of alliances is that they automatically decrease the level of
competition in markets where the partner was previously a serious competitor. An
example is the Lufthansa-United alliance which was scrutinised by regulatory bodies
because the airlines competed extensively on the North Atlantic. Furthermore, a major
airline can control the level of competition on its home turf by allying with with the
domestic airlines. This will prevent entry by competitors via the purchase of
controlling equity stakes in the domestic airlines.
5.4.6 World-wide economic changes
The transformation of the world-wide economic landscape is also a crucial factor
which has lead airlines to seek for partners. According to IATA, the global economic
recession which has hit particularly the US and Europe at the beginning of this decade
has caused airlines to lose more than $14 billion dollars on international operations
from 1990 to 1993 (Oliver, 1994). The financial bleeding of airlines was worsened in
that period by the Gulf War in 1991 which caused fuel prices to soar (see Figure 5.6)
and passenger traffic to drop.
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Figure 5.6 Variation of fuel price over the period 1989 to 1992
Data extractedfrom Airline Business, various issues
As a result, airlines have been under serious pressure to reduce their costs. Alliancing
constitutes an effective means to do so because the partner airlines can share their
costs and avoid duplication of assets. Alliances also enable airlines to benefit from
traffic feed which then leads to a higher traffic density on their network. This results in
a decrease in their unit costs.
5.4.7 Regulatory barriers
Having analysed all the forces which have induced airlines to co-operate, the question
arises as to why airlines have selected the alliance strategy to improve their competitive
position instead of making use of mergers and acquisitions as in other industries. The
answer to this question lies in the current regulatory and nationalist barriers which
render the merger strategy difficult, if not impossible, to adopt.
5.4.7.1 Competition issues
Promotion of competition between airlines is important in the airline industry because
it leads to lower fares and improved service. Mergers are generally considered as anti-
competitive because they decrease the level of competition in many markets. This was
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observed particularly in the US following the 'merger-mania' which occurred in the
mid-1980s. Fares went up, especially when the merged entity extended its control
over hubs at both ends of the markets (Mauldin, 1989) and service levels deteriorated.
For that reason, airline mergers are generally frowned upon and have to clear a
number of regulatory hurdles before gaining approval.
In the EU, mergers are subject to the EC Merger Control Regulation which
investigates their potential effect on market concentration. If the merger involves two
carriers of the same country, then it has to be cleared by the national monopolies and
merger commission first. Furthermore, even though the proposed merger falls within
the provisions of the Merger Control Regulation, it can still be challenged in national
courts on the basis of Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome. This Article applies to check
the abuse of market power where it is enjoyed by the combined entity in a dominant
position. Since most of the intra-EU routes are either monopolies or duopolies, then
any merger is very likely to result in a dominant position which can then be
scrutinised under Article 86. The US counterparts of the EU regulations are the
antitrust regulations embodied in the Sherman and Clayton Acts 35 . These rules also
scrutinise mergers to detect whether they restrict competition.
5.4.7.2 National regulations
Most governments tend to have an aversion for the loss of the national identity of their
airlines. Therefore, apart from the rules designed to maintain competition in markets,
other regulations exist to preserve the national identity of carriers.
In the US, regulations restrict the purchase of shares by foreign interests in US carriers
to a maximum (25% in most cases). The key point here is control. The US
Government takes the view that foreign interests should be permitted 49% of the stock
in a US airline or 25% of the voting stock because, with the rest of the stock being
widely distributed among institutional and private investors, a holding of more than
34
See footnote 24.
35
See footnote 25.
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25% would imply control. Therefore, it is not possible for a foreign carrier to acquire
a majority interest in, let alone take over, a US airline even though it is a private
company. Currently, the US Government is debating whether to allow the limit on the
voting stock to be risen to 49%.
In Europe, a similar situation prevailed before 1993 when the the Third Liberalisation
Package had not yet come in force. The Third Package effectively replaced the
concept of national ownership and control by that of Community ownership meaning
that EU airlines are now required to be majority owned by nationals of Member States
instead of being locally owned. Therefore, EU airlines can merge with airlines of
other EU States provided they satisfy the competition conditions outlined above.
However, as Balfour (1995) notes, the new regulation has not lead to a spate of
mergers as in the US, though equity stakes among EU airlines are increasing
gradually. British Airways, for example, has acquired 49% of TAT with the option of
increasing its stake to 100% in 1997. Restrictions on the ownership and control
structure of EU airlines with respect to non-EU interests still remain in place, and vary
depending on the policy of the EU States.
Mergers between US and European airlines with Asian and African carriers are
practically impossible because most of these carriers are majority owned by their
governments. The nationalist tendency is also very strong in these regions and airlines
are viewed as a symbol of national virility which positions the country in the
international arena. Governments will therefore strongly resist mergers and
acquisitions, and will consider alliances more acceptable. The nationalist sentiment in
Asia is best exemplified by the following statement from a Korean Airlines official:
'Our airline industry is a national strategic business and a matter of national pride. We
cannot consider mergers with others.' (Knibb, 1994; p. 40).
5.4.7.3 International regulations
Once a proposed airline merger has cleared all these national and regional hurdles and
proved that it will not affect competition negatively, it has to confront a major
international regulation: the bilateral agreement. These agreements, known as
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bilaterals, define the type and level of airline operation between the two countries
which are signatories to the agreement.
One of the main barriers to airline mergers is the 'substantial ownership and control'
clause present n all existing bilateral agreements, a version of which states that
'....each contracting party reserves the right to withhold, revoke, or suspend, or impose
such conditions as it may deem necessary with respect to the operating permission of
the designated airline, in any case where it is not satisfied that substantial ownership
and effective control of that airline are vested in nationals of the other contracting
party' (Fenema, 1992, p. 27, emphasis added). 'Substantial' has usually been
quantified in domestic regulations as more than 50%. Thus, following from the
bilateral agreement, it can be difficult for a state to negotiate for access to other
countries if its citizens do not own more than 50% of its airline. This negates the
possibility of a foreign carrier, or any other interest, of acquiring the airline wholly.
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter has shown that of the two theories developed to explain the need for
inter-firm collaboration, Ohmae's globalisation theory lends itself better to the airline
industry. However, that theory is geared mainly towards non-service industries and
therefore explains the proliferation of airline alliances only partially. Indeed, other
factors have prompted airlines to adopt the co-operative strategy. The recognition of
the existence of other forces has lead to the formulation of an alternative model of
airline alliance formation.
Having identified the forces driving airline alliance formation and incorporated them
into a conceptual model, it would be useful to ask whether airline alliances will
continue to exist in the future, or whether they are mere transitional organisational
forms which will either dissolve into their constituents or evolve into single entities
tied even more tightly together. For the time being, it is difficult to imagine the airline
industry moving away from the trend of allying. Indeed, it does seem that airlines
have recognised that alliances enable them to achieve some kind of a global reach in
less time and at much lower costs than if the growth were organic. Furthermore, the
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regulatory restrictions which have constrained airlines towards alliances are not near
to disappear. Therefore, the trend towards airline co-operation is here to stay.
However, airlines appear to lack expertise in managing their alliances for the number
of alliance casualties is quite substantial. This lack of experience can be attributed to
the newness of the alliance strategy to airline managers. Therefore, there will be more
break-ups in the future followed by recombinations. This state of flux will gradually
yield a stable environment as airlines settle with their 'right' partners.
Whether these combined structures will go one step further towards mergers is
another question. Regulatory and nationalist bathers to airline mergers are still very
strong and conmionly work alongside political wrangling. Furthermore, even though
ownership regulations within a region can be relaxed (as in the case of Europe),
regulations allowing foreign ownership from outside that region still remain very
restrictive. For example, it is very difficult for an European or Asian carrier to
purchase a stake of more than 25% in a US carrier. Bilateral agreements, which are
being widely claimed as outdated but which show no signs of being replaced, will also
act as effective barriers to mergers. Furthermore, nationalist barriers to mergers
remain very strong in Asia and especially Africa and are not expected to fall in the
near future. Governments in those regions still retain high ownership and control over
their airlines. Therefore, it is predicted that the airline industry will evolve to a state
where there will be domination by a number of groupings constituted of distinct
airlines co-operating closely together.
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6. AIRLINE COLLABORATIVE STRATEGIES
Introduction
S
igning the agreement to form an alliance is only the first step. Following that,
strategies have to be implemented at the operational level to make the
alliance work and eventually bring benefits to the partners. The aim of this
chapter is to identify the collaborative strategies which airlines have devised and to
examine how these tools can increase the competitiveness of those airlines. It is
divided into two main parts. In the first part, the methods by which alliances increase
the traffic flows on the airlines' individual networks are looked into. Particular
attention is paid to code-sharing and block-spacing as they constitute the backbone of
all existing strategic airline alliances and of most tactical ones. The second part of this
chapter is devoted to the methods of reducing production costs via airline alliances.
Sectors of production which are combined together are identified and how lower unit
costs and higher productivity are achieved is discussed.
6.1Market-Related Alliance Strategies
Market-related alliance tools are those which are designed to increase the
attractiveness of the partner airlines in the eyes of consumers and to increase their
market power. Their application is meant to increase market share, traffic density and
load factors, and eventually lower unit costs as costs of production are spread over a
larger amount of traffic. Increases in market power can allow the airlines to raise fares
without losing much traffic, and hence increase their revenues. The marketing tools
are identified as code-sharing, block-spacing, franchising, schedule, fare and service
co-ordination and FFP combination.
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6.1.1 Code-sharing
Code-sharing is a central element of most current airline alliances. The US DoT
defines code-sharing as 'a common airline industry marketing practice where, by
mutual agreement between co-operating carriers, at least one of the airline designator
codes used on a flight is different from that of the airline operating the flight'
(Shenton, 1994a, p. 13). In other words, code-sharing is the practice whereby two
airlines willingly36 share the same IATA two-letter code, as presented on published
schedules, CRSs and tickets, on the same flight. An example of code-sharing is given
in Figure 6.1 taken from the ABC WoridAirways Guide of September 1995.
Amsterdam-Minneapolis NW8665•
Minneapolis-San Diego	 NW195
Figure 6.1 Code-sharing example
Source: ABC Guide, September 1995
What this extract wants to convey is that both the Amsterdam-Minneapolis and
Minneapolis-San Diego flight portions are operated by Northwest Airlines, hence the
connection is on-line. However, flight NW8665 is in fact operated by KLM with its
own aircraft and crews. The sign '•' is there to give an indication that the flight is
code-shared.
Code-sharing is not a new concept to the airline industry. Indeed, it has been around
for nearly thirty years. However, its current use is much more extensive and
aggressive in nature. The next sections will explore the development of code-sharing
since it was invented.
36 It is important to distinguish code-sharing from 'controlled duplication' whereby two airlines are assigned the same
designator code for the simple reason that the alphabet is limited and the number of airlines exceeds the number of designator
codes available. Controlled duplication is practised only where the two airlines do not serve the same markets.
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6.1.2 Development of code-sharing
6.1.2.1 Code-sharing between US airlines
The origins of code-sharing can be traced as far back as 1967 when Allegheny
Airlines (the former USAir) withdrew from low-density markets and allowed
independent commuter carriers to operate them. The withdrawal came as a result of
the planned move of Allegheny Airlines to jet aircraft which could not be
economically operated in those markets. To avoid losing its presence in those markets,
Allegheny Airlines ensured that the independent commuters used its designator code
on the segments which they operated. In spite of its success, the practice started
proliferating throughout the US only after 1984. This lateness can be attributed to the
introduction of CRSs and the full development of hub-and-spoke networks in the US
which occurred at around that time. Table 3.1 lists the current code-sharing
agreements between US majors and commuters.
6.1.2.2 Code-sharing between US andforeign airlines
In the late 1980s, the concept of code-sharing began exporting itself into the
international arena. The prime motive for foreign airlines to code-share with US
airlines was to enable them to exploit their traffic rights to beyond-gateway cities
which had up to then been left unused or abandoned owing to the low traffic density
of those markets (Shenton, 1 994a). An example is the code-sharing agreement
between Qantas and American Airlines whereby Qantas passengers from Sydney
bound to San Francisco were accommodated on a connecting American Airlines flight
to San Francisco at New York. That was in spite of the fact that Qantas possessed the
traffic rights from New York to San Francisco. The New York-San Francisco flights
were identified under both American Airlines' and Qantas' designator codes. As of
October 1988, the US DoT had approved 17 such agreements (see Table 6.1).
As from 1989, the rationale for code-sharing shifted from the exploitation of unused
traffic rights to the securing of traffic feed and the access of markets. Airlines wanted
to be able to code-share on routes where they did not already have the right to fly.
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US carrier	 Non-US carrier	 Code-sharing route
Qantas	 New York/Los Angeles/San Francisco-
Australia
Florida Express	 Orlando/Ft. Lauderdale-Nassau
Britt Airways	 Cleveland-London, Ontario, Canada
British Airways	 Chicago/Seattle-London
Transavia	 US-London-Amsterdam
Canadian	 Pittsburgh-Toronto/Hamilton, Canada
Malev	 New York-Frankfurt-Budapest
Gulf Air	 New York-London, UK-Gulf States
LIAT	 San Juan-Caribbean
Malev	 New York-Zurich-Budapest
Canadian	 Dallas Fort Worth/Houston-
Calgary/Edmonton, Canada
British Airways	 Washington/Chicago/Denver-London,
UK
Chautauqua	 Pittsburgh-Hamilton, Ontario, Canada
Bar Harbor	 Boston-St. Johns, Halifax, Canada
Austrian	 New York-Frankfurt-Zurich, Vienna
Air Canada	 Syracuse/Albany-Toronto,
Detroit-London, Ontario, Canada
Table 6.1 Code-sharing agreements between US and non-US airlines (Oct.
1988)
Source: Air Transport World, December 1988, p. 81
In 1989, BA and United sealed a major code-share agreement which effectively
allowed them to act as 'the ultimate global airbridge' (Feldman, 1989; p. 97). Though
the alliance was eventually dissolved, it was greatly imitated by other carriers.
Consequently, the number of US-foreign route agreements increased steadily since
then to reach 61 in 1994 (GAO, 1995). Figure 6.2 shows the yearly progression in the
number of code-shared agreements between US and foreign airlines since 1989.
The shift in the rationale for code-sharing has increased its strategic importance to
such an extent that code-sharing has been used in the bilateral negotiations between
the UK and the US in 1991. In exchange for the replacement of TWA and Pan Am by
American Airlines and United Airlines as the only US carriers allowed to fly to
Heathrow, BA was permitted access to beyond-gateway points via code-sharing with
a US partner. Hardened opponents of code-sharing such as American Airlines have
reluctantly yielded to the pressure of code-sharing and are seeking code-share partners
to extend their global network (Jennings, 1 995b), hence the recent alliance with BA.
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Figure 6.2 Number of US-foreign code-sharing agreements
Source: US GAO (1995)
6.1.2.3 Code-sharing agreements ofEuropean airlines
Prior to the First Liberalisation Package (1985), code-sharing within Europe was
virtually non-existent. The phenomenon started picking up mid-point in the
liberalisation process (1990), at which time four European airlines—KLM, Lufthansa,
SAS and Swissair—had created 20 code-sharing alliances (see Figure 6.3). Twelve of
those alliances were with European airlines and the rest were with airlines in other
regions of the world. After the adoption of the Third Package, the number of code-
sharing alliances increased dramatically to 71 in 1995. Forty five of those alliances are
intra-Europe while the rest is mostly with US carriers (see Figure 6.4). BA, Iberia,
KLM, Lufthansa, Swissair and British Midland lead the way in making use of the
code-sharing tool.
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Figure 6.3 Number of code-sharing partners of selected European airlines in 1990
Source: ABC WoridAirways Guide, June 1990
Figure 6.4 Number of code-sharing partners of selected European airlines in 1995
Source: Airline Business. June 1995, ABC WorldAirways Guide, June 1995
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Since the Third Package was the most liberal of all three liberalisation Packages, one
can conclude that it was partly responsible for the code-sharing spree which occurred
after 1993. The effect of European liberalisation is even more dramatic if the number
of code-shared intra-European routes is considered. Figure 6.5 gives the number of
such routes two years before and after the Third Package. In 1990, there were a total
number of 32 intra-European code-shared routes; this number had risen to 203 in
1995.
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Figure 6.5 Number of intra-Europe code-shared routes
Source: ABC World Airways Guide, June 1990 and June 1995
The Third Liberalisation Package can also be held responsible for the surge in code-
sharing agreements between European major and regional/domestic airlines. From
Figure 6.6, one can observe that the number of such alliances increased at a very slow
rate from 1988 to 1992. However, from 1993 to 1996, the number increased threefold.
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Figure 6.6 Evolution in the number of code-share alliances between European major and
regional/domestic airlines
Source: ABC WoridAirways Guide
6.1.3 Types of code-sharing alliances
Airlines make use of code-sharing to various degrees of involvement. Based on the
strategic scope of code-sharing, the US GAO (1995) differentiates between three types
of code-sharing alliances: strategic, regional and point-specific. These can be either
gateway-to-gateway code-sharing (for example, between Frankfurt and Chicago in the
case of the Lufthansa-United alliance) or behind-gateway code-sharing (for example,
between Charlotte and Charleston for the BA-USAir alliance). The different types of
code-sharing are analysed next.
6.1.3.1 Strategic code-sharing alliances
In strategic alliances, code-sharing is practised on a large number of routes with the
aim of linking the participating airlines' flight networks strategically. Only three
existing airline alliances effectively fall into this category: BA-USAir, KLM-Northwest
and Lufthansa-United Airlines. The details of the code-sharing agreements
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of these three alliances are presented below. One will observe that the alliances
involve both gateway-to-gateway and behind-gateway code-sharing.
Following the agreement sealed in 1993, BA places its designator code on USAir's
flights from 7 connecting points to 52 cities within the US. USAir, however, does not
code-share on BA flights from London because this is not allowed in the US-UK
bilateral agreement. Furthermore, USA1r has not requested the permission to do so.
The transatlantic routes are operated by BA using aircraft wet-leased from USAir. The
details of the agreement are shown in Figure 6.7.
USA1r aircraft	 British Airways	 British Airways
USAir and British Airways 	 codes on its aircraft	 codes on its aircraft
codes
Figure 6.7 British Airways-USAIr code-sharing network as of December 1994
Source: GAO (1995)
The KLM-Northwest and Lufthansa-United code-sharing alliances differ from the
BA-USAir one in that both airlines in the partnerships code-share on each other's
routes. KLM code-shares with Northwest on flights from Minneapolis, Boston and
Detroit to 88 US cities as well as on eight KLM gateway cities in the US. The
transatlantic flights are operated by both KLM and Northwest. Conversely, KLM
flights from Amsterdam to 30 European and Middle Eastern cities carry the Northwest
designator code (see Figure 6.8). The Lufthansa-United code-sharing network is
shown in Figure 6.9. Lufthansa has access to 25 US cities flown by United from
WashingtonlDulles and Chicago while United code-shares with Lufthansa on flights
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from Frankfurt to 30 European and Middle Eastern cities. United aircraft are used to
fly the inter-hub routes. In addition, United code-shares on Lufthansa's flights
between Frankfurt and Lufthansa's 10 US gateways and Lufthansa code-shares on
United flights between its 10 US gateways and the 25 interior cities.
Northwest aircraft
	 Northwest aircraft
Northwest and KLM codes
	 Northwest and KLM codes
Minneapolis
Boston
88 US cities Amsterdam	 urj	 30 European
and Middle Eastern
cities
Detroit
KLM aircraft
Northwest and KLM codes
Northwest aircraft
	
KLM aircraft
Northwest and KLM codes 	 Northwest and KLM codes
Figure 6.8 KLM-Northwest code-sharing network as of December 1994
Source: GAO (1995)
25 US cities	 WashingtonfDulles
I	 I Chicago
United aircraft
United and Lufthansa
codes
I 30 European and
_j'4	 Frankfurt '4	 Middle Eastern cities
United aircraft	 Lufthansa aircraft
United and Lufthansa Lufthansa and United
codes	 codes
Figure 6.9 Lufthansa-United code-share network as of December 1994
Source: GAO (1995) and Lufthansa data
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6.1.3.2 Regional code-sharing alliances
In this type of alliance, airlines share their codes on a large number of routes to and
from a specific region. United Airlines is quite advanced in that type of co-operation
and has secured a substantial number of code-sharing agreements with airlines
throughout the world to allow it to benefit from traffic feed. The regional code-share
alliances of United Airlines are given in Table 6.2.
Partner airline	 Country	 Number of code-
shared routes
Lufthansa
Aeromar
Air Canada
ALM Antillean
Aloha
Ansett Australia
British Midland
Gulfstream International
Germany
Mexico
Canada
Caribbean
Hawaii
Australia
UK and Europe
Florida and Bahamas
11
10
6
4
4
7
8
12
Table 6.2 Regional code-share alliances of United Airlines
Source: Murphy (1995)
Other examples of regional code-sharing alliances include American Airlines with
British Midland and Gulf Air, and Continental Airlines with Alitalia.
6.1.3.3 Point-spec?flc code-sharing alliances
A code-sharing alliance which applies on flights between only a small number of
points is termed a point-specific alliance. The GAO does not specify explicitly how
small the number of points has to be for an alliance to qualify as point-specific.
However, it does seem that the number has to be at least less than three. Out of the 61
code-sharing alliances between US and foreign airlines, the GAO found the majority
(50) to be point-specific. Most code-sharing alliances world-wide also tend to be
point-specific (Gallagher, 1994), the reason being that regulatory approval has to be
obtained for beyond-gateway code-sharing.
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6.1.4 Block-spacing
Block-spacing is a concept which is parallel to code-sharing and is often confused with
it. Under a block-spaced agreement, an airline purchases a number of seats on another
carrier's flight and markets those flights as though they were its own. Block-spacing is
therefore akin to some kind of partial wet-lease, whereas code sharing is more of an
improved version of interlining (de (iroot, 1994). An example of a block-spacing
agreement is the one between Virgin Atlantic and Delta Airlines whereby Delta
Airlines purchases seats on Virgin's flights between Newark, New York, San
Francisco, Los Angeles and London/Heathrow and between Boston, Orlando, Miami
and London/Gatwick. As of June 1995, there were a total number of 51 block-spacing
agreements world-wide. Figure 6.10 shows the breakdown of the number of block-
space agreements by region. European and Asian airlines are way ahead airlines in
other world regions in the use of block-spacing agreements; taken together, they
account for nearly 69% of all block-space alliances.
20
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Airline hase
Figure 6.10 Breakdown of airline block-space agreements by region (1995)
Source: Airline Business, June 1995
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6.1.5 Benefits of code-sharing and block-spacing
Most airline alliances are built upon code-sharing and block-spacing because these
tools confer a number of marketing benefits, the mo&t important ones being
economical access to new markets, traffic feed, capacity containment and better CRS
position.
6.1.5.1 Economical access to new markets
Code-sharing and block-spacing are being increasingly used to allow airlines access to
new markets and to benefit from traffic feed. For example, BA is able to gain access
to 52 US cities to which it does not have the right to fly via its code-sharing alliance
with USAir. By placing its code on USAir's flights to those destinations, BA can
effectively market those flights as if they were its own. In that way, a flight from
London to, say, Syracuse via Philadelphia is promoted from interline to on-line
status37 . This is advantageous since consumers are known to prefer on-line to interline
connections38 . Promotion of interline connections to on-line connections allows the
airlines to keep traffic on the combined system and to benefit from traffic feed. Code-
sharing also helps BA to sell the long-haul portion of the service. In addition, BA does
not have to invest the enormous amounts of capital and time in trying to develop and
operate the routes itself.
6.1.5.2 Traffic feed
Traffic feed is the main rationale behind the formation of major-regional/domestic
alliances. This is particularly the case in the US where commuter airlines feed their
major partners at their hubs. To a certain extent, this is also true in Europe where,
following liberalisation, airlines have allied with domestic airlines in other European
countries in order to access the markets of their competitors. This has lead to a
' Hence, Sorensen (1995) describes code-sharing as 'super-interlining'.
38 Studies performed by the US DoT have shown that consumers prefer on-line to interline connections because they believe
that same carrier connections leave from closely-positioned terminal gates so that the walking distance is short. In addition,
they believe that there is less risk of baggage loss in on-line connections.
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reaction whereby European majors have taken large stakes in their domestic airlines to
pre-empt competition in their domestic markets.
Traffic feed is also occurring in the international arena. Taking the BA-USAir
example, placing the BA code on intra-US routes increases the amount of traffic
transferring to the Europe-bound BA flights at the US gateways.
6.1.5.3 Capacity containment
Code-sharing and block-spacing also allow airlines to contain capacity in thin markets
which can not support two or more competitors. The airline which moves out of the
market can still maintain its presence there by placing its code on its partner's flight or
on part of its seats. Airlines can make use of code-sharing in this way to avoid the
duplication of flights. For example, Swissair and Austrian Airlines code-share on the
Zurich-Vienna route. Only one aircraft is flown at a higher load factor rather than two
aircraft at lower load factors. Operating costs are thus reduced though the airlines still
have access to the revenue.
6.1.5.4 Better CRS position
The practice of code-sharing is closely linked to CRSs. Owing to the order of CRS
display which gives precedence of on-line connections over interline connections,
code-shared flights are promoted to better screen positions. Since travel agents have a
greater likelihood of booking a flight on the first CRS screen, code-shared flights
stand a greater chance of being selected than an interline connection. This is in spite
of the fact that some interline connections can be better than the code-shared flights in
terms of travel distance and waiting time at the connecting airport. As was pointed out
in Chapter 4, some airlines use code-sharing to clutter the CRS screens by using
double and triple listings. Consequently, competitors' flights are pushed to less
favourable CRS screens.
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Base
UK
UK
UK
UK
UK
UK
Denmark
South Africa
BA franchise Date operational
CityFlyer Express
Brymon
Maersk Air
Loganair
Manx Airlines-Europe
GB Airways
Sun-Air
Comair
August 1993
August 1993
August 1993
July 1994
January 1995
February 1995
August 1996
October 1996
6.1.6 Franchising
Franchising is an even closer type of co-operation than code-sharing in that the
operating airline shares the whole brand of the franchisor rather than its code only.
Under the franchising agreement, the franchisee is allowed to operate its services
using the franchisor's flight prefix (code-sharing), and to adopt its livery, cabin
interior decor, and cabin crew uniforms, in exchange for a fee. Under the agreement,
the franchisee can usually pay for a number of services provided by the franchisor.
These services include reservations, ticketing, inventory control, revenue accounting,
sales, ground handling and catering (Endres, 1995; Bathgate, 1995). The franchising
strategy has its origins in the US when commuter airlines allied to US majors were
brought under one brand such as American Eagle, The Delta Connection and
Northwest Airlink.
Following the adoption of the Third Liberalisation Package, franchising has been
actively pursued in Europe by two UK carriers, namely BA and Virgin Atlantic, with
the former being by far the more active of the two. The BA franchises are given in
Table 6.3.
Table 6.3 BA franchises (1996)
Source: various
Except for Maersk and GB Airways which operate as BA, the carriers are grouped
under the brand name of BA Express. They have aircraft livery, on-board and ground
personnel uniforms, and in-flight service which are similar to those of BA (Crumley,
1993). In addition to the airlines listed, TAT European Airways in France and
DeutscheBA in Germany are also managed as franchises.
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In the same way as US major airlines, BA strives to obtain control of its franchisees
via equity holdings. In the words of Lewis Scard, BA's General Manager Franchising:
'[British Airways] likes partnerships, but also likes to control [the franchisees]'
(Endres, 1995; p. 16). Therefore, BA wholly owns Brymon and possesses holdings of
49.9% in TAT European Airways and of 49% in DeutscheBA and GB Airways. One
could argue that the emphasis of BA on franchisee ownership and control is partly
driven by the need to prevent competitors from the European continent from accessing
the British domestic market via alliances with UK's domestic/regional airlines.
The franchise alliances of Virgin Atlantic are less extensive than those of BA and do
not involve equity holdings. The first one was sealed in March 1993 with the Greek
carrier Southeast European Airlines (SEEA) which operated between
London/Heathrow and Athens. The alliance has been terminated partly due to SEEA's
financial problems. Virgin still has a franchising agreement with CityJet which
operates between Dublin and London City airport.
6.1.7 Benefits offranchising
6.1. 7.1 Benefits to the franchisor
The main benefit of franchising to the franchisor is low-risk and economical access to
markets where it has a weak presence. That was the main rationale for the formation
of franchises between major and commuter airlines in the US following deregulation
when most US majors ceased operation in many thin markets owing to their
unprofitability. In addition, the majors did not possess the appropriate small aircraft to
operate in those markets economically. Therefore, in order to maintain a significant
presence in the markets, they sealed franchising agreements with a number of
commuter airlines which also provided them with feed at their main hubs.
Market presence and traffic feed are also the reasons underlying BA's franchising
strategy. For example, Manx enables BA to be present in Wales in spite of the fact
that it had abandoned Wales on economic grounds. Concerning feed, Manx links into
BA's network at Manchester. BA also uses the franchising strategy to access new
0 Department of Air Transport, Cranfield University 	 124
_____________________________________Chapter 6: Airline collaborative strategies
markets and to gain a foothold in its European competitors' markets. For example, GB
Airways allows it access to the West Mediterranean (Gibraltar, Madeira, Tunisia and
Morocco among others). TAT European Airways and DeutscheBA provide access to
France and Germany and allow BA to compete indirectly with Air France/Air Inter
and Lufthansa respectively.
A third benefit accruing to the franchisor comes in the fees paid by the franchisees,
and in the money it receives for the services it renders to them. However, such
financial elements are of minimal importance when compared to traffic feed, market
presence and access for it is in the franchisor's interest to keep the franchisee's costs
down. Only then will the franchisee be able to operate the thin domestic routes
economically.
The situation could be different in Virgin Atlantic's case for its franchise with CityJet
does not provide it with feed. This leads Mike Bathgate of Manx airlines to conclude
that ' .......the rationale is for Virgin to see franchising as a profit opportunity in its
own right-and nothing to do with feed' (Bathgate, 1995; p. 9).
6.1. 7.2 Benefits to the franchisee
Based on Burgess (1995) and Bathgate (1995), the benefits accruing to the franchisee
can be summarised as follows:
(1) Brand affiliation. Being affiliated to a major airline brings passenger credibility.
This is especially important if the franchisee operates turboprop aircraft in which
passengers are less enthusiastic to fly. According to Burgess (1995), the BA livery
adopted by CityFlyer is reassuring to passengers who view it as a 'seal of approval'.
This seems to have been proven by research (Endres, 1995).
(2) FFP affiliation. By being affiliated with the majors' FFPs, the franchisees can
offer their passengers FFP benefits which a small independent airline would be unable
to provide, such as lounge access and the ability to earn FFP points. This can bring in
increased traffic as FFP points collected on the franchisee's flights can be used on the
franchisor's extensive network. For example, Manx witnessed a high increase in its
Executive Card holders when it allied with BA (Bathgate, 1995).
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(3) Better marketing and distribution. The services provided to the franchisee enable it
to access the franchisor's comprehensive world-wide marketing and distribution
network. On its own, the franchisee would never have been able to achieve such
global access owing to the tremendous costs involved.
(4) Improved bottom line. All these factors increase the traffic density on the
franchisee's network/routes leading to increased revenues and lower unit costs.
To this list can be added the financial support available to the franchisee when the
franchisor purchases a stake into it. This provides the franchisee with the financial
ability to acquire aircraft and to put up with competition.
6.1.8 Schedule andfare co-ordination
One of the factors which determines the attractiveness of a service is the layover at the
connecting airport. Travellers do not like to wait for a long time and a short waiting
time promotes the service onto higher CRS screens where it has a greater probability
of being selected. Therefore, one of the measures taken by allied airlines is to co-
ordinate their schedules at the connecting airport to bring their flights closer together.
Particular attention is paid to code-shared and block-spaced flights so that they
resemble on-line connections as closely as possible. Co-ordination of schedules is
often accompanied by attempts to bring the respective gates of the airlines closer so
that the walking distance of the connecting passengers is shortened.
Figure 6.11 gives an example of schedule co-ordination between KLM and Northwest
Airlines. In 1991, a passenger from Amsterdam bound to Miami would fly to Boston
where he/she would wait for 125 minutes for the flight to Miami via Orlando. The
flight option has been improved in two ways in 1994. Firstly, the passenger is routed
through Detroit where he/she is able to connect to a direct flight for Miami. Secondly,
the waiting time at the US gateway has been reduced to 90 minutes. If all the KLM-
Northwest or Northwest-Northwest connecting flights from Amsterdam to a US
destination are considered, it is observed that the frequency-weighted average connect
time at Boston, Detroit and Minneapolis decreased from 138.0 minutes in 1991 to
124.8 minutes in 1994 corresponding to a decrease in time of 9.5%.
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Detroit	 1994
17h10 18h40	 1991
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14h50
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	 21h23
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14h45 16h50
Boston
Figure 6.11 Flight routings from Amsterdam to Miami in 1991 and 1994
Source: ABC WorldAirways Guide, June 1991 and June 1994
(: code-shared with and operated by KLM)
Joint fare setting is illegal and can only be allowed only if the alliance receives
exemption from the law by the regulatory bodies concerned. Unlike schedule co-
ordination, the joint setting of fares can act to the detriment of consumers. By
agreeing on fares, airlines virtually eliminate fare competition between them and can
set fares at an artificially high level without fearing any substantial loss of passengers
if they control a large share of the market. The proposed BA-American Airlines
alliance is in a good position to do so. Considering that the alliance will control a
large share of the UK-US transatlantic market, Alamdari and Morrell' 9
 argue that fares
are very likely to rise.
6.1.9 Service co-ordination
As airlines have attempted to expand their networks by linking them together, they
have tried to project themselves as one single entity. The objective is to provide
consumers with the so-called 'seamless' service. Ideally, a passenger experiencing
seamless travel feels no difference when transferring from one airline to another on
the way to his/her final destination. To that passenger, it seems that he/she is
Alamdari, F., and Morrell, P. in 'Competition and clients will suffer' Travel and Tourism Guide, June 19, 1996, p. 5.
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travelling with only one airline. However, perfect seamlessness is an ideal which can
be reached only after a merger when integration is total. In alliances, the degree of
seainlessness which can be achieved is limited by various cultural and operational
factors.
Alliance partners have tried to project themselves as a single entity by applying a
number of marketing ploys which focus on seamless travel. The marketing practices
which have been described above form part of those ploys. Code-sharing, block-
spacing, franchising, schedule co-ordination and FFP combination all attempt to make
the passenger feel that he/she is travelling with only one airline and not with two
separate ones. Other means of creating the feeling of seamless travel include through
check-in, whereby the passenger checks his baggage only once and collects it only at
his/her final destination. Passenger walking distance at connecting airports is also
reduced by moving flights to gates which are closer to each other. SAS and
Continental, for example, have moved their flights to the same terminal at Newark.
However, operational difficulties can be encountered in the form of the unavailability
of slots when alliance partners attempt to shift their flights in order to decrease
passenger waiting time at connecting hubs.
The discrepancy in the quality of service of the partners in airline alliances is an area
of concern for many airlines, namely BA, KLM and Swissair in their alliances with
USAir, Northwest Airlines and Delta Airlines respectively. This is because all three
European carriers place great emphasis on a high quality of service in order to
differentiate their product. There is a great possibility that an alliance with an airline
offering inferior service levels might damage their image and lead to a fall in traffic in
the long run. Consequently, some airlines, namely KLM and Northwest Airlines, have
made efforts to harmonise their service quality levels wherever possible. For example,
KLM and Northwest have together designed virtually identical business classes on
their transatlantic flights featuring seats offering 48 inches leg room, greater choice of
entertainment and a wider range of meals among others. Airlines have also used
common advertising and branding to portray the alliance as offering a single
transportation system. That is the aim of BA whereby its franchises are unified under
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the BA Express brand. KLM and Northwest, spurred by their antitrust immunity, have
developed the KLM-Northwest World-wide Reliability logo (see Figure 6.12) which
incorporates the individual logos of both companies. It is extensively used in
promotional material, at the gates and check-in desks and on aircraft (Feldman,
1993b).
fljr4
Figure 6.12 The KLM-Northwest Worldwide Reliability logo
6.1.10 FFP Combination
Affiliation to an airline's FFP allows passengers to accumulate points on that airline's
flights. These points can then be used to obtain upgrades or free flights with the airline
when in sufficient number. An FFP is effectively a marketing tool which encourages
consumers to continue flying with the airline to whose FFP they belong, and to
discourage them from switching to competitors.
Most airline alliances have combined their FFPs allowing passengers to collect points
when they fly with either of the partners. Swissair offers a common FFP with Austrian
Airlines and Crossair called Qualiflyer. Likewise, Cathay Pacific, Singapore Airlines
and Malaysian Airlines developed the common FFP 'Passages' In July 1993. BA has
extended its FFP to both its major alliances and its franchises.
Obviously, the larger the network of the airline, the greater are the opportunities to
accumulate points and the greater the number of destinations for which these FFP
points can be used. Therefore, the size of an airline's network is an important variable
defming the attractiveness of its FFP relative to that of its competitors. Alliances
enable airlines to expand their networks at low cost and passengers can collect points
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when flying to more destinations. Furthermore, the passengers are offered a greater
number and variety of destinations to choose from when using their FFP points,
provided the networks of the partners do not overlap substantially. This by itself
makes the airlines in the partnership more competitive.
6.2 Cost-Reduction Strategies
The marketing strategies which have been described aim towards increasing revenues.
From the production point of view, the ultimate objective of airline alliances is to
improve efficiency and lower unit costs through resource consolidation and joint
production (Kilhstedt and Harrington, 1991; Landreth, 1992). Taken together, the
marketing and cost-reducing strategies lead to an improvement in the bottom line. In
this section, focus is on the areas which offer potential for joint production and
resource consolidation. These areas can be classified into five main categories:
facilities, labour, capacity utilisation, purchasing and non-core activities.
6.2.1 Facilities
Financial savings can be achieved either by joint use of facilities such as sales offices,
airport infrastructure including terminal facilities and lounges, and maintenance bases.
The utilisation of the certain facilities can also be enhanced if they are shared. Airlines
already strive to reap economies in those ways. For example, KLM has moved to
Northwest's terminal at Los Angeles (Feldman, 1993b). Likewise, EQA business
passengers could access one another's business lounges (Cameron, 1992) which
meant that the airlines could incur savings in not having to set up lounges at certain
key airports. Under the 'governor concept' introduced by the EQA in 1992, each
carrier took over the sales operations of the alliance in their respective domestic
markets. This lead to the closure of certain local sales offices resulting in substantial
savings in rent and reservations (Odell, 1994; Zenker, 1992). Joint maintenance brings
with it the added benefit of increased utilisation of facilities. Co-operation takes the
form of joint maintenance programs as in the case of the agreement between Japan
Airlines and All Nippon Airways (Knibb, 1994). Swissair and Austrian Airlines have
an agreement on the maintenance of their MD-80 aircraft whereby Swissair is
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responsible for engines and components while Austrian Airlines makes the larger
airframe checks for both airlines (Zenker, 1992). Furthermore, capital costs are
reduced as each of the partners are not required to set up separate maintenance bases.
6.2.2 Labour
Rationalisation in labour is closely related to economies derived from the shared use
of facilities. For example, closing down sales offices under the EQA's 'governor
concept' leads either to cuts in or a reorganisation of the sales force. In the same way,
economies are derived through the joint use of ground personnel or by practising
reciprocal ground handling. This avoids duplication of personnel at numerous airports
and leads to an improved utilisation of the remaining personnel.
Already in 1994, the former EQA was at an advanced stage in this type of co-
operation. The EQA partners co-operated at 30 stations in Europe. Swissair no longer
has ground handling people stationed at Vienna airport even though it has three daily
flights between Zurich and Vienna. Conversely, there are no Austrian Airlines staff at
Zurich airport (Feldman, 1993b; Zenker, 1992). The partners also agreed on Vilnius as
their joint station run by staff recruited from each of them. Costs were shared equally
by the three giving them a cost advantage over Lufthansa which had also opened a
station there (Cameron, 1992).
6.2.3 Capacity utilisation
How code-sharing and block-spacing improve capacity utilisation have already been
examined in section 6.1.5.3. Airlines also practice joint operation in a limited number
of cases to limit capacity. This consists in the operation, by one airline, of an air
service whereby another airline shares in both the costs and risks of that service. Joint
operation is particularly effective when the markets are of low traffic density. An
example of joint service is that offered by Air France and CSA on the Prague-Paris
route.	 -
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6.2.4 Purchasing
In the area of purchasing, substantial discounts are possible through the practice of
joint purchasing. Indeed, the large airline system which makes up the alliance can
order any type of commodities in sufficiently large amounts to obtain attractive
discounts from suppliers. Important items which can lead to significant savings are
flight equipment such as airframes, aircraft engines, aircraft communication and
navigation equipment, and spare parts and assemblies. Commonality of product and
sensible ordering is needed to achieve substantial results (Wood, 1994). Bulk purchase
of fuel from the same supplier can also lead to substantial discounts. Other sources of
savings are joint purchase of insurance (as practised by Air Mauritanie and Royal Air
Maroc) and of miscellaneous office and on-board equipment. To benefit from
synergies in purchasing, the Global Excellence has recently created a common
supplies purchasing agency called DSS World Sourcing. It has been set up as a non-
exclusive service agent to buy commercial supplies for the three airlines.
6.2.5 Non-core activities
This category includes those activities which are not directly related to airline
operation. Examples of such activities offering potential synergies are joint catering
and training of personnel, joint revenue accounting, and the integration of electronic
and automation systems.
6.3 Conclusion
Collaborative strategies of airlines are aimed towards increasing revenues and/or
decreasing costs. Code-sharing is a widely used marketing tool by most airline
alliances. It offers the potential to access new markets and traffic feed as well as
improved capacity utilisation and better CRS position. Related to code-sharing are
block-spacing and franchising which offers the same advantages. Cost-reducing
strategies are based mainly on the joint use of facilities and labour, and on the sharing
of capacity. Airlines can also increase their power to negotiate discounts with
suppliers by practising joint purchasing.
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PART III
MODELLING AIRLINE ALLIANCE SUCCESS
The previous two parts have set the background on which this research is constructed.
This part consists of the main contribution of this research towards analysing and
modelling airline alliance success.
PART I	 Background	 Types of interfirrn agreements
Histozy of co-operation in the airline indusuy
PART H
	
The new alliance era	 The current situation
Forces driving airline alliance fonnation
Airline collaborative strategies
PART III	 Modelling airline
alliance performance
PART IV	 Conclusions
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7. RESEARCH APPROACH
Introduction
A
good understanding of what is meant by alliance success is key to this
research. The aim of this chapter is to provide a proper definition of
alliance success. Being clear about what is meant by success will be
important when devising quantitative measurements of airline alliance success later.
7.1 The Definitional Problem
Attempting to define alliance success can be rather tricky as success is a very
subjective concept. Indeed, success has a different meaning to different firms at
different times. Success of a collaborative venture could mean survival to the ailing
company or could be synonymous to market domination to the strong firm. The BA-
USAir alliance is a perfect example of how the meaning of alliance success can
diverge between partners. To BA, success lies in accessing the US domestic market
while to USAir, success is to avoid bankruptcy by benefiting from a cash injection.
Furthennore, the literature search has also shown that all too often alliance success is
equated to its longevity. In its survey of airline alliances, the Boston Consulting
Group took this particular approach. However, as pointed out by Harrigan (1990) and
Yoshino et al (1995), alliance longevity can result from high exit barriers which force
firms to remain in the alliance even though it has achieved its intended goals. These
high exit barriers can take the form of capital or assets which are tied up to the
alliance. Conversely, termination is does not necessarily an indication of alliance
failure. Instead, it could mean that the alliance has achieved the objectives for which it
was designed and is no longer required. That is especially the case when the partners
ally in order to learn skills and expertise from each other and to capture each other's
'embedded knowledge' (Badarocco,. 1991).
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7.2 Internal Stability And Operational Performance
For an alliance to produce benefits, it is important for it to be internally stable. Indeed,
the relationship has to be structured in such a way that no strain exists between the
partners. The internal processes have to occur smoothly between the two finns so that
their synergistic potential is not wasted. The importance of alliance stability should
not be underestimated. The KLM-Northwest alliance is a good example on how
internal instability can inhibit alliance performance. This particular alliance has
brought substantial benefits to the constituent airlines. However, even the fact that it
can do so is not preventing the two airlines from drifting apart as a result of wrangling
at the boardroom level.
Once internal stability is achieved, the alliance can progress beyond mere existence
and achieve the set of objectives which was the rationale for its creation. Only when
those objectives have been reached can the alliance be considered a total success. The
basic argument is that alliance success consists of both successful management and on
goal achievement. In addition, as the alliance performs and yields concrete benefits,
the partners feel a growing sense of satisfaction concerning their venture. This
stabilises the alliance even further. However, successful management, in and by itself,
is not sufficient to ensure that the alliance objectives will be reached. Other
operational factors which are characteristic of the airline industry, come into play. The
situation is represented graphically in Figure 7.1.
Figure 7.1 The alliance stability-success relationship
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In brief, a successful alliance is one which
(1) is stable, and
(2) achieves its objectives.
Measurement of airline alliance success would require the quantification of both.
However, it is very difficult to attach a value to the extent to which an airline alliance
is stable. Moreover, this might not be necessary since the airline industry is basically a
service industry and a great number of studies have been performed on the
management of alliances between service companies. Therefore, the investigation of
factors contributing to airline alliance stability will be of a qualitative nature and will
be based on previous studies which are not necessarily airline-specific. That is the
subject of Chapter 8.
Quantification can be performed more easily as far as the alliance objectives are
concerned. Chapter 9 will identif' the operational goals of airline alliances and their
quantification will be dealt with in subsequent chapters.
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8. AIRLINE ALLIANCE STABILITY
Introduction
F
or an airline alliance to succeed, it has to be managed appropriately. This
requires a good understanding of how the relationship between two separate
firms is structured. It is argued that such an understanding is lacking in the
airline industry because airline managers have long been accustomed to the Porterian
competitive strategy, whereby a company tackles its competitors single-handedly.
This is a major factor causing airline alliance failure.
The aim of this chapter is to discuss the management issues which need to be
considered when designing and maintaining a stable airline alliance. Much is
borrowed from the extant business and strategy literature and attempts are made to
adapt the concepts developed in those fields to airline alliances. The chapter is divided
into three main parts. The first part addresses the formation stage of alliances. Once
the alliance deal has been struck and the firms start interacting, a number of
managerial problems are bound to surface as managers come to terms with the
concept of shared controL AThe issues to be considered at the alliance operational stage
are analysed in the second part of the chapter. The chapter concludes with the
evolving nature of alliances which alliance managers should be aware of and be able
to cope with.
8.1Stages In Alliance Development
The fact that alliances involve two or more interacting firms which can influence but
which can not control one another creates a number of challenges when managing
them (Borys and Jemison, 1989; Parkhe, 1993). These managerial and organisational
problems have to be thoroughly understood and tackled in the proper fashion as they
contribute in bringing about alliance stability, and ultimately alliance success.
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Faulkner (1995), for example, finds statistical evidence linking alliance management
factors with their ultimate effectiveness in his study of 67 alliances. l'his is also the
main conclusion reached by Parkhe (1993) in an empirical study of alliances grounded
in game theory. In a qualitative study of airline alliances, Flanagan and Marcus (1992,
p. 23) argue that 'There are no universal structural models that can guarantee success.
Rather, it is understanding the fundamental power relationship between the partners
and the process by which an airline chooses its partners, and subsequently structures
that relationship which is critical to success.' Based on that statement and on the work
of Achrol et a! (1991), three main stages in the development of alliances can be
distinguished: the formation stage, the operational stage and the evolution stage. Each
stage has to be managed carefully as progress in the next stages depends on its
successful completion. The major issues which need to be given adequate
consideration at each of the stages are given in Figure 8.1.
FORMATION
	
OPERATION
	
EVOLUTION
Confirmation of strategic
rationale
Strategic fit
Partner selection
Alliance creation
Commitment
Trust
Gaming implications
Power
Control
Change in strategic objectives
Partner development
Learning
Monitoring and divorce
procedures
Figure 8.1 Stages in alliance development
8.2 The Formation Process
The alliance formation stage can be modelled into four steps:
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(1) Confirmation of the strategic rationale
(2) Setting the criteria for strategic fit
(3) Finding the right partner
(4) Creating the alliance (Lorange and Roos, 1992; Sommerlatte, 1994).
8.2.1 Step 1: Confirmation of the strategic rationale
In the first step, the airline has to be clear about how an alliance can help it achieve its
overall business objectives. It is important for it to confirm that an alliance is the best
means by which to meet these objectives, rather than going for a merger or
acquisition. In so many cases, airlines have formed alliances just because everybody
else was doing so. The alliance is bound to fail if the venture is approached with such
an attitude. The airline must also be clear about its own objectives for the alliance and
what type of alliance is best suited to these objectives. (Flanagan and Marcus, 1992).
Key questions which have to be answered are: should the alliance be strategic or
tactical, and should it involve equity?; is the alliance going to be indefinite or is it
going to be dissolved after a specified time span?
8.2.2 Step 2: Setting the criteria for strategic fit
Sommerlatte (1994) differentiates between two types of criteria for partner strategiQ
fit: hard and soft. The hard criteria evaluate the partner specific strengths and whether
they suit the airline's objectives. Examples of hard criteria for an airline alliance are
the network size of the prospective partner, the degree of overlap of the networks of
the two airlines, the market power of the partner at major hubs, the fleet size and
aircraft types in the fleet of the partner, the presence in regions bearing main traffic
flows and having the potential for growth, and the financial standing of the
prospective partner. The BA-USAir alliance is an example of an airline alliance which
did not perform as expected because USAir did not fulfil the financial fitness
criterion.
Soft criteria are those which can not be readily quantified and which are, in most
cases, purely judgemental. A very important soft criterion is compatibility. Achrol et
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a! (1990) argue that compatibility between partners replaces the organisational
identity, operating system and strategy which is prominent in the single organisation.
According to them, compatibility is effectively the glue which holds the partners
together. They identify two types of firm compatibility which affect the structure of
alliance relationships: organisational compatibility, which can be subdivided into
cultural, strategic and functional compatibility, and goal compatibility. In selecting
appropriate partners, it is essential for the candidates to exhibit these characteristics
(Bucklin and Sengupta, 1992). They are discussed next.
8.2.2.1 Cultural compatibility
Cultural differences are reflected in the very structure of perceiving, thinking and
reasoning. Parkhe (1991) identifies three potential sources of cultural friction: the
societal context, the national context and the corporate context. Differences in the
societal culture lead to differences in problem solving and conflict resolution. For
example, in certain cultures, any emerging problems have to be tackled immediately.
In other cultures, however, problems are viewed as predestined and have to be
fatalistically accepted. Likewise, some cultures regard conflict as healthy while, in
others, conflict is to be avoided at all costs. The national context consists of industry
structure and institutions, and government laws and regulation (Parkhe, 1991). Three
main national contexts emerge world-wide: the Japanese context with its keiretsu
(large industrial groups of firms representing diverse industries and skills), the US
context which views collaboration with suspicion as reflected by its antitrust
regulations, and the European context which is characterised by nationalist and
protectionist tendencies. Co-operation in alliances can be rendered difficult by the
differences in the industry structure in which the two partners thrive, and by the
different government laws prevailing.The corporate culture, which is closely related
to the previous two contexts, incorporates the values of particular organisations. US
companies are known to be addicted to 'a tradition that has long taught managers the
dangerously incorrect arithmetic that equates 51% with 100% and 49% with 0%'
(Ohmae, 1992; p. 44). Europeans and Japanese, on the other hand, tend to consider
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their partners as equals and do not put emphasis on control in their co-operative
ventures.
8.2.2.2 Strategic compatibility
Strategically, an airline can be a cost leader or marketing oriented. Clashes will result
if the partners differ along this dimension by having very different ways of operating.
The cost-leader, for example, prefers a structured centralised organisation, while the
market-oriented firm will push for greater decentralisation. Strategic incompatibility
can also arise if the assets of the firms are not complementary.J The BA-United
Airlines alliance which was created in 1987 is an example of an alliance which failed
owing to non-complementarity of assets. United Airlines main reason for allying was
to have access to Heathrow via BA. Once it obtained the traffic rights to Heathrow°,
access provided by BA was no longer required and the alliance was dissolved. The
combined assets also need to possess a synergistic potential (Faulkner, 1995). Indeed,
there is no point in having very compatible assets which, when combined together, are
still unable to beat the competition. Thus, it is very unlikely for alliances between
weak partners to produce a strong entity.
8.2.2.3 Functional compatibility
Functionally, alliance partners can differ in the style of management (authoritarian or
participatory), delegation of responsibility (high or low), decision-making (centralised
or decentralised), and reliance on formal planning and control systems (high or low).
Such differences in the way of operating can lead to friction which undermines the
stability of the alliance. Parkhe (1991) proposes the creation of unitary management
processes and structures where one decision point has the authority and independence
to commit to both partners. In that way, problems caused by unclear lines of authority,
poor communication, and slow decision-making can be avoided. He recognises that
40 Following a renegotiation of the US-UK bilateral in 1991, United Airlines and American Airlines were allowed to replace
TWA and Pan Am as the only two airlines allowed to serve London Heathrow.
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this may be difficult if the partners are equal in terms of size and resource
contributions, but it has to be done during the alliance formation negotiations.
8.2.2.4 Goal compatibility
fFirms entering into alliances do not necessarily have the same goals (Borys and
[Jemison, 1989). The KLM-Northwest airline alliance is a case in point. At the time of
alliance formation, the interest of KLM lay in accessing the US market via
Northwest's extensive domestic network. Northwest, however, was in dire financial
straits and was in great need of a fmancially strong partner to back it up. Differences
in objectives are present particularly in alliances between majors and domestic
airlines. Indeed, the former are concerned with securing traffic feed and inhibiting
competition, while the latter seek survival by benefiting from the protection of a
strong carrier.
Achrol et al (1990) differentiate between the autonomous goals of the firms and the
goals which intersect with the alliance. Conflict can arise as the firms strive to co-
operate while retaining their autonomy at the same time (Spekman and Sawhney,
1990). The extent of compromise between the autonomous goals and the alliance
goals will define the level of conflict.
The substitute for goal similarity between organisations is goal complementarity
which is the extent to which partners perceive that simultaneous goal accomplishment
is possible (Spekman and Sawhney, 1990). The goals of the independent
organisations in the alliance need not be totally identical. Indeed, achieving one of the
partner's objectives does not have to entail disbenefits for the other partner. Goal
compatibility therefore creates a win-win situation whereby both partners gain which
determines the stability of the alliance. It is important for the partners to recognise
that their goals need not be identical since the complementarity issue becomes the
common driving force (Lorange and Roos, 1992). Achrol et al (1990) argue that
avoidance of conflict over autonomous goals is possible by a clear definition of the
domain for the partners and the alliance. This can be achieved by introducing specific
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clauses in the agreement preventing partners from entering one another's business. It
is also advisable that the partners do not compete in the same market.
8.2.3 Step 3: Finding the right partner
Finding the right partner is carried out by applying the criteria presented above to a
set of potential candidates. However, this can be difficult in the current airline
industry because most of the suitable partners are being taken up rapidly.
Furthermore, it is extremely difficult to find the partner with an entirely compatible
culture (Achrol et a!, 1990; Faulkner, 1995). The problem is even more acute when
partners in different world regions are sought (Yoshino and kangan, 1995). This is
particularly the case of contemporary airline alliances which, in most cases, involve
airlines from different countries as they strive to achieve global reach. Therefore, it is
essential for each airline management to make great efforts to learn the ideologies of
their partners and attempt to understand the different contexts from which the partner
comes from (Lewis, 1990). Sommerlatte (1994) proposes the use of a cultural 'map'
which graphically compares the cultural positions of the firm and its prospective
partner based on a set of criteria. The narrower the gap between the companies, then
the lower will be the risk of cultural conflict. However, if the cultural gap is too vast,
then it is better to create a joint venture with its own identity.
Analytical considerations need to take into account two dimensions of the prospective
partners: (1) how much are they each prepared to invest into and retrieve from the
alliance, which effectively asks to what extent is the alliance important to the firm,
and (2) their individual strategic position, that is are they leaders or followers in their
respective business? Such an analysis will reveal whether the partners complement
each other and whether both of them will gain from the alliance. If this is the case,
then the chances of success will increase. The question as to whether the partner has a
hidden agenda needs to be addressed.
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8.2.4 Step 4: Creating the alliancet
Once the three stages of alliance formation have been completed, then it is time to
create the alliance. In that stage, the partners present their strategic objectives to each
other, and detail their expectations of the alliance. Discussion has to be open to create
the feeling of trust. Lorange and Roos (1992) identify a number of political and
analytical issues which have to be given due attention at that stage of the formation
process. They are discussed below.
8.2.4.1 Stakeholder blessing
Internal and external stakeholders can view the alliance as a threat to their careers and
power within the firm, to their job, or even to their reputation and they may be
concerned about the response of the stock market. They might therefore group
themselves to stop the venture. It is therefore imperative to understand their behaviour
and consider their demands so that they agree to the alliance. Chances of them
accepting are promoted by previous positive experiences and a reputation for
trustworthiness in dealings. However, if they continue to oppose the venture, then it is
advisable for it to be postponed.
8.2.4.2 Internal support
In striving for internal support, managers have to ensure that the personnel within
their organisations who will be participating in the strategic alliance have been
adequately documented on the venture and are clear about their tasks. They must also
be motivated to carry them out and be prepared to interact with their counterparts. It is
advisable for the personnel to be aware of the negotiations quite early so that they are
ready for quick task actions during the alliance implementation. This may be difficult
in certain cases owing to confidentiality reasons, but should be applied wherever
possible.
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8.2.4.3 Strategic plan
This stage is effectively concerned with translating the strategic alliance idea into a
business plan. Information is gathered to investigate which and how the partners can
combine their operations effectively to reach their set objectives. It is only when the
business plan has been laid out clearly that the strategic alliance can become
competitive.
The formation process is now complete. The partner has been selected, details of co-
operation have been hammered out and the alliance is now operational. While the
alliance is performing, it is essential to maintain it as it is very easy for it the
relationship between the firms to deteriorate. The next section will analyse the
structure of inter-firm relationships and, from that, provide guidelines on how to keep
the alliance stable.
8.3 Structure Of Alliance Relationships
The basic notion underlining the structure of alliance relationships is that alliances
involve the interaction of people. This interaction engenders feelings, which, if good,
promote alliance stability. The structure of alliance relationships is defined by the
degree of trust into the partner, the level of commitment to the alliance and the degree
of power/control exerted or experienced. The alliance situation can be modelled as in
Figure 8.2.
8.3.1 Commitment
Achrol et al (1990, p. 16) define commitment as 'the desire and intent of participants
to give energy and loyalty to an organisation, to be effectively attached to its goals
and values, and to sustain the well-being of the relationship'. In their view,
commitment of an organisation to an alliance replaces the traditional control
mechanisms in single finns, namely a defined line of authority or an internally
consistent set of goals. It is essential for participating firms to be committed as they
will then be prone to co-operation, communication and more adaptable to conflict.
The importance of commitment, exhibited particularly by top management, was
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highly correlated to alliance success in the study of 67 alliances carried out by
Faulkner (1995).
Commitment	 Trust
INTERFIRM
RELATIONSHIP
Power
Figure 8.2 Conceptual model of the structure of alliance relationships
The need therefore arises to maintain and enhance the commitment of the partners to
the alliance. One way is by the investment of resources which might be either
financial, personnel, technological or physical facilities (Cravens et a!, 1993). The
latter deter the investing firm from terminating the relationship as this can lead to their
irreversible loss. The involvement of unique physical assets and specialised skills
further increases commitment (Williamson, 1985). Acbrol et a! (1990) observe that
commitment to the alliance is high if the alliance goals are strategic in nature, that is
the success of the participating organisations is highly dependent on the success of the
alliance. However, most finns, in particular airlines, would avoid being in such a
vulnerable position where their future is dependent on the actions of another company.
Another means by which airlines have attempted to demonstrate their commitment to
their alliances has been to purchase a small stake in their partners. These equity
investments heighten the investing firm's interest in its partner's success, and
therefore increase its commitment to the alliance success. This practice was prevalent
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in the EQA and the Global Excellence where the constituent airlines had bought into
one another. BA is also a firm proponent of equity purchases though, in its case, the
purchases are more substantial and unilateral in that it does all the purchasing.
8.3.2 Trust
Driscoll (1978) defines trust of a firm in its alliance partner as the belief that the
partner will, without the exercise of influence or control, strive for outcomes that are
beneficial for both firms. Achrol et al (1990, p. 17) go further to add that 'the level of
trust in an alliance is indicated by each firm's confidence in its partner's sincerity,
loyalty, and willingness to refrain from opportunistic 4 ' behaviour.' A feeling of trust
within the alliance context favours more open communication, greater clarification of
goals and problems, more extensive search for alternative courses of action, and a
greater motivation to implement decisions (Zand, 1972). Trust is an important factor
when it comes to withering the effects of unforeseen changes in the operating
environment of the partners and of the alliance, and is seen as key to sustaining
alliance stability (Jarillo in Borys and Jemison, 1989).
Trust is a very important factor in airline alliances and has been known to be the cause
of failure behind a number of airline alliances. The sense of mistrust felt by Lufthansa
in its negotiations with American Airlines caused it to prefer United Airlines as its US
partner (Jennings, 1995b). American Airlines also got into problems with Japan
Airlines (JAL) when, after one year's of negotiation for linking up the airlines'FFPs,
it asked the US DoT to reject JAL's application to serve Honolulu from Sendai. More
recently, the KLM-Northwest Airlines alliance was undermined when Northwest felt
that KLM wanted to take control of it and consequently adopted a measure to prevent
KLM from gaining further control into it. In order to rekindle the feeling of trust,
KLM has withdrawn three senior executives from the board of Northwest.
4 Examp1es of opportunistic action, in this context, could be withholding or distorting information, shirking or failing to fulfil
promises, appropriating a partner's proprietary technology or key personnel, making payments late, or abruptly abandoning the
alliance.
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Like in any kind of relationship, trust takes time to develop. However, an examination
of the past relationships of prospective partners gives an indication as to whether they
are worthy of trust42 . American Airlines, for example, is notorious in that it has a
string of failed code-sharing partnerships. This, according to a code-sharing expert, is
'not an insignificant fact' for potential partners. Unilateral commitments as proposed
by Gulati et al (1994) contribute to nurture the feeling of trust in the alliance context.
Taking the risk of committing resources to the alliance activities even before the
contract has been agreed upon and sealed gives a strong indication that the firm takes
interest in the success of the alliance and is therefore worthy of trust. Achrol et a!
(1990) argue that trust depends on the manner in which interfirm interactions are
organised and conducted. For example, interactions between people of the same status
from the two different organisations facilitate trust. The attitude taken towards the
partner is also important. Indeed, considering the partner on an equal basis and taking
a problem-solving attitude rather than one emphasising control generates trust.
8.3.3 A game-theoretic perspective of alliances
Low levels of commitment and trust and a high degree of power induce cheating. This
tendency to cheat prevails because one partner finds it 'advantageous to maximise his
own gains at the expense of the venture' (Hennart in Parkhe, 1993; p. 796). The
alliance situation characterised by two or more interacting firms which are mutually
vulnerable to one another but which can not control one another's behaviour, and
which can be tempted to cheat at any time makes game theory an ideally-suited tool to
study the structure of alliance relationships. The application of game theory to
alliances was performed by Gulati et a! (1994). Their work which is is presented
below confirms the importance of unilateral commitments in generating trust.
42 Parkhe (1993) refers to this as the 'shadow of the future'. He confirms statistically that the performance of a strategic alliance
will be positively related to the length of the 'shadow of the future' that is cast.
Airline Business, June 1995, p. 25.
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Co-operate
Company A
Not co-operate
8.3.3.1 The Prisoner's Dilemma
Different scenarios exist to conceptualise this unstable situation prevailing between
two firms, the most common one being termed the Prisoner's Dilemma. In the
Prisoner's Dilemma, the two firms are assumed to have a choice of two options: co-
operation or non co-operation. The hypothetical outcomes of the different choices of
action are depicted in Figure 8.3. Co-operation with each other yields a greater payoff
than if neither co-operate. However, the temptation to act opportunistically is high as
the non co-operative partner can receive the highest possible pay-off while the other
loses out. Consequently, each partner fears that the other will cheat while it itself co-
operates in good faith which ends up in non co-operation on the part of both who
hence end up worse off than if they had co-operated in the first place.
Company B
Co-operate	 Not co-operate
Outcome	 Outcome
Company A: 7
	 Company A: 3
Company B: 7	 Company B: 9
Outcome	 Outcome
Company A: 9	 Company A: 5
Company B: 3	 Company B: 5
Figure 8.3 Hypothetical payoffs in the Prisoner's Dilemma situation
Source: Gulati et a! (1994)
The Prisoner's Dilemma therefore assumes that each company's best response to its
partner's choice of action is the same regardless of what its partner chooses, that is
non-co-operation. One might argue that if alliances grounded in the Prisoner's
Dilemma are bound to fail, then each prospective partner should rationally anticipate
this and not enter the alliance in the first place. However, according to Gulati et a!
(1994), allying companies expect to benefit from the formation of the alliance itself,
that is, even if neither co-operate, they still expect to get better payoffs that they
0 Department of Air Transport, Cranfield University 	 149
Co-operate
Company A
Not co-operate
_____________________________________________Chapter 8: Airline alliance stability
would without the alliance. Consequently, they argue that taking the Prisoner's
Dilemma as the only available alliance structure guarantees the failure of the alliance.
They therefore propose an alternative structure which could be more effective in
preserving alliance stability.
8.3.3.2 The modfIed alliance scenario
The new outcome of firm interaction is depicted in Figure 8.4. In the improved game-
theoretic model, the tendency for non co-operation does not dominate over that for co-
operation as in Figure 8.3. Indeed, company A's co-operation is best responded to by
co-operation from company B.
Company B
Co-operate	 Not co-operate
Outcome	 Outcome
Company A: 9
	
Company A: 4
Company B: 9
	
Company B: 7
Outcome	 Outcome
CompanyA:7	 CompanyA:5
Company B: 4
	
Company B: 5
Figure 8.4 Hypothetical payoffs in the modified game-theoretic model
Source: Gulati et a! (1994)
Likewise, the best response to non-co-operation is non-co-operation itself. The need,
however, arises to sway the equilibrium towards co-operation and Gulati et al (1994)
propose the use of unilateral commitments as a means of achieving that goal. Such
unilateral commitments could be an emphasis on the importance of the alliance by
committing the firm's reputation to its success, a unilateral commitment of resources,
or a promise of exclusivity. These commitments from one or both partners indicate
that the firm has all the intentions of co-operating, will not indulge in any type of
opportunistic behaviour, and hopes for a reciprocal commitment When one of the
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firms has made such commitments, the other can then decide on how it is going to
move. This sequential mode of action can result in a better outcome in terms of
alliance performance and stability. The effectiveness of unilateral commitments in
maintaining robust relationships is confirmed by Parkhe (1993) who demonstrates
empirically that the level of commitment of non-recoverable investments in a strategic
alliance is negatively related to the perception of opportunistic behaviour.
8.3.4 Power and control issues in interfinn relationships
Power is central to alliance relationships (Flanagan and Marcus, 1993; Thorelli,
1986). The emergence of power of one of the firms in an interfirm relationship is due
either to unequal resource endowments (Emerson, 1962) or size (Osborn and Baughn,
1990) which leads to an imbalance in the interdependence between the firms. This
imbalance can be particularly prevalent in alliances between major airlines and
regional/domestic airlines. Bucklin and Sengupta (1992) argue that power imbalances
are potential sources of conflict in that the more powerful partner can abuse of its
position and is very likely to behave opportunistically. Furthermore, the more
powerful partner can use its position as a bargaining chip and restrict access of its
partner to resources in its possession (Harrigan and Newman, 1990). The weaker
partner, when confronted to a situation of inferiority, will react to limit its
vulnerability in various ways, one of them being involvement in competing alliances.
This can engender a chain reaction ending in both firms failing to achieve their initial
goals. Hence, Bucklin and Sengupta (1992) hypothesise and confirm their hypothesis
statistically that power imbalances undermine interfirm relationships.
They consequently propose that the balance of power can be levelled by the use of the
law of contract whereby weak firms can control the behaviour of their stronger
partners and can be compensated in case of deviation from the initial agreement. Four
means of balancing the relationship via contractual governance are identified: (1)
formality, (2) exit barriers, (3) exclusivity, and (4) financial incentives. Formality is
addressed in the legal document itself which constrains the behaviour of the stronger
party. Raising of exit barriers is possible by designing long-term agreements or by
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incorporating penalties if the partner were to leave the alliance prematurely.
Exclusivity clauses in the contract prevent the partner from allying with other firms,
and financial incentives involve equity investments, direct monetary payments or
commissions on joint sales. Regression analysis performed by Bucklin and Sengupta
(1992) confirm that the combination of those characteristics of contractual governance
reduce the power imbalance in an alliance. However, significant costs (Williamson,
1985) can be incurred in using the law to protect one's interests in case the contract
has been breached. Furthermore, over-emphasis on the legal aspect can undermine the
feeling of trust which is important for alliance stability.
Once the alliance has been properly formed and is being adequately maintained, it will
start evolving. It is important for managers to realise that alliances are prone to
evolution resulting from changing external and internal circumstances, the
repositioning of partner priorities and interpartner learning. The evolutionary aspect of
alliances is considered next.
8.4 Alliance Evolution
Faulkner (1995) considers alliance evolution as a prerequisite for survival. According
to Thorelli (1986), an alliance will wither unless efforts are consciously made to
induce the alliance to evolve. Achrol et al (1990) define four successive stages in the
temporal development of alliances: (1) the entrepreneurial stage, (2) the collectivity
stage, (3) the formalisation stage, and (4) the domain elaboration stage. The alliance
evolution model is graphically represented in Figure 8.5 and the different stages are
described in some detail.
The entrepreneurial stage, as the name indicates, is characterised by an entrepreneurial
spirit which encourages innovation, creativity, acquisition and control of resources,
and development of an ideology. Success is then determined by adequate resource
acquisition, growth, flexibility and the development of external support. The
collectivity stage is more concerned with human resource management. Success is
defined by the development of commitment, cohesion and morale, and informal and
open communication among personnel involved in the alliance.
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Flexibility
Adaptation
Growth
Resource Acquisition
External Support
Environment Fit
Leadership
Training
Commitment
Cohesion
Loyalty
Morale
Initiative
Communications
TIME
Stage 1	 Stage2	 Stage3	 Stage4
ENTREPRENEURIAL COLLECTIVITY	 FORMALISATION	 DOMAIN
ELABORATION
Goal Setting	 Back to
Planning	 Entrepreneurial
Optimal Use of
	 Stage Issues
Resources
Efficiency
Information Management
Stability and Order
Coordination and
Direction
Figure 8.5 Alliance development model
Adaptedfrom Achrol et al (1991)
Successful completion of the first and second stages leads to alliance stability on
which the formalisation stage can build. At that point, policies and procedures within
the alliance have become institutionalised and alliance goals formalised. Efforts can
then be made to reach those goals and success comes in goal attainment. The final
stage-domain elaboration-is more of an aftermath when the alliance seeks to renew
itself and expand its domain. This is achieved by a re-evaluation of the strategic goals,
domains and synergies between partners.
SAS explains its devolvement from the EQA six years after its creation by the
alliance's lack of evolution. According to SAS, the alliance never progressed much
beyond the collectivity stage and it was too slow in yielding benefits. Hence, SAS has
preferred to strengthen its ties with Lufthansa.
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8.4.1 Strategic incompatibility
Strategic incompatibilities can also arise after alliance formation as the interests of the
partners change. This is particularly so in the volatile air transport environment.
Parkhe (1991) argues that one way to ensure alliance stability in that case is to build
flexibility into the partnership structure which can allow the partners to cope with the
changes in their internal and external environments. Flexible structures can be
developed by starting co-operation on small scale, short-term projects and then
gradually progressing towards more extensive co-operation. This enables strategic fit
between the partners to be assessed on a continual basis. Another alternative is to
enter into a general co-operative agreement which is activated only when required.
8.4.2 Flexibility, balanced development and bonding
Considering the evolutionary nature of alliances, Faulkner (1995) identifies flexibility
as an important factor in the success of alliances. Indeed, when circumstances change,
the alliance should have inbuilt mechanisms which allow it to adapt. Managers should
also be trained to accept the tendency of alliances to change, and should be capable of
coping with it.
As the alliance moves along its evolutionary path, there is bound to be some
discrepancy in the development of the individual partners. Faulkner (1995) therefore
recommends that a balanced development should prevail for alliance stability. The
BA-USAir and KLM-Northwest alliances are cases in point. A study by the Gellman
Research Associates in the US on the benefits of code sharing has indicated that BA
and KLM are reaping substantially greater benefits than their US partners. Northwest
Airlines is also blaming KLM of furthering its interests at its expense, which is
undermining the agreement.
A third recommendation by Faulkner (1995) is for the partners to create bonding
mechanisms which will prevent alliance dissolution. He identifies three bonding
mechanisms:
Sec Chapter 4.
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(1) Combined problem resolution
(2) Regular personnel exchange
(3) Combination of cultures.
The first two mechanisms are relatively easy to implement in the context of airline
alliances. However, some resistance is anticipated where the third mechanism is
concerned.
8.4.3 Interpartner learning
Involvement into a strategic alliance necessarily entails an opening-up of the
organisations to their partners who then have access, to a certain degree, to their
competencies. Learning via the alliance can then enable one of the firms to acquire the
skills and technologies it did not possess at the time of alliance formation so that it
may eventually not need its partner any more. Taking a rather extreme view, Parkhe
(1991) and Hamel (1991) observe that alliances can become races to learn: the
company which intemalises the core abilities of its partner faster can then dominate
the relationship by increasing its bargaining power and eventually become a
formidable competitor. From that, it can be argued that the stability of the alliance can
depend on the degree to which the partners can learn each other's core expertise. The
less they learn, the better, since they will then continue to need their partner as they
did at alliance formation. It therefore becomes important to devise means to protect
the firms' core competencies. Faulkner (1995) notes that this view of alliance
development is too narrow in that it does not take into account the synergies which
result from the alliance. Though one partner has learnt all about the skills of its
counterpart, it still needs it to translate the synergistic potential of the alliance into
tangible benefits.
In marketing airline alliances where the goal is the achievement of economies of
scope and density, interpartner learning is not relevant (Porter and Fuller, 1985).
However, an airline can use its alliance to learn about its market and pricing
strategies. The problem is more serious if the alliance allows an airline to have access
to strategically important data of its partner. This could make it a serious competitor
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in case the alliance were to break. Learning can also be prevalent in cost-reducing
alliances. For example, an alliance can allow an airline to have access to maintenance
expertise and knowledge which takes time to acquire via the usual channels.
Therefore, it becomes important for airlines to develop safeguards protecting their
core expertise, keeping in mind that current airline alliances are quite unstable and
that their partner could be a competitor in the future. Conversely, for the alliance to
be stable, alliance managers should not view the implementation of safeguards as an
indication of distrust.
8.4.4 Monitoring and divorce procedures
Having recognised that change is inherent to alliances, it is important to set up
procedures such as communication links and organisational structures to constantly
monitor and reassess the alliance. For example, the Global Excellence has created a
Steering Committee of the CEOs charged with planning long-term alliance strategy.
Senior executive committees are also charged with generating proposals for areas of
co-operation while the responsibility of some functional managers is to facilitate co-
operation (Flanagan and Marcus, 1993). The break-up of an alliance can be a rather
bitter experience as the parties wrangle over who owns what. Therefore, procedures
should be established at the outset as to how the separation will take place, if ever it
does happen.
8.5 Conclusion
This chapter has attempted to bring together selected important issues pertaining to
the management of alliances which have been raised in the extensive business and
strategy literature. These points could be useful to managers of airline alliances as
they attempt to make their alliances stable and eventually successful. Partner selection
is an important initial stage in the alliance formation process in which consideration
has to be given to the different types of partner compatibility, namely organisational
and goal compatibility. Once the partner has been selected, a formal procedure which
focuses on a number of political and analytical issues has to be adopted in creating the
alliance. After the agreement has been finalised and the partners start working
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together, the structure of the relationship has to be carefully managed. Consideration
has to be given to the level of partner conimitment, the amount of trust and the
balance of power within the relationship. Analysis grounded in game theory shows
that alliance stability is enhanced if the partners do not perceive the alliance from the
Prisoner's Dilemma perspective. Unilateral commitments are primordial to sway the
relationship away from that. Finally, this chapter recognises the importance of alliance
evolution and the need for continuous reassessment.
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9. AIRLINE ALLIANCE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES
Introduction
T
wo meanings of airline alliance success were identified in Chapter 7.
Stability as a success criterion was used in Chapter 8 and the factors
contributing to the endurance of the alliance were presented. The second
alliance success criterion, the attainment of objectives, is now applied. The aim of this
chapter is to analyse the objectives of airline alliances in depth and from that, classify
them in a way that facilitates their future measurement.
9.1Airline Alliance Performance Measurement
A very important consideration when attempting to measure airline alliance
performance is to differentiate between long-term and medium-term objectives. These
are usually not identical though achieving the medium-term objectives enables the
fulfilment of the long-term ones. In the airline alliance context, the long-term goal of
airlines adopting the alliance strategy is to reap financial returns in the form of either
increased revenues or decreased costs or both. What they seek is an eventual
improvement in their bottom line. Medium-term goals of alliances are more of an
operational nature, such as the increase in market share or the dominance of a market.
Focus on the long-term objective of airline alliances would mandate the application of
traditional financial measures such as Return on Investment, Return on Sales, Growth
in Revenues, Cash Flow/Investment, Average Return on Total Capital and the like to
the assessment of airline alliance performance (Chakravarthy, 1986). However, a
serious drawback in the use of the financial measures is that while they are appropriate
in measuring the strategic performance of an airline as a whole, they would not lend
themselves easily to the measurement of the alliance performance specifically. This is
because it is virtually impossible to separate the financial payoffs of the alliance from
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the overall fmancial results of the airline owing to the inappropriateness of the current
reporting procedures. Moreover, it is doubtful whether airlines themselves have
implemented mechanisms to isolate the benefits of their alliances.
In order to circumvent this problem of separability, it is deemed preferable to take one
step backwards in the airline goal hierarchy so as to focus on the medium-term
objectives of airline alliances. In other words, the operational performance of the
alliance is monitored. Alliance success is then given by the extent to which alliance-
specfIc goals have been achieved. The change in value of the measured variable from
a defined pre-alliance period to a defined post-alliance period measures alliance
success for that particular goal. This approach requires the identification of the
alliance-specific objectives of airlines, which is considered next.
9.2 Identification And Classification Of Airline Alliance Objectives
The strategic rationale for the creation of an airline alliance can essentially be
analysed from two perspectives: supply (production) and demand (marketing). On the
supply side, the objectives are to decrease production costs and increase efficiency.
Demand-side objectives consist mainly of accessing new markets, benefiting from
traffic feed and increasing market power. In economic terms, the achievement of these
objectives allows the airlines to reap economies of scale, economies of scope and
economies of density. The relative importance of the operational goals can be judged
from a survey carried out by Flanagan and Marcus (1993) with a sample of 118
airlines. The results of the survey are summarised in Figure 9.1.
9.3 Supply-Side Alliance Goals
On the supply side, the strategy is to combine certain of the partners' operations in
order to decrease unit production costs and to increase the utilisation of resources. In
economic terms, this equates to economies of scale. The areas of production in which
rational isation of operations are possible were detailed in Chapter 6. It is important to
distinguish between economies of scale in specific production sectors and economies
of scale accruing from overall airline size which are considered further. Therefore,
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supply-side economies of scale will hereafter be referred to as economies of
integration.
Figure 9.1 Relative importance of airline alliance objectives
Source: Flanagan and Marcus (1993)
Key:
TF: traffic feed AC: ass to new markds; SM: sa1es/inarking scale CU: ñiaeased capacity utilisation FA facilities scale SG:
ation and ground scalç DM: defaice of cerrent marks; SN: scale in non-core adivities.
9.4 Demand-Side Alliance Goals
On the demand side, alliances enable airlines to satisfy their need to grow. That growth
is a motivator for airline alliance formation was demonstrated by Youssef (1992) who
found a statistically-significant difference between the means of the sizçs of allied and
non-allied airlines. Why is the growth imperative prevalent in the airline industry? This
is because size carries with it a number of network-based advantages termed as
economies of scope and density. There is also a belief that increased size leads to
economies of scale. The next sections will elaborate upon the relevance of these
economies in the context of airline alliances.
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9.4.1 Economies of scale
By defmition, economies of scale are realised when unit costs decrease with increases
in total production (that is, firm size). The hypothetical existence of economies of
scale in the airline industry has been the subject of a large number of studies 45 . In a
review of the most prominent ones, White (1979) concludes that cost advantages as a
result of size alone do not exist in the airline industry, other factors such as average
stage length, traffic density, and input prices remaining constant46.
Do alliances bring about scale economies? The fundamental question here is whether
the unit costs of allied airlines is significantly lower than that of non-allied airlines. If
ever these economies exist, they will be revealed by a significant degree of
association between airline unit costs and airline and alliance size after adjustments
for airline traffic density, stage length and input prices. In a preliminary attempt to
detect the existence of economies of scale due to alliance formation, the unit cost of
44 airlines47 in 1993 is plotted against their size and the size of the alliances to which
they belong (see Figure 9.2 and Figure 9.3). Size is measured by airline total available
seat-kilometres (ASK). The sample of airlines contained a nearly equal mix of those
actively involved in alliances and those not so much involved into it: 21 airlines had
less than 5 alliances while 23 had more than 5 alliances.
From Figure 9.2 and Figure 9.3, one can observe that there is no distinct variation of
unit cost with alliance size so that economies of scale due to airline and alliance size
are virtually non-existent. In fact, it would seem that airlines and alliances are subject
to constant returns to scale as evidenced by the horizontal least-squares regression
line.
These studies include Caves (1962), Gordon (1965), Strazheim (1965), Eads el a! (1969), Jordan (1970), Eads (1972), Keeler
1972), Reid and Mohrfield (1973) and Douglas and Miller (1974).6 Antoniou (1991) however notes that inadequacies in the methodology and the absence of coffection for network and
technological characteristics in the studies can conceal the cost advantages arising from airline size.
ASK data was obtained from ICAO Digest of Statistics-Financial data (1994) and JATA WA7 (1994). Cnide sample data is
provided in Appendix A.
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Figure 9.2 Variation of airline unit cost with airline size
25
Figure 9.3 Variation of airline unit cost with alliance size
In order to control for the effects of network traffic density, stage length and input
prices, these variables are inserted in a function explaining unit costs:
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(TCOST' = f[ASKO LP, ASLO,(LCOST') , ASKA 1	 (Eq. 9.1)
ASK)0	 ]ASK a
where
subscriptS 'a' and 'A' respectively refer to the airline and the alliance to which it
belongs;
TCO.T is the unit cost of the airline as given by the ratio of total costs to output;
ASK
ASK is the measure of firm size (airline or alliance);
LF is the average load factor on the airline's network. It is used as a proxy for traffic
density on the airline's network4';
ASL is the average stage length in the airline's network;
LCOST .	 .	 . .is the unit labour cost of the airline. This value is used as proxy for input
ASK
prices4 . Labour costs are used since they constitute a high proportion of the inputs to
producing a seat-kilometre.
Simple linearity in Equation 9.1 is assumed and both linear and logarithmic50
equations are specified:
(TCOST	
x0 + x, (ASK)a + x2 (LF) a + x3 (ASL)'	 (LCOSTI	 I +x5(ASK)4
.. ASK)a	 a	 ASK)0
(Eq. 9.la)
(TCOST	 _____
_____	 (LCOSTLnI -	 I = Ln(x0 )+x1 Ln(ASK) +X2 Lfl(LF) 0 ^x3 Ln(ASL) +x Ln'	 I
. ASK)Q	 a	 ASK)a
+x5 Ln(ASK) 
A
(Eq. 9.lb)
The reciprocal of ASL is used in the regression since it is known that unit costs
decrease exponentially with length of haul (see Figure 9.4). In models 9.la and 9.lb, a
48 Load factor has been used for traffic density correction in a number of studies investigating the existence of economics of
scale in the airline industry. See White (1979) for a comprehensive listing of the studies.
An arguably better indicator of the difference in input prices would have been the Purchasing Power Parity. However, this
measure was not available for all the countries in which the airlines in the sample were based so that it was not used.
50 The logarithm of the variables is used as that transformation is known to even out the problems of variable non-normality
(Norusis, 1993).
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positive and statistically-significant value of the coefficients x 1
 and x5
 would indicate
the existence of economies of scale in airline size and alliance size respectively. The
results of the multiple linear regressions are given in Table 9.1.
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Figure 9.4 Variation of airline unit cost with average stage length
Both models are valid as concluded by their highly-significant F statistics. Their
explanatory power as given by the R 2 values is very satisfactory considering that the
analysis was of a cross-sectional nature. The linear model was more powerful than the
logarithmic model, explaining approximately 72 per cent of the variation in the data.
The coefficient of ASKA is statistically non-significant at the 5% significance level in
both models pointing to the conclusion that changes in alliance size do not affect airline
unit cost'.The coefficient of ASKa is also statistically non-significant at the 5% level.
One can therefore conclude that economies of scale at the airline level are non-existent
as well.
it was also attempted to regess alliance unit coat against alliance ASK. Veiy poor results we ot*ained conlirining the hypxlhesis
that no ecc,omies of scale exist at the alliance level.
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xo
xi
x2
x3
x4
-1.134
(-0.102)
[0.9199]
-1 .427e-8
(-1.228)
[0.2323]
-0.043
(-2.027)
[0.00781
6274.118
(2.939)
[0.0076]
1.240
(2.822)
[0.0099]
Constant
ASKa
LFa
ASLI'
(LCOST"
ASK
5.181
(1.577)
[0. 129 1]
-0.116
(-1.511)
[0.1451]
-0.138
(-2.143)
[0.0089]
0.194
(2.4 19)
[0.0243]
0.330
(3.5 15)
[0.0020]
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Coefficient	 Associated	 Linear model	 Log model
variable
x5	 ASKA
Model test statistics
R2
F
-4.022e-9	 0.041
(-0.992)	 (1.128)
[0.332]	 [0.27 15]
0.716	 0.644
14.557	 10.774
[0.0000]	 [0.0000]
Table 9.1 Regression results for the detection of economies of scale
(1-statistics in circular brackets and levels of signflcance in square brackets)
Unit labour cost, average stage length and load factor are the only variables affecting
airline unit cost. Their coefficients have the expected signs and are significant at the
1% level of significance in both models. Since coefficients can be interpreted as
elasticities when regressing the variables in logarithmic form, the results of the
regression indicate that an increase of 1 per cent in input prices would lead to an
increase of approximately 0.3 per cent in unit costs, average stage length and traffic
density remaining constant. Likewise, a 1 per cent increase in network load factor
decreases unit costs by approximately 0.15 per cent with input prices and average
stage length maintained constant, and a 1 per cent increase in 	 can increase unit
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ctsts by approximately 0.2 per cent, traffic density and input prices remaining
constant.
Many studies have econometrically demonstrated that there are no cost advantages to
be gained solely from size. The above analysis has gone one step further by showing
that such benefits are also non-existent at the alliance level. In spite of that, the belief
that size can bring about this particular type of economies still remains in the airline
industry. Youssef (1992, p. 10) argues that this is what is leading airlines to ally:
'Perceptions [of scale economies] are a strong motivator.......Airlines may
consequently seek equity alliances as a means of achieving economies of scale in
production, whether or not such economies exist'. This could be true. However, a
more plausible explanation for the tendency for airline growth could be that airline
size confers advantages other than economies of scale. Those other advantages of size
come in economies of scope, increased market power and economies of density.
9.4.2 Economies of scope
Scope economies exist when it is less costly to produce multiple products jointly
rather than producing each product separately. Most of the scope economies in the
airline industry are related to the size of the network and its structure, with each city-
pair in the network being the location where the output (revenue passenger-kilometre)
is produced. Simultaneous production on a large number of city-pairs (the network) is
much more economic than separate production on each one of the city-pairs. Also, it
is more economical for a new route to branch out from an existing network (Johnson,
1985; O'Connor, 1995). Evidence of economies of scope in the airline industry is
provided by Weisman (1990) who fmds that airline output on a network is dependent
upon the overall network structure.
Levine (1987) identifies information dissemination (marketing and advertising) as an
important source of economies of scope. Indeed, it is proportionately less costly to
advertise an airline product over a whole network of routes rather than on a single
route. This is due to the availability of media discounts which cause advertising costs
to be less than proportionally related to the number of city-pair markets served
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(Hanlon, 1996). Moreover, there are indivisibilities associated with public media
(newspapers and television) which make it preferable to offer the airline information
to a large, geographically dispersed audience (Levine, 1987).
FFPs, travel agency overrides, and corporate discounts also exhibit to economies of
scope as they necessitate large networks for them to be effective and economic. FFPs
work effectively in attracting traffic only when the airline offers a large number of
city-pairs on which FFP points can be collected and thereafter used. Travel agency
commissions are related to the proportion of the traffic volume switched by the
agency to the airline offering the incentive. If the airline flies over a large number of
routes, then the travel agent is provided with a larger choice of destinations and it is
easier for himfher to have access to the overrides, which is to the advantage of the
airline.
The size of an airline's network is also important when it comes to the operation of
hub-and-spoke systems. These systems, which appeared following airline deregulation
in the US, are characterised by a central airport (the hub) from which routes (the
spokes) radiate outwards to a large number of destinations. They replaced the point-
to-point linear route network which existed in the US prior to deregulation since
linking to a hub could increase the number of city-pairs served dramatically 32 . In
addition, the hub-and-spoke system allows the collection of passengers destined to
different destinations via the hub on one aircraft. Consequently, a larger aircraft with
lower unit operating costs can be used on a spoke, which would have not been
possible had the operation been point-to-point. For the hub-and-spoke system to work
effectively, the airline needs to serve a large number of destinations from the hub.
Therefore, the larger airline in terms of network size is at an advantage relative to its
smaller counterpart.
This discussion has shown the importance of network size to the reaping of economies
of scope in the contemporary airline industry. However, expanding one's network
52 For a hub with n spokes, the maximum number of connecting markets and the maximum number of city-pair markets can be
mathematically shown to be n(n-1)/2 and n(n+1)/2 respectively (Doganis, 1991).
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organically can be very costly and time-consuming. Alliances enable airlines to
bypass organic growth and to effectively complement their networks with those of
their partners. Integration of the networks can then enable them to reap the economies
of scope resulting from network size and structure.
9.4.3 Market power
Economies of scope and market power are closely related in the sense that production
on a large network and the creation of hub-and-spoke systems can create artificial
barriers to entry. These barriers are then used to generate economic rents and
supranormal profits53
 (Youssef, 1992). Alliances increase the market power of airlines
by conferring them a greater 'mass' in a short time, mass being '...a large revenue
base diversified by geographic markets....' (Levine, 1987, p. 393). Increased mass can
be used to deter predatory practices from a competitor attempting entry as having a
large and diversified network allows the alliance to practice cross-subsidisation and to
sustain a fare war with the competitor. Levine (1987) identifies potential economies of
scope here as the reputation of the alliance as a formidable competitor is
communicated throughout its network and deters further entry. The ability of cross-
subsidisation is critical when competitive pricing is practised by the alliance to push
competitors out of markets and to increase its market share. The prevalence of
economies of scope and market power is the principal reason for the failure of the
contestability54 theory put forward by Baumol et a! (1982) to justify US airline
deregulation.
Hubbing creates sources of market power as the airline is able to dominate gates,
runway and concourse capacity at the hub and possesses the attractive slots, leaving
Youssef (1992) found no statistical evidence to support his hypothesis of market power as a motivator for alliance formation.
However, this could well be the result of the inappropriateness of his measures of market power which were taken to be yield
and operating margin. These measures are subject to other important factors, namely discounting which could blur their
relationship with market power. A better measure of market power is market share in origin-destination markets which is shown
in Chapter II to change considerably following alliance formation.
According to the contestability theory, the threat of entry by competitors into airline markets is sufficiently powerful to deter
incumbents from exercising market power. For the markets to be contestable, airlines shouldbc able to enter and leave them
without incurring losses due to sunk costs. This requires that (1) all factors of production arc mobile among markets, (2)
consumers are willing and able to switch quickly among suppliers, and (3) existing firms are able to change their prices quickly
in response to the entry of a new firm.
0 Department of Air Transport, Cranfield University 	 168
_______________________________________Chapter 9: Airline alliance strategic objectives
little scope for new entry. The lack of attractive slots makes it difficult for the new
entrant to compete with the incumbent by using frequency as a competitive tool, and
disrupts the new entrant's plans to benefit from the necessary network economies in
order to survive. In the US context, Levine (1987, p. 469) observes that incumbents
tend to control unused airport assets so as to impede new entry: 'Controlling
substantial amounts of unused space can make entry more difficult, expensive and
risky by making already-constructed facilities unavailable to the new entrant.' The
information costs and economies of scope which stem from size are also inherent in
the hubbing technique. This deters market entry even further as the new entrant
realises that the incumbent can use these economies in predatory practices.
The fact that the alliance controls the hubs at both ends of the market is a source of
market power in the inter-hub market. This follows from the work of Mauldin (1989)
who shows that fares in those types of market are significantly higher than those
where only one hub is dominated. The KLM-Northwest alliance has exerted
considerable market power on the transatlantic routes which it operates. Hanlon
(1996) points out that the market shares of KLM and Northwest on transatlantic routes
were 3 and 5 per cent respectively prior to alliance formation. Following alliance
formation, the combined market share of the two airlines has risen to 12 per cent. The
proposed BA-American Airlines alliance is also in a position to exert even higher
market power on transatlantic routes considering that it currently will have 60% of the
market share.
9.4.4 Economies of density
Economies of density exist when unit costs fall with increasing traffic volume,
keeping the network size fixed (Gillen et al, 1985). This is different from economies
of scale where the network size increases 55 . Youssef (1992) identifies two locations
where economies of density can exist: on individual city-pairs (link density) and on
The distinction between economies of density and economies of scale disappears when the focus is on a single route instead
of the whole network. Increasing the traffic volume on a single route can lead to the use of a larger aircraft which can be
operated at lower unit costs. However, Weisman (1990) argues that the existence of economies of scale in this situation is
questionable as a change in technology is required, which leads to a change in the production function. Therefore, such
economies are best qualified as economies of density.
0 Department of Air Transport, Cranfield University 	 169
Chapter 9: Airline alliance strategic objectives
the whole airline network (network density). These economies exist for a number of
reasons. Firstly, as the traffic volume on an individual route increases, higher load
factors are obtained leading to lower unit costs. Secondly, the increased traffic density
could require the use of a larger aircraft with can be operated at lower unit costs.
Thirdly, increased traffic volume leads to a more efficient utilisation of aircraft and
crews. If similar economies arise on all the routes in the network, then economies of
network density are reaped. The existence of economies of density in the airline
industry has been statistically proven in a number of studies, the most notable ones
being those of Caves et al (1984) and Bailey et a! (1985). The existence of economies
of density in the airline industry is mathematically demonstrated by the statistically-
significant coefficient of load factor in Equations 9.la and 9.lb.
The practice of hubbing brings about economies of density in two ways. By collecting
passengers from the same origin but bound to different destinations onto a single
aircraft, the airline is able to increase its frequencies and load factors on the spokes.
Doing so also decreases the number of flights required for the carriage of a given
number of passengers over a given number of destinations, hence a decrease in unit
costs (Hanlon, 1996). The fact that hubbing leads to economies of density has been
empirically proven by McShan and Windle (1989) and by Brueckner et a! (1992).
The prevalence of economies of density in the airline industry is critical to the
operation of alliances. Indeed, efficient linking of networks increases the 'effective'
network size (Youssef, 1992) of the individual airlines' in the alliance as they are able
to offer a larger choice of destinations to consumers. The traffic density on the
networks therefore increases while the airlines' actual network size remains constant.
Alliances can also enable airlines to reap economies of density by indulging into
reciprocal traffic feed. Efficient network connections and the practice of code-sharing
increase the attractiveness of the alliance interline connections relative to interline
connections of competing carriers and therefore keep passengers on the integrated
alliance network. The traffic density on the allies individual networks consequently
increase. Traffic feed is the main rationale for the formation of alliances between
major long-haul airlines and smaller regional/domestic ones.
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9.4.5 Hubbing in the international context
The US experience has shown that the hubbing technique is important in ensuring that
network economies are achieved. Indeed, by its ability to concentrate passengers from
one origin bound to different destinations, or from a variety of origins to one
destination, the hubbing technique allows airlines to benefit from economies of scope
and density and also to achieve increased market power. Following airline
deregulation in the US in 1978, the importance of hubbing as a survival tool became
apparent and airlines rushed to establish hubs at strategically-located major airports to
be able to cover the whole nation. (Dempsey and Goetz, 1992).
One of the goals of alliances is to emulate the hubbing technique in the international
context to achieve a more extensive global coverage. Hence, airlines have linked their
networks with high-frequency inter-hub flights for efficient transfer of passengers
from one network to the other. British Airways, for example, has daily flights from
London to the US airports from which USAir has an extensive network, namely
Baltimore, Boston, Charlotte, Los Angeles, New York JFK, Philadelphia and
Pittsburgh. Likewise, KLM has daily flights from Amsterdam to Boston, Detroit and
Minneapolis which are Northwest's main hubs. By marketing its partner's
destinations as if they were its own, an airline can increase the traffic on its network
and therefore reap economies of density. The increase in 'effective' network size also
brings in economies of scope.
One of the main problems in practising international hubbing with European and
Asian airlines is that airports in those regions are not hubs in the right sense of the
word (Jenks, 1990). To qualify as a hub, an airport needs to possess two
characteristics. The first one is that the hubbing airline has established a flight
structure such that the airport is the hub with spokes radiating from it. Most European
and Asian airports have developed in that way mainly because of bilateral restrictions
which require national airlines to operate international routes from their main airports
(Hanlon, 1996). The second characteristic of authentic hubs is that the hubbing airline
schedules its flights from the spokes to arrive at the hub in 'waves', that is having all
flights landing at the hub within minutes from each other. In that way, passengers can
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all transfer to their connecting flights at the hub after which all flights depart to the
spoke destinations. Not many European and Asian airports possess this scheduling
characteristic. In Europe, the only ones are most probably Brussels and Amsterdam.
Connections in the non-authentic hubs occur primarily from the sheer volume of
departures and arrivals of the national carrier at the airport (Jenks, 1990). Therefore, in
an alliance consisting of a European and a US carrier, a passenger connecting at the
European airport could find that he/she has to wait for a long time for his/her onwards
flight.
9.5 Conclusion
Alliance success measurement will be based on the degree of goal attainment. The
objectives of airline alliances are economies of scale on the supply side, economies of
density, economies of scope and market power on the demand side. Economies of
scale on the demand side are inexistent both at the airline level and at the alliance
level.
For proper and adequate measurement of alliance success, it is necessary to
incorporate the airline collaborative strategies identified in Chapter 6 into the alliance
goal classification scheme. The result of this integration is given in Figure 9.5. The
prevalence of economies of scope and density are analysed in the next chapter.
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Figure 9.5 Alliance objectives' classification scheme
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10. MODELLING SCOPE AND DENSITY
ECONOMIES IN AIRLINE ALLIANCES
Introduction
T
he thesis now proceeds into a mathematical analysis of airline alliances. The
objective is to build mathematical models of airline alliance operational
performance which will be very important in the identification and
evaluation of those factors which contribute in bringing it about. Indeed, these models
will provide alliance success and success factor quantification, such quantification
being notoriously lacking in research studies on airline alliances. A further use for the
models is in the prediction of outcomes when the structure and operations of potential
alliances are being investigated into. Hence, the models will provide airline managers
with an effective management tool in their decision-making processes when
considering alliance formation and analysing prospective partners. Again, such a
management tool is lacking in the airline industry where it seems that decisions
concerning the workings of alliances are taken in a fashion akin to guesswork.
This aim of this chapter is to build a mathematical model of scope and density
economies in airline alliances. Scope economies refer to marketing advantages which
result from the size and structure of airlines' networks. Density economies refer to the
lower unit costs obtained by increasing the traffic on a fixed-sized network. The
chapter is divided into three main parts. The first part describes how airlines have
linked their networks to benefit from scope and density economies and develops a
methodology to quantify alliance performance in this context. The second part
develops the mathematical model of alliance success by identifying those factors
which are believed to influence it. Measures for these factors are defined to enable
their incorporation in the mathematical model. The third part presents the results of
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the model calibration and discusses their implications on the structuring of airline
alliances.
10.1 Airline Network Integration
In Chapter 9, two main ways by which airlines can use alliances to reap economies of
scope and density were identified as market access and traffic feed. Adequate market
integration enables airlines to add certain of their partner's destinations to their own
network and market them as if they were their own. The greater choice of destinations
attracts more traffic onto the airline's network. Traffic feed can also be viewed as
some form of market access whereby an airline can have access the traffic in the
exclusive markets of its partner without it having to set up its own operations in those
particular markets. Furthermore, traffic feed also allows airlines to support a higher
level of service which increases the carrier's share of available departures thus
attracting more local traffic (Bailey et al, 1985).
The extent to which traffic density benefits can be reaped by airlines in an alliance
depends greatly on the degree to which their individual networks are integrated
together. As in the airline mergers which took place in the US after deregulation,
network integration in alliances is effectively achieved by linking the hubs of the
partners so as to create an extended network (Oum et al, 1993; GRA, 1994). A
graphical model of the situation is provided in Figure 10.1. This figure will be the
basis of the following discussions and modelling processes.
A passenger from an origin (0) in the network of airline x bound to a destination (D)
in the network of airline y is routed via the partners' hubs H and H. The inter-hub
flight H—H is operated either by the outbound flight of airline x or by the return
flight of airline y or both. In many cases, following alliance formation, the inter-hub
flights are either operated jointly or code-shared. Incidentally, this 'two-hub' theory
has been criticised by Shenton (1994b) who argues that alliances force travellers to
make double connections while only one connection was required previously.
However, these arguments take a one-sided view of the situation and do not consider
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Figure 10.1 Network integration in airline alliances
the additional advantages offered by alliances such as their on-line characteristics,
through check-in and shorter layover times. Furthermore, the argument that only one
connection was required in the past is not necessarily true. Rather, the passenger
travelling from behind-gateway cities in one continent to beyond-gateway cities in
another continent was routed through more than one or even two connecting points
under the prevailing interlining system.
10.2 Alliance Success Measurement
In the measurement of success, the alliance will be the unit of analysis as opposed to
the individual airlines which constitute the partnership. The degree of success of the
alliance will be quantified as the change in a property of the alliance from a defined
pre-alliance period to a defined post-alliance period:
alliance success = M4 (posi_al/iai.ce) - M4 (pre_alliance)	 (Eq. 10.1)
where MA is the alliance property.
From the discussion on network integration, it would appear that the effects of co-
operation between airlines x and ywill be observed primarily on the inter-hub (H—H)
route. Such effects could be in the form of increased load factors as the airlines stop
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competing against each other and use only one aircraft instead of two to operate the
route. Market presence is maintained by code-sharing or block-spacing. Furthermore,
the provision of a greater choice of destinations to consumers at the end points of both
networks and at the hubs will stimulate traffic on both the airlines' networks. This will
be translated into increased passenger traffic on the inter-hub route and possibly
increased load factors provided no aircraft change has occurred. Measures geared
towards improving traffic feed will keep passengers connecting at F! or Il on the
airlines' combined system instead of them interlining with a competing carrier. The
effectiveness of those practices will again be reflected in improved alliance traffic on
the inter-hub route. Thus, the economies of link density obtained by the alliance on
the inter-hub route will reflect the economies of density from which the alliance
partners benefit on their respective networks.
From this discussion, it logically follows that the best location to measure alliance
success in this context is on the inter-hub route. Possible alliance properties to be
monitored are the alliance load factor and the alliance passenger traffic on that route.
The alliance success measures which result are mathematically expressed in Equations
10.2 and 10.3.
r(HP + HPAX)
(LFA) =	 U
][ 
(CAF+CAP1
YJY
(AHPAXA) U = 4(HPAx) +(HPAx)]
where
(Eq. 10.2)
(Eq. 10.3)
is the change in value from a defined pre-alliance period to a defined post-alliance
period;
subscript 'A' refers to the alliance, subscripts 'x' and 'y' refer to the airlines in the
alliance, and subscript '/' refers to the inter-hub route from Hto H,,;
HPAXis the passenger traffic on the inter-hub route; and
CAP is the capacity offered on the inter-hub route.
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A major drawback in using alliance inter-hub load factor when measuring its success
is that it is highly affected by service frequency. The formation of an alliance is likely
to be accompanied by a step increase in service frequency as the partners attempt to
integrate their networks and gain market share. However, it is unlikely that passenger
traffic will respond to the frequency increase immediately. A more gradual response
over a certain period of time is expected. Therefore, the increase in frequency on the
route will cause a dip in load factor. This is apparent in Figure 10.2 which shows the
variation in load factor and passenger traffic for the KLM-Northwest combination on
the Amsterdam-Boston route.
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Figure 10.2 Variation in KLM-Northwest load factor and number of passengers carried on the
Amsterdam-Boston inter-hub route
Data source: ICA 0-Traffic by Flight Stage
From 1988 to 1989, the total number of flights of the KLM-Northwest combination
increased by 131 with the same type of aircraft (McDonnell Douglas DC1O). The
number of passengers carried by the alliance consequently increased. However, the
load factor of the alliance fell from 79 per cent to 66 per cent in the same time period.
Therefore, owing to the inappropriateness of load factor as a success measure, only
alliance inter-hub passenger traffic will be used to quantify alliance success. The
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airline alliances to which the success measure will be applied are selected in the next
section.
10.3 Alliance Selection
One of the criteria for selection of airline alliances to be included in the analysis is the
degree of marketing co-operation achieved. Only alliances which are strategic in nature,
as defined in Chapter 4, are selected. A second requisite is that the alliances are between
carriers of comparable size and scope. Those alliances satisfying these two conditions
are the former EQA56, the Global Excellence, British Airways-USAir, KLM-Northwest
Airlines, SAS-Continental Airlines and the alliances of Iberia with Aerolineas
Argentinas and Viasa. Franchising and feeder agreements with small domestic and
regional airlines are excluded from the sample. The Lufthansa-United Airlines alliance
is also excluded since it is very recent and its post-alliance traffic data is not available
from the ICAO compilation of traffic statistics.
In order to obtain a homogeneous sample of routes, only non-stop inter-hub routes are
selected. Therefore, the London-Sydney and Madrid-Santiago inter-hub routes which
are served by the British Airways-Qantas and Iberia-Ladeco alliances" respectively are
not included in the analysis even though these alliances are quite sizeable. Iberia's hub
in Miami is also not considered because it is only used as means to route traffic from
Madrid into Latin America and vice-versa. Therefore, travellers from Spain are
required to stop at Miami and Buenos-Aires/Caracas/Santiago on their way to their
destinations (two hub stops). Furthermore, for the sake of homogeneity, the Zurich-
Changi route operated by the Swissair-Singapore Airlines alliance is omitted from the
sample because it is the only one involving an Asian hub, while all the other hub
combinations in the sample involve either European hubs or European and US hubs.
56 The alliances of Swissair and Austrian Airlines with Sabena are not considered as Sabena replaced SAS only recently. Therefore,
the effects of the alliance might not yet be observable.
57 British Airways flight BAOO9 from Heathrow to Sydney stops at Bangkok, while Qantas flight QF1O stops at both Singapore and
Melbourne on their way to Sydney. Iberia flight 16811 stops at Rio de Janeiro on its way to Santiago (ABC World Airways Guide,
September 1995).
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13415
16975
11685
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-3706
23539
19536
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-19820
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984
14766
49.52
40.17
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-16.05
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64.55
-10.29
-4.07
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115.52
-8.62
-26.30
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3.76
33.61
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The selected inter-hub routes and the change in alliance passenger traffic are given in
Table 10.1 . The pre-alliance period is taken as 1989 for the EQA, Global Excellence,
SAS-Continental and the alliances of Iberia, and as 1991 for KLM-Northwest and
British Airways-USAir because they became operational in 1992. The post-alliance
period is taken as 1994 as the latest traffic data is for that year. By that time, alliance
effects are expected to be observable. Traffic data is obtained from the ICA 0-Traffic by
Flight Stage. In a small number of cases, traffic data for 1989 was not listed in that data
source. Alliance inter-hub traffic was then estimated using Equation 10.4:
(HPAXA )1 = (F1 x CAP1 x	 (Eq. 10.4)
where
F is the frequency of the airline on inter-hub route
CAP,J is the capacity of the aircraft operated by the airline on the inter-hub route, and
LFr is the average load factor of the airline in the particular region r (transatlantic or
European).
H	 H	 Alliance	 Jfp14X	 AHPAX(%)
Table 10.1 Inter-hub routes selected for analysis
' The raw data from which tiHPAX and iLF are derived is given in Appendix B.
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H,.	 H,	 Alliance	 AHFAX	 AHPAX(%)
ZRH
CVG
ZRH
CPH
EWR
OSL
EWR
ARN
EWR
DOS
AMS
DET
AMS
MSP
AMS
BUE
MAD
CCs
MAD
LON
BWI
LON
BOS
LON
CLI
LON
LAX
LON
NYC
LON
PHL
LON
PIT
ATL
ZRH
CVG
EWR
CPFI
RWR
OSL
EWR
ARN
AMS
13OS
AMS2
DEl2
AMS3
MSP3
MAD
BUE
MAD
CCS
BWI4
LON4
BOS
LON
CLT4
LON4
LAX
LON
NYC
LON
PilL
LON
PIT4
LON
SR-DL
SR-DL
SR-DL
SK-CO
SK-CO
SK-CO
SK-CO
SK-CO
SK-CO
KL-NW
KL-NW
}(L-NW
KL-NW
KL-NW
KL-NW
lB-AR.
lB-AR
lB-VA
lB-VA
BA-Us
BA-US
BA-US
BA-US
BA-US
BA-US
BA-US
BA-US
BA-US
BA-US
BA-US
BA-US
BA-US
BA-US
11455
12573
13467
22985
27197
41594
11463
35479
5726
33451
32538
35983
44485
33386
34638
38336
42918
10733
14103
47649
47123
17488
19123
54534
56514
31550
34248
81487
82013
68021
70465
17858
25729
23.74
34.01
41.66
96.80
27.23
74.84
12.39
84.71
81.16
103.62
128.11
96.14
99.75
64.97
92.87
20.61
18.11
16.31
18,12
19.46
21.37
21.66
23.57
132.99
158.20
Table 10.1 (Cont'd)
Key: AMS: Amsterdam; ARN: Stockholm (Arlanda); ATL: Atlanta; BOS: Boston; 8W!: Baltimore; BUE:
Buenos Aires; CCS: Caracas; CPH: Copenhagen; CLT: Charlotte; CVG: Cincinnati; DET: Detroit; FRA:
Frankfurt; OVA: Geneva; EWR: New York (Newark); lAD: Washington (Dulles); LAX: Los Angeles;
LON: London; MAD: Madrid; MSP: Minneapolis; NYC: New York; ORD: Chicago (O'Hare); OSL: Oslo;
PHL: Philadelphia; PIT: Pittsburgh; SF0: San Francisco; VIE: Vienna; ZRH: Zurich
Notes
'1989 traffic data estimated using airlines' average European load factor obtained from AEA 1990
Yearbook-Statistical Appendices
2 1989 traffic data estimated using KLM's average transatlantic load factor obtained from AEA 1990
Yearbook-Statistical Appendices
l989 traffic data estimated using Northwest's average transatlantic data obtained from Air Transport
World, December 1989
1989 traffic data estimated using British Airways' average transatlantic load factor obtained from AEA
1990 Yearbook-Statistical Appendices
- Routes not operated by the airlines in the alliance in the pre-alliance period
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10.4 Isolation Of Alliance Effects
Having defined a measure of alliance success, it is essential to recognise that passenger
traffic on the inter-hub routes is influenced by a series of other factors other than close
co-operation between alliance partners. The main factors affecting the alliance's inter-
hub traffic can be identified as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and population in the
country of origin, the fares offered on the inter-hub route or in through markets via the
hubs, alliance service frequency, the airline/alliance quality of service, and the level of
competition experienced by the alliance. How those variables affect demand for air
travel is briefly described below.
10.4.1 Determinants of demand
As the GDP of the home countries of airlines increases, people tend to have more
disposable income which can be spent on air travel, hence an increase in passenger
traffic. GDP is also an indicator of the level of a country's economic activity which
generates demand for air travel (Kanafani, 1983). An increase in population can also
lead to increased passenger traffic. However, this might not always be the case,
particularly in Third World countries where a large proportion of the population can not
afford air travel.
Low fares offered on selected routes in the airlines' networks are likely to stimulate
demand particularly in the leisure market, and thus increase passenger traffic on the
inter-hub route. Increases in service frequency can increase the market share of the
alliance relative to that of its competitors as conceptualised in the generally-accepted S-
curve variation of market share with frequency59 (see Taneja, 1981). Increased service
frequency can also stimulate traffic as more flights are offered at convenient times.
However, they can lead to drops in load factors as was observed previously. It is
recognised that the relationship between demand and frequency is two-way. Increases in
frequency can stimulate demand as explained above. However, increased demand
"The S-curve variation of market share with service frequency is discussed in depth in Chapter 11.
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(resulting from an increase in GDP) can lead airlines to increase frequency to
accommodate the higher number of passengers.
Improvements in airline in-flight service quality can enable the airline to divert
passengers from its competitors, provided the improvements are not accompanied by
large fare rises. Finally, changes in the level of competition can affect the number of
consumers travelling with the alliance as a high competition means that traffic has to be
divided among a large number of competitors. The quality of the competition in terms
of frequency and in-flight service also affects the market share of the airline. This list of
variables affecting demand is not exhaustive. However, they explain most of the
variation in demand on a route.
Some of the variables affecting demand will be related to alliance formation while
others will not. The variables which are totally independent of alliance formation
include GDP and population. The other factors are related to various degrees to the
alliance formation. For example, service frequency on the inter-hub route can change
dramatically following the formation of the airline alliance. This is apparent in Figure
10.3 which gives the total weekly frequencies 6° on the inter-hub routes of the EQA
immediately before and after its formation.
Fare levels are also related to alliance formation. In an analysis of the fare levels in
markets originating from the EQA hub cities, Youssef (1992) found that fares in those
markets had increased more than fares in other non-alliance markets in the same region.
At an aggregate level, he found that the fares in alliance markets increased by an
average of about 1.5% over those in non-alliance markets from 1989 to 1991. The fare
increases were attributed partly to increases in market concentration in the favour of the
EQA (Youssef and Hansen, 1994). The change in market concentration as a result of
alliance formation shows that the alliance can effectively decrease the level of
competition it experiences in certain markets. Youssef (1992) found that the EQA inter-
hub markets effectively became monopolies of the alliance after its formation61.
60 Data is for the last week of June.
61 Fifth-Freedom service provided by Thai and Alitalia in the Copenhagen-Zurich market was terminated in 1991.
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CPH-VIE	 ARN-VIE	 GVA-VIE	 ZRH-VIE
EQA inter-hub route
Figure 10.3 Service frequency changes in EQA inter-hub routes after alliance formation
Data source: ABC World Airways Guide, June 1989 and June 1991
(ARN: Arlanda, Stockholm; CPH: Copenhagen; GVA: Geneva; VIE: Vienna; ZRH: Zurith)
The effect of the EQA extended to its O-D markets where the average number of
carriers decreased from 5.6 to 5.3.
The extent to which airline alliances affect the quality of in-flight service is less defined,
though it can be argued that a relationship does exist between the two. For example, the
pressures towards offering seamless travel can lead airline partners to bring their in-ffight
service to higher standards. This is exemplified by the KLM-Northwest affiance whereby
both airlines have redefined their business-class product and brought it up to identical
quality levels. The other side of the coin is when the alliance results in the formation of a
monopoly on the inter-hub route. Incentive then exists to bring service levels down to
decrease costs as the airlines realise that the consumer has no other choice than to fly
with them.
It is recognised that changes in the fares, service frequency, service quality and level of
competition are not exclusively the result of alliance formation. They can be affected by
other competitive and cost-reduction pressures. This gives rise to a major problem when
it comes to disentangling the alliance and non-alliance effects.
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However, from the above discussion and Youssef's case study of the EQA, one can
argue that alliance effects are very predominant on inter-hub routes. The analysis will
therefore be pursued on the assumption that GDP and population are the only non-
alliance variables which have to be controlled for. In brief, inter-hub passenger levels
of the alliance can, to a certain extent, be modelled by Equation 10.5.
HPAXA = f(GDP, POP, alliance)
where
HPAXA is the alliance passenger traffic between the hubs,
GDP is the Gross Domestic Product of the country of origin,
POP is the population in the country of origin, and
(Eq. 10.5)
alliance represents a vector of those variables directly affected by the formation of the
alliance, that is fare, service frequency, level of competition and level of in-flight
service.
How to separate the effects of alliance formation from the overall traffic results of the
allied airlines is considered next.
10.4.2 Separating alliance and non-alliance effects
10.4.2.1 Methodology
The main difficulty in determining the impact of alliance formation on inter-hub
traffic is to predict the change in traffic had the alliance not been formed in the first
place. The methodology devised to overcome that problem is based on the elasticities
of alliance inter-hub passenger levels with respect to GDP and population. It is best
explained with reference to Figure 10.4 which considers inter-hub traffic to vary only
with GDP for simplicity purposes.
Let the alliance inter-hub passenger traffic vary with GDP according to Equation 10.6.
Ln(HPAXA ) = a0 + a1 Ln(GDP)	 (Eq. 10.6)
The coefficient a1 can be determined by a time-series linear regression and represents
the elasticity of traffic with respect to GDP.
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Alliance formation (tA)
Figure 10.4 Isolation of alliance effects
This variation of inter-hub traffic with GDP can be assumed to be valid after the
alliance was formed as shown by the dashed line in Figure 10.4. This assumption
holds because GDP is completely independent of alliance formation. Since, by
definition, elasticities are percentage changes when variables are regressed in
logarithmic form (ICAO, 1985), then Equation 10.6 can be re-written as follows
d(HPAXA ) = a1d(GDP)	 (Eq. 10.7)
where d refers to percentage changes.
If from time tA (pre-alliance) to time tA+ (post-alliance), the GDP changes by p%, it
follows from Equation 10.7 that the GDP-induced change in traffic will be a1p%. If it
is known that the actual percentage change in traffic from time t4- to time tA + is q%,
then the percentage change in traffic brought about by the alliance can be
approximated to (q-a1p)%, that is the difference between the dashed and solid lines in
Figure 10.4. An approximate value of the absolute change in traffic as a result of the
r(q—a1p)
alliance is then given by
	 where r is the amount of passenger traffic at tA.
100
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A worked example is given next to illustrate how the methodology is applied to isolate
the effects of the alliance.
10.4.2.2 Worked example
Let the variation in the number of passengers carried by the British Airways-USAir
alliance on the London—*Los Angeles sector be described by Equation 10.8a below62.
Ln(HPAXBA,US ) = 1.41 8Ln(GDP) + 0.754Ln(CAP) —15.122	 (Eq. 1O.8a)
where CAP is the alliance yearly capacity on the route. Service frequency is replaced by
capacity for reasons given in section 10.4.2.3.
The elasticity of demand (EGDP ) with respect to GDP is therefore 1.418.
From the pre-alliance period (1991) to the post-alliance period (1994), the total number
of passengers carried by the British Airways-USAir combination from London to Los
Angeles increased from 162,152 to 193,702. The percentage change in total traffic on
the route is then
(MIPAXT)V = (193,702-162,1 52 x 100 19.46%L	 162,152	 ) (Eq. 1O.8b)
In that period, GDP changed from $926,506.0 mn. to $844,663.7 mn., that is
(EGDP)O, (844,663.7— 926,506.0') x 100 = —8.83%
926,506.0	 ) (Eq. !O.8c)
The percentage change in traffic resulting from the increase in GDP is then given by
(AHPAXGDP )% = EGDP x (LGDP) % = 1.418 x (-8.83) = —12.52%	 (Eq. 1O.8d)
The percentage increase in traffic caused by the alliance from 1991 to 1994 can
therefore be approximated to
(AFIPAXBA,Us)% = (AHPAxT )% —(MIPAXQDP )% = 19.46—(-12.52) = 3 1.98%
(Eq. 1O.8e)
From Equation 10.8e, it follows that the absolute change in traffic brought about by the
alliance strategies is approximately
62 How this equation is arrived at is shown in sections 10.4.2.3 and 10.4.2.4.
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= (LJ-IPAXBAIUS )	 31.98
'BAIUS	 x HPAX1991 	- x 162,152 51856100	 100
(Eq. 10.8f)
10.4.2.3 Model specflcation
This section describes how the general model of inter-hub passenger traffic given in
Equation 10.5 is specified to prepare it for accurate calibration. As a reminder, Equation
10.5 explains the variation in alliance inter-hub traffic by changes in GDP, population
and alliance-related factors. The elasticities of demand with respect to the variables for
each of the selected inter-hub routes can be determined by a time-series regression. For
an accurate estimation of the coefficients of GDP and POP, it is necessary to perform
the time-series regression on a sufficiently-long time span. Yearly data is used with the
period of analysis spanning a ten-year period ranging from 1983 to 1992. Since the Gulf
War and a global recession took place in that period, it is important to account for those
occurrences for they were responsible for dramatic falls in traffic levels in certain years.
Inclusion of the war and the recession will improve the accuracy of the GDP coefficient.
This is achieved by dummy variables taking the value of one for those years which
experienced the Gulf War and/or the recession, and a value of zero otherwise. Equation
10.5 can therefore be reformulated as follows:
HPAXA = J'(GDP, POP, alliance, RECESSION, WAR)	 (Eq. 10.9)
where RECESSION and WAR are the dummy variables for those occurrences.
A multiplicative model of alliance inter-hub traffic taking the following form is
proposed:
[xi(RECESSION)+x2(WAR)+x3(LCOM)I (GDP)x4 (FARE)X5 (CAp)X6 (PoP) 7HPAXA = x0e
(Eq. 10.10)
where
FARE is the alliance fare level in constant US dollars on the inter-hub route. The only
source of fare data is the ABC WorldAirways Guide. Owing to the different
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restrictions which are attached to the fares listed in this source, the Y (lowest
unrestricted economy class) one-way fare is selected
CAP is the capacity provided by the alliance as given by the sum of the capacities of
the partners. Capacity is used instead of service frequency because the total number of
seats provided airlines over the years is listed in the ICA 0-Traffic by Flight Stage.
Frequency, on the other hand, is only listed per week in the ABC World Airways
Guide. Replacing service frequency by capacity can be justified considering the fact
that aircraft size is optimised for the routes where they are operated. It is therefore
highly unlikely for aircraft size and type used over the inter-hub routes to change
dramatically over time so that any changes in capacity must necessarily result from
frequency changes
LCOM is the level of competition experienced by the alliance on the inter-hub route as
given by the number of 'effective' competitors to the alliance. The 'effective'
competitors are defined as those which provided a number of seats comparable to that
of the alliance in the year being considered. The LCOM variable forms part of the
exponential term as it takes a value of zero when the alliance experiences no
competition.
The relationship between traffic and the factors which explain its variation is assumed
to be multiplicative so that the coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities. One
problem which was encountered when running the regressions was a high correlation
between the POP variable and a number of other variables in the model, namely
GDP63 . In many cases, this caused the coefficient of the GDP variable to be negative.
The POP variable was consequently discarded from the model. This was observed to
have no significant effect on the model's explanatory power for most of the inter-hub
routes.
Data for GDP is obtained from the European and International Marketing Data and
Statistics compiled by Euromoney Plc. Both FARE and GDP are deflated to 1980
63 Collinearity problems are often encountered with population in time-series regressions becausc it varies smoothly with time
(Kanafani, 1983)
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values using Consumer Price Indices (CPI) which are available from the same data
source as GDP.
Taking logarithms to base 'e' on both sides of the Equation 10.10 gives Equation
10.11 which was subjected to a stepwise linear regression using the SPSS software
package, Version 6.0 for Windows.
Ln(HPAXA ) = + x1 (REcEsSIoN) + x2 (wAR) + x3 (LcoM) + x4Ln(GDP) + (Eq. 10.11)
x5 Ln(FARE) + x6Ln(CAP)
Data for the selected inter-hub routes is given in Appendix C.
10.4.2.4 Results
The results of the linear regressions are given in Table 10.2. Overall, the models are
very satisfactory, all having high explanatory powers. The problem of autocorrelation
was not serious in the models with Durbin-Watson statistics ranging from 1.3 to 2.7.
The independent variables are therefore appropriate in explaining the variation of
alliance inter-hub traffic levels. The only exceptions are Vienna-Zurich (R 2 57%)
Copenhagen-Geneva (R2 = 66%), BostonLondon (R2 = 66%) and Pittsburgh-
London (R 2 = 43%). One probable explanation for the low explanatory power of
those models could be the small number of data points upon which the regressions
were based. The models also had high F-statistics ascertaining their validity. Variables
had high t-statistics implying that the probability of them actually being zero is
minimal.
In 11 cases, GDP is significant in explaining the variation in inter-hub passenger
numbers, indicating that these markets have not yet reached maturity. These routes all
originated from Europe (Vienna, Stockholm, Copenhagen, Madrid, and London). In
one case (Vienna-Geneva), GDP is the only variable on which alliance inter-hub
"The stepwise regression method involves the sequential computation of a series of regression equations. At each step, an
independent variable is added to the equation and others are removed until the explanatory power of the equation does not
improve significantly. The criterion for entering and removing an independent variable in the SP5S software package is based
on the F statistic. Independent variables producing F values less than 1.0 are removed from the equation and those with F
values exceeding 1.5 are entered into the equation.
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traffic depends. AJI US-originating routes are independent of GDP, which leads to the
conclusion that nearly all the US population is capable of purchasing a ticket for
overseas travel. The elasticity of traffic to GDP varies between 0.5 and 2, with an
extreme value of 3.15 obtained for the Stockholm-Vienna market. The values for the
GDP coefficients are satisfactory considering that Wheatcroft (1994) obtained a value
of approximately 2 for the income elasticity of demand for international air travel. The
high value obtained for the Stockholm-Vienna market comes from a high degree of
multicollinearity in the model.
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The capacity provided by the alliances on the inter-hub routes is present in nearly all
the models. In 23 of the models, it is the only variable explaining the variation in
alliance passenger traffic. This indicates that any changes in frequency made by the
alliance is very likely to affect the traffic it carries, and therefore the network
economies which might result. In a number of routes, the coefficient of Ln(CAP) is
observed to be greater than unity. This effectively means that changes in alliance
capacity result in a greater-than-proportional increase in traffic.
The coefficients for fare and level of competition both have the expected negative
sign. However, the FARE variable does not appear in many of the regressions. One
possible reason is that the fares listed in the ABC World Airways Guide are not the
actual fares which passengers are required to pay owing to the widespread practice of
discounting. Another probable reason why fares are absent from the models is because
hubs are mostly used as points of transfer. Fares are therefore from origin to
destination, and bear little relationship with fares charged between hubs. Level of
competition is also absent from many of the models. This is because competition on
inter-hub routes is minimal since it is operated mainly by the carriers designated under
the bilateral agreement between the countries in which the hubs are located. In the
intra-European context, the designated carriers are the alliance airlines themselves.
The only carriers capable of providing competition to the alliance are those which
possess Fifth Freedom traffic rights, and these are very few. Moreover, for many inter-
hub routes, the carriers competing with the alliance did not offer capacity comparable
to the alliance so that they did not qualify as 'effective' competitors and therefore
were not included in the analysis. Competition is rather felt in O-D markets.
The coefficients for WAR and RECESSION have the expected negative sign in all the
models where they appear. Since these variables are dummies, it is difficult to
interpret their meaning except that it is evident that they caused decreases in inter-hub
traffic. The WAR variable is observed to appear only in the models for intra-European
traffic levels, while the RECESSION variable appears in both intra-European and
transatlantic models. The RECESSION variable, however, had to be omitted from
many of the EQA regressions since it was sometimes highly correlated to capacity.
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This is because the recession occurred in the period 1990 to 1992, which is when the
EQA became fully operational and implemented capacity increases on the inter-hub
routes.
10.4.2.5 Removal of GDP effects
Having been able to present the variation in alliance inter-hub traffic in a way which
allows an approximation to the alliance effects, the next stage is to remove the effects
of GDP. Of the routes affected by GDP, the variation in alliance traffic on the Vienna-
Geneva route is observed to depend exclusively on that variable, implying that it was
unaffected by alliance formation. This route is subsequently discarded from the
sample. This leaves ten routes whose alliance inter-hub traffic was affected by both
alliance and non-alliance factors. The rest of the routes in the sample are not affected
by GDP leading one to conclude that the only changes in traffic are mainly a
consequence of alliance strategies. Table 10.3 gives the routes which required the
application of the methodology developed in section 10.4.2.1.
H
	
H,	 EGDP AHP14X AGDP AHPAX31,P LtHPAX4iiwnce Mi1'4X411iance
(%)	 (%)	 (%)	 (%)	 (number)
Table 10.3 Isolation of alliance effects on inter-hub traffic flows.
Using data from Tables 10.1 and 10.3, the average percentage change in inter-hub
traffic caused by alliance formation for the selected airline alliances is computed.
Comparison of results between alliances is possible in Figure 10.5.
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Figure 10.5 Average percentage change in inter-hub traffic for the alliances in the sample
One can observe that the two major transatlantic alliances, British Airways-USAir
(BA-US), and KLM-Northwest (KL-NW), are the most effective ones in that they
caused the highest changes in inter-hub traffic. The other transatlantic alliances,
Swissair-Delta Airlines (SR-DL) and SAS-Continental Airlines (SK-CO) are however
not so effective. The fact that BA-US and KL-NW are combining their activities to a
much greater extent than SR-DL and SK-CO, and make extensive use of beyond
gateway code-sharing can be a possible reason why they are performing better'.
Antitrust immunity and the longer period of time for which it was in existence can
explain why the KLM-Northwest alliance outperforms the British Airways-USA1r
alliance. The alliances of Iberia with Aerolineas Argentinas and Viasa are also not
functioning as well as BA-US and KL-NW, an observation most possibly explained by
the current financial difficulties of Iberia. The airline has consequently deemed it
necessary to relegate its alliance strategy to lower levels in its list of priorities. Of the
alliances forming the EQA, the SAS-Austrian Airlines alliance is the most effective
63 Swissair and Delta Airlin only code-share on the Zunth-Manta and Zurith-Cincinnati int-hub route, while SAS and
Continontal Airlin do n code-share with eath oth.
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one yielding an increase of approximately 75% in inter-hub traffic. It is followed by
the SAS-Swissair alliance (55%) and the Swissair-Austrian Airlines alliance (42%).
Taken together, the transatlantic alliances produced an average increase of
approximately 73% in inter-hub traffic while, in comparison, the EQA produced an
average increase of approximately 57%. A preliminary conclusion that can be drawn
is that trans-continental alliances are more effective than regional ones, most probably
because the latter are much more likely to suffer from network overlap.
The first step in the modelling of airline alliance operational performance is now
complete. A means of measuring alliance success has been defined and a methodology
has been devised to isolate the effects of the alliance. The methodology has then been
applied to the inter-hub routes where separation of alliance and non-alliance effects
was necessary. The next step is to select and measure potential alliance success factors
for model construction.
10.5 Modelling Scope and Density Economies in Airline Alliances
The method by which airline alliance performance is modelled here is to select a set of
variables which are thought to contribute in bringing about alliance success and try to
find any relationships that might exist between those variables and airline alliance
performance. Again, regression analysis appears to be a mathematical tool which is
well suited to that kind of approach. Null hypotheses concerning the effect of the
variables are formulated and the statistical significance of the variable coefficients
will provide evidence as to whether those hypotheses can be rejected or not.
At this preliminary stage, the basic model of alliance performance to be tested can be
crudely formulated as follows
LHPAXA = f(networlc service, competition)	 (Eq. 10.12)
where &[-IPAX4 refers is the alliance success measure, and network, service, and
competition respectively refer to network-related, service-related, and competition-
related factors influencing the success of the alliance. The selected variables are listed
in Figure 10.6.
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Network-related
factors:
'Effective' network size
Network complemenlarily
Partner hub separation
Network integration
Service-related
factors:
Fare
Travel convenience
Degree of 'seamlessness
Competition-related
factors:
Interline agreements
Competing alliances
Figure 10.6 Factors affecting airline alliance performance
The following sections will explain the choice of the variables by describing how they
are thought to affect alliance success. Means by which they will be measured will also
be developed. Raw data used for the measurements of the variables and for model
calibration is given in Appendix D.
10.5.1 Network-related factors
As was observed previously, one of the reasons for the formation of airline alliances is
the need for airlines to extend their individual networks without however bearing the
astronomical costs of doing so organically-that is to extend their 'effective' network
(Youssef, 1992). Indeed, proper connection of networks can enable an airline to
extend its reach to certain destinations in its partner's network, and market them as
though they were its own, hence attracting more passengers. Furthermore, having a
large network has advantages in that it gives the consumer the perception that the
airline it is considering travelling with is fmancially strong, and that there is less risk of
baggage loss or missed flights (Youssef and Hansen, 1994). Additionally, were the
airline to code-share with its partner, it would satisfy consumers' preference for on-
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line connections (Bailey et a!, 1985). Combination of networks and of FFPs allow
passengers to collect and use points on a wider choice of destinations.
Evidence about the existence of benefits in the integration of networks was provided
in the study on code-sharing performed by the US GAO (1995). According to this
study, British Airways has benefited from a substantial increase in interline traffic
with USAir from US cities other than those on which it code-shares. Indeed, the
number of USAir to British Airways interline traffic rose by 60% from 1994 to 1995,
while USAir is quoted to have earned approximately $12 million from increased
interline traffic and the wet-lease agreement it has with British Airways.
From this discussion, one can conclude that certain characteristics of the airlines'
individual networks, and of the ways in which they are linked together must affect the
benefits that can be reaped from the alliance. They are proposed to be
(1) the change in effective network coverage of the airline combination,
(2) the degree to which the individual networks geographically complement each
other,
(3) the degree to which the respective networks of the partner airlines are connected
together, and
(4) partner hub separation.
Each of them are considered next.
10.5.1.1 Network coverage
Consequent to alliance formation, it is anticipated that the airlines will co-ordinate
their schedules to bring departing H—D, spoke flights closer to incoming H
—
H inter-
hub flights and incoming O,—H spoke flights closer to departing H—H inter-hub
flights (see Figure 10.1). The availability of additional destinations (D 1) will increase
the coverage of the airline combination making it more attractive, while the
availability of additional origins (0,) will increase the feed on the networks. The
rationale for schedule co-ordination is also the intention of promoting the alliance
flight option to better positions on CRS screens and of keeping transferring passengers
onto the combined airline system, rather than them choosing to interline with a
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competing carrier. Since passengers prefer travelling with airlines with large
networks, the following null hypothesis about network size change can be postulated:
h 1 : Alliance success is positively related to alliance 'effective' network size
Network size measurement
The network coverage improvement (ANSIZE) resulting from alliance formation can
then be defined as the sum of
(1) The number of additional destinations offered to the customer as a result of the
improved link (ADESN), and
(2) The number of additional origins feeding into the inter-hub flight (AORJG).
However, networks overlap and connections between hubs is not optimal so that not
all origins and destinations contribute to increasing network coverage. A set of
constraints is therefore required to enable the determination of the effective number of
origins and destinations (termed as connectable) which can be included in the alliance
network
Constraint I: Minimum Connect Time
The minimum connect time (MCT) is an airport characteristic and is the minimum
time required for a passenger to be processed through the airport. It varies according
to the nature of the flight (domestic-domestic, domestic-international, international-
domestic or international-international). Obviously, passengers will be unable to
connect to any flights leaving in that time period.
Constraint II: Maximum Connect Time
If a passenger is prepared to wait indefinitely at the connecting hub, then it is
theoretically possible for him/her to connect to all services from/to that hub (Dennis,
1994). However, in practice, there is a limit to the time a passenger is prepared to wait
for a connecting flight; this limit is termed the maximum connect time (MC7). If the
connecting flight to the required destination lies within the time limit, then that
destination can be qualified as connectable. It is recognised that the waiting time
tolerance depends on the type of passenger. The businessman values his time very
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highly and the flight option incorporating a long layover is unattractive to him. On the
other hand, the tourist is more liable to trade off a long layover for a low fare.
Since waiting time effectively varies with each and every individual, it has been
arbitrarily selected in many studies. For example, in his analysis of airline alliances,
Youssef (1992) sets an upper limit of seven hours to the waiting time while
recognising that it is a very high value. He justifies the upper limit by the necessity to
collect a large sample of connecting services for his analyses. Bailey et a! (1985)
approach the problem more rationally and argue that passenger waiting time depends
on the type of airport where the flight originates or ends. They therefore set the MXCT
to two hours for flights where both the origin and destination are large to medium
hubs, and to three hours where either the origin or destination is a small hub or a non-
hub.
For the purposes of this study, it is argued that connecting passengers select the flight
option which minimises the total journey time and will therefore consider the waiting
time in relation to the actual flying time. For example, if the journey is short-haul, the
passenger will be unwilling to wait for a long time for his/her connection. Indeed, for
short haul air travel, a long waiting time can have a substantial impact on the total
journey time and can go to the extent of doubling it. As the length of haul increases,
the waiting time becomes less critical since its contribution to the total journey time
decreases. The above argument can be expressed mathematically as follows:
Ttime= Ftime + Wtime	 (Eq. 1O.13a)
where Ttime is the total journey time, Ftime is the time in flight and Wtime is the
waiting time at the connecting hub. Dividing throughout by Ttime followed by
mathematical manipulation gives
I Wtime) 1(Ftime') = -	 - Hp ) , + (H - D),	 (Eq. 1O.13b)
'Ttime	 . Ttime)	 Ttime	 Ttime J
The discussion is based on destinations. However, the same arguments apply for origins.
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where (H—H), and (H—D) refer to flying times of the inter-hub and hub-to-
destination portions of the trip. From Equation 10.1 3b, one can deduce that short H
—
H and H—D flights lead to a waiting time which constitutes a high proportion of total
journey time. The contrary is true when H—H and H—D flights are long-haul. On
this basis, waiting times are assumed to be as in Figure 10.7.
Length of haul
Short
Medium
Long
H—DtJ
Short-haul:
Medium-haul:
Long-haul:
Short	 Medium	 Long	 Hi—H,
2	 3	 4
3	 4	 4
4	 4	 5
Ftime ^ 3 hrs
3 hrs <Ftime ^ 5 hrs
Ftime> 5 hrs
Figure 10.7 Passenger waiting times (hrs) at connecting hubs
The Time Window defined by constraints I and II is shown in Figure 10.8.
Constraint III: Common destinations
Destinations common to both networks are eliminated as it very unlikely for a
passenger to go through H,, on his/her way to D when a direct flight from H exists.
The same applies for origins.
Constraint IV. Backtrack
Passengers inherently have in mind the circuit that they are going to fly. Where the
H—I-I,,—D flight is fairly uni-directional (Figure 10.9a), consumers are likely to fly
with the alliance. However, if it involves considerable backtracking (Figure 10.9b),
they will certainly consider the alliance option unattractive and will fly with a
competing airline/alliance. Therefore, those origins/destinations which involve
considerable backtracking do not contribute towards increasing network coverage.
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Hi-H, flight
	
H..D flight
lands	 departs
TIME WINDOW
MCT
	 Connectable destinations
MXCT
Figure 10.8 Definition of the connectable destination
H
(a)
0
H•
(b)
Do
Figure 10.9 Illustration of constraint 4
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In order to screen out the unwanted origins/destinations, a means of quantifying the
acceptable amount of backtrack is necessary. Based on Ricout (1994), the measure (B)
for origins and destinations is defined as
O—F1
BoNG = (
0— H) + (H - H)
H —D
BDESN = (H - H) + (H - D)
(Eq. 1O.14a)
(Eq. 10.14b)
respectively, where variables on the right hand side of the Equations 10.14a and
10.14b refer to great circle distances. Low values of B imply a high degree of
backtrack. For the purposes of this study, destinations with values of B lying in the
range 0 to 0.75 will be screened out.
Application of the four constraints before and after alliance formation will give the
additional network coverage achieved as a result of co-operation. However, the
number of connectable origins and destinations in and by itself does not appropriately
capture the network coverage variable. This is because of the differing frequencies
with which they are served. Therefore, when modelling alliance success, the
frequency-weighted number of connectable origins and destinations will be used to
quantify the change in effective network size:
MTSIZE =	
"OPJG +	 ' 'DESN
	 (Eq. 10.15)
where F refers to the frequency-weighting.
Code-sharing
The discussion in Chapter 6 has shown that code-sharing is more powerful than
interlining in the quest for marketing advantages. Indeed, while interlining is a passive
agreement between two airlines, code-sharing is a more aggressive marketing tool
geared towards gaining a competitive edge against competitors. Evidence of the
benefits of code-sharing have been provided by GRA (1994) and the US GAO (1995).
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Considering the importance of code-sharing, it is necessary to incorporate it into the
model. This is achieved by attaching a weighting of 2 to code-shared destinations' 7 to
indicate that they contribute to network expansion to a greater extent than simple
interlining.
10.5.1.2 Network complementarity
Complementarity is a term used to describe the level of duplication between the
partners' individual networks. Network complementarity is considered as an
important factor contributing to the success of airline alliances, and has influenced the
choice of partners in a number of cases. Indeed, Debbage (1994, p.195) observes that
'...of the four or five global alliance networks that will likely dominate
intercontinental city-pair markets, it is widely anticipated that the BAtlJSAir
operation will be competitive because of the geographic complementarily of the route
network' (emphasis added). Network complementarity is particularly important when
the objective of the alliance is to access new markets for the reason that minimal
network overlap allows each airline in the partnership to have access to a greater
number of markets than if the overlap were substantial. Moreover, it can be critical
when the formation of the alliance affects competition and requires the acceptance of
competition authorities. According to US DoT and US Justice Department officials,
the level of integration achieved by KLM and Northwest Airlines would have been
acceptable even if the alliance had not benefited from antitrust immunity since the two
airlines were not significant competitors on most routes. On the other hand, Lufthansa
and United Airlines compete on many city-pair markets and competition would suffer
negative effects if the alliance were granted antitrust immunity (GAO, 1995). As high
network complementarity is expected to be beneficial to alliance success, the
following null hypothesis can be formulated:
h2 : Alliance success is positively related to the network complementarity of the
airlines in the partnership
67 That is, the frequency at which code-shared destinations are served is doubled when applying the measure of network
coverage change defined by Equation 10.15.
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Measurement of network complementarity
Since network complementarity is determined by the amount of overlap between the
networks (Shaw and Ivy, 1994), the number of destinations common to both networks
can be used as a basis for defining a measure for it:
NCOMP =1—_ 
D	
(Eq. 1O.16a)
where NCOMP,, is the complementarity between the networks of airlines x and y,
is the number of destinations served by both airlines x and y, and 	 and
are the network sizes of airlines x and y in terms of destinations served. Division by
the combined network size is necessary to correct for the differing scale of operations
of airlines at their hubs. According to Equation 1O.16a, a high proportion of common
destinations in the combined network reflects a low complementarity and vice-versa.
In the same way as the effective network size variable, it is recognised that the number
of common destinations in and by itself does not totally capture the synergistic
potential of networks. This is again because of the different destinations are served
with different frequencies. An improved measure of network complementarity is
therefore obtained by weighting the destinations by their respective frequencies:
where F refers to the frequency weighting.
10.5.1.3 Hub separation
Hub separation refers to the distance between the hubs of the partner airlines, and
defines the global reach of the alliance. An alliance is expected to be successful when
partners are based far from each other because then, the alliance is more likely to be
the only quasi on-line option involving only one stop. In addition, the further the
networks are from each other, the lesser will be the degree of overlap between them.
The null hypothesis is therefore
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h3: Alliance success is positively related to the distance between the hubs of the
alliance partners
10.5.1.4 Network integration
The term integration is used to describe the degree to which the separate networks of
the airlines in the alliance are linked together to offer the consumer a greater choice of
destinations. A better linkage between the networks allows easy transfer from one to
the other and therefore enhances the perception that the two networks are not separate,
but are in fact a single entity. The quantity which is considered to reflect the quality of
the connection of networks is the inter-hub frequency. In general, the formation of
alliances is accompanied by substantial increases in inter-hub frequency (see Figure
10.3). This theoretically improves network integration by facilitating access to each.
Consumer choices of flight times are less constrained and the probability of potential
travellers securing seats on their desired flights is raised (Bailey et a!, 1985; Ippolito,
1981). An increase in frequency is also expected to stimulate demand on the inter-hub
route and, to a lesser extent, on spokes as well. Another advantage of inter-hub
frequency increases is that it improves the attractiveness of the alliance option relative
to competitors in O-D markets so that it stands a better chance of being chosen by
travellers. Finally, an increase in frequency will raise the market share of the alliance
on the inter-hub route, as theorised by Taneja's S-curve (Taneja, 1976, 1981). For
those reasons, the null hypothesis is formulated as follows:
h4: Alliance success is positively related to network integration
Owing to certain data limitations detailed in section 10.4.2.3 alliance inter-hub
frequency is proxied by capacity.
10.5.2 Service-relatedfactors
A main objective of airline alliances is to provide the consumer with a complete
product which has certain features absent in competitors' products, hence making the
option of flying with the alliance more attractive. Some of those features which have
been analysed above are related to the networks. This section will analyse another set
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of alliance characteristics which are related to the service it offers. Included in this set
are the fare, the travel convenience and the degree of 'seamlessness'.
10.5.2.1 Fare
How alliance formation affects fares was briefly analysed in section 10.4.1. Evidence
provided by Youssef (1992) indicates that fares in inter-hub markets are very likely to
rise as the airlines cease competing for traffic and achieve enough market power to
oust Fifth Freedom carriers out of the markets. Yet, when it comes to O-D markets,
the alliance could lead to decreases in fares as a result of cost savings achieved by the
combination of operations and density economies on inter-hub routes. Cost savings on
the supply side achieved as a result of co-operation could also lead to lower fares.
In addition, though competition in inter-hub markets is likely to decrease after alliance
formation, competition in O-D markets could increase with the formation of
comparable competing alliances (GRA, 1994). This situation is apparent on Europe-
US O-D markets where travellers have the option of flying with either British
Airways-USAir, KLM-Northwest and Lufthansa-United, not considering the other
interlining possibilities available. The alliances would then have to reduce fares in
order to remain competitive. Since the effect of fares on passenger traffic is not clear,
the null hypothesis is formulated as follows:
h 5 : Alliance success is related to alliance fares
Fare measurement
It is necessary to include an aggregate measure of fares in the alliance model. Studies
on fares in the airline industry have made use of airline yield (revenue per passenger-
kilometre) as an overall measure of fare levels (for example, Morrison and Winston,
1989). In this thesis, this measure is slightly modified to take into account the
integration between the two airlines in the partnership and the competitive pressures
they might experience. The measure (YIELD_A) is defined as
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(Revenue + Revenue
YIELD A=I
	
(Eq.1O.17)
-	 RPK+RPK )
where subscripts x and y are the airlines in the alliance, and RPK represents the
revenue passenger-kilometres carried by the airlines.
10.5.2.2 Travel convenience
Travel convenience is a term describing the ease with which a passenger can reach
his/her destination. A major factor affecting travel convenience is the timing of
flights68 (Bailey et al, 1985). As in any scheduled system, airlines can offer capacity in
discrete units while demand for airline services is continuous. As a result, most air
travellers must depart/arrive at a time other than the most preferred time. This travel
constraint effectively makes scheduling a competitive tool: the effectiveness with
which the discrete units of supply are matched with the continuous demand defines
the travel convenience.
The same logic is relevant to the alliance context. For a passenger travelling from H
to D via H, the amount of time for which he/she has to wait for the connecting flight
at FI will affect his/her level of perceived travel convenience as provided by the
alliance system. If the layover time is long, then the connection will bear no difference
with the standard interline agreements in existence. It is therefore in the interest of
alliance partners to co-ordinate their schedules to bring their respective incoming and
outgoing flights closer together and, in doing so, decrease passenger waiting time at
the connecting airport. Only then will the passenger view the combined airline system
as one single entity. Since travel convenience is considered to be an important
variable in the model of alliance success, the null hypothesis is
h6 : Alliance success is positively related to travel convenience
68 Other factors are service frequency and the directness of flights (number of stops and backtrack) which have already been
considered.
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Travel convenience measurement
In a study on the value of time in air travel, Douglas and Miller (1974) quantify travel
convenience by 'schedule delay' which they define as the absolute difference between
passengers' most preferred departure/arrival time and that of their actual
departure/arrival time69. This measure can be adapted to the alliance context where the
preferred departure time of the transiting passenger can be assumed to lie immediately
after the MCT (see Figure 10.8). However, it is highly unlikely for all the departing
flights of the partner airline lying within the Time Window specified in Figure 10.8 to
be grouped at that time. Rather, they will follow a certain distribution, a hypothetical
one being shown in Figure 10.10.
Figure 10.10 Hypothetical distribution of alliance connecting flights before and after alliance
formation
If the departing flights are grouped far from the MCT, then the average passenger
waiting time will be long and the flight routing via the alliance connecting hub will
not be favourably rated by customers. After alliance formation, the partners will try to
schedule their flights in such a way that the incoming O—H flights are close to the
69 To this, they add an expected delay resulting from the inability of the customer to secure a seat on the preferred flight owing
to high load factors.
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departing H—H flight, and that departing H—D flights are close to the incoming H i—
H), flight. The average waiting time at FI and H will thus be lowered, and the flight
routing will be more favourably rated.
A measure of travel convenience is then the average time a passenger has to wait for
his/her connecting flight, defined as the ratio of the sum of schedule delays to the total
number of origins/destinations. The travel convenience (TCONV) of the alliance
network is taken as the sum of the averages of the waiting times at H and H:
TCONV= SD
H	SD11	
(Eq. 10.18)
no
where SDH and SDH are the schedule delays at H and H respectively, and no and
nd are the number of connectable origins and destinations respectively.
A situation can arise where the same origin comes up at different arrival times in the
Time Window. In those cases, the last arrival time is selected since passengers will
select flights in such a way as to minimise their waiting time. For the same reason, the
first departure time is selected if the same destination is present at different departure
times in the Time Window. Where no direct alliance inter-hub flight exists (for
example, Zurich-Cincinnati and London-Baltimore in 1989), the waiting time at the
stop is added to the average waiting time at the connecting hub for that flight option to
incur a high time penalty.
10.5.2.3 Degree of 'seamlessness'
The belief currently prevailing in the airline industry is that passengers want to
experience seamless travel when transferring from one airline to the other. For that
reason, many alliance partners are attempting to harmonise their service levels. It is
anticipated that harmonisation of service of the alliance partners will improve their
traffic levels so that the null hypothesis is
h7: Alliance success is positively related to the degree of seamlessness
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Measurement of the degree of seamlessness
The quantification of the degree of similarity between alliance carriers necessitates the
identification of those major characteristics which affect travellers' perception of
seamless travel. The proxy for the degree of seamlessness (SEAM) will incorporate the
following variables:
(1) The reciprocal of the difference in the average age (AGE_A) of the aircraft in the
airlines' fleets. Passengers generally prefer travelling on board new aircraft for safety
and aesthetic reasons. An apparent difference in aircraft age could be viewed by
passengers unfavourably. However, in many cases, passengers do not actually see the
aircraft they are boarding and they usually perceive aircraft age as a function of the
amount of noise it generates. Therefore, a lower weighting is attached to this variable.
The reciprocal of the difference is taken for a large average age discrepancy indicates
low seamlessness and vice versa. Age data is obtained from Dempsey and Goetz
(1992) and from airline financial reports.
(2) The provision of through check-in (T_CHECK). A dummy is used to represent this
variable ('Yes' = 1; 'No' = 0).
(3) The use of the same terminal at connecting hubs (TERMINAL). A dummy is used
to represent this variable ('Yes' = 1; 'No' = 0).
(4) The practice of joint advertising (J_ADVERT) to create awareness of the airline
combination. A dummy is used to represent this variable ('Yes' = 1; 'No' = 0).
(5) The reciprocal of the difference in seat pitch (S_PITCH) which is represented by
the average aircraft capacity in the fleet. The reciprocal is taken for the same reason as
for AGE_A.
(6) The difference in in-flight service (SERVICE). This is a very difficult variable to
quantifr as in-flight service is made up of a number of non-measurable items (such as
food and drink) and is very subjective. In-flight service will be measured by the
average number of flight attendants per seat. This measure does have shortcomings
but it is considered to be the best one which affords some quantification of the
treatment passengers are expected to receive on board aircraft.
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The provision of a combined FFP also contributes to projecting the alliance as a single
entity. However, all the airline partners in the sample had combined their FFPs so that
it is not necessary to include that variable. Items (4) and (5) will be given a higher
weighting than the others as they are considered to be more important in enhancing
the perception of seamless travel. Combination of variables is carried out by
standardisation7° throughout the sample followed by addition. Thus negative values for
SEAM indicate that the alliances have a degree of seamlessness which is below the
average in the sample of selected alliances (considered as less effective alliances)
while positive values of SEAM are for alliances providing a degree of seamlessness
above the sample average (more effective alliances).
10.5.3 Competition-relatedfactors
The formation of an alliance is very likely to result in some kind of reaction from
competitors for it constitutes a considerable threat to their market share. The degree of
competition is therefore a major factor shaping the success of airline alliances.
Competition is experienced mainly in O—D markets (O-^H--H--->D) and comes
from airline interlining agreements and from other alliances. The situation is depicted
graphically in Figure 10.11.
Passengers from those cities represented by squares have the choice of travelling with
two alliances to reach their destination. There is unsubstantiated evidence that
competition between alliances is hotting up, particularly between Europe and the US
with the formation of three strong alliances (British Airways-USAir, KLM-Northwest
Airlines, and Lufthansa-United Airlines). Increased levels of competition are expected
to affect alliance success negatively so that the null hypothesis is
h 8: Alliance success is negatively affected by competition levels
70 The standard value of variable Xis obtained from the following expression:
x-x
'U
where X is the mean of variable X, and p is its standard deviation. Standardisation creates dimensionless variables which can
then be added algebraically together.
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Figure 10.11 Competition between alliances
Adaptedfrom GRII 0994,)
Measurement of the level of competition
The measure of the level of competition (icom) experienced by an alliance in an O—D
market can be taken as the number of effective competitors (frequency-weighted) in
that particular market, where effective has been defined in section 10.4.2.3. For all 0-
D markets served by the alliance for a particular hub combination, the overall level of
competition (LCOM) is taken as the average frequency-weighted number of
competitors:
LCOM= i=1
N
	 (Eq. 10.19)
where F is the frequency of competitor c, n is the number of competitors to the
alliance in O—D market i and N is the number of O—D markets served by the alliance.
Since on-line connections and other alliances provide more effective competition than
interline connections, they are given a higher weighting when calculating LCOM. A
simple example is provided below to illustrate how the computation of LCOM is
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performed. Effective competitors and their frequency of service are obtained from the
ABC World Airways Guide.
Example
For airline alliance A operating between hubs H and H, the competition in O-D
markets is as in Table 10.4.
O—D markets	 Competitors Freq/wk
(O—D)1
(O—D)2
(O—D)3
2
C2	 I
C3	 3
lcom(O-D) 1	5
C l	 3
C2	 4
lcom(O-D)2	7
c 1	4
lcom(O-D)3
	4
Table 10.4 Illustration of the computation of
the level of competition
The level of competition for the H-H combination is given by
lcom	 164LCOMHH 
= number of 0 - D markets 4 - (Eq. 10.20)
One problem is that the number of O-D markets served by an alliance is large, and
considering the number of inter-hub combinations included in the analysis,
computation of LCOM can be very time-consuming. Therefore, in order to facilitate
the task, origins are taken to be at H instead of 0 (see Figure 10.11) so that the level
of competition in H5-^H--^D markets is taken to approximate the level of
competition in O-+H-.+H--*D markets.
10.6 Model Formulation And Results
10.6.1 Modelformulation
The model of airline alliance performance can now be formulated in a more formal
way as follows:
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AHR4XA = f (ANSIZE, NCOMP , S HUB, AHCAP, A YIELD_ A, A TCONV, SE4M, LiLCOM)
(Eq. 10.21)
where
HPAXA is the inter-hub passenger traffic of the alliance;
NSIZE is the effective network size of the alliance;
S_HUB is the distance between the partners' hubs;
HCAP is the inter-hub capacity of the alliance;
YIELD_A is the average yield of the alliance on the inter-hub route;
TCONVis the average waiting time at the alliance hubs;
SEAM is the degree of seamlessness between the partners;
LCOM is the average level of competition experienced by the alliance in its markets;
and
A is the change in value from the pre-alliance period to the post-alliance period.
Two specifications of the model are run:
Linear model:
AHPAXA = a0 + a1 (ANSIzE) + a2 (NCOMP) + a3 (s_ HUB) + a4 (ARCAP) +
a5 (AYIELD_ A) + a 6
 (ATCONV) + a 7 (SEAM) + a8 (ALcOM)
(Eq. 10.21a)
Semi-logarithmic model
Ln(AHPAXA) b0 + b1 Ln(AIStTSIZE) + b2 Ln(NCOMP) + b3 Ln(S_ HUB) +
b4 Ln(AHCAP) + b5 (AYIELD A) + b6
 (ATcONV) + a 7 (SEAM) + a8 (ALCOM)
(Eq. 10.21b)
One of the disadvantages of using the logarithmic transfonnation here is that the
model variables are in fact changes which can be negative or zero, in which cases it is
impossible to take logarithms. Therefore, the logarithmic transformation was applied
only to those variables which had the positive sign throughout most of the data, hence
the semi-log model. Variable summary statistics are given in Table 10.5 below.
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Variable
LHPAX
ANSJZE
NCOMP
SHUB
LIHCAP
IYIELD_A
M'CONV
SEAM
ELCOM
28874.57
201.14
0.7633
4733.38
44107.95
-4.06
23.85
1.09
5.24
25844.32
219.59
0.2035
2994.32
39226.09
4.30
34.62
4.18
3.49
Ln(EtRPA)7	 10.15	 0.89
Ln(EiNSIZE)	 4.83	 1.31
Ln(NCOMP) -0.25	 0.22
Ln(S HUB)	 8.30	 0.84
Ln(AHCAP)	 10.56	 0.74
Table 10.5 Summary statistics of
variables in the model of alliance
performance
(.t: mean; 2: standard deviation)
The models are checked for normality using normal Q-Q pIots 7 of the residuals and
K-S statistics72. The normality assumption held quite well for the linear model. This
was not the case for the semi-log model which showed departures from normality.
The correlation matrices of the two models were used to investigate the presence of
multicollinearity. A high correlation (r = O.T113;p = 0.000) was observed between the
hub separation (S_HUB) and network complementarity (NCOMP) variables. The high
variable inflation factors 73 (VIF) confirmed that the correlation was creating the
problem of multicollinearity in the models. When the regressions were run, both
variables to adopted the 'wrong' (negative) sign. The relationship between S_HUB
and NCOMP can be explained by the fact that the further are the networks apart, the
less likely they are to overlap. Furthermore, if the networks are close, it is most
The Q-Q plot pairs each observed value with its expected value in the normal distribution. If the sample is from a normal
distribution, the points are expected to lie approximately on a straight line with slope I.72 The K-S statistic tests for the hypothesis that the data is from a normal distribution. Low significance levels for the K-S
statisticlead to the rejection of the hypothesis.
" 
VIF is defined as	 -	 where R,' is the multiple correlation coefficient of the ith independent variable is predicted from
1- R,
other independent variables. A high VIF, indicates that variable I is almost a linear combination of the other independent
variables (Norusis, 1993).
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probable that they will be situated in the same world region. With the formation of
regional blocks as the European Union and the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), and the spread of deregulation and liberalisation, there will be
certainly exist liberal bilaterals between the countries in those regions. This will result
in many common destinations served by the carriers operating in those regions. On the
other hand, most airlines based at hubs in different world regions will not benefit from
such liberal bilateral agreements between their countries and, as in the case of the UK
and the US, coimnon points in the networks of the allied carriers are limited to
gateways. To correct the problem of multicollinearity, the S_HUB variable was
discarded from the model. As a consequence, the sign of the NCOMP variable
reverted to positive in the regressions.
The assumption of equality of variance in the regressions was checked using
scatterplots of standardised regression residuals against standardised predicted values.
For both models, the residuals lay in a random distribution about the horizontal line
through zero, hence homoscedasticity. The results of the various statistical tests are
given in Appendix D.
10.6.2 Regression results
The results of the linear and semi-log regressions are given in Table 10.6. Only the
network size, network complementarity, network integration, travel convenience and
level of competition variables are significant at the 5% level in both models. The
models of airline alliance performance can therefore be written as follows:
Linear model:
AHPAX = 9.759 (AwsJzE)+3.8o4 (NcoMr)+ 0.513 (tHcAP)— 0.106 (TcoNv)
—46.945 (iLcoM)
(Eq. 1O.22a)
Semi-log model:
Ln(LHPAX) = 6219 + 0.065 Ln(MTSIZE) + 0.394 Ln(NCOMP) + 0.619 Ln(AHCAP)
—0.0 12 (ATcoNv) —7.98 1 (ALc0M)
(Eq. 1O.22b)
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Variable	 Coefficient	 Linear model Semi-log model
Intercept	 a1Jb0	 -10699.704	 6.219
(-0.887)	 (2.497)
[0.3812]	 [0.0014]
ANSIZE	 a1	 9.759	 -
(2.8 19)
[0.0002]
Ln(MTSIZE)	 b1	
-	 0.065
(4.65 5)
[0.0005]
NCOMP	 a2	 3.804	 -
(2.2 17)
[0.0334]
Ln(NCQMP)	 b2	
-	 0.3 94
(2.685)
[0.0049]
M-ICAP	 a4	 0.513	 -
(9.116)
[0.0000]
Ln(AI-JCAP)	 b4	
-	 0.6 19
(4.133)
[0.0003]
AYIELDA	 a5/b5	 893.583	 0.061
(1.199)	 (1.207)
[0.2390]	 [0.2382]
LTCONV	 a6/b6	
-0.106	 -0.01
(-3.271)	 (-2.288)
[0.002 1]
	 [0.0358]
SEAM	 a-/b-	 1971.667	 0.062
(0.863)	 (0.175)
[0.5740]	 [0.6571]
EiLCOM	 a8/b8	 -46.945	 -7.981
(-6.945)	 (-4.173)
[0.0002]	 [0.0008]
Model test statistics:
n	 44	 32
0.766	 0.671
F	 20.170	 15.195
[0.0000]	 [0.0009]
Table 10.6 Regression results for scope and density benefits of
alliances
(n: number of data points)
Note: 1-statistics in circular brackets and level of signflcance in square brackets
10.6.3 Discussion
In terms of explanatory power (R2 ), both models behave well with an explanatory
power of approximately 77% for the linear model and 67% for the logarithmic model.
This can be considered very satisfactory considering that the analysis was of a cross-
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sectional nature involving airlines of differing characteristics. Indeed, Norusis (1993)
points out that low R 2 values should be expected when a cross-sectional analysis is
undertaken. The F-statistics of both models are highly significant, confinning the
validity of the models. The lower explanatory power of the semi-log model can be
explained by the fact that not all variables were transformed. In addition, of the
transformed variables, some of the data points had to be dropped because they were
negative. This lead to a decrease in sample size. Deviation from normality can also
explain the lower explanatory power of the semi-log model.
Overall, the regression results confirm most of the hypotheses made about the
variables in the model. The coefficient of the network size variable (111%/SIZE) in both
models has the expected positive sign. Incidentally, the frequency-weighted measure
of network size was observed to perform better than the non-weighted one. The
coefficient of A1/SIZE is significant at the 1% level in both models confirming the
hypothesis that network size is a key variable for alliance success. Therefore, an
airline should search for a partner with a large network in order to attract additional
traffic onto its own network. Furthermore, the larger the partner's network, the more
feed traffic will the airline receive. However, an important consideration is that the
additional origins and destinations should be 'connectable', that is lying within airport
and passenger waiting time limits. The significance of the network size variable leads
one to conclude that alliances provide airlines with a major source of economies of
scope. For example, passengers travelling with one airline can be made aware of the
product in a larger number of markets. The preference of passenger for larger
networks as proved in the models also indicates that the joint FFP of the combination
will be quite strong and that the only FFPs capable of competing effectively with it
will have to be operated on a comparable network size. According to the linear model,
an additional connectable destination/origin can lead to an increase of approximately
10 passengers on the inter-hub route. In terms of percentages, a 1% in effective
network size causes approximately 0.07% increase in alliance inter-hub pasenger
traffic.
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The network complementarity variable (NCOMP) is significant at the 1% level in the
logarithmic model and at the 5% level in the linear model. It has the expected positive
coefficient, that is the lower the overlap between networks, the more likely is the
alliance to succeed. This is to be expected since a high degree of network overlap
implies that there are many destinations which can be reached non-stop (O—*D) or
stopping only once (O-3H--.D), rather than by being routed through the two-stop
option (O-^H--^H--*D) provided by the alliance. The significant presence of the
network complementarity variable in the model confirms that it is preferable for
airlines to seek for partners based in different world regions to avoid network
duplication. Where substantial duplication occurs (as in the EQA), measures should be
taken for the partners to drop certain routes operated by both of them. However, it is
recognised that this is not an easy task and can be done only if the partners have
achieved such a degree of co-operation as to act as a single airline. The relationship
also needs to be a very trusting one, and it can be argued that no airline alliance has
reached that required level of trust yet. A network complementarity of 1 (no overlap)
is expected to produce an increase of approximately 4 passengers between the
partners' hubs. Alliance performance is elastic with respect to network
complementarity: an increase in complementarity of 1% is expected to increase inter-
hub traffic by approximately 0.4% according to the semi-log model.
The network integration variable (HCAP) is significant at the 1% level in both
models, confirming that efficient connection between networks is important to
alliance success. Indeed, increasing inter-hub capacity 74 contributes to raising
passenger levels on that route and, as a consequence, on the networks of the partners
as well. However, it is important to recognise that the source of increased inter-hub
traffic is not exclusively the improved connection between the networks. It can also
come from stimulation of traffic travelling between the two hub cities as a result of
increased frequency. The formation of the alliance and the frequency increase can
have the effect of decreasing the number of competitors operating in the inter-hub
Hence frequency, if no change in aircraft takes place.
0 Department of Air Transport, Cranfield University 	 22
Chapter 10: Scope and density economies in airline alliances
market with the consequent increase in the market share of the alliance, hence more
passengers. The alliance models therefore proves that network connection is important
for economies of network density. However, it is unable to separate the effects of the
constituents of this variable. According to the linear model, an increase of 10 in inter-
hub capacity is expected to increase the inter-hub passenger traffic by 5. In terms of
percentages, an increase of 1% in inter-hub capacity leads to an increase of
approximately 0.6% in passenger traffic between the partners' hubs.
In both models, the YIELD_A variable has the 'wrong' sign in that an increase in
alliance yield (hence fare) results in an increase in traffic levels. However, the
coefficients of the variable are not significant at the 1% and even at the 5% levels in
both models so that the hypothesis that they are not equal to zero can not be rejected.
One can conclude that fares in the markets operated by the alliance do not affect
alliance passenger traffic. This could result from the market power which the
combined hubbing strategy confers to the partner airlines. However, the non-
significance of the variable representing fare levels can very well be the result of
deficiencies in the method of measurement. Indeed, alliance operation is very
localised in that it takes place only on certain markets and between certain airports.
For example, the KLM—Northwest alliance was initially structured around the
Northwest hubs of Boston, Detroit and Minneapolis. Extension of co-operation to
include the Memphis hub came at a later stage. Therefore, taking the average yield
over the whole networks of the airlines is not an appropriate representation of the
average yield on the markets affected by alliance formation as factors other than the
alliance affect fares on other parts of the airlines' networks. An improved measure of
fares should take this into consideration and limit measurement to those markets
affected by alliance formation. However, this procedure is limited by the lack of fare
data on spoke markets. The use of Y fares on inter-hub markets did not give
conclusive results because of the prevalence of the complicated fare structures leading
to various discounts and also because the O-D through fare bears no relationship with
the inter-hub fare. The absence of a relationship between the change inter-hub Y fare
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and the change passenger traffic is obvious in Figure 10.12 where the line of best fit is
nearly horizontal.
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Figure 10.12 Scatterplot of Ln(AHPAXA) v/s change in inter-hub Yfare
The travel convenience variable (LTCONV) has the expected negative sign. It is
significant at the 1% level in the linear model and at the 5% level in the semi-log
model. Therefore, a decrease in connect time will increase traffic levels between the
alliance networks. This confirms the belief that decreasing passenger waiting time at
connecting airports improves the appeal of the overall product which the airlines offer
to potential consumers. Decreases in connect time also promote the alliance flight
option to better positions on CRSs. It is therefore in the interest of airline partners to
match their flights appropriately for departing and incoming flights to lie as close as
possible to each other. This is however not an easy task mainly because of slot
availability problems due to airport congestion. Furthermore, partners might be
reticent to move flights as their slot might be an attractive one gained painstakingly.
Therefore, schedule co-ordination requires the partners to have reached a high level of
trust and integration so as to act as a single airline. The model proves that schedule co-
ordination brings significant benefits. According to the linear model, a decrease in
average waiting time of 10 minutes at the hubs will increase passenger traffic by
I
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approximately 1. Inter-hub passenger traffic is not elastic with respect to average
waiting time: a decrease of 1% in average waiting time increases passenger traffic by
approximately 0.01%.
Travel convenience can be taken to form part of the attributes of seamless travel.
However, since it lends itself more easily to quantification, it was deemed preferable
to separate it from those other attributes of seamless travel which are less easily
quantifiable. The coefficient of the seamless travel variable (SEAM), which
incorporates those attributes, is not significant at the 5% level in the alliance models.
This implies that the hypothesis that passengers are not affected by seamless travel
can not be rejected. A possible explanation is that most passengers are more
concerned about reaching their destination without the hassle of several stops, aircraft
changes (as in the case of the traditional interlining practice) and long connect times
than about service levels and similar in-flight standards, provided they satisfy some
basic minimum criteria. It can also be argued that seamless travel affects mostly high-
yield business class passengers who are more concerned with the ease and comfort of
flying, and who are less tolerant to dramatic changes to service levels and in-flight
standards. Figure 10.13 which shows the linear relationship between the change in
alliance yield and the degree of seamlessness of the alliance, supports this argument.
Leisure traffic is more likely to give fares priority over whether seamless travel is
provided or not. Having said that, it is recognised that the degree of seamlessness of
an alliance has been measured somewhat crudely in this research. Improved methods
of measurement are necessary to investigate this issue further.
The change in the level of competition (LCOM) experienced by the alliance has the
expected negative sign and its coefficient is significant at the 1% significance level.
This indicates that a reaction is expected from competitors following alliance
formation. The reaction will affect the eventual success of the alliance, and needs to
be carefully appraised by the partners-to-be. Two types of competitor reaction are
expected: either they will move out of markets where the alliance achieves substantial
market power, or they will co-operate to confront the alliance more effectively.
Alliance success is highly dependent on competitor reaction.
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Figure 10.13 Relationship between change in alliance yield and degree of seamlessness
(R' = 0.63)
Indeed, increasing the level of competition by 1 causes alliance inter-hub passenger
levels to fall by approximately 47. In terms of percentages, an increase of 1% in the
level of competition leads to an 8% fall in alliance performance. Competitor reactions
to alliance formation are analysed in greater depth in Chapter 11.
Owing to the variables' differing units of measurement, the regression coefficients can
not be used to assess their relative importance. One means to do so is to calculate the
standardised coefficients which, as a result of standardisation, are dimensionless.
These coefficients are termed beta coefficients and Table 10.7 gives the ones for the
significant variables in the alliance models.
Beta coefficienti
Variable	 Linear model
	
Variable	 Semi-log model
L\LCOM	 0.965
M'SIZE	 0.882
AHCAP	 0.778
NCOMP	 0.300
ATCONV	 0.142
Ln(ANSIZE)	 0.899
ESLCOM	 0.864
Ln(HCAP)	 0.615
Ln(NCOMP)	 0.193
iTCONV	 0.049
Table 10.7 Variable beta coefficients
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In both of them, the change in effective network size and in the level of competition
are the most important variables. This implies that these factors are the first ones to be
given consideration by those airlines contemplating the alliance strategy. Following
them in order of importance come network integration, the complementarity of
networks of the potential partners and the convenience of travel offered by the alliance
to travellers. The fact that network size has a higher beta coefficient than travel
convenience indicates that passengers are willing to trade-off smaller improvements in
waiting time against a wider choice of destinations. One of the possible reasons for
that is that FFPs are now widespread industry practice and that travellers are seeking
for airlines which can offer them a large enough network on which to collect and use
points. This implies that having a joint FFP is a major asset for alliances, even though
it is not accompanied by substantial decreases in waiting time.
10.7 Conclusion
Scope and density benefits of airline alliances are best measured by the change in
passenger traffic between the partners' hubs. Of all the strategic alliance considered,
the KLM-Northwest and British Airways-USAir alliances have produced the greatest
benefits. Mathematical modelling of alliance performance indicates that network size,
network complementarity, network integration, travel convenience and level of
competition are the critical success factors of airline alliance success. In order of
importance come network size and level of competition, followed by network
integration, network complementarity and travel convenience. Surprisingly, the
provision of seamless travel did not explain alliance success. However, further
research is needed in that field.
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11. MARKET POWER IN AIRLINE ALLIANCES
Introduction
T
he aim of this chapter is to analyse market power stemming from alliance
formation in detail, and from that analysis, build mathematical models of
alliance market power. As in the previous chapter, these models are useful
in providing quantification of alliance success and in the identification of success
factor variables. Furthermore they enable the verification of the validity of
unsubstantiated beliefs concerning airline alliances. They can therefore be used as a
management tool by airline managers and corporate strategists thinking of adopting
the alliance strategy.
This chapter is divided into two main parts. In the first part, potential measures of
alliance success are defined and their advantages and shortcomings are described. The
location of measurement is selected as the inter-hub route and the origin-destination
(O-D) market. The measure is then applied to three strategic alliances (EQA, British
Airways-USAir and KLM-Northwest) to investigate whether they have been effective
in increasing their market power, or whether they have not progressed substantially in
that field since their formation.
The second part of the chapter deals with the formulation of the model of alliance
market power. The selection of success factor variables is discussed and means of
measuring those factors are devised. The market power models are then calibrated
using two different regression techniques: linear and logit. It is deemed necessary to
run the logit model because the linear model is complicated by the presence of
simultaneity between variables. In addition, the logit model is more effective in
separating alliance and competitor effects. The model results and implications are then
discussed.
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11.1 Market Power Measurement
In the airline context, market power is the ability of a carrier to deter entry of potential
competitors or to decrease the competitiveness of those carriers already in the market.
As noted in Chapter 9, it can exist on a route or within an airport, with a certain
relationship between the two (Mauldin, 1989). The 'market power' theory put forward
by Youssef (1992) to explain the emergence of airline alliances argues that alliances
are strategic tools used by airlines to decrease the level of competition and therefore to
preserve existing sources of economic rents. As a result, those airlines are able to
enjoy supranormal profits, establish new market barriers and, in certain cases,
continue their operational inefficiencies with the negative effects being felt by the
consumer (such as fare increases unaccompanied by service quality enhancement).
11.1.1 Previous studies on airline market power
In order to decide upon and devise a suitable measure of alliance success, it is deemed
important to review some of the literature pertaining to market power and its effects in
the civil aviation industry. Many of the studies on market power were performed to
investigate the effects of the spate of airline mergers and the formation of hub-and-
spoke networks which followed airline deregulation in the US in 1978.
One such study was carried out by Borenstein (1989) who constructed econometric
models to evaluate the effects of airport and route dominance. He used the price
charged by the dominating airline as an indicator of the dominance exerted. Among
the explanatory variables were airport and route market share as well as airport and
route concentration. One of the findings of the study was that '....an individual
airline's share of traffic on the route and at the endpoint airports seems to be a
principal determinant of a carrier's ability to raise the price of its product'
(Borenstein, 1989, p. 357). Concentration increases were also found to be of use in
explaining the rise in fares. Furthermore, the econometric analysis revealed that the
higher prices charged by the dominant airline did not allow other airlines in the
market to raise their prices as well. Hence airport and route dominance seemed to
insulate the dominant airline from competition. In another study, Borenstein (1990)
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used price, market share and service changes as measures of market power. The
Northwest-Republic and TWA-Ozark mergers were used to show that the market
power achieved was translated into higher prices, higher market share and reduced
capacity to increase load factors.
Borenstein's initial work was furthered by Mauldin (1989) who attempted to shed
light on the structural relationships between route dominance, market concentration
and airport concentration in the US domestic marketplace. Fares were used as measure
of market power. The statistical analyses revealed that fares were on average higher
on routes with hubs at the endpoints than in non-hub markets. Lack of slots and space
at hub airports, as well as the requirement for new entrants to enter on a large scale,
were identified as sources of market power.
In an analysis of the competitive behaviour of US airlines and, at the same time,
testing the contestability hypothesis, Bailey et a! (1985) used price as a measure of
market dominance. Their econometric model revealed a direct relationship between
price, as measured by the average yield, and market concentration. The same approach
was employed by Hurdle et a! (1989) when investigating whether airline markets
satisf' the conditions of perfect contestability. Their results confirmed market
concentration to be of significance in explaining market power 75 . Other studies which
have used fares as a reflection of market power include Morrison and Winston (1990)
and Meyer and Oster (1987). In the former study, yields were observed to fall with
increasing number of competitors, while in the latter, an increase in the level of
competition lead to the availability of a greater choice of discount fares.
A more recent study by Belobaba and Acker (1994) analysed the changes in airline
market concentration on a selected number of US O-D markets. An important finding
of their study was that the formation of hub-and-spoke networks lead to both
increased and decreased competition depending on the markets being analysed.
Indeed, hub-and-spoke networks allowed airlines to compete effectively in connecting
750ne variation of this study over that of Bailey el a! (1985) is that the measure of market concentration incorporated the
number of potential entrants in addition to the number of incumbents. This enabled a test of the contestability hypothesis
pertaining to airline markets.
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markets as they reaped the scope and density economies which those networks
conferred. However, they also enabled the hub-dominating airline to reinforce its
position, push out competitors and increase market concentration in markets
originating or ending at a hub.
In an unpublished paper, Jorge-Calderon (1995) investigated market power issues on
the European side using the same approach as in the US studies. Airline market power
was, in that case, quantified as relative market share (that is, ratio of airline market
share to competitor market share). The econometric model of market power revealed
relative frequency share, relative plane size and relative economy fare to be the most
significant explanatory variables. Youssef (1992) investigated the relationship
between market concentration and fares in the airline alliance context basing himself
on the EQA. Markets on which the EQA operated were observed to experience
increases in concentration which were responsible for real fare increases.
From this review of studies, it would appear that market power results from a higher
market share which in turn produces higher prices. Market share and fare therefore
constitute appropriate measures of route market power and are selected for this study.
As already noted, most of the studies mentioned above were carried out in the US
context and, as such, did not suffer from lack of data. This study, however, deals with
international airlines and routes for which collection of traffic and fare data is not so
rigorous as in the US. Therefore, certain approximations have to be made in the
quantification of market power. These approximations are considered next.
11.1.1.1 Market share
Ideally, the computation of market share should be based on actual passenger traffic
in individual city-pair markets. For this research, the only appropriate source of such
data is the ICAO Digest of Statistics-Traffic by Flight Stage. However, there are two
major problems is making use of this data source. First, not all markets are listed so
that it may be difficult to obtain a sample of routes large enough to justify the use of
regression analysis. Second, some airlines have not reported their data though they
operated on the routes. This has the result of inflating the market share of the alliance
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carriers. In order to circumvent the problem, market share will be substituted by
frequency share. The assumption that frequency share approximates market share is
based on previous work, notably that of Taneja (1968, 1981). Since this
approximation is critical to the analysis in this chapter, a review of the main pieces of
work in that context is presented.
The study by Taneja (1968) on the relationship between frequency share and market
share involved the application of linear regression analysis to the following set of
models:
MSHARE = f(FSHARE)
	 (Eq. 11.la)
MSHARE f(FSHARE, STIME)
	 (Eq. 11.lb)
MSHARE = J(FSHARE, N_ AIRLINES)
	 (Eq. 11.lc)
MSHARE = f (FSHAREI NOSTOP, ONESTOP, MTIME, N_ AIRLINES) (Eq. 1 1.ld)
where MSHARE is the airline's market share, FSHARE is the airline's frequency
share, STIME is the scheduled flying time, N_AIRLINES is the number of airlines in
the market, NOSTOP is the number of non-stop flights, ONESTOP is the number of
one-stop flights, and MTIME is the minimum flying time. The results of the
regressions lead Taneja to conclude that market share depends almost completely on
frequency share. No mention was however made as to the shape of the variation of the
two quantities.
Shultz (1970) hypothesised that market share depends on frequency share, advertising
share, demand, revenue, profit, and equipment innovations and tested a dynamic
market share model involving four simultaneous equations containing those variables.
Again, F and t tests at the 5% significance level revealed frequency share to be the
only significant explanatory variable. Detzel (1971) attempted to improve the models
of Taneja and Shultz by including a scheduling variable (the timing of the airline's
departures relative to the departures of competing flights), passenger capacity of each
flight in the market and the time-of-day travel distribution. His results confirmed that
frequency share is the principal determinant of market share.
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Basing himself on further empirical evidence, Taneja (1981) argued that the variation
of market share with frequency share is in fact not linear, but is in the form of an S-
curve, the location of which depends on the number of competitors in the market (see
Figure 11.1). From this variation, one can deduce that the airline with the higher
frequency share attracts more than a proportional share of the traffic. The S-curve
variation is caused mainly by the existence of information costs (Levine, 1987; Miller
III, 1979) which drive customers to contact the airline on which they have the highest
probability of securing a seat at a convenient departure time, that is the airline with the
highest share of departures.
Figure 11.1 Variation of market share with frequency share
(n: number of competitors)
Adapted from Taneja (1981)
The theory of the S-curve has lead to the formulation of the following function
describing the variation of market share with frequency share in a number of academic
studies investigating either airline or airport market share76
MSHARE FSHARE
	 (Eq. 11.2)
76 See for example Cohas eta! (1995)
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where a is a constant defining the shape of the curve. The belief that the competitor
with the largest capacity share finds it easier to gain market share (which drives
airlines to maximise their capacity share), has lead Miller III (1979) to investigate
Equation 11.2 with capacity in place of frequency. Both cross-sectional and time-
series regressions give values of a which are very close to unity. Based on these
studies and because of the unavailability of city-pair passenger traffic data, alliance
market share is approximated by frequency share in this research:
MSHAREA FREQA	 (Eq. 11.3)
FREQ1
where A represents the alliance, i represents the services operating in the market and n
is the number of services. Substitution of market share by frequency share has been
used by Youssef (1992) with very satisfactory results. Service frequency is available
from the ABC World Airways Guide.
11.1.1.2 Fare
Most of the studies on market power were carried out in the US domestic market
where an abundance of data on fares is available. As Maillebiau and Hansen (1995)
note, this is not the case for international operations where fare data can be obtained
only from the ABC WorldAirways Guide. Two problems are encountered in using this
data source. First, it is not very reliable in that it does not give the actual fares being
paid. Indeed, owing to various unofficial discounts, the fares paid by consumers can
differ, sometimes widely, from the published fares. In addition, the fare data is very
complex with many different fare classes. Owing to the complex variety of published
fares and the restrictions to which they are associated, the lowest unrestricted
economy (F) fares were selected for this study. However, they did not give conclusive
results in the regression analyses, most probably because they were not representative
of the actual fares paid, and were therefore discarded. A second restriction associated
In the cross-sectional analysis, a lay within the range 1.007 <a < 1.173, and in the time-series analysis, a lay within the
range 0.951 <a< 1.054.
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with the use of the ABC Guide is that it does not list the fares to all the destinations
considered in this research. The only fares which are consistently listed are those
between the major hubs of the airlines.
Yield would have been a good approximation to fares. However, market power
analysis is performed on inter-hub and on O-D markets (see section 11.2.1) so that the
computation of yield requires data for the revenues and passenger traffic on those
individual markets, such data being very difficult to obtain. Owing to these
difficulties, fare was eventually dropped leaving market share as the only measure of
alliance market power used in the mathematical modelling process.
11.2 Effects Of Alliances
The selected measure of alliance market power will now be applied to visualise how
effective airlines have been able to increase their market power via alliances.
However, prior to that, the markets to which the analysis will be applied have to be
identified. The airline alliances to be included in the study also need to be selected.
11.2.1 Market selection
In the context of airline alliances, two market types are identified as potential
candidates for assessment (refer to Figure 10.1):
(1) the inter-hub market (H—H) and
(2) the origin-destination (H—D) market.
The connecting hub-to-destination market (H—D) was also analysed. However, in the
course of the analysis, methodological problems were encountered when determining
the alliance market share in the H—D markets. This was because of the difficulty in
determining which flights competed with the alliance owing to the Time Window
constraints imposed for selection of connectable destinations (see Figure 10.8).
Consequently, attempts to model the market share on H,—D markets did not yield
conclusive results. Another possible reason for that is the fact that a large number of
hubs apart from H connect to the H—D routes and affect alliance market share there
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H,
I
(Figure 11.2). The H—D markets were therefore dropped from the analysis leaving the
inter-hub markets and the O-D markets as analysis candidates.
Figure 11.2 Hubs affecting traffic levels on H,—D market
(He : competitors' hubs)
11.2.2 Alliance selection
To investigate the (possibly) different characteristics of regional and intercontinental
alliances, the following alliances are selected for analysis:
(1) KLM—Northwest Airlines,
(2) British Airways—USAir, and
(3)EQA
The KLM—Northwest alliance is selected since it seems to be at an advanced stage of
co-operation probably because of the antitrust immunity which it enjoys. It is
compared to the British Airways—USAir alliance which is not protected from antitrust
to identify whether antitrust immunity leads to different alliance characteristics. The
EQA is chosen because it is the only European alliance having achieved an
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appreciable level of co-operation and which has been in existence for a sufficiently
long time to enable the measurement of changes following alliance formation.
As in Chapter 10, the unit of analysis is the alliance. For example, if x 1 and are the
market shares of SAS and Swissair respectively before the formation of the alliance,
and x2 and Y2 are their respective market shares after alliance formation, then the
change in EQA market share is (x 2 + Y2) - (xj + yj). In the case of fares, the mean fare
of the airlines in the partnership is taken.
Pre-alliance and post-alliance periods
As in Chapter 10, the measurement of alliance success is based on changes in the
success variable from a selected pre-alliance period to a selected post-alliance period.
For the EQA, the pre-alliance period is taken as the last week of June 1989 while for
the KLM—Northwest alliance, it is taken as the last week of June 1991 in spite of the
fact that the alliance already existed in 1989. This is because it was only in 1991 that
the two airlines were granted the permission to perform their operations jointly. In
addition, Northwest did not perform well in the years 1989 to 1991 leading KLM to
write off its investment of $400 million in it. Therefore, alliance effects might not be
apparent in the period 1989 to 1991. The pre-alliance period is also taken as the last
week June 1991 for British Airways—USAir as that alliance came into existence in
1992. The post-alliance period for the EQA is taken as the last week of June 1994 as
SAS moved out of the alliance after that. In the cases of KLM-Northwest and British
Airways-USAir, the post-alliance period is taken as the last week of June 1995 when
measurable alliance effects have been realised.
11.2.3 Effects in inter-hub markets
One would expect the inter-hub markets to be affected by alliance formation because
the airlines in the partnership tend to dominate the airports at both ends of the market.
As a consequence, the combined entity will be in a better position to prevent entry on
a scale sufficient to constitute effective competition (Borenstein, 1989; Mauldin,
1989). The structure of international air transport itself also contributes in increasing
the market power of the airlines in the partnership. Indeed, bilateral treaties between
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countries favour the designated carriers operating between international hubs. Any
other carriers operating on those markets will be Fifth Freedom carriers which are
restricted in their ability to compete. Alliancing between the designated carriers
further reinforces their control of the inter-hub market so that they are in a better
position to oust competitors out. The alliance between SAS and Swissair exemplifies
the above argument. Swissair and SAS are the carriers designated to fly between
Zurich and Copenhagen. In 1988 (prior to alliance formation), Thai and Alitalia
provided Fifth Freedom service between those two hubs. In 1991, after the formation
of the EQA, they terminated their service, leaving the SAS-Swissair combination in
total control of the market. The following sub-sections analyse the changes in alliance
market share and fare (wherever data is available) on alliance inter-hub markets. The
effects of alliances on those variables is presented in graphical form; the data from
which the graphs are constructed are provided in Appendix E.
11.2.3.1 Changes in EQA inter-hub markets
The inter-hub markets selected for the analysis of the EQA are given in Table 11.1
below.
H	 H
Geneva
Geneva
Geneva
Zurich
Zurich
Zurich
Vienna
Vienna
Vienna
Vienna
Vienna
Copenhagen
Oslo
Arlanda (Stockholm)
Copenhagen
Oslo
Arlanda
Geneva
Zurich
Copenhagen
Oslo
Arlanda
Table 11.1 Hub combinations in
market power analysis (EQA)
The, examination of market power on inter-hub markets also includes fare changes
because fares between hubs and major cities are consistently listed in the ABC World
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Figure 11.3 Change in EQA market share on inter-hub markets
Data source: ABC WorldAirways Guide
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Figure 11.4 Change in EQA fares on inter-hub markets
Data source: ABC WoridAirways Guide
Note: Fare data for Gaieva-Oslo and ViCma-Oslo is ixt available
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In seven of the eleven inter-hub markets, the market share of the EQA increased,
while real fares rose in all the markets for which data was available.
One could argue that the changes in market share and fares were not caused by the
alliance but by other factors in the competitive environment. To test whether that the
changes in the variables can be traced back to the formation of the alliance,
comparison of variable means is made between two time periods, one which
experienced alliance formation (1989-1994) and one which did not (1984-1988). A
difference in means significant at the 5% level is obtained (see Table 11.2) which
allows the rejection of the hypothesis that the alliance is not responsible for the
increase in inter-hub market share and fares.
Market power variable	
'a = 0.05	 1-statistic
Market share	 2.086	 3.245
Fare	 2.262	 2.64 1
Table 11.2 Results of 1-tests for alliance market
power variables (EQA)
11.2.3.2 Changes in British Airways-USAir and KLM-Northwest inter-hub markets
The inter-hub markets selected for the market share analysis of the British Airways-
USAir and KLM-Northwest are given in Table 11.3.
H	 H
Amsterdam
Amsterdam
Amsterdam
London
London
London
London
London
London
Boston
Detroit
Minneapolis
Boston
Charlotte
Los Angeles
New York
Philadelphia
Pittsburgh
Table 11.3 Hub combinations
in market power analysis
(BA-US and KL-NW)
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The changes in market share and real fares of the alliances are shown in Figure 11.5
and Figure 11.6 respectively.
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Figure 11.5 Change in inter-hub market share of transatlantic alliances
Data source: ABC WoridAirways Guide
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Both alliances had the expected effect of increasing market share and fares in most of
the inter-hub markets considered. A point of interest is the fall in fares on the London-
Boston market which could be explained by an increase in competition at an alliance
level between British Airways-USAir and KLM-Northwest, Boston being one of the
US connect point of both European airlines. However, Virgin Atlantic could also be
responsible for that. Figure 11.5 indicates that the KLM-Northwest alliance has been
the more effective of the two as it has benefited from larger increases in market share
that the British-Airways alliance. This can be attributable to the antitrust immunity
enjoyed only by the KLM-Northwest alliance which allows it greater scope in its co-
operation.
As in the case of the EQA, the null hypothesis that alliance formation has not caused
the observed changes in market power variables is tested. Variable means for the
periods 1991-1994 and 1984-1988 are compared using a Student's t test. The results
of the statistical test are given in Table 11.4. They show that the null hypothesis can
be rejected so that the alliance has effectively lead to an increase in the market power
of the allied airlines on the transatlantic inter-hub markets.
Market power variable	 ta=005	 t-statistic
Market share	 2.120	 3.265
Fare	 2.228	 3.721
Table 11.4 Results of I-tests for alliance market
power variables (transatlantic)
Fare data is for British Airways .USAir only
11.2.4 Effects in Origin-Destination markets
Though the domination of the inter-hub market is an important objective of allied
airlines, the main thrust of the alliance strategy is to gain market power in O-D
markets as a substantial part of traffic is of O-D nature, using H3, merely as a
connecting point. There is no point in being a strong airline only in the inter-hub
sector of the flight when the airline's passengers are transferring to a competing
carrier at the connecting hub on their way to their destination. Furthermore, only by
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having a strong presence in O-D markets can airlines benefit from network economies
of scope and exert price leadership. This sub-section examines how the market share
of the selected alliances has changed in O-D markets.
11.2.4.1 Identflcation of competing services
The identification of competing services is not as straightforward as in the case of
inter-hub markets. For O-D markets, the alliance service is taken to be both the on-
line and/or interline services involving the airlines in the partnership. Competing
services are either non-stop or those which are routed via hubs other than the alliance
connect point (Hi). Both on-line and interline services are considered to compete with
the alliance. The services are identified in the ABC World Airways Guide. Figure 11.7
illustrates the above definitions. On the Boston-Barcelona O-D market, the United
Airlines-Iberia and Delta Airlines-Iberia interline services, and the Sabena, Lufthansa
and British Airways on-line services all compete with the KLM-Northwest interline
(code-shared) service.
It is recognised that an infinite number of connections are possible for any city-pair.
For example, passengers from Boston on their way to Barcelona can be routed via
Philadelphia, Montreal or Paris. The ones listed in the ABC World Airways Guide are
only those which have been paid for by airlines. Therefore, 'good' connections which
involve short connect times are not necessarily listed in the ABC Guide. However, one
can argue that publication of a flight in the ABC Guide conveys some kind of a
marketing advantage to the airline as the ABC Guide is still widely consulted by travel
agents in spite of the advent of the CRSs 78 . As a consequence, it is very unlikely for
the travelling public to be aware of flights which are not listed in the ABC Guide.
These flights do not compete effectively with the alliance and do not affect its market
share dramatically, hence justifying the use of the ABC Guide for the identification of
competitors.
According to Mr. Ricky Mack of the Reed Travel Group, the ABC WoridAirways Guide and the OAG are still widely used in
the Western world. Furthermore, the OAG distributes part of its information to CRSs and to business travellers in the form of
small guides and computer discs so that they can effectively dictate the flights they want to the travel agent. This fUrther
justifies the use of the ABC Guide for this piece of research (Lecture by Mr. Ricky Mack, Cranfield University, October Ii,
1995).
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Figure 11.7 Competing flights on the Boston-Barcelona O-D market in June 1994
Source: ABC WoridAirways Guide, June 1994
Key:
AMS: Amsterdam; BCN: Barcelona; BOS: Boston; BRU: Brussels; FRA: Frankfurt; lAD: Washington, Dulles; JFK:
Washington, JFK, LHR: London, Heathrow; MAD: Madrid; BA: British Airways; DL: Delta, IB: Iberia, KL: KLM; LI-I:
Lufthansa NW: Northwest; SN: Sabena; TW: Transworld Airlines; UA: United Airlines
11.2.4.2 Selection of O-D markets
Again, the assessment of the effectiveness of the alliances is based on changes from
the defined pre-alliance and post-alliance periods. This criterion determines the
selection of O-D markets to be included in the analysis. Using the ABC Guide, the 0-
D markets serviced by the airlines in the partnership (intraline, interline or code-
shared) both in the pre-alliance and post-alliance periods are identified. Having a
sample of O-D markets which were served in both periods enabled market share
changes to be computed. The selected origins and connecting points for the EQA and
the transatlantic alliances are given in Table 11.5. The O-D markets for these hub
combinations are given in Appendix F.
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Airline alliance	 Origin (IIi)	 Connecting point (Hi.)
Boston
Minneapolis
Amsterdam
London
Philadelphia
Copenhagen
Vienna
Zurich
Amsterdam
Amsterdam
Boston
Detroit
Minneapolis
Baltimore
Boston
Charlotte
Los Angeles
New York
Philadelphia
Pittsburgh
London
Geneva
Vienna
Zurich
Geneva
Copenhagen
Oslo
Stockholm
Zurich
Copenhagen
Oslo
Stockholm
Vienna
Table 11.5 Origins and connecting points for alliance O-D
markets
Though Detroit is an important hub of the KLM-Northwest alliance, it is not
considered in the analysis because its sample of O-D markets which existed in both
the pre-alliance and post-alliance periods was too small. This was also the case for
most of the USAir hubs which left Philadelphia as the only US origin for the British
Airways-USAir alliance. For the same reason, only Copenhagen is taken as origin for
SAS.
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11.2.4.3 Alliance market share changes in O-D markets
The change in the average O-D market share for each of the origins is given in Figure
11.8. Fare changes are not considered because of the unavailability of fare data in O-D
markets.
Figure 11.8 Change of alliance average market share in O-D markets
Data source: ABC WorldAirwavs Guide
For all the origins, with the exception of Amsterdam, the average market share of the
alliances in the O-D markets increased over the period in which the alliances became
operational. The changes for the EQA are generally similar for all three hubs
considered and lie in the range of 17% (Vienna) to Copenhagen (4 1%). Market share
for the transatlantic alliances vary quite dramatically in magnitude. The KLM-
Northwest O-D markets originating from Amsterdam actually experienced a slight
decrease in average market share (4%). Minneapolis was, by far, the most effective
origin with the KLM-Northwest alliance benefiting from a 149% increase in average
market share. The result for London was modest (10.5%). Taken together with
Amsterdam's result, it would indicate that the alliances experienced difficulty in
increasing their market share in O-D markets originating from European hubs. A
possible explanation could be the increased competition between the two transatlantic
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alliances considered, with the effects of SAS-Continental, Swissair-Delta and
Lufthansa-United entering the equation.
In brief, the analysis has shown that the alliances considered have been able to
enhance their market power with varying degrees of success. The question which now
arises is what are the factors which cause the variation in the degree of success, that is
which affect the ability of airlines to increase their market power via alliances. The
next part of this chapter will address this question in depth.
11.3 Alliance Inter-Hub Market Power
Market power on routes which have hubs at both endpoints has been extensively
researched by Borenstein (1989) and Mauldin (1989). The main finding of these
studies have shown that such markets are very likely to have fares which are higher
than comparable markets which just originate from a hub or which have no hubs at
their endpoints. Airport dominance was found to be a decisive factor in explaining the
market power of the dominant airlines on markets via hubs. Hence, regulatory bodies
were recommended to give due consideration to the concentration at the hubs of the
airlines seeking merger approval.
An alliance creates a situation analogous to merging in that the hubs at both ends of
the inter-hub market become dominated by a single entity, namely the alliance. Prior
to alliance formation, the hubs at the ends of the market were each dominated by one
carrier only with both competing against each other. The extent to which the alliance
can be considered as a single entity is however open to discussion, though the level of
integration is certainly not as high as in a merger. Nevertheless, the domination of the
airports at both ends of the route does act as a deterrent to entry since it is difficult for
the new entrant to enter at the minimum scale necessary to compete effectively in
such a situation. This argument also applies to the non-allied carriers already in the
market which suddenly have to face a more formidable competitor. This weakening
of their position eventually leads them to abandon the market, resulting in an increase
in the alliance market share. The change in the number of competing services from
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to 1994 on the IEQA and transatlantic inter-hub routes are shown in Figure 11.9 and
Figure 11.10 respectively.
Figure 11.9 Change in the number of competitors to the 1QA on inter-hub routes
Data source: ABC WoridAirways Guide
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Figure 11.10 Change in the number of competitors on transatlantic inter-hub markets
Data source: ABC WorldAirways Guide
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In eight of the eleven markets, the number of services competing with those of the
EQA fell, while the level of competition on all transatlantic markets decreased. This
evidence confirms how effective alliances are in driving competition out of inter-hub
markets.
However, in the context of airline alliances, there are other factors apart from airport
dominance which increase the market power of airlines on inter-hub markets. In order
to identify those factors, it is important not to restrict oneself to the inter-hub market
only, but to look at the broader picture which is the O-D market with the connection at
H. In order to keep connecting travellers on the alliance network, the airlines in the
partnership usually attempt to increase their service frequency 19, decrease their connect
time and make use of code-sharing and combined FFPs. These increase the probability
that the alliance service from H to D is going to be selected by a traveller rather than
other competing services. Consequently, alliance strategies implemented to promote
its O-D service also increase the attractiveness of the alliance inter-hub flight to the
detriment of competitors' services between the same two hubs.
This section has identified hub dominance at both ends of the inter-hub market as one
of the factors affecting alliance inter-hub market share. Other alliance success factors
are effects on O-D markets which spill over the inter-hub market. The next section
will be concerned totally with the O-D markets since factors affecting the market
power of the alliance in those markets are very likely to have a simultaneous effect on
its inter-hub market power.
11.4 Alliance Market Power In O-D Markets
The factors affecting the market power of alliances in O-D markets can be classified
as either alliance-specific or competitor-specific. They are identified in Figure 11.11.
The reasons for the inclusion of those particular variables as well as their
measurement are considered next.
However, when the objective of the alliance is to decrease costs, a decrease in service frequency may occur as the airlines
rationalise their capacity on the inter-hub route.
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Alliance-specific factors	 Competitor-specific factors
Connect time	 Connect time
Service quality	 Service quality
Frequency	 Level of competition
ALLIANCE
MARKET POWER
Figure 11.11 Factors affecting alliance market power
11.4.1 Connect time
The connect time is the time period between the incoming H
—
H flight and the H—D
flight. Basically, it is the length of time a passenger has to wait for his/her connecting
flight. Since it contributes to the total elapsed time from origin to destination, connect
time can be regarded as influencing the costs of air travel to the consumer (Abrahams,
1983). It is anticipated that the alliance partners will attempt to decrease the connect
time to make their flight more attractive and to promote their flight option on CRS'
displays, and eventually increase their market share. Evidence of the relationship
between airline demand in O-D markets and waiting time is provided by Ippolito'°
80 The waiting time in the model consisted of frequency delay, which is the difference between the desired and offered
departure times, and stochastic delay which is the waiting time consequent to the unavailability of a seat on the desired flight.
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(1981) using a complex regression model. The alliance connect time is the time
interval between the arrival of the H
—
H flight and the departure of the H—D flight51.
The alliance move to improve its connections can engender a reaction from the
competitors fearing to lose market share, hence the incorporation of a variable
quantifying the competitor attractiveness in terms of waiting time. Considering the
large number of competitors in O-D markets, it is difficult and time-consuming to
include the connect time values of all the competitors individually. Therefore, all the
competitors are considered together and an aggregate variable is produced. This
variable is the average competitor connect time (CTIMEc) defined as follows:
_xctime I
1
- 
FREQC	
C)
CTJMEc -
C1QCJ
(Eq. 11.4)
where subscript 'c' denotes the competing service, FREQC is the frequency with which
that service is operated, ctime is the connect time and n is the number of effective
competitors in the market. The connect time is weighted by the reciprocal of the
frequency to give a higher penalty to infrequent services. This is because a high
service frequency contributes to lowering waiting time at the connecting point in the
network owing to the availability of a wider choice of flight times and of lower load
factors. This increases the probability of obtaining tickets near to departure times
(Abrahams, 1983; Anderson and Kraus, 1980; De Vany, 1975; Douglas and Miller III,
1974; Ippolito, 1981).
11.4.2 Quality of service
A factor which affects passenger choice of airline is the quality of service, which is
defined here as whether the service offered involves an on-line or interline connection,
and whether it is non-stop, involves only one stop or multiple stops. On-line
8) Strictly speaking, the actual passenger waiting time is the time interval defined above, from which is subtracted the airport
minimum connect time. However, the passenger has no notion of the minimum connect time and his/her choice of service is
influenced only by the total time for which he/she is on ground at the connecting point.
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connections are preferred to interline connections by passengers mainly because they
are associated with a smaller risk of baggage loss and less 'transition friction'
(Youssef and Hansen, 1994), that is less hassle and shorter walking distances when
transferring from one flight to the other. Non-stop services are rated higher by
travellers over one-stop services, which are in turn rated better than multi-stop
services because of the lengthy time and circuitous routings which are involved in
them.
It was initially attempted to quantify service quality of the alliance and of its
competitors using the Boeing Quality of Service Index (QS]) market share model
(Boeing, 1989). This model takes into account the dependence of flight attractiveness
on the number and type of stops using a quantity termed 'stop factor'. However,
application of this method turned out to be too lengthy owing to the large number of
O-D markets under consideration. Based on Kanafani and Ghobrial (1985), the flight
option is represented by a dummy variable (quality) taking the following values:
quality = 1.0 for one-stop on-line connection
0.5 for one-stop interline connection
0.25 for multi-stop interline connection
where subscripts A and c refer to the alliance and its competitors respective1y2.
Though one could argue that these values are arbitrarily selected, the actual value is
not critical. Rather, they are meant to differentiate between the various flight types
and attach a greater weighting to those having a greater appeal to the consumer.
11.4.2.1 Alliance service quality
This piece of research restricts itself to inter-hub markets and alliance O-D markets
involving only one stop. Prior to alliance formation, the partners-to-be offered either
82 This approach was also adopted by the US Civil Aeronautics Board in devising the QSJ Model I for analysis of market share.
In this study, the flights were weighted as follows:
non-stop flights: 1.0,
one-stop flights: 0.55,
two-stop flights: 0.40,
three-stop flights: 0.20, and
more than three stops: 0.03 (Boeing, 1989).
The values were chosen based on experience.
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on-line connection or basic inter-line service on the O-D markets. Following the
sealing of the partnership, a widely-used tool used by alliances to provide improved
service quality is code-sharing. The marketing advantages of code-sharing have been
elaborated upon extensively in Chapter 6. In brief, the practice of code-sharing on the
H—D route will effectively convert the interline service between the partners to on-
line service, that is making it seem to potential travellers that no change of airline is
involved in the trip. Promotion to on-line status pushes the alliance flight option to
better CRS positions. Code-shared routes will therefore be considered equivalent to
on-line service in this study. The alliance service quality (QUALITYA) is therefore
given by
QUALITYA = 0.5 f the connection is interline, and
QUALITYA = 1.0 f the connection is intraline or code-shared
11.4.2.2 Competitors' service quality
Since the strategy of the alliance is to raise its flight quality above that of its
competitors, it is necessary to include a variable for the attractiveness of the
competitor flights in the model. The competitors' flights can be either of the following
four types:
(1) Non-stop
(2) Code-shared, where the competitor is another alliance. This is the case mostly on
transatlantic flights where the KLM-Northwest, British Airways-USAir and
Lufthansa-United compete, alongside with other less developed alliances such as
SAS-Continental and Swissair-Delta.
(3) On-line connection with only one stop
(4) Interline connection with only one stop
(5) Interline connection with multiple stops.
The non-stop flights are of better quality than that of the alliance and represent the
greatest opposition to it. Then come the on-line and code-sharing services which are
of comparable quality to that of the alliance. They are followed by the basic interline
service with one stop followed by the interline service with multiple stops in order of
decreasing attractiveness.
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Quantification of competitor service quality is as follows:
quality	 1.5 jf the service is non-stop,
1.0 f the service is intraline or code-shared
0.5 f the service is interline with only one stop, and
0.25 if the service is interline with multiple stops.
As in the measurement of competitor connection time, it would be too lengthy to
consider each competitor individually so that an aggregate measure is proposed. This
measure, QUALITYC is defined as
_______	 (FREQC x quality)
QUALITYC = c=1	 (Eq. 11.5)
FREQC
The variable qualily is weighted by the service frequency since it is in itself an
important quality variable. For example, a daily interline service can attract a larger
amount of traffic than a weekly on-line service owing to the greater schedule
flexibility which it offers to consumers.
11.4.3 Level of competition
Basing himself on empirical data, Taneja (1981, p. 143) notes that '....the S-curve is a
function of the number of competitors in the market' implying a change in alliance
market share with a change in the number of competitors. This can be observed in
Figure 11.1 where the curve is observed to shift as the number of competitors in the
market increases from two to four, resulting in a decrease in airline market share.
Therefore, a variable for the change in the level of competition experienced by the
alliance needs to be included in the market power model. In this study, the total
frequency of the competitors is used to measure the O-D level of competition:
LCOMF = FREQC	 (Eq. 11.6)
where n is the number of competing services. The frequency weighting is applied as
passengers are known to be heavily responsive to service frequency.
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11.4.4 Market concentration
Belobaba and Acker (1994, P. 7) define market concentration as 'the number of firms
that sell a particular product or collection of closely-related products in a market and
the distribution of the firms' sizes in terms of sales'. A review of the relevant air
transport studies indicates that market concentration contributes to bringing market
power. Bailey et a! (1985); Call and Keeler, (1983), Hurdle et a! (1989) and Mauldin
(1989) all provide empirical evidence of a linear relationship between market
concentration and yields/fares. However, Evans and Kessides (1993) find consistent
results between yields and demand variables while omitting the market concentration
variable in their models. Borenstein (1989) includes both market share and market
concentration variables in his models of market power and fmds that both are of value
in explaining price variations.
Youssef (1992) investigated the effects of market share and market concentration in
the EQA O-D markets and found a positive relationship between changes in alliance
frequency share and market concentration, with the alliance's ability to influence
market concentration via service frequency changes increasing after alliance
formation. Market concentration was also found to have a significant influence on
fares. Alliance dummy variables and market concentration were observed to be highly
correlated leading Youssef to conclude that alliance formation has an important effect
on market concentration.
The effect that market concentration has on alliance market share is shown in Figure
11.12 which is a plot of the change in the average market share of the selected
alliances against the change in the average market concentration in the O-D markets.
A linear relationship can be observed between alliance market share and market
concentration indicating that alliance market share increases with increasing market
concentration. Further evidence of the relationship between the change in alliance
market share and the change in market concentration in O-D markets is provided in
Appendix G which contains disaggregate plots of those quantities for each of the hub
combinations in this study.
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Figure 11.12 Variation of the change in average alliance O-D market share with the change in
average O-D market concentration
(r = 0.576)
This evidence coupled with that from the above-mentioned studies confirms that
market concentration has to be considered in the market power model. However, there
seems to be a lack of clarity as to how market concentration fits into the interaction
between market share, market power and yields. On the one hand, studies show that
market concentration is directly related to market share and yields while on the other
hand, it is considered to be an endogeneous 83 variable in the market share models. For
example, Youssef (1992, p.'79) concludes from his study that '...the impact of alliances
on fares is an indirect one, with market concentration the intervening variable'. Market
concentration will be introduced into the model to investigate its behaviour.
11.4.4.1 Measure of market concentration
Various measures of market concentration exist: the K-firm concentration ratio, the
Gini Index and the Herfmdahl-Hirschman Index (HHJ). However, there is no
consensus on which one is the best. The HHI is selected for this study since it is the
That is a variable causally dependent on other independent variables in the model.
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one most commonly used in air transport studiesM on market and airport
concentration. Furthermore, it attaches more importance to the large firms in the
market under the assumption that large firms have more market power. This,
according to Lame (1995), is very appropriate since it takes the customer's viewpoint
of market concentration. HHI is defined as the sum of the square of the market share
values of the carriers (i) operating in the market
HHI = (MSHARE,) 2
	 (Eq. 11.7a)
Since data for market share is unavailable, it will be substituted for by frequency
share:
HHIF 
=	
) 2
	 (Eq. 11.7b)
11.5 Variable Changes
As a preliminary stage in the analysis, the changes in the model variables from the
pre-alliance period to the post-alliance period are analysed. This will provide an
insight into the extent to which the alliances strategies have been implemented and the
reactions of the competitors. The changes in the averages of the variables in the
market power model for the EQA and the transatlantic alliances are given in Figure
11.13 and Figure 11.14 respectively.
84 See, for example, Belobaba and Acker (1994) and Hurdle et al (1989).
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11.5.1 EQA
The variable QUALITYA is absent in the case of the EQA since the sample of selected
O-D markets remained interline over the alliance period. Code-sharing was not
implemented by the EQA in those markets so that there was no quality improvement
accompanying alliance formation. However, increases in average alliance service
frequency were substantial with Copenhagen, Vienna and Zurich markets
experiencing an increase in average service frequency of 11.4%, 39.7% and 35.7%
respectively. Only markets originating from Vienna had a decrease in average connect
time and this was rather low (9.7%). Markets from Copenhagen and Zurich
experienced increases in average connect time, albeit quite low (4.5% and 3.0%
respectively). These observations indicate that the EQA was focused more on
frequency competitiveness that on connect time improvements. The market share of
the EQA increased substantially in all three cases (Copenhagen: 41.0%; Vienna:
16.6% and Zurich: 2 1.1%). These results seem to be linked to the frequency increases
leading one to conclude that service frequency is of importance in determining market
share.
In the Copenhagen O-D markets, the effect of alliance formation was to decrease the
average number of competing services and their service frequency. However, the level
of competition, both in terms of the number of competitors and their frequency,
increased slightly in the Vienna and Zurich markets. This indicates that the market
share increase of the EQA in the Vienna and Zurich markets was at the expense of the
competitors, while, in the Copenhagen markets, the EQA gained market share as
competitors moved out of the markets.
The increase in average service frequency is an indication of one of the strategies of
the competitors to counter the effect of the alliance. Service frequency improvements
were however low and occurred in only two cases, Vienna (5.4%) and Zurich (8.4%).
Another strategy was to decrease connect time to render the service more attractive
and to promote it to higher CRS screens. Competitor average connect time decreased
in all three markets, though by small amounts (Copenhagen: 10.5%; Vienna: 7.4%
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and Zurich: 1.0%). By far, the most important competitor reaction to alliance
formation was to improve the quality of their services by offering more intraline and
less multi-stop services. Average competitor service quality more than doubled in the
markets originating from Copenhagen and by about 90% in those originating from
Zurich. Competitor reaction was much less important in the Vienna markets where the
competitor average service quality actually decreased by 3.7%.
Average market concentration increased in all three cases, with the highest increases
occurring in the Copenhagen (67.1%) and Zurich (27.7%) markets. The trend in
market concentration seems to follow that of alliance market share implying that the
alliance is capable of affecting the concentration in those O-D markets in which it
operates. In spite of the increase in the level of competition in the Vienna and Zurich
markets, the market concentration increased. This means that a higher proportion of
market share was in the hands of a lower number of competitors.
11.5.2 Transatlantic alliances
The average market share of the alliances increased for all the hubs considered, with
the exception of Amsterdam where the KLM-Northwest average market share fell by
3.7%. The highest increase in average market share occurred in the case of
Minneapolis with an increase of 149.1%. Second came Philadelphia where the British
Airways-USAir average market share increased by 43.6%. Unlike the EQA, both
transatlantic alliances made efforts to decrease average connect time. The highest
decreases in average connect time occurred in the cases of Amsterdam, Boston and
London (9.5%, 20.2% and 3 5.9% respectively). Minneapolis, however, experienced a
slight increase in connect time (7.4%). Changes in alliance service quality are
considered only for the KLM-Northwest alliance which practised extensive code-
sharing on both sides of the Atlantic. In the case of the British Airways-USAir
alliance, the sample of markets were not code-shared and hence showed no service
quality improvement following alliance formation. Code-sharing increased the service
quality of the KLM-Northwest alliance substantially for all three hubs, with the
greatest improvement occurring for Amsterdam (53.8%). Alliance average service
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frequency increased in all five cases. The most important increases were those of
Minneapolis and Philadelphia (109.0% and 42.0%). Increases at the other hubs
considered were much lower. Like the EQA, the service frequency changes seem to be
related to the changes in alliance market share.
The transatlantic alliances were very effective in decreasing the level of competition
experienced in O-D markets. Indeed, both in terms of the number of competing
services and their frequency, the level of competition fell for all five hubs considered.
The highest decrease occurred in O-D markets originating from London
(approximately 78%). The number of competitors fell by only 10% in O-D markets
from Minneapolis; however, in terms of frequency, the decrease was high (43.4%).
Both this decrease and the increase in alliance service frequency seem to be linked to
the high increase in alliance market share.
Since it would seem that the alliance competitors were unable to compete in terms of
service frequency, they instead concentrated their efforts on connect time and service
quality improvements. Competitor average connect time decreased in four of the five
cases, with the greatest improvements occurring for Minneapolis and London (52.7%
and 41.9% respectively) which are the hubs where the alliances enjoyed their highest
increases in market share. Competitor average connect time increased very slightly in
the case of Boston (0.4%). This is quite surprising since Boston is used as connect
point by both British airways-USAir and KLM-Northwest alliances. It could be that
the competitors preferred to concentrate on service quality to counter the alliance for
Boston experienced one of the highest improvements in average competitor service
quality (56.6%) together with Minneapolis (57.1%). Only in the case of Philadelphia
did the average competitor service quality decrease (29.3%).
Average concentration increased for all five hubs with the highest increases occurring
in the cases of Minneapolis and Philadelphia (47.2% and 33.2% respectively). This
seems to be linked to the changes in alliance market share and service frequency
changes. Overall, these results indicate that the focus of the transatlantic alliances
were in O-D markets originating from the US hubs Minneapolis and Philadelphia.
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This observation coincides with the strategy of KLM and British Airways to increase
their traffic feed from the US domestic market. Another observation is that though
Amsterdam is the centre of KLM's operations, its alliance-related changes were
among the lowest for all the five hubs considered.
11.6 Model Calibration
The conclusions drawn above are based purely on observation. In order to identify
those variables contributing to the change in market share in alliance O-D markets and
provide concrete numerical evidence of their effects, a mathematical model is
required. Figure 11.15 shows the conceptual model of market power which is
formulated at the simplest level, that is the change in alliance market share is
considered to be the result of the separate effects of the alliance and competitor
variables and market concentration.
Alliance-specific factors	 I Competitor-specific factors
ALLIANCE
MARKET POWER
Market concentration
Figure 11.15 Alliance market power model
At this stage, the market concentration effects are not considered and the alliance
market power model is operationalised as in Equation 11.8:
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LMSHAREA
 = f(alliance, competitors) 	 (Eq. 11.8)
where alliance is a vector of the alliance-related variables, and competitors is a vector
of the competitor-related variables. The market share model is formulated in full in
Equation 11.9.
AMSHARE A = a0 + a 1 (bCTIME A ) + a2 (LFREQA ) + a3
 (AQUALJTYA)
+a4 (ALCOMF ) + a5 (tsiCTJMEc) + a6(AQUALJTYC)	
(Eq. 11.9)
The linear specification is preferred to the log-linear specification because both
independent and dependent variables are changes which, if negative, can not be
subjected to the logarithmic transformation. The model is calibrated using the
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression technique. The dependent variable (change in
alliance market share) is in percentage terms. The results of the regression are given in
Table 11.6. Only those variables which are significant at the 5% level or better are
presented.
Overall the models have a satisfactory explanatory power considering that the
regression was of a cross-sectional type with non-homogeneous O-D markets. The
only cases of low explanatory power are Vienna and Amsterdam (43.3% and 17.0%
respectively). This means that variables other than those included in the model
determine the change in alliance market share. The models of the transatlantic
alliances have better explanatory powers than those of the EQA. All models, with the
exception of Amsterdam, are valid at the 1% significance level as indicated by their F-
statistics.
11.6.1 EQA results
The regression coefficients in the models of the EQA all have the expected signs. The
only significant variables explaining the change in market share of the alliance are the
changes in alliance service frequency, competitor service frequency, competitor
connect time and competitor service quality.
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For O-D markets originating from Copenhagen, changes in alliance service frequency,
the level of competition and the quality of the competition are the most important
variables determining the change in market share of the alliance. According to the
calibrated model, increasing the alliance weekly frequency by one would result in
approximately 1.4% increase in market share 5. Alliance market share is inelastic with
respect to level of competition as were the weekly frequency of the competitors to
increase by one, the alliance market share would fall only by approximately 0.2%.
However, the alliance can suffer considerably from competitor service quality for an
increase of one in competitor service quality (via intralining instead of interlining and
less multi-stop services) can lead to a 10% decrease in alliance market share.
The change in market share of the alliance in O-D markets originating from Vienna is
dependent only on the variables of competitors present in those markets, namely the
competitor service frequency and quality. As in the case of Copenhagen, elasticity
with respect to competitor service frequency is low with a fall of 0.6 in alliance
market share with an increase of one in competitor weekly service frequency.
However, competitor service quality is quite important in determining alliance market
share with a fall of 27% in market share with an increase of one in average competitor
service quality.
For O-D markets originating from Zurich, the alliance market share is dependent on
alliance frequency, level of competition and alliance connect time. The percentage
change in alliance market share is approximately 1% for a change of one in weekly
service frequency. The market share elasticity with respect to levels of competition is
nearly the same as in the case of Vienna. The coefficient of competitor connect time
indicates that an improvement of ten minutes could cause the alliance market share to
increase by 1%.
All the percentage changes cited hold provided the other variables are constant.
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11.6.2 Results for transatlantic alliances
The coefficients of the regressions all have the expected signs. Only alliance variables
are significant for O-D markets originating from Amsterdam. The coefficients are
fairly the same for Minneapolis O-D markets. According to the calibrated models, an
increase of one in alliance weekly frequency will increase its market share by
approximately 2%. Also, an increase of one in service quality will increase alliance
market share by approximately 6-7%. This confirms the importance of code-sharing
as a competitive tool to gain market share. The coefficient of QUALITY4 is lower for
the Boston model with an increase of one in service quality resulting in an increase of
approximately 4% in alliance market share.
Changes in alliance market share are inelastic with respect to competitor service
frequency. An increase of one in competitor weekly frequency causes the alliance
market share to fall by 0.9% in O-D markets originating from Boston and by only
0.1% in O-D markets originating from Minneapolis. Changes in alliance market share
is also inelastic with respect to changes in competitor connect time for O-D markets
originating from Boston: an improvement of ten minutes in competitor connect time
causes alliance market share to decrease by only 0.9%. However, the same decrease in
competitor connect time leads to a drop of 2.6% in alliance market share in markets
originating from Minneapolis. Changes in alliance market share are highly elastic with
respect to competitor service quality. An increase of one in competitor service quality
is expected to cause a drop of 35% and 22% in KLM-Northwest market share in O-D
markets originating from Boston and Minneapolis respectively.
Only competitor variables are significant in explaining the change in the British
Airways-USAir market share. As for the KLM-Northwest alliance, changes in market
share are fairly inelastic with respect to changes in competitor service frequency and
connect time. An increase of ten in competitor service frequency leads to a decrease of
approximately 0.6% in alliance market share for Philadelphia and of 1.2% for London.
However, changes in competitor service quality can cause dramatic changes in
alliance market share: an increase of one in competitor service quality leads to a
decrease in alliance market share of about 40-50%.
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11.6.3 Market concentration effects
As explained in sub-section 11.4.4, market concentration can affect alliance market
power. In order to investigate the effects of market concentration changes, that
variable is introduced into the regression models. The modified alliance market share
model is then
/MSHAREA
 = a0 + a1 (ACTIMEA ) + a2 (LFREQA ) + a3 (AQUALJTYA)
+a4 (ALCOMF ) + a5 (ttCTIMEc) + a6 (AQUALJTYC ) + a7(LHHI)	
(Eq. 11.10)
The results of the OLS regression are given in Table 11.7 . Again, only those variables
which are significant at the 5% level or better are presented.
Introduction of the market concentration variable improves the explanatory power of
all the models with the exception of Zurich. The model F-statistics also increase and
are all significant at the 1% level. The market concentration variable is significant at
the 1% level in all the models with its coefficient being fairly close to unity except in
the cases of Zurich and Boston. The high level of significance of the market
concentration shows that alliance market share changes are heavily dependent on this
variable. Inclusion of the market concentration variable into the market share models
causes a number of variables to turn non-significant meaning that it absorbs their
effects on the alliance market share variable. This observation tends to indicate that
market concentration is an intervening variable between the alliance and competitor
variables and alliance market share, that is changes in service frequency, connect time
and quality of service affect market concentration which, in turn, affects alliance
market share.
In order to investigate this hypothesis, change in O-D market concentration is
regressed against the alliance and competitor variables. The results of the OLS
regression are presented in Table 11.8. With the exception of Zurich, the model
explanatory powers are reasonably high and they have highly significant F-statistics.
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Competitor variables are of value in explaining changes in market concentration in
most of the models. Alliance variables (frequency) are present only in the cases of
Amsterdam, Minneapolis and Philadelphia. The fact that the alliance and competitor
variables explain the variation in market concentration changes to a certain extent
reinforces the belief that market concentration is in effect an intermediate variable.
11.6.4 General conclusions
Taken together, the results of the modelling exercise indicate that service frequency
and service quality are important alliance attributes which determine the market share
it can gain. Surprisingly, the change in alliance market share is found to be
independent of alliance connect time improvement. In general, the competitor
variables dominated over the alliance variables. For Vienna, London and Philadelphia,
they are the only variables present in the models. The level of competition and
competitor connection quality are significant variables in the case of the EQA. For
transatlantic alliances, the competitor connect time improvement is also of value in
explaining the performance of the alliances. Graphical analysis of the variable changes
shows that competitors are very likely to react to alliance formation by providing
more on-line connections and by discarding the multi-stop services so as to improve
the overall quality of their services. The reaction of the competitors is to be expected
as the market share gain of the alliance comes partly at their expense.
The market share models are complicated by the complex involvement of market
concentration in the market share models. Indeed, in addition to direct effects, there
are strong indications that the alliance and its competitors also affect alliance market
share changes indirectly via changes in market concentration. This is apparent in the
regression with market concentration as dependent variable instead of market share.
Hence, one can conclude that the market power model of alliances is not as simple as
to be suitably approximated by the linear regression model.
One means by which to obtain alliance variable coefficients while, at the same time,
taking competitor reactions into account is to run a logit model. The theory behind the
application of that particular model is considered next.
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exp(V,)
- exp(V,)+exp(V) (Eq. 11.11)
11.7 The Logit Model
The logit modelling technique is appropriate in this situation as it can take into
account the simultaneity that exists between the alliance-induced changes and the
competitor reactions to those changes. Indeed, the specification of the logit model is
such that a change in the alliance attributes will affect its market share only if it is not
accompanied by a proportional change on the part of its competitors. The theoretical
background of the logit model is briefly presented below.
11. Zi Theory of the logit model
This logit modelling technique views the traveller as a rational decision-maker who
evaluates the different travelling options according to certain criteria and chooses the
option which has the highest overall attractiveness (utility) based on those criteria.
Due to inconsistencies in choice behaviour and observational deficiencies, the total
utility of each alternative is considered as the sum of two parts, (1) the representative
component (V) and (2) the random component (c). The general form of the logit
model expresses the probability of selecting carrier i (F1) instead of carrier j as a
function of the representative components of the utilities of i andf6:
The market share is effectively an estimate of the probability of selection. Using
logarithmic transformations and mathematical manipulations, Equation 11.11 can be
re-written as
LnI M =V, 
—V.
LMS)	 J (Eq. 11.12)
The logit model has been used in a number of air transport studies to model either
airport, airline or mode of travel choice. For a comprehensive compilation and
86 This expression is based on the assumptions that a is independent, identical across the alternatives and IogisticaJly
distributed.
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analysis of the results of such studies, the reader is referred to Alamdari and Black
(1992).
11.7.2 Application to the alliance context
In the context of this study, the traveller going from H to D is required to choose
between flying with the alliance or with its competitors. The logit model will therefore
be calibrated for the period of June 1994 when the EQA, British Airways-USAir and
KLM-Northwest alliances were already created and operational. The choice of the
traveller is considered to depend on the variables identified previously, that is
frequency of service, connect time and quality of service. As before, the competitors
will be aggregated and considered as one choice.
In the previous analysis which was based on variable changes, the aircraft type was
not considered since it did not vary greatly as a result of alliance formation. Since this
analysis is for the post-alliance period only, the aircraft type has to be controlled for as
passengers prefer to travel with large aircraft rather than with narrow-bodied aircraft.
The values applied in the Boeing QSI model will be used in quantifying the
attractiveness of the various aircraft types. These values can be found in Appendix H.
Since O-D markets consisting of at least two flight segments are the subject of
analysis, the aircraft type values for the H
—
H and H—D portions of the flight are
added to give an overall measure of aircraft type for the service.
Depending on the type of traveller, fares can be important in the choice of service and
it has been shown to have a significant in the utility function by Alamdari (1989),
Carlton et al (1980) and Kanafani and Ghobrial (1985) among others. However, fare
data especially in connecting markets is not available for all the markets included in
the study. Consequently, there is no choice but to exclude the fare variable from the
logit model and to sacrifice some of the model explanatory power by doing so.
The representative utility (VA) of the alliance service is given by
VA = bI (FREQA )+ b2 (CTIME A ) + b3 (QUALJTYA )+ b4 (ACTYPE)	 (Eq. 11.13)
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where ACTYPE is the aircraft type and b0...b4 are variable coefficients. Likewise, the
competitors' representative utility is
= b I (FREQC ) + b2 (CTIMEc)+ b3 (QUALITY) + b4 (ACTYPEc)	 (Eq. 11.14)
where ACTYPEc is the frequency-weighted average aircraft type of the competitors.
From Equation 11.12, the probability of selecting the service provided by the alliance
carriers is
Ln[ MS1J = b0 + bI (FREQA
 - 
FREQ) + b2 (CTJMEA - CTIMEc)
MS	 (Eq. 11.15)
+b3 (QUALITYA - QUALJTY)+b4 (ACTYPE4 - ACTYPEc)
OLS regression can be used on Equation 11.15 to obtain the values of the coefficients.
Substitution of these coefficients into the alliance utility function can then allow an
analysis of the determinants of alliance attractiveness, and hence market share.
11.7.3 Model results and discussion
The results of the regression for the EQA, KLM-Northwest and British Airways-
USAir alliances are given in Table 11.9. Except for Minneapolis, London and
Philadelphia, the explanatory power of the models is low ranging from 43%
(Copenhagen) to 56% (Boston). A possible explanation for the low explanatory power
of the models could be the exclusion of fares from the modelling process. Indeed,
economies on the cost side resulting from alliance formation could have been passed
on to the consumer in the form of lower fares. Having fares which are lower than
those of its competitors increases the attractiveness of the alliance service and
therefore increases its market share. Unfortunately, the lack of fare data does not
allow this hypothesis to be tested. Nevertheless, the models are valid with F-statistics
which are significant to the 1% level.
The logit models seem to be very effective in disentangling the alliance effects from
those of the competitors.
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The striking feature of the statistical results is that for all origins, the alliance
frequency quality of service, and connect time have a significant presence in the
alliance utility function. This indicates that these attributes are highly valued by
travellers in their choice of service, and therefore determine to a certain extent the
alliance market share. The high coefficients of QUALiTY relative to those of the other
variables suggest that travellers attach greater importance to the quality of service;
that is, they prefer intraline services to interline ones. This is indicative of the
importance of code-sharing between carriers in alliances because the method of
measurement placed a greater weighting on code-shared connections than those which
were not. However, one has to bear in mind that the advantages conferred by code-
sharing could decrease with time as consumer groups pressure for clearer
identification of code-shared connections at the time of ticket purchase.
The coefficients of service frequency have the same magnitude throughout the sample
of hubs. Coefficient means are 0.0 13 for the EQA, 0.03 7 for British Airways-USAir
and 0.112 for KLM-Northwest. The interpretation of these figures is that an increase
often in alliance weekly frequency will increase the attractiveness of the EQA service
by approximately 0.1 units, of the British Airways-USAir service by approximately
0.4 units and of the KLM-Northwest service by approximately 1.1 units, everything
else remaining unchanged. The lower mean coefficient of the EQA could be explained
by the strong intermodal competition existing between air and rail transportation in
Europe. Owing to the highly-developed rail network in Europe, travellers are less
sensitive to frequency changes. This is an important factor to be considered when
forming alliances within Europe.
Aircraft type is included in the model to control for its effects on market share.
However, it does not seem to affect the choice of service. The ACTYPE variable is
present only in the Minneapolis utility function and even then, it is marginally
significant. According to the model, improving the average aircraft type by one
increases the alliance attractiveness by 0.2 units. One possible explanation for that
could be the fact that the carriers competing in the O-D markets use roughly the same
type of aircraft.
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The coefficient of connect time has the expected negative coefficient in all of the
models except for Zurich. The reason for the 'wrong' sign in the case of Zurich was
traced to a high correlation (r = 0.85) between the connect time and service frequency
variables87. The coefficients have a mean of -0.026 for the EQA and a mean of -0.077
for the transatlantic alliances. An improvement of ten minutes in connect time can
therefore result in an increase of approximately 2.6 units in the utility of the EQA
service, and an increase of approximately 7.7 units in the utility of the transatlantic
service, all other variables being constant. The difference in elasticity between the
European and transatlantic alliances is to be expected because the distances involved
are different. O-D distance, and hence travel time, is shorter in the case of the EQA
because the inter-hub distance is shorter. Therefore, a reduction in connect time
achieved by the long-distance transatlantic alliances is more likely to be appreciated
by travellers than the same connect time reduction achieved by the European alliance.
The intercept term in the utility function can be interpreted as the attractiveness of the
alliance keeping frequency, connect time, service quality and aircraft type constant. In
nearly all cases, the hypothesis that the intercept term is not zero can not be rejected.
Furthermore, where significant, it is negative. The fundamental conclusion that can be
drawn from these results is that the belief that alliance formation in and by itself is
sufficient to increase airline market share is false. Indeed, in many cases, airlines have
rushed to form alliances, only to cease co-operation after the agreement-signing stage.
Just being an alliance on paper brings no benefits; this study has shown that co-
operation is necessary to increase service frequency, decrease connect time and
implement code-sharing for the alliance to yield the expected market share increase.
11.8 Conclusion
This chapter has attempted to identif r the factors which affect the increase in market
power achievable via the alliance strategy. Because of data limitations, only market
share approximated by frequency share was used as measure of market power. An
87 The quoted frequency coefficient is that obtained when the regression is performed without the inclusion of the connect time
variable.
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analysis of the inter-hub and O-D markets has shown that the EQA, British Airways-
USAir and KLM-Northwest alliances have experienced increases in market share in
most cases. Mathematical modelling was performed using both OLS and logit
techniques. Variable analysis and OLS regression revealed that alliance formation is
accompanied by a rapid reaction by competitors, the reaction being mainly focused on
providing more intraline/code-shared services and less interline and multi-stop
services. The linear model also revealed the importance of alliance O-D service
frequency and the quality of the connection as important success variables. However,
the linear model revealed that the structure of the relationship between alliance-related
factors, competitor-related factors and market concentration was quite complex.
Interpretation of the linear model was also hampered by the fact that the competitor
variables dominated over the alliance variables. From that, it was deemed necessary to
calibrate a logit model which would enable determination of the alliance variables.
The logit models confirmed the importance of alliance service frequency and
connection quality in the performance of the alliance. In addition, it revealed that
alliance connect time is also critical to alliance success.
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12. PRODUCTION BENEFITS OF AIRLINE
ALLIANCES
Introduction
T
he aim of this chapter is to analyse the effects of alliance formation on
airline costs and productivity, and to identify those areas where alliances
provide the greatest potential for cost reduction and productivity increases.
The EQA is the alliance on which the analyses are based, with Austrian Airlines being
the airline of focus.
Analysis of the production benefits of alliances carries the same problem as in the
case of the marketing benefits, namely the separability of effects. Indeed, great
methodological difficulties were experienced when trying to isolate the effects of the
alliance from other factors which affect airline productivity and unit costs. Therefore,
this analysis limits itself to the graphical demonstration of the overall effects and,
from that, judgementally assess whether the alliance has been effective.
The chapter starts by identifying the airlines which will be subjected to the analysis
and then proceeds with a description of how the alliance effects will be demonstrated.
Aggregate unit costs and labour productivity are then analysed. The analysis then
proceeds at a disaggregate level with a classification of the airline cost and
productivity items being devised. Measures of unit cost and productivity for those
items are then defined and applied to Austrian Airlines and Finnair. The final part of
the chapter draws conclusions from the results.
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12.1 Cost And Productivity Items
Production benefits of alliances are achieved either by the sharing of costs between
the partners or by the elimination of the cost item as it is taken over by the partner.
The strategies for cost reduction were detailed in Chapter 6; they are summarised in
Table 12.1.
Cost category	 Cost-reduction strategy
Facilities Joint or reciprocal use of maintenance bases and
equipment, airport infrastructure, (terminal facilities,
business lounges, check-in desks) and sales offices
leading to improved utilisation and cost avoidance
Labour Reduction in the number of employees and improved
utilisation/productivity of labour force for sales,
maintenance, airline and airport operations
Capacity	 Capacity reduction and/or improved utilisation of
aircraft
Purchasing Increased power to negotiate discounts in the
purchase of aircraft, aircraft parts, thel, insurance and
administrative equipment
Other Joint training of personnel, exchange of equipment to
avoid renting from external suppliers, administrative
costs
Table 12.1 Areas of cost reduction via alliances
Essentially, the successful implementation of these strategies is expected to show up
as lower unit costs, increased labour productivity and increased asset utilisation. One
way to verify whether alliance formation has had any effect on unit costs, productivity
and utilisation is to monitor these quantities over a time period starting before alliance
formation and ending after alliance formation,
12.2 Airline And Alliance Selection
In the examination of costs, the unit of analysis is the airline. The selected airline is
Austrian Airlines (OS) which has formed part of the EQA ever since its inception in
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1989. This particular alliance is chosen because it is more advanced in the
implementation of strategies for cost reduction, and also because it has been in
existence long enough for its effects to be observable. In addition, the cost-reduction
strategies have been applied over a large part of the, airlines' networks so that the
effects are more liable to show up when their overall costs are analysed. This is in
contrast to the KLM-Northwest and British Airways-USAir alliances where the
practice of cost reduction is very localised (transatlantic operations only) and
therefore, not easily detected in an analysis of overall costs. Cost and productivity data
specific to transatlantic operations only are not available making the analysis of those
alliances impossible.
Changes in unit costs, productivity and utilisation are monitored over the period 1985-
1994. That particular time span is selected because the EQA came to existence in
1989 and therefore, the pre-alliance period (1985-1989) and the post-alliance period
(1989-1994) are approximately of the same lengths, providing a good basis for
comparison. Furthermore, 1994 is the latest year for which data is available.
Swissair and SAS are not included in the analysis because over the period selected,
they were very active in alliances other than the EQA. Indeed, Swissair is still
involved in the Global Excellence while SAS was co-operating with numerous other
airlines such as Continental Airlines, Canadian Airlines and Thai Airways (see Figure
4.16). Therefore, any observed changes in its unit costs and productivity of SAS and
Swissair could not be amenable solely to the EQA. Austrian Airlines, on the other
hand, was involved extensively only in the EQA from 1989 to 1994 so that changes in
unit cost and productivity can be traced back to that alliance only.
12.3 Detection Of Alliance Effects
In order to investigate whether the EQA has had any substantial effect on Austrian
Airlines, it is necessary to compare its results with those of a similar airline that was
not involved in any major strategic alliance over the period 1985-1994. That airline is
chosen to be Finnair. The latter was involved in the EQA in 1989, but opted out of it
shortly after the alliance was formed so that it is highly improbable that the EQA had
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any significant effect on its operations. Austrian Airlines and Finnair are similar in
that they are both short/medium haul air1ines 7
 and are both based in Europe.
Therefore, they are expected to have similar cost structures. The selection of Finnair
was also driven by the fact that it was the only airline to have consistently reported its
cost and performance data in the ICA 0-Digest of Statistics and L4TA WATS.
The important quantity to be considered in the comparison of Austrian and Finnair is
the rate of change of unit cost/productivity over the post-alliance period (1989-1994).
A greater rate of decrease/increase of unit cost/productivity for Austrian Airlines over
the post-alliance period would lend support to the hypothesis that the effects were
caused by the EQA. However, it is also important to compare rates of change for
Austrian Airlines in the pre- and post-alliance periods as it is possible that the EQA
effects, though present, are not sufficient to improve Austrian's costs and productivity
beyond those of Finnair.
Costs are expressed in US dollars brought down to 1990 terms using Consumer Price
Indices (CPI) to eliminate the effect of inflation. This conversion of cost data is
deemed important as inflation is beyond the control of airlines. It is recognised that
the conversion to US dollars exposes monetary quantities to the problem of
fluctuating exchange rates. However, this is unavoidable as costs of two airlines based
in different European countries are being compared. In order to relate the unit costs
and productivity of the two airlines and to make them more comparable, unit costs
and productivity are expressed in terms of an index with 1989 values being equivalent
to 100. The year 1989 is selected as the base year because interest lies in what
happens to unit costs and productivity after that year. The following sections provide a
graphical comparison of Austrian Airlines and Finnair. First, the aggregate unit cost
and labour productivity will be analysed. Unit cost and labour productivity analysis at
the disaggregate level will then follow. Raw data from which the figures are derived is
given in Appendix I.
87 In 1989, Austrian's average stage length was 698 km and Finnair's average stage length was 929 km. Finnair does however
have a long-haul network.
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12.4 Aggregate Unit Cost and Labour Productivity Comparison
The trends in unit operating cost, labour unit cost and labour productivity of the
airlines over the period 1985-1994 are depicted in Figure 12.1, Figure 12.2, and
Figure 12.3 respectively.
Year
Figure 12.1 Unit operating cost
Unit operating cost is obtained by dividing the total operating cost of the airline by its
output (ATK). One would expect the unit operating cost of Austrian to decrease at a
faster rate than that of Finnair in the post-alliance period as a result of co-operation
within the EQA. However, this does not seem to be the case. Both Austrian's and
Finnair's unit operating cost increase in the year following alliance formation with
Austrian's rate of change being higher than that of Finnair. After 1990, the unit
operating cost of the two airlines follow a generally decreasing trend. The rate of
decrease of Austrian is lower than that of Finnair. This could imply that alliance
formation did not have an appreciable effect on the unit operating cost of Austrian
Airlines.
Unit labour costs shown in Figure 12.2 are measured as the ratio of total labour costs
to output.
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Year
Figure 12.2 Unit labour cost
It is known that collaboration within the EQA has focused on exchanging and cross-
utilising personnel. Therefore, the rate of decrease of Austrian's unit labour cost
should exceed that of Finnair after 1989. However, from 1989 to 1991, Austrian's and
Finnair unit labour costs follow exactly the same paths, increasing in 1990 and
decreasing in 1991. Austrian labour unit cost does continue to fall after 1991;
however, as from 1992, it increases while Finnair's unit labour cost decreases.
Therefore, it appears that the effect of the alliance on unit labour costs is virtually
inexistent.
Labour productivity measured as the ATK per employee is shown in Figure 12.3.
Again, as a result of cross-utilisation of personnel, one would expect the rate of
increase of Austrian's labour productivity to exceed that of Finnair in the post-alliance
period. In the first year following alliance formation, this seems to be the case. This is
also apparent in the period 1991-1992 when Austrian experienced a sharp increase in
labour productivity while Finnair's labour productivity decreased. However, after
1992, Austrian's labour productivity flattened out while that of Finnair increased
sharply. From the comparison, it would appear that alliance formation had a positive
effect on Austrian's labour unit cost.
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Figure 12.3 Labour productivity
The graphical analysis indicates that alliance formation did not have much of an effect
on the unit operating cost and labour cost of Austrian Airlines. The effect on labour
productivity is also not very clear. One possible reason for that could be the way in
which these quantities were measured. Indeed, the use of ATK as unit of production is
not appropriate for all the labour groups within the airlines. For example, a more
appropriate unit of production for flight crew is flying hours. Likewise, cabin crew
produce revenue passenger kilometres (RPK). Another reason for the lack of alliance
effect is that collaboration has extended only to specific cost areas of Austrian
Airlines. Therefore, an analysis of the overall unit costs is likely to conceal any
alliance effects. In the next section, areas of co-operation will be identified and
appropriate measures defined for unit cost and productivity.
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12.5 Areas Of Collaboration
The various areas of collaboration in the EQA are identified in Table 12.2.
Cost category	 Sub-category	 Unit cost measure	 Productivity measure
Labour	 Flight crew	 Flight personnel costs
	
Flying hours
Flying hours	 Flight personnel numbe
Cabin crew	 Cabin personnel costs	 RPK
RPK
	
Cabin personnel number
Maintenance and
overhaul (M&O)
Ticketing, sales and
promotion (TSP)
Other
M& 0 personnel costs
Flying hours
TSP personnel costs
Passenger number
Other personnel costs
ATK
Flying hours
M& 0 personnel number
Passenger number
TSP personnel number
A TK
Other personnel number
Facilities
Capacity
Station	 Station costs
Aircraft departures
M&O*	
M& 0 costs
Flying hours
TSP	 TSP costs
Passenger number
Aircraft Flying hours
Number of aircraft
Purchasing	 Fuel and oil	 Fuel and oil costs	 -
ATK
Insurance	 Insurance costs
	 -
ATK
Other	 Rental	 Rental costs
ATK
Training	 Training costs	 -
Number of employees
Administration	 Administration costs 	 -
ATK
Table 12.2 Unit cost and productivity measures
: Minus labour costs
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It is important to be clear as to what each cost category actually encompasses. Since
data for the computation of unit costs and productivity are taken from the JCAO
Digest of Statistics and IA TA-WA TS, their definition of each category is adopted.
Flight crew and cabin crew costs include pay and allowances, pensions, insurance,
travelling and crew equipment costs. Maintenance and overhaul (M&O) personnel
costs, and ticketing, sales and promotion (TSP) personnel costs consist essentially of
the pay and allowances of the personnel involved in those activities. 'Other' personnel
are those who can not be classified in either of the above-mentioned categories.
Usually, they consist of general and administrative personnel.
Station costs includes items such as the pay, allowances and expenses of all station
staff engaged in handling and servicing aircraft and load, station accommodation
costs, maintenance and insurance of airport facilities, representation and traffic
handling fees charged by third parties for handling the air services of the airline,
station store charges, rental of stores and storekeepers' pay and allowances. M&O
costs include the cost of maintenance for keeping aircraft, engines and spares in
operative conditions, the cost of repair and overhaul and certificate of airworthiness
overhaul carried out under government mandatory requirements. This cost item also
includes the cost of repair, overhaul and maintenance of the flight equipment by
outside contractors and manufacturers. TSP costs involve accommodation costs
(rental of sales offices), commissions on ticket sales, agency fees for outside services,
and the costs of advertising and publicity through various media.
Fuel and oil costs include purchasing expenses, non-refundable duties and taxes
involved with those items. Insurance costs include insurance against accidental
damage to flight equipment while in flight and on the ground and insurance against
liability occurring from operation of aircraft. Rental costs include expenses arising
from the rental of aircraft and crews from other carriers.
Training costs includes the costs of training flight crew. Administrative costs include
expenses incurred in performing general and administrative functions of the airline
and those expenses relating to matters of a general corporate nature.
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As mentioned previously, sources of data for the computation of unit costs and
productivity are the ICA 0-Digest of Statistics, Financial Data and Fleet and
Personnel, and the L4TA-WATS. However, a disadvantage inherent in these data
sources is the overlap between the labour and facilities categories with labour costs
included in the latter. Therefore, an approximation to the costs of running the facilities
was obtained by subtracting the labour costs from the total facilities costs. However,
in the case of station expenses, this was not possible since labour cost data for that
category was not available.
12.6 Disaggregate Unit Cost And Productivity Comparison
12.6.1 Labour cost
Year
Figure 12.4 Flight personnel unit cost
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Figure 12.5 Cabin personnel unit cost
1 cn
Figure 12.6 M&O personnel unit cost
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Figure 12.7 TSP personnel unit cost
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Figure 12.8 'Other' personnel unit cost
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12.6.1.1 Discussion
For flight personnel (see Figure 12.4), the unit costs of Austrian and Finnair follow
practically the same trends both before and after 1989. Before 1989, their unit costs
rise almost linearly with a rate of 20 per year for Austrian and a rate of 16 per year for
Finnair. Austrian unit cost falls in 1989 while that of Finnair levels out. However,
they both rise at exactly the same rate over the period 1989-1990 before starting to fall
gradually. Austrian's and Finnair's unit costs start to increase in 1992 and 1993
respectively at the same rate. Comparison of the changes in unit costs for the two
airlines leads one to conclude that the EQA has not been successful in bringing down
the flight personnel unit costs of Austrian Airlines. One possible reason for that
observation is that it is quite difficult to lower flight crew salaries or to lay off flight
personnel because of the strength of unions. The effect of the EQA is more on
increasing flight crew productivity as will be observed later.
Unlike flight personnel, some effect of the EQA can be distinguished in the case of
cabin personnel unit costs (see Figure 12.5). From 1985 to 1988, the cabin personnel
unit costs of Austrian and Finnair follow generally the same rising trend. Austrian's
unit costs fall slightly in 1989 and from 1989 to 1990, Austrian's unit cost increases at
a rate of 14 per year while Finnair's unit cost increases at a rate of 39 per year. This is
indicative of some alliance effect. Finnair's unit cost continues to increase after 1990,
while, up to 1991, Austrian seems to be successful in lowering its unit costs.
However, after 1991, its unit costs rise sharply at a rate of 30 per year. On the other
hand, Finnair seems to have taken measures to decrease unit costs in 1991. Those
measures have been successful as, from 1991 to 1994, Finnair's unit costs fell at a rate
of 25 per year. Therefore, one can conclude that while the EQA was effective in the
years immediately after its formation, that was not the case after 1991 when other
factors drove cabin personnel unit costs up. After 1993, Austrian's unit cost fall;
however, the rate of decrease is not significantly different from that of Finnair so that
the presence of any alliance effect can not be supported.
Concerning M&O personnel unit costs, EQA effects are fairly distinguishable (see
Figure 12.6). In the pre-alliance period, Austrian and Finnair unit costs follow an
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increasing trend, with the increase of Austrian being the sharper of the two (a rate of
21 per year). The increase in Finnair's unit cost is more gradual with a plateau
occurring in the period 1987-1988. In 1989, Austrian unit cost falls dramatically. It
rises back to 1988 levels in 1990; however, the trend of increasing costs which
prevailed in the pre-alliance period seems to have been curbed. Indeed, after alliance
formation, the costs cease rising and remain fairly stable. As from 1992, they start
increasing gradually. In comparison, Finnair's unit costs start increasing as from 1988.
Over the period 1989-1990, Austrian's unit cost rises at a rate of 11 while Finnair's
unit cost rises at a rate of 18. Over the period 1990-1992, Finnair's unit cost continue
to increase while Austrian's unit cost goes down. Therefore, one can conclude that the
EQA has been effective in improving the M&O personnel unit costs of Austrian
Airlines.
Changes in TSP personnel unit costs are shown in Figure 12.7. The unit costs of
Austrian and Finnair follow near-identical paths before 1989, rising at approximately
13 per year. After alliance formation, the unit cost of Austrian and Finnair both
increase. However, that of Austrian increases at a lower rate than that of Finnair
indicating some alliance effect. The latter does not appear to be sustained after 1991.
Indeed, as from that year, the unit costs of Fiimair starts decreasing. In comparison,
the unit cost of Austrian starts to rise as from 1992. Therefore, EQA effects on the
TSP personnel unit cost of Austrian are not very apparent. That is a surprising result
as EQA partners are known to co-operate quite extensively in that sector. One
possible explanation could be that there has not been a decrease in TSP personnel, but
rather a reorganisation with personnel based in the partners' countries being sent to
other locations. Another explanation could be that the effect of the EQA has been very
localised and can not be detected by an analysis of overall costs.
The changes in the unit labour costs of administrative and general personnel is shown
in Figure 12.8. Both the unit costs of Austrian and Finnair increase in the pre-alliance
period with the increase for Austrian being the sharper of the two. In 1989, Austrian's
unit cost decreases sharply and, over the post-alliance period, fluctuates quite
dramatically. Finnair's unit cost levels off in the period 1988-1990 and then increases
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over the period 1990-1992. It then decreases after 1992. A comparison of the two
airlines indicates that some alliance effect was prevalent over the period 1989-1992.
Furthermore, the shape increase in Austrian's unit cost in the pre-alliance period
seems to have been curbed in the post-alliance period. Nevertheless, one should not
conclude that such an effect was due solely to alliance formation as the EQA was not
very active in the exchange and reciprocal use of general and administrative
personnel.
The above analysis shows that while some effect of alliance formation can be
observed on the unit labour costs of Austrian airlines in certain categories, it is not
clearly apparent. In addition, the effect occurs mainly in the few years following
alliance formation and decreases in magnitude with time. However, the EQA seems to
have been very effective in improving the productivity of Austrian's personnel as will
be seen in the next section.
12.6.2 Labour productivity
Year
Figure 12.9 Flight personnel productivity
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Figure 12.11 M&O personnel productivity
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Figure 12.12 TSP personnel productivity
Figure 12.13 'Other' personnel productivity
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12.6.2.1 Discussion
The change in flight personnel productivity is shown in Figure 12.9. In the pre-
alliance period, the productivity of Austrian and Finnair flight personnel vary in
generally the same way. It increases for Finnair over the period 1986-1989 while that
of Austrian increases from 1988 to 1989. After 1989, the productivity of Austrian's
personnel levels off but then increases sharply from 1991 to 1991. Conversely, after
1989, the productivity of Finnair's personnel decreases and does so until 1992. After
1992, Austrian's productivity decreases while that of Finnair starts increasing.
Comparison of flight productivity trends in the few years following alliance formation
leads one to conclude that the EQA has been effective in that field. However, after
1992, other negative factors have dominated over the alliance effects.
Changes in cabin personnel productivity are shown in Figure 12.10. In the pre-alliance
period, the productivity of Austrian and Finnair follow near-identical paths, increasing
from 1985 to 1987, decreasing sharply in 1988 and rising in 1989. However, they then
follow completely different paths after 1989. From 1989 to 1991, Finnair's
productivity decreases at a rate of about 10 per year. On the other hand, Austrian's
productivity increases slightly in 1990, and then sharply in 1991 (a change in index of
approximately 40). It then falls slightly in 1992 and starts increasing again in 1993.
Finnair productivity increases fairly rapidly after 1991. Its rate of increase exceeds
that of Austrian in the period 1992-1994. The conclusion of this comparison is that the
EQA has been beneficial to Austrian in the years following alliance formation where
cabin personnel productivity is concerned.
The same conclusion is reached in the case of M&O personnel productivity (see
Figure 12.11). Productivity for Finnair increases from 1986 to 1989 while that of
Austrian increases sharply in 1989. That could be indicative of the effects of co-
operation as Finnair's productivity was decreasing prior to that. From 1989 to 1990,
the productivity of both airlines decrease slightly and at the same rate. However, after
1990, Finnair's productivity maintains a slightly decreasing trend while that of
Austrian increases at a rate of about 7 per year. Its productivity levels off after 1992
while that of Finnair increases at a rate of 10 per year. Therefore, it appears that some
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effects of co-operation have taken place in the three years after alliance formation.
However, after that, these effects seem to have disappeared.
The productivity of TSP personnel in terms of number of passengers per employee is
shown in Figure 12.12. Productivity for Austrian and Finnair follow generally the
same trend from 1985 to 1987. However, from 1987 to 1989, Austrian's productivity
decreases at a rate of approximately 5 per year, while that of Finnair increases at the
same rate. However, after 1989, Finnair's productivity falls dramatically and
continues to do so until 1992. On the other hand, that of Austrian increases slightly,
and after a slight dip in 1991, continues its increase at a faster rate. This result is to be
expected as co-operation in the EQA has been very much focused on cross-selling.
The productivity of 'other' personnel measured in ATK per employee is shown in
Figure 12.13. The productivity of Austrian and Finnair follow generally the same
trend in both the pre- and post-alliance periods so that one can conclude that the
alliance had no effect in that field. This is to be expected as the EQA members
expressed no intention of co-operating as far as administrative and general personnel
is concerned.
This section has shown that, in general, labour productivity benefits in the post-
alliance period have been more apparent than lower labour unit costs. The next section
analyses the effects of EQA formation on the unit cost of facilities.
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Figure 12.14 Station unit costs
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Figure 12.15 M&O unit costs
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Figure 12.16 TSP unit costs
12.6.3.1 Discussion
Changes in station unit costs are shown in Figure 12.14. In the pre-alliance period, the
unit cost of Finnair rises gradually while that of Austrian increases sharply over the
period 1985-1987 before decreasing in 1988. In the year following alliance formation,
the unit cost of both airlines increase with that of Austrian increasing at a slightly
higher rate than that of Finnair. After 1990, Finnair's unit cost starts decreasing while
that of Austrian remains more or less stable. After 1992, the unit costs of both airlines
follow fairly similar trends, falling in 1993 and then increasing. Therefore, it can be
concluded that the EQA has not been effective in reducing Austrian's station unit cost.
This is an unexpected result as EQA members had actually targeted this area as a
potential one for cost reduction. The absence of any appreciable result can be
attributed to the fact that the EQA members were quite slow in exploiting the
synergies in that field. Furthermore, the number of common stations was limited
making detection of co-operation effects difficult.
The change in M&O unit costs after correcting for labour costs is depicted in Figure
12.15. Here again, the effect of the EQA is not very obvious. In the pre-alliance
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period, Finnair's unit cost increases gradually at a rate of about 20 per year. On the
other hand, Austrian's unit cost fluctuates quite wildly in that period. After 1989,
Finnair' s unit cost falls at a rate of approximately 15 per year before starting to
increase in 1993. However, that of Austrian increases sharply in the year following
alliance formation and remains at high levels before starting to fall in 1992. Since
Austrian's unit cost was rising at a time when Finnair's unit cost was falling, one can
conclude that the EQA has not been effective in bringing Austrian's unit M&O costs
down in the period 1989-1992. However, as from 1992, co-operation seems to be
yielding benefits.
The same conclusion can be reached where TSP unit costs are concerned (see Figure
12.12). The unit costs of Austrian and Finnair follow practically the same paths in the
pre-alliance and post-alliance periods. The only differences occur in 1993 and 1994
when Finnair's unit cost falls and then rises sharply. One possible explanation for the
absence of any EQA effect is that the closure of sales offices has occurred only in
those countries where the EQA partners are based. Increases in TSP costs in other
countries could have counterbalanced the effect of the alliance, making detection of
EQA effects on unit costs difficult.
The general observation from this analysis is that the alliance strategy has not lowered
the unit cost of facilities of Austrian Airlines. However, it could be that EQA effects
have not been detected because co-operation was implemented only in certain areas.
The next section will analyse changes in aircraft utilisation.
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Figure 12.17 Aircraft utilisation
Figure 12.17 above shows the change in aircraft utilisation as measured by the number
of flying hours per day. From 1985 to 1987, Austrian's and Finnair's aircraft
utilisation follow near-identical paths, decreasing in 1986 and increasing in 1987. The
only difference is in 1988 when Austrian's utilisation falls while that of Finnair
continues to increase. However, in the year of alliance formation, Austrian's
utilisation increase and continues to do so in 1990. After that, it remains at high levels.
In comparison, Finnair's utilisation starts decreasing in 1988 and does so up to 1992
at a rate of approximately 6 per year. It then increases at a rate of about the same rate
over the period 1992-1994. This indicates that the EQA must have been responsible
for the improvement in Austrian's aircraft utilisation. Such an improvement comes
from the reciprocal use of aircraft, and from the use of code-sharing which allows
Austrian to re-assign certain aircraft to other routes in its network.
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12.6.5 Purchasing
Figure 12.18 Fuel and oil unit cost
Figure 12.19 Insurance unit cost
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Changes in fuel and oil unit costs measured in costs per ATK are shown in Figure
12.18. A priori, one expects to see a decrease in Austrian's unit cost over the post-
alliance period as it benefits from a lower price obtained as a result of a greater
bargaining power. However, this does not seem to have occurred. Indeed, over the
period of analysis, the unit costs of Austrian and Finnair vary in similar ways. They
both fall in 1986 and over the period 1986-1989. They then rise in 1990 as a result of
the Gulf War, though it seems that Finnair has suffered more than Austrian in that
year. Both then recover from that year with unit costs decreasing from 1990 to 1994.
The same conclusion is reached concerning unit insurance costs (see Figure 12.19).
Here again, the unit costs of Austrian and Finnair follow similar trends and no
apparent difference exists between them in the post-alliance period. The only
difference occurs in 1990 when Austrian's unit cost rises sharply, only to fall back to
Finnair levels in the following year. Therefore, in the area of purchasing, the
formation of the EQA has not affected Austrian Airlines appreciably. The next section
will consider alliance effects in cost areas which can not be categorised in the above-
mentioned cost categories. Collaboration in the EQA has not really extended to those
areas so that no change in Austrian's unit costs relative to those of Finnair is expected.
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12.6.6 Other costs
1000
900
-.- Os -
800	 • AY
700 ________ _________________ ________ _____________________________________________
_____ ___________ _____	 /600 __ __ _  _ _ _ __ __ __  ___ _ _ _____________________________________________
400 ________ ________________ ________ ________________ _________________________
500 ___ _______ ___ _________________
300 _______ ________________ _______ _______________ ________________________
200 \	 ____________ ______ ____________ ___________________
1985	 1986	 1987	 1988	 1989	 1990	 1991	 1992	 1993	 1994
Year
Figure 12.20 Rental unit cost
Figure 12.21 Training unit cost
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Figure 12.22 Administration unit cost
12.6.6.1 Discussion
Austrian and Finnair rental unit costs are compared in Figure 12.20. From 1986 to
1989, the unit costs of both airlines increase gradually. In the year following the
formation of the EQA, Austrian's unit cost actually falls while that of Finnair
continues to rise. However, one can not conclude that this is due to the EQA as the
unit cost of Austrian appears to be affected by some external factor causing it to rise
dramatically. This conceals any effect of the EQA on unit costs.
In the case of training and administration unit costs (see Figure 12.21 and Figure
12.22 respectively), Austrian and Finnair follow very similar paths and appear to be
affected by the same economic forces. The rate of change of Austrian's unit cost is not
very different from that of Finnair in the post-alliance period, hence the absence of
any appreciable alliance effect.
12.7 Conclusion
This chapter has attempted to examine whether the production benefits have resulted
from the formation of the EQA. Various unit cost and productivity measures were
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costs is perhaps too small to allow its detection in the overall TSP costs of the airline.
The same applies for station costs.
Another area where the alliance strategy has worked is that of aircraft utilisation.
While Finnair's aircraft utilisation fell in the post-alliance period, that of Austrian rose
to higher levels. This comes as a result of using one's partner aircraft and also of
code-sharing. However, it could also be the result of improved scheduling.
Contrary to expectation, the unit costs of fuel and insurance were not affected by
alliance formation. In the case of fuel, this can be explained by the fact that fuel prices
are subject to other influences which are beyond the control of the airlines. Also, the
EQA does not seem to have put the mechanisms in place in order to purchase fuel and
insurance jointly.
Finally, rental, training and administrative unit costs were unaffected by the alliance,
most probably because co-operation did not extend to those areas, or because the
intention of collaborating never went beyond that.
One has to realise that the changes occurring in the post-alliance period are not
exclusively the result of alliance formation in the case of Austrian Airlines. Indeed, as
from 1990, the aviation industry suffered the effects of the Gulf War and economic
recession which forced airlines to investigate means of decreasing their production
costs and increase the productivity of their labour force. Of course, the alliance
strategy consisted of one of the ways of achieving that objective. However, other ways
include the reduction in labour force, reduction of salaries, and negotiations to
increase productivity. It is very difficult to separate alliance effects from the combined
effects of all the measures taken to improve the financial situation of the airline. It was
attempted to do so qualitatively using the Annual Reports of Austrian and Finnair.
However, alliance-specific information provided in the reports was very sparse, and
only served to highlight the dominance of internally-generated strategies. Therefore,
the analysis provided in this chapter provides an indication of alliance effects at best.
The results of the analyses in this chapter are summarised in Table 12.3.
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defined and applied to Austrian Airlines and Finnair over a period including the year
at which the EQA was formed. Differences between Austrian and Finnair in the rates
of change of unit costs and productivity in the post-alliance period (1989-1994) were
examined to detect the effects of collaboration. Clearly, it is a combination of co-
operative strategies and internally-generated moves which lead to the changes so that
any observable differences in rates of change between the two airlines were
considered to be only indicative of the effects of the EQA.
An analysis of the unit operating cost and unit labour cost revealed no appreciable
alliance effect. In fact, Austrian performed worse than Finnair in the post-alliance
period. However, this could be due to the means of measurement and to the fact that
collaboration extended to specific, instead of all, areas.
No effects were observed on flight personnel unit costs which vary at the same rate in
the post-alliance period for both Austrian Airlines and Finnair. However, some
alliance effect was detected in the case of cabin personnel, M&O and TSP personnel.
Some alliance effect is observed in the case of administrative and general personnel
unit costs in the period 1989-1992. However, this is considered to result more from
airline-specific moves than from the alliance as the literature has shown no indication
that the EQA members intended to exploit the synergies in joint administration.
The graphical analysis has shown that an area which has clearly benefited from
alliance formation is that of labour productivity. For all of Austrian's flight personnel,
cabin personnel, M&O personnel and TSP personnel, productivity has increased at a
faster rate than that of Finnair in the post-alliance period. Thus, even though Austrian
has not managed to decrease unit costs for most of these personnel groups, it has
succeeded in gaining productivity benefits as a result of collaboration.
When it comes to the use of facilities, the effects of the EQA are not clearly visible.
Indeed, no difference exists between the rates of change in the unit costs of Austrian
and Finnair so that the hypothesis of an EQA effect is not supported. One possible
reason is that the effect of the EQA has been very localised. For example, the closure
of sales offices occurred only in the partners' respective countries. The reduction in
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Cost/productivity item	 Short-term effect	 Long-term effect
Flight crew unit cost
Cabin crew unit cost
M&O unit labour cost
TSP unit labour cost
Other personnel unit cost
Flight crew productivity
Cabin crew productivity
M&O personnel productivity
TSP personnel productivity
Other personnel productivity
Station unit cost
M&O unit cost
TSP unit cost
Aircraft utilisation
Fuel and oil unit cost
Insurance unit cost
Rental unit cost
Training unit cost
Administration unit cost
None
None
Medium
None
Small
Large
Medium
Small
Medium
None
None
Small
None
Medium
None
None
None
None
None
Table 12.3 Summary of the effects of the EQA on Austrian Airlines
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13. CONCLUSION
Introduction
J
n the previous twelve chapters, the evolution of the airline alliance phenomenon
was examined and the factors contributing to alliance success were analysed
both qualitatively and quantitatively. This chapter will summarise the findings of
the research, and interpret their meaning to airline managers thinking of embarking on
to the collaborative strategy. Like in most pieces of research of this kind, the models
of alliance success which have been constructed here are not perfect, but have a
certain number of limitations due to lack of data and underlying assumptions. The
limitations will be presented in this chapter and potential means of improving the
models will be discussed wherever relevant. During the course of this research, other
fields of interest emerged. This chapter will conclude with those areas offering
potential for further research.
13.1 The General Research Contributions
The main aim of this research is to analyse the factors contributing to airline alliance
success. It is designed to be used as a management tool by airline managers who are
contemplating the alliance strategy to increase the competitiveness of their airlines in
the future. In addition, it effectively sets the groundwork for future research on airline
alliances.
Five main contributions of this research can be identified. First, it has brought
together the widely-dispersed (and sometimes contradictory) knowledge on airline
alliances. Thus, one can have a general idea as to how the collaborative strategy has
propagated in the airline industry. Second, it has analysed the current structure of the
airline industry to reveal the various groupings as well as any underlying trends which
airline alliances are following. Third, this research has analysed the forces which have
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driven airlines to co-operate. A conceptual model of airline alliance formation has
been constructed, which lends itself to quantitative analysis. Fourth, this research has
discussed the 'soft' management issues which are veiy important in ensuring the
stability of airline alliances. By drawing on knowledge developed in the business and
social sciences, it was possible to present guidelines on how to design a stable airline
alliance. The fifth contribution of this research lies in the quantitative analysis of the
performance of airline alliances in terms of goal attainment. The following sections
will discuss the findings of the research and, from there, propose recommendations as
to how airlines should go about choosing alliance strategies and implementing them.
13.2 Discussion Of Research Findings
13.2.1 Increasing need to ally
In the preliminary stages of this research, it was deemed important to analyse the
direction which the trend in airline alliance formation was taking and to identify the
forces which were driving airlines to collaborate more extensively. A conceptual
model based on airline-specific socio-political and economic occurrences was
constructed in an attempt to explain the pressing need for co-operation. Components
of the model included deregulationlliberalisation, globalisation, privatisation, world-
wide economic changes as factors leading airlines to collaborate. Regulatory barriers,
both national and international, as well as nationalist barriers were identified as the
forces which constrained airlines to ally rather than merge.
The conclusion that can be drawn from the qualitative model is that co-operation
between airlines will continue to grow in importance as airlines find that they need to
become more competitive and operate on a global scale in order to survive.
Developing such skill organically can be time-consuming and costly and co-operating
allows one to bypass such difficulties. However, legislative barriers currently dictating
the behaviour of airlines seem to be resistant to any changes and mergers between
airlines based in different continents seem unlikely to be easy in the near future. In
fact, airline mergers and acquisitions could become increasingly difficult as aviation
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markets consolidate into blocks such as the European Union. Therefore, it is predicted
that the formation of airline alliances will continue to occur and the airline industry
will eventually consist of a number of four or five groupings constituted of distinct
airlines co-operating closely together.
Hence, it is recommended that airlines form part of at least one grouping in order to
survive and grow. Opting for a go-it-alone strategy could prove fatal to airlines as they
could find it increasingly difficult to reap the economies of scope and density
necessary for profitable operation. The only option viable for future operation could
turn out to be niche markets for those carriers. By forming part of a grouping, airlines
would be able to benefit from better access to global markets and from traffic feed
originating in a number of world regions. They will also find it easier to compete for
market share and take price initiatives.
In many cases, the urgency of co-operation has lead to airline alliances which did not
have much of a sound rationale behind them and which did not take into consideration
the issues essential for their stability. The next section will present the findings of the
qualitative analysis of the structure of airline alliance relationships.
13.2.2 Factors determining airline alliance stability
The eventual success of an airline alliance depends greatly on its internal stability.
Indeed, many of the difficulties experienced by current airline alliances occur because
the importance of internal alliance stability was overlooked during the negotiations
and afterwards. This results from the fact that airline managers have long been
accustomed to operating alone in their business environment, and that the concept of
collaboration is alien to them. Therefore, a major success factor of strategic airline
alliances is a thorough understanding of the 'soft' management issues inherent in their
workings.
For that, a conceptual model of the development of alliances was devised, based on
knowledge derived from the business and strategy disciplines. The model consists of
three stages, formation, operation and evolution. A number of factors need to be given
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due consideration when the alliance is any one of these stages in the course of its
development. The following recommendations can be made based on that conceptual
model.
First, it is important to set specific criteria which the potential partner will have to
satisfy. Such criteria need to be based on the compatibility between the airline and its
potential partner. Four types of compatibility are identified as important: cultural,
strategic, functional, and goal. It is anticipated that cultural compatibility can be hard
to obtain as the need to achieve global coverage mandates alliances between airlines
based in different continents. However, if the two airlines have fairly similar ways of
managing their operations, this will constitute an advantage. If the partners are
culturally very different, then efforts aimed towards understanding one another have
to be promoted. Strategic and goal compatibility refer to the long-term objectives of
the paTtners. Conflict of objectives will certainly lead to alliance failure. Functional
compatibility refers to the style of management which, if incompatible, can cause
instability within the alliance. After having defined the criteria for fit, the airline can
then go to the next step which is to apply them to screen out potential partners. It is
recognised that with the limited number of attractive partners, all the criteria will not
be satisfied. Therefore, a certain degree of compromise is necessitated and it is up to
the airline to decide on which criteria to attach more weight in its decision-making
process.
Once the partner is identified, the airline can go ahead and create the alliance. To
ensure that the alliance idea is accepted within the airline, managers have to get key
personnel to agree to it and thus, gain internal support. The signing of the alliance
contract is not an end in itself. Indeed, managers have to devise a strategic plan which
will set out the course of the alliance, and find ways in which it can be used to create
value. Then, it is of utmost importance to communicate to the personnel of both
airlines what co-operation will be based upon. If it is unclear to the personnel as to
how the alliance is operationalised, little progress will be made.
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At the formation stage, and also during the operational phase, there is an ongoing
interaction between personnel from both airlines. It is necessary to understand that
interaction and how it can promote alliance stability. Three issues need to be given
due consideration: commitment, trust and power/control. The feeling that one's
partner is committed to the success of the alliance encourages one to be committed as
well and reinforces the bond between the airlines. Unilateral commitment of resources
(personnel or capital) or the promise of exclusivity are ways to demonstrate
commitment. Equity purchases can help an airline make its partner aware of its
commitment to the alliance. However, it is recommended that the equity be small so
that it does not convey the impression that the airline is attempting to control its
partner.
The feeling of trust also needs to be promoted within the two companies. Indeed, if
one of them feels that the other is using the alliance to its own advantage, then it is
most likely to leave the partnership. Feelings of trust are promoted at the negotiation
stage and are also generated by making non-recoverable investments to the alliance.
Power imbalances can undermine interfirm relationships. These power imbalances are
most likely to arise between airlines of significantly different sizes such as major and
regional/commuter airlines. Indeed, there is the danger that the former can abuse its
dominant position and act opportunistically. Commitment and trust can help alleviate
and eventually eliminate the feeling of vulnerability felt by the weaker partner. The
law of contract can also be used by the weaker partner to control its stronger partner to
a certain extent. However, the implementation of the law can be a costly and time-
consuming process.
An issue which is frequently overlooked by alliance managers is that alliances evolve
as a result of changes in both external and internal circumstances. Thus, the
importance which an airline attributes to its alliance can change over time. This can
lead to instability if the alliance has not been designed to cope with such changes.
Therefore, it is necessary to include flexibility to change at the design phase of the
alliance. Mechanisms should also be implemented to monitor the alliance regularly so
that changes are detected soon enough to take the appropriate corrective action.
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Finally, the alliance partners have to recognise that dissolution can take place. Too
often, this has been overlooked and the separation has been lengthy and painful as the
partners spend large amounts of time deciding who owns what. Therefore, it is
important to decide upon dissolution procedures at the design phase of the alliance.
The second criterion of airline alliance success is the achievement of the set
objectives. The next section will present the findings of the quantitative analyses and,
from there, make recommendations to airlines.
13.2.3 Critical alliance performance factors
13.2.3.1 Economies of scale
A belief prevails that alliances can be a means of reaping economies of scale. This
research has empirically shown that belief to be untrue. Indeed, it was found that
constant returns to scale exist the airline level and, more interestingly, at the alliance
level. In other words, this implies that the alliance strategy does not enable an airline
to lower its unit costs solely because it has caused the airline to increase the scale of
its operations. Therefore, it is recommended that airlines do not adopt the alliance
strategy if their aim is to lower their unit costs just by increasing their size.
13.2.3.2 Economies of scope and density
Economies of scope are reaped when an airline is able to operate on a larger network
and, as such, become more competitive. Density economies derive from an increase in
traffic on a network of fixed size, leading to higher load factors and lower unit costs.
The variables which were observed to affect alliance success in those areas are the
change in 'effective' network size, partner network complementarity, the change in
alliance inter-hub capacity, the change in alliance travel convenience and the change
in the level of competition experienced by the alliance. The implications of each of
these factors are discussed next.
The 'effective' network size of an airline is the total number of points in its network
and the points in its partner's network which can be marketed as though they were its
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own. The regression model indicates that airlines should look for a partner with a
large network in order to attract substantial additional traffic onto its own network. In
addition, a partner with a large network enables the airline to benefit from appreciable
traffic feed. The size of the partner's network is also important in that the linking of
FFPs will be more effective since they can be deployed onto a large network.
Therefore, passengers have a greater choice of destinations on which to collect and
use FFP points. If the partner with the desired network size is not available, it is
possible for the airline to reap the benefits by allying with a number of airlines with
smaller networks. This strategy could be desirable in that the airline can have access
to a number of regions; however, managerial difficulties in dealing with a large
number of alliances can be encountered.
Network complementarity refers to the degree of overlap between the partners'
networks. The model indicates that airlines should seek for partners whose networks
do not overlap substantially with its own for the alliance to be successful. If the
alliance has already been formed, then the partners need to take the necessary steps to
eliminate the duplication problem. Network complementarity and hub separation were
found to be highly correlated implying that partners with close hubs are very likely to
have substantially-overlapping networks. Therefore, for airlines seeking scope and
density economies, it is desirable for them to select partners based in other
continents/world regions. However, airlines may wish to ally with partners based very
close to achieve a strong position in the region.
The inclusion of the change in the inter-hub capacity into the model was dictated by
the necessity to control for that variable. Indeed, it is known that changes in
frequency (and hence total capacity) can stimulate traffic and bring about market
share gains. Therefore, any change in inter-hub capacity provided by the alliance is
likely to increase its passenger traffic on that route. In the model, the variable had the
expected positive coefficient. However, the fact that the alliance was the unit of
analysis masked the possibility that the increase in frequency was not alliance-
initiated, but a unilateral decision taken by one of the airlines in the partnership. An
increase in inter-hub capacity is recommended for the alliance because of the traffic
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stimulation and market share increases it can bring about. In addition, it could be that
increasing the inter-hub capacity integrates the two networks further and makes them
appear as a single entity to the consumer.
Travel convenience refers to the average length of time a passenger has to wait for
his/her connecting flight. A decrease in connect time was observed to contribute
significantly to alliance success. Therefore, it is recommended that alliance partners
make efforts to co-ordinate their scheduling activities at connecting points in their
networks. By matching their flights such that departing and incoming flights lie as
close as possible to each other, they can increase the amount of traffic on their
networks. Shorter waiting times make the alliance flight option attractive to
passengers and promote it to better positions on CRS screens.
Level of competition was also found to be an important determinant of airline alliance
performance. As expected, an increase in competition levels will hinder alliance
success. Therefore, the potential reaction of competitors needs to be carefully
assessed when formulating the strategic plan of the alliance. A problem of
simultaneity between variables is recognised here. Indeed, the formation of an
alliance will cause competitors to react. They might either move out of the market or,
more likely, try to increase their competitiveness. These reactions will, in turn, affect
the performance of the alliance. The model could be improved by taking this
simultaneity issue into account.
Of the variables found to affect airline alliance success, the level of competition was
found to be the one of highest relative importance. It is followed by the network size,
inter-hub capacity, network complementarity and travel convenience in order of
importance. Airlines have virtually no control on the reaction of competitors.
Therefore, it is recommended that they concentrate firstly on the network size of the
prospective partner as a first screening criterion followed by the complementarity of
their networks. Once the alliance is formed, the frequency of service between hubs
should be increased and incoming and departing flights should be matched at
connecting airports to decrease the waiting time of passengers.
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One of the controversial findings of this piece of research is that alliance success is
unaffected by fare levels. However, this can be explained by the fact that the measure
of fares in the alliance models was not very appropriate. An ideal measure would have
been the average yield obtained on the network centred on the hubs of the partners.
Unfortunately, such information was unavailable so that the alliance average yield on
the whole of the partners' networks was used instead. However, the use of average
yield is not very appropriate in this analysis as airline alliances operate only between
selected hubs and not on the whole network of the partners. Averaging fares over the
partners whole networks renders the detection of alliance effects difficult.
A second controversial finding was that alliance performance is independent of the
degree of seamlessness between the partners' respective levels of service, both in
flight and on the ground. One can therefore conclude that passengers are not
concerned with the differing levels of service which they might experience when
transferring from one airline to its partner. This could be true in the case of low-yield
passengers who are more concerned about reaching their destination. This would be
less so in the case of business-class passengers where in-flight service levels and
ground treatment are important in their choice of airline. The fact that business-class
traffic constitutes a low proportion of the total traffic carried by the alliance could
explain the absence of the seamlessness variable in the alliance models. However,
these conclusions should be treated with caution as the degree of seamlessness was
somewhat crudely measured in this research. More in-depth research is required to
improve the measure for inclusion in the model.
13.2.3.3 Market power
Alliance market power exhibits itself on inter-hub and origin-destination (O-D)
markets. On the inter-hub route, the alliance dominates the hubs at both ends of the
market and can make entry of competitors very difficult. The domination of the
alliance on the inter-hub route can also cause competitors to move out of it as they
find it increasingly difficult to compete. EQA, KLM-Northwest and British Airways-
USAir were observed to experience 'arge increases in market share on inter-hub routes
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after those alliance were formed. Therefore, an increase in frequency on inter-hub
routes is recommended to inhibit the ability of other airlines to compete and therefore,
gain control of that market.
On O-D markets, quantitative analysis pointed to alliance frequency, connect time
and quality of connection as alliance market share determinants. These results imply
that alliances should increase the frequency of service in origin-destination markets to
gain more market power. Indeed, an increase in frequency makes the alliance option
more attractive to the consumer and increases its chances of being selected. The linear
models predicted an increase of around 2% in market share for an increase of one in
average weekly frequency. Also, partners should make efforts to decrease the connect
time as that variable was observed to be of value in explaining the change in market
share of the alliances considered in the study. A third conclusion of the analysis is that
alliances should strive for most of the O-D markets to involve only one stop.
Furthermore, code-sharing is to be encouraged in order to present the flight as on-line
rather than inter-line as it was shown to increase alliance market share,
Another finding of this alliance market share analysis is that competitors are very
likely to react swiftly by increasing their service frequency, decreasing average
connect time and increasing service quality. For the alliances considered, increases in
service quality were observed to form the major strategy of competitors to counter the
effects of the alliance. Therefore, it is important for prospective partners to realise
that the market power benefits expected from allying are very likely to be affected by
the reaction of their competitors. In particular, promotion of multi-stop services to
one-stop status and an increased use of code-sharing are the major competitor
reactions to be expected. Therefore, the potential reaction of competitors to alliance
formation needs to be assessed in the analysis of the alliance future benefits.
As in the model of scope and density economies, it was not possible to include fares
in the market power models because of the lack of fare data. Usually, fares are
substituted for by yields. However, in this case, the actual fare is required as the
econometric analyses are of a cross-sectional type involving a number of origin-
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destination markets served by the alliances before and after alliance formation.
Inclusion of fares could improve on the explanatory power and the prediction
accuracy of the alliance market share models.
13.2.3.4 Production benefits
Lower unit costs, improved productivity and increased capacity utilisation are the
main objectives of airlines combining their operations on the production side. In order
to identify the areas where alliances offer the greatest potential of achieving these
goals, a case study of Austrian Airlines was performed.
In general, it was observed that the alliance was generally not successful in decreasing
unit labour costs. Small decreases in the unit costs occurred only in the cases of cabin
crew, maintenance and overhaul, and ticketing, sales and promotion personnel. This
can be explained by the fact that it is very difficult to lay off personnel owing to the
strength of unions. However, the productivity of all the above-mentioned personnel as
well as that of flight crew improved considerably after alliance formation. Aircraft
utilisation was also greatly improved after alliance formation probably as a result of
code-sharing and cross-utilisation of aircraft.
Unit costs of facilities were not observed to be affected by EQA formation. However
it is known that the EQA partners have closed down a number of sales offices and
taken over one another's operations at a certain number of stations. The fact that these
measures have been very localised in the airline's network could explain why they
could not be detected in an examination of the overall costs of the airline. The unit
costs of fuel, insurance, rental and administration were also observed to be unaffected
by alliance formation. This is possibly because the EQA partners have been very slow
in implementing joint strategies in those areas and there also seems to have been a
lack of direction as to where and how to operationalise the alliance.
The main finding of the analysis of alliance production benefits seems to be that
labour productivity and capacity utilisation are the main areas where it is easier and
quicker to reap benefits via alliance formation. Therefore, it is recommended for
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airlines to concentrate on them at the initial stage of alliance formation. Once tangible
benefits are obtained and hence faith in the alliance is reinforced, the partners can
progress to the more difficult area of unit cost reduction.
It is important to note that the analysis of the production benefits has been seriously
hampered by difficulties in separating alliance and non-alliance effects and by the lack
of an appropriate case study subject. The EQA appears to offer potential for research
as it has been in existence for a sufficiently-long time and has been geared towards
exploiting the production benefits of allying. However, it seems to have been very
slow in implementing the necessary collaborative measures. Other alliances such as
British Airways-USAir and KLM-Northwest have also collaborated on the production
side. However, the fact that co-operation has been only on the transatlantic makes the
detection of its effects by an examination of overall costs virtually impossible. Costs
and productivity data specific to transatlantic operations are not available from the
concerned airlines. Therefore, it is recognised at this stage that further in-depth
research is necessitated in the area of co-operation on the production side. The
research should preferably be done in collaboration with an airline involved in such
alliances in order to have access to data A methodology also needs to be developed to
isolate the alliance effects.
13.3 Policy Recommendations
From this research, the following recommendations are made to help airline managers
design stable and effective alliances:
• Ensure that the prospective partner is compatible with the airline. The compatibility
condition should be satisfied in four areas: culture, strategic intent, function and
goal
• Ensure that the alliance idea is accepted by key personnel and that the means by
which co-operation will take place is clearly communicated to all personnel
• Ensure that commitment to the success of the alliance is conveyed to the partner,
and that an environment promoting trust prevails during the negotiation stage
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• Understand that the alliance will evolve and therefore build in mechanisms
allowing changes to be implemented in the agreement
• Recognise that the alliance is not eternal, and therefore decide upon the dissolution
procedures when the alliance is being designed
• Avoid using the alliance strategy if the objective is to achieve scale economies
• Select a partner with a large network
• Select a partner with a complementary network
• Increase the frequency of service between the partners' hubs
• Match the partners' flights at the connecting hub so that passenger waiting time is
decreased
• Anticipate the reaction of competitors to the formation of the alliance
• Make use of code-sharing to promote the alliance's services from interline to
intraline
• Bring multi-stop origin-destination services to involve one-stop only
• Concentrate on improving the productivity of their personnel and the utilisation of
their aircraft by using the alliance before moving on to decreasing unit costs of
production.
13.4 Proposals For Further Research
While carrying out this study, a number of areas offering potential for further research
were identified. They are discussed below.
1. This research has been hampered by the fact that the airline alliance phenomenon is
relatively new. Therefore, for most of the alliances considered, only two or three years
of data were available for quantitative analysis. For alliance effects to be fully
revealed, a longer time period is required. Therefore, it would be necessary to perform
an analysis similar to the one in this study in a few years time when data over a longer
time period is available.
2. Another area of research involves the calibration of the conceptual model of the
forces driving airlines to form strategic alliances. From the qualitative analysis carried
out in Chapter 5, a number of hypotheses can be formulated and statistically tested in
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order to identify those forces which are most influential in the model. Thus, a better
insight into the antecedents of airline alliance formation can be obtained.
3. This study has focused on strategic airline alliances between airlines of fairly
equivalent size and strengths. It would be useful to investigate the success factors of
airline alliances between airlines of unequal strengths, such as those between major
airlines and feeder carriers, as this type of alliance is also becoming quite common.
The managerial implications of such alliances are anticipated to be quite different
from alliances between equal partners as the power and control issues in such a
partnership are very much prevalent.
4. Most of the current strategic airline alliances are formed between European carriers
or between European and US carriers. The only two Asian carriers involved in a
major airline grouping are Thai Airways (allied to Lufthansa), Qantas (allied to
British Airways) and SIA (allied to Swissair). For that reason, the analyses in this
study have focused exclusively on European and European-US alliances. It is
anticipated that the number of strategic airline alliances involving an Asian carrier
will increase in the future owing to the pressing need to access that region. Therefore,
it would be useful to extend this study to encompass Asian airlines in order to detect
any differences in success factors.
5. The market power model in this research was observed to suffer from the effects of
simultaneity between a number of the variables, hence the use of the logit model.
While this model explains the attractiveness (utility) of the alliance option as
compared to that of its competitors, it can not be readily used to estimate changes in
market share as a result of a change in variables. One means by which to calibrate the
simultaneous model would be to apply the two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression
technique. This would require the availability of a number of so-called 'instrumental'
variables which are not affected by those in the model, but which can be used to
estimate those variables simultaneously related to the dependent variable.
6. Finally, a fifth area of research would concern the production benefits of airline
alliances. This study has attempted to analyse these benefits. However, it has been
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hampered by a number of methodological problems. Further research is required in
that field, with each of the cost categories constituting a study in their own right.
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APPENUICES
The following sections give the raw data which have been used in the numerical
analyses in this research.
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APPENDIX A: Raw data used in section 9.4.1
Airline	 TCOST/ASKa	 ASKa	 LFa	 ASL LCOST/ASK0	ASKA
	
(Cts./ASK)	 (mn.)	 (%)	 (km.)	 (Cts./ASK)	 (bn.)
Aeromexico	 10.43	 10509648	 64.5	 965.30	 2.05	 361.90
Air Canada	 9.48	 22774347	 62.6	 1509.06	 -	 316.49
Air France	 14.89	 50119395	 73.1	 1766.49	 -	 206.78
Air Lanka	 6.69	 3683204	 71.2 2414.04	 -	 14.09
AirTanzania	 12.57	 152931	 56.9	 613.28	 -	 0.15
AirZimbabwe	 14.51	 666416	 73.2	 753.52	 -	 0.67
AlaskaAirlines	 7.87	 12115311	 62.8	 1110.90	 2.59	 145.33
Alitalia	 11.77	 30258736	 68.5	 1000.79	 3.97	 100.07
America West	 6.17	 19631336	 67.9	 1087.23	 1.61	 19.63
American Airlines	 8.91	 159039499	 64.8	 1671.56	 3.25	 234.21
ANA	 18.62	 38522068	 62.9	 1057.71	 3.38	 185.29
BA	 9.22	 86231812	 71.1	 1639.43	 1.95	 238.85-
British Midland
	
24.94	 2215795	 61.2	 486.28	 4.76	 388.57
CAl	 9.95	 20715067	 68.3	 1645.51	 3.43	 284.64
Cathay Pacific 	 8.23	 32710185	 71.3 2979.69	 2.15	 283.36
Delta Airlines	 9.11	 138876301	 66.3	 1212.57	 3.51	 206.58
Ethiopian Airlines	 15.49	 1606971	 56.1	 931.00	 -	 1.61
Finnair	 10.81	 6490152	 62.8	 1034.69	 3.01	 108.33
Iberia	 12.76	 22530578	 68.6	 1161.69	 5.45	 233.39
Japan Air System	 24.28	 10613868	 62.0	 690.61	 -	 10.61
Japan Airlines	 14.08	 62936425	 68.9 2416.82	 -	 251.33
Kuwait Airways	 12.71	 4514198	 60.7 2022.41	 -	 27.04
Lacsa	 8.72	 1606873	 57.2	 1225.71	 0.56	 24.14
Ladeco	 7.68	 2252661	 61.5	 1121.02	 -	 24.78
LOT	 8.31	 3899221	 66.1	 1261.30	 -	 235.59
Lufthansa	 16.87	 56536239	 67.9	 1112.06	 4.68	 403.34
Meridiana	 17.15	 1397392	 55.7	 585.25	 4.60	 1.40
Mexicana	 11.15	 8751656	 59.6	 1036.85	 3.06	 19.26
NorthwestAirlines	 8.72	 93135305	 68.1	 1363.53	 2.86	 173.82
Olympic Airways	 10.24	 8428539	 64.4	 738.05	 -	 8.43
PAL	 8.66	 13967281	 68.7	 1167.66	 0.81	 18.48
PIA	 7.90	 10407553	 66.9	 1028.67	 1.25	 10.41
Qantas	 5.25	 48345281	 72.1	 2081.60	 1.82	 393.86
RoyalAirMaroc	 9.91	 4573009	 68.1	 1299.83	 -	 77.22
SAS	 19.79	 18465652	 65.6	 713.45	 6.60	 69.03
Saudi	 14.10	 18249970	 61.8	 1138.69	 -	 26.68
SIA	 7.12	 44946900	 71.5	 3471.42	 -	 183.82
TAP	 16.54	 7585727	 69.3	 1420.07	 -	 7.59
Thai Airways	 8.44	 25241586	 68.1	 1542.19	 1.46	 25.24
Tower Air	 7.15	 4439799	 74.2 4622.82	 1.42	 4.44
TWA	 8.34	 40080542	 63.5	 1361.76	 3.01	 52.20
United Airlines	 8.09	 173833646	 71.1	 1707.54	 2.79	 277.98
USAir	 11.06	 61057928	 62.2	 861.88	 4.63	 357.55
Virgin	 5.51	 12243471	 71.0	 7454.42	 0.53	 153.34
-: Labour cost data not available
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APPENDIX B: Data for computation of the change in alliance inter-hub passenger traffic and
load factor
H. 	 H	 Pax39191	 Cap89191	 LF89191	 Pax	 Cap94	 LF94
Copenhagen
Vienna
Stockholm
Vienna
Geneva
Zurich
Vienna
Vienna
Copenhagen
Copenhagen
Oslo
Stockholm
Stockholm
Geneva
Geneva
Zurich
Zurich
Zurich
Atlanta
Zurich
Cincinnati
Zurich
Copenhagen
Oslo
Stockhom
New york
New york
New york
Boston
Detroit
Minneapolis
Amsterdam
Amsterdam
Amsterdam
Buenos aires
Madrid
Caracas
Madrid
Chicago
S.Francisco
Washington
Frankfurt
Frankfurt
Frankfurt
London
London
London
London
London
Vienna
Copenhagen
Vienna
Stockholm
Vienna
Vienna
Geneva
Zurich
Geneva
Zurich
Zurich
Zurich
Geneva
Copenhagen
Stockholm
Copenhagen
Oslo
Stockholm
Zurich
Atlanta
Zurich
Cincinnati
New york
New york
New york
Copenhagen
Oslo
Stockhom
Amsterdam
Amsterdam
Amsterdam
Boston
Detroit
Minneapolis
Madrid
Buenos aires
Madrid
Caracas
Frankfurt
Frankfurt
Frankfurt
Chicago
S.Francisco
Washington
Baltimore
Boston
Charlotte
Los Angeles
New York
48661
52001
22061
22507
18134
n/a
19736
157427
29053
84475
10614
72033
12885
28830
n/a
91050
16912
75377
43934
48248
n/a
n/a
67586
42969
47408
65280
42091
46232
39487
n/a
n/a
40091
n/a
n/a
59018
46215
52081
46956
69955
69376
54382
72648
67358
54643
n/a
107203
n/a
162152
376283
86593
86483
40132
39885
51886
n/a
52499
282421
60421
159700
25720
135759
27541
57851
n/a
163746
63201
133936
73031
73037
n/a
n/a
91356
61352
67347
90292
61785
65902
61068
n/a
n/a
60806
n/a
n/a
77091
64932
78968
78792
93961
89092
71914
94702
89098
71902
n/a
131689
n/a
206748
511488
0.5620
0.60 13
0.5497
0.5643
0.3495
0.3759
0.5574
0.4808
0.5290
0.4127
0.5306
0.4678
0.4983
0.5560
0.2676
0.5628
0.60 16
0.6606
0.7398
0 .7 004
0.7039
0.7230
0.68 12
0.7015
0.6466
0.6593
0.7656
0.7 117
0.6595
0.5959
0.7445
0.7787
0.7562
0.7671
0.7560
0.7600
0.8 141
0.7843
0.7357
72758
72887
35476
39482
29819
158702
29665
132168
52594
75780
34153
65826
28777
47441
27131
87344
36448
55557
58700
59703
12573
13467
90571
84563
82887
92477
53554
51958
72938
70709
68112
72629
79211
69364
97354
89133
62814
61059
139843
87141
148757
148496
84091
141792
47649
124691
545:34
193702
457770
124326
124533
71779
71883
79664
324939
79084
326137
119692
144368
74154
149881
56254
119501
56238
170808
74143
123385
95513
95015
29975
29620
123725
123142
124116
123528
74290
74082
92508
97677
81810
92502
98208
81526
135662
115411
92606
93063
199028
114086
193287
198858
114086
192665
76220
159415
76459
265907
647898
0.5852
0.5853
0.4942
0.5493
0.3743
0.4884
0.3751
0.4053
0.4394
0.5249
0.4606
0.4392
0.5 116
0.3970
0.4824
0.5 114
0.49 16
0.4503
0.6146
0.6284
0.4194
0.4547
0.7320
0.6867
0.6678
0.7486
0.7209
0.7014
0.7885
0.7239
0.8326
0.7852
0.8066
0.8508
0.7176
0.7723
0.6783
0.6561
0.7026
0.7638
0.7696
0.7467
0.7371
0.7360
0.6252
0.7822
0.7 132
0.7285
0.7065
0 Department of Air Transport, Cranfleld University
	
328
Appendices
H	 H,	 Fax89191	 Cap89191	 LF89191	 Pax94	Cap94	 LF94
London	 Philadelphia	 51146	 64598	 0.7918	 119167 158425	 0.7522
London	 Pittsburgh	 n/a	 n/a	 -	 27737	 44890 0.6 179
Baltimore	 London	 n/a	 n/a	 -	 47123	 75180 0.6268
Boston	 London	 105532	 131201	 0.8044	 124655 157173	 0.793 1
Charlotte	 London	 n/a	 n/a	 -	 56514	 76650 0.7373
Los Angeles	 London	 160238	 206515	 0.7759	 194486 264522 0.7352
NewYork	 London	 347924	 511646 0.6800 429937 648842 0.6626
Philadelphia	 London	 44540	 62992	 0.7071	 115005 157457 0.7304
Pittsburgh	 London	 99	 739	 0.1340	 25828	 44310 0.5829
Data source: ICAO-Traffic by Flight Stage, 1989 and 1994 editions
n/a: data not available or flight was not operated
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APPENDIX C: Data accompanying Table 10.2
Year	 HPAX	 GDP'	 CAP	 FARE2	 LCOM WAR RECESSION
From Copenhagen to Vienna (SAS-Austrian Airlines)
1983	 48651	 95775	 97476
	
1739
	
0
	
0
	
0
1984	 55055	 99220	 101841
	
1756
	
0
	
0
	
0
1985	 48997	 102497	 85104
	
1793
	
0
	
0
1986	 47813	 107533	 85725
	
1793
	
1
	
0
	
0
1987	 49900	 109513	 82262
	
1663
	
0
	 0
	
0
1988	 48902	 109007	 86378
	
1554
	
1
	
0
	
0
1989	 48661	 111406	 86593
	
1536
	
I
	
0
	
0
1990	 48997	 111637	 87722
	 1604
	
1
	
0
1991	 50565	 113409	 106717
	
1731
	
1
1992	 65602	 114944	 121058
	 1764
	
0
	
0
	
I
From Vienna to Copenhagen (SAS-Austrian Airlines)
1983	 46091	 1035532	 89347
	
5121
	
0
	
0
	
0
1984	 49371	 1038028	 92946
	
4715
	
0
	
0
	
0
1985	 49206	 1061752	 85394
	
4882
	
0
	
0
1986	 48893	 1102711	 86042
	 4884
	
2
	
0
	
0
1987	 52447	 1130831	 82752
	
4870
	
0
	
0
1988	 52312	 1177878	 87303
	 4887
	
0
	
0
	
0
1989	 52001	 1220095	 86483
	 4745
	 0
	
0
	
0
1990	 54171	 1334074	 87464
	 4667
	
I
	
0
	
I
1991	 53695	 1393478	 106373
	
4891
1992	 67163	 1423776	 121783
	 4818
	
0
	
0
From Stockholm to Vienna (SAS-Austrian Airlines)
1983	 9213	 1232726	 17663
	
1825
	
0
	
0
	
0
1984	 10404	 1282617	 17954
	
1868
	
0
	
0
	
0
1985	 11198	 1307362	 17832
	 1809
	
0
	
0
	
0
1986	 12412	 1337355	 20393
	 1909
	 0
	
0
	
0
1987	 14440	 1379417	 21064
	 1832
	 0
	
0
	
0
1988	 15410	 1410470	 21714
	
1732
	 0
	
0
	
0
1989	 22061	 1443989	 40132
	
1672
	 0
	
0
	
0
1990	 28271	 1463668	 51932
	
1581
	 0
	
1
1991	 32656	 1447327	 67944
	
1778
	
0
	
1
1992	 33087	 1426750	 73043
	
1790
	
0
	
0
From Vienna to Stockholm (SAS-Austrian Airlines)
1983	 14772	 1035532	 26218
	 6767
	 0
	
0
	
0
1984	 16119	 1038028	 26844
	 6488
	 0
	
0
	
0
1985	 12413	 1061752	 18212
	
6457
	
0
	
0
	
0
1986	 13367	 1102711	 20393
	
6457
	
0
	
0
	
0
1987	 14935	 1130831	 20929
	
6443
	
0
	
0
	
0
1988	 15336	 1177878	 21800
	
6474
	
0
	
0
	
0
1989	 22507	 1220095	 39885
	
6285
	
0
	
0
	
0
1990	 32237	 1334074	 57392
	
6178
	
0
	
0
	
1
1991	 26134	 1393478	 66929
	
6471
	
I
	
1
1992	 36627	 1423776	 75036
	
6371
	
0
	
0
	
1
Data sources: International/European Marketing Data and Statistics, Euromoney P/c.; ICAO Digest of Statistics, ABC Guide
'In millions of local currency, constant 1980 terms;
21n local currency, constant 1980 terms
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743
	
0
	
0
	
0
751
	
0
	
0
	
0
735
	 0	 0
	
0
799
	
0
	
0
	
0
780
	
1
	
0
	
0
766	 1	 0
	
0
745
	
1
	
0
	
0
731
	
1
	
0
	
I
769
	
0
	
1
	
1
773
	
0
	
0	 1
3716
	
0
	
0
	
0
3602	 0
	
0
	
0
3598
	
0
	
0
	
0
3667
	
0
	
0
	
0
3725	 0	 0	 0
3737
	
0
	
0
	
0
3628
	
0
	
0
	
0
3793	 0
	
0
	
1
3986	 0
4000
	
0
	
0
2879
	
4
	
0
	
0
2797
	
2
	
0
	
0
2787
	
3
	
0
	
0
2845	 2
	
0
	
0
2885	 3
	
0
	
0
2902	 4
	
0
	
0
2818
	
5
	
0
	
0
2948	 4	 0
3152	 5
2986
	
3
	
0
1862
	
0
	
0
	
0
1861
	
0
	
0
	
0
1902
	
0
	
0
	
0
1885
	
1
	
0
	
0
1816
	
0
	
0
	
0
1694
	
0
	
0
	
0
1690
	
0
	
0
	
0
1763
	
1
	
0
	
1
1954
	
0
	
1
	
1
1907	 0
	
0
	
1
Year	 HPAX	 GDP	 CAP
From Geneva to Vienna (Swissair-Austrian Airlines)
1983	 13361	 172647	 40568
1984	 15399	 175967	 36420
1985	 15781	 182316	 36864
1986	 15316	 187398	 38771
1987	 16976	 191769	 38315
1988	 14031	 197102	 38807
1989	 18134	 204423	 51886
1990	 18158	 209197	 48174
1991	 20944	 209332	 63641
1992	 24324	 208705	 73291
From Vienna to Geneva (Swissair-Austrian Airlines)
1983	 13144	 1201217	 37517
1984	 14632	 1276775	 36433
1985	 15820	 1348425	 36986
1986	 16440	 1422497	 39041
1987	 19745	 1481388	 38315
1988	 16800	 1566578	 38807
1989	 19736	 1671530	 52499
1990	 19425	 1801000	 48114
1991	 22554	 1923000	 63855
1992	 22318	 2036000	 68044
From Vienna to Zurich (Swissair-Austrian Airlines)
1983	 69272	 1201217	 126583
1984	 72814	 1276775	 128681
1985	 139060	 1348425	 261943
1986	 130674	 1422497	 268369
1987	 146200	 1481388	 275177
1988	 148744	 1566578	 280409
1989	 157427	 1671530	 282421
1990	 172237	 1801000	 282707
1991	 153663	 1923000	 307249
1992	 90124	 2036000	 330659
From Copenhagen to Geneva (SAS-Swissair)
1983	 36098	 95775	 45418
1984	 41303	 99220	 62193
1985	 41389	 102497	 68101
1986	 33867	 107533	 69739
1987	 34251	 109513	 70173
1988	 31920	 109007	 73289
1989	 29053	 111406	 60421
1990	 37375	 111637	 66942
1991	 41975	 113409	 84327
1992	 48997	 114944	 108775
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1659
	
4
	
0
	
0
1663
	
4
	
0
	
0
1697
	
3
	
0
	
0
1682
	
3
	
0
	 0
1619
	
4
	
0
	
0
1512
	
3
	
0
	
0
1510
	
2
	
0
	
0
1576
	
2
	
0
	
1
1748
	
2
	
1
1705
	
2
	
0
	
1
Year	 HPAX	 GDP	 CAP
From Copenhagen to Zurich (SAS-Swissair)
1983	 47922	 95775	 81204
1984	 57286	 99220	 94095
1985	 79478	 102497	 141143
1986	 84298	 107533	 146252
1987	 85719	 109513	 145064
1988	 82268	 109007	 152639
1989	 84475	 111406	 159700
1990	 82270	 111637	 166009
1991	 77158	 113409	 160079
1992	 77296	 114944	 136205
From Oslo to Zurich (SAS-Swissair)
1988	 9159	 274613	 24994
	
1643
	
0
	
0
	
0
1989	 10614	 279775	 25720
	
1571
	
0
	
0
	
0
1990	 24162	 285703	 45773
	
1598
	
0
	
0
	
1
1991	 28333	 287194	 53425
	
1880
	
0
	
1
	
1
1992	 32205	 287271	 71154
	
1837
	
0
	
0
	
1
From Stockholm to Zurich (SAS-Swissair)
1983	 8525	 1232726	 18010
	
1927
	 0
	
0
	
0
1984	 15951	 1282617	 31885
	
1882
	
0
	
0
	
0
1985	 48894	 1307362	 74233
	
1825
	
1
	
0
	
0
1986	 59942	 1337355	 98728
	
1906
	
0
	
0
	
0
1987	 65571	 1379417	 101656
	
1919
	
0
	
0
	
0
1988	 68780	 1410470	 112803
	
1885
	
0
	
0
	
0
1989	 72033	 1443989	 135759
	
1749
	
0
	
0
	
0
1990	 70690	 1463668	 166705
	
1653
	
0
	
0
	
1
1991	 23097	 1447327	 72847
	
1884
	
0
	
1
1992	 61526	 1426750	 140477
	
1842
	
0
	
0
From Stockholm to Geneva (SAS-Swissair)
1985	 428	 1307362	 860	 1971	 0
	
0
	
0
1989	 12885	 1443989	 27541	 1927	 0
	
0
	
0
1990	 24810	 1463668	 55073	 1785	 0
	
0
1992	 27871	 1426750	 70087	 1990	 0
	
0
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Appendices
Year	 HPAJ(	 GDP	 CAP	 FARE LCOM WAR RECESSION
From Geneva to Copenhagen (SAS-Swissair)
1983	 14977	 172647
1984	 19540	 175967
1985	 41077	 182316
1986	 41576	 187398
1987	 44719	 191769
1988	 39860	 197102
1989	 28830	 204423
1990	 31372	 209197
1991	 36163	 209332
1992	 37145	 208705
28295
	 975
	
0
	
0
	
0
35180
	 976
	
0
	
0
	
0
67792
	
1048
	
0
	
0
	
0
69462
	
1054
	
0
	
0
	
0
70970
	
1042
	
0
	
0
	
0
70913
	
1021
	
0
	
0
	
0
57851
	
993
	
1
	
0
	
0
66571
	
976
	
0
	
0
	
I
76017
	 994
	
0
	
I
	
1
69487
	 999
	
0
	
0
From Geneva to Stockholm (SAS-Swissair)
1985	 421	 182316	 935	 1422	 0	 0	 0
1986	 69	 187398	 110	 1428	 0	 0	 0
1988	 10179	 197102	 4900	 1384	 0	 0	 0
1990	 22990	 209197	 55233	 1323	 0	 0	 1
1992	 25886	 208705	 70025	 1355	 0	 0	 1
From Zurich to Copenhagen (SAS-Swissair)
1983	 45874	 172647
1984	 61017	 175967
1985	 93629	 182316
1986	 95551	 187398
1987	 93998	 191769
1988	 91418	 197102
1989	 91050	 204423
1990	 85687	 209197
1991	 79756	 209332
1992	 83245	 208705
From Zurich to Oslo (SAS-Swissair)
1988	 11023	 197102
1989	 16912	 204423
1990	 26652	 209197
1991	 29679	 209332
1992	 34026	 208705
From Zurich to Stockholm (SAS-Swissair)
1983	 10519	 172647
1984	 17211	 175967
1985	 47683	 182316
1986	 56742	 187398
1987	 63332	 191769
1988	 67221	 197102
1989	 75377	 204423
1990	 70228	 209197
1991	 22758	 209332
1992	 61171	 208705
0 Department of Air Transport, Cranfield University
Appendices
Year	 HPAX	 GDP	 CAP	 FARE LCOM WAR RECESSION
From Atlanta to Zurich (Swissair-Delta Airlines)
1987	 22458	 3258387	 43873
	
738
	
0
	
0
	
0
1988	 36793	 3370807	 69604
	
694
	
0
	
0
	
0
1989	 43934	 3446694	 73031
	
603
	
0
	
0
	
0
1990	 45805	 3481841	 75891
	 603
	
0
	
0
	
I
1991	 44664	 3462129	 74691
	
682
	
0
	
1
1992	 50751	 3545802	 84497
	
702
	
0
	
0
From Zurich to Atlanta (Swissair-Delta Airlines)
1987	 25522	 191769	 43873
	
4618
	
0
	
0
	
0
1988	 40315	 197102	 69785
	
3717
	
0
	
0
	
0
1989	 48248	 204423	 73037
	
2418
	
0
	
0
	
0
1990	 50442	 209197	 76115
	
2304
	
0
	
0
	
1
1991	 48424	 209332	 74261
	
2512
	
0
	
1
1992	 53296	 208705	 84488
	
2353
	
0
	
0
	
1
From Copenhagen to New York (SAS-Continental)
1983	 88386	 95775	 112979
	
1
	
0
	
0
1984	 109581	 99220	 145604
	
4935
	
1
	
0
	
0
1985	 83794	 102497	 121403
	
4836
	
1
	
0
	
0
1986	 76083	 107533	 114987	 n/a'
	
1
	
0
	
0
1987	 69574	 109513	 89088
	
4378
	
3
	
0
	
0
1988	 61649	 109007	 78331
	
4062
	
3
	
0
	
0
1989	 67586	 111406	 91356	 n/a	 0
	
0
1990	 72008	 111637	 92601
	
4443
	 0
	
1
1991	 60829	 113409	 76057
	 3765
	
1
	
1
1992	 79354	 114944	 105399
	 3663
	
2
	
0
	
1
From Oslo to New York (SAS-Continental)
1983	 48927	 264431	 71635
	
2991
	
0
	
0
1984	 68753	 280020	 100077
	
3379
	
1
	
0
	
0
1985	 53325	 292857	 81868
	
3355
	
1
	
0
	
0
1986	 46772	 280566	 73621	 n/a	 I
	
0
	
0
1987	 52771	 282150	 70348
	
3259
	 0
	
0
1988	 38190	 274613	 58725
	 3133
	
3
	
0
	
0
1989	 42969	 279775	 61352
	
2945
	
I
	
0
	
0
1990	 45145	 285703	 69788
	
3149
	
1
	
0
	
1
1992	 47784	 287271	 64199
	
2756
	
1
	
0
	
1
From Stockholm to New York (SAS-Continental)
1983	 11063	 1232726	 13781
	
4608
	
0
	
0
	
0
1984	 22272	 1282617	 28735
	
4267
	
0
	
0
	
0
1985	 16178	 1307362	 25041
	
3946
	
0
	
0
1986	 25035	 1337355	 36585	 n/a	 0
	
0
	
0
1987	 23958	 1379417	 29344
	
3943
	
1
	
0
	
0
1988	 36115	 1410470	 51860
	
3752
	
3
	
0
	
0
1989	 47408	 1443989	 67347
	
3573
	
2
	
0
	
0
1990	 49780	 1463668	 74150
	
3597
	
3
	
0
	
1
1992	 48902	 1426750	 72494
	
2988
	
3
	
0
	
I
Not available
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Year	 HPAX	 GDP	 CAP	 FARE LCOM WAR RECESSION
From New York to Copenhagen (SAS-Continental)
1983	 83473	 2707215	 113814
	
612
	
0
	
0
1984	 107267	 2884589	 145360
	 684	 0
	
0
1985	 82434	 3066068	 119639
	
658
	
0
	
0
1986	 77864	 3181041	 113584	 n/a	 2
	
0
	
0
1987	 70340	 3258387	 84544
	
651
	
3
	
0
	
0
1988	 60927	 3370807	 77851
	 630	 2
	
0
	
0
1989	 65280	 3446694	 90292
	
636
	
0
	
0
1990	 72188	 3481841	 92170
	
634
	
2
	
0
1991	 61218	 3462129	 75200
	 549
	
3
1992	 79831	 3545802	 105385	 555
	
3
	
0
	
I
From New York to Oslo (SAS-Continental)
1983	 51669	 2707215	 68539
	 654
	
1
	
0
	
0
1984	 66636	 2884589	 96088
	 684
	
1
	
0
	
0
1985	 51956	 3066068	 81409
	
658
	
1
	
0
	
0
1986	 46487	 3181041	 74342	 n/a	 1
	 0
	
0
1987	 52724	 3258387	 70124
	
651
	
2
	
0
	
0
1988	 38306	 3370807	 57991
	 630
	
3
	
0
	
0
1989	 42091	 3446694	 61785
	 601	 1
	
0
	
0
1990	 43940	 3481841	 69161
	 634
	
2
	
0
1992	 50498	 3545802	 69703
	
555
	
2
	
0
	
1
From New York to Stockholm (SAS-Continental)
1983	 12131	 2707215	 15567	 782
	
0
	
0
	
0
1984	 24297	 2884589	 31789
	 737
	
0
	
0
	
0
1985	 19178	 3066068	 27571
	
708
	
0
	
0
	
0
1986	 26248	 3181041	 36312	 n/a	 0
	
0
	
0
1987	 28051	 3258387	 34944
	
701
	
2
	
0
	
0
1988	 37920	 3370807	 52841
	
677
	
4
	
0
	
0
1989	 46232	 3446694	 65902
	
646
	
2
	
0
	
0
1990	 50109	 3481841	 74568
	 584
	
2
	
0
1991	 49061	 3462129	 71046
	 600
	
3
	
1
1992	 48959	 3545802	 72689
	 598
	
3
	
0
	
1
From Boston to Amsterdam (KLM-Northwest Airlines)
1988	 16698	 3370807	 21868	 n/a	 0
	
0
	
0
1989	 39487	 3446694	 61068	 n/a	 0
	
0
	
0
1990	 57674	 3481841	 76107	 n/a	 0
	
0
1991	 55778	 3462129	 70677	 n/a	 3
	
I
1992	 57802	 3545802	 78196	 n/a	 1
	
0
From Amsterdam to Boston (KLM-Northwest Airlines)
1988	 17214	 473717	 21868	 n/a	 1	 0	 0
1989	 40091	 495893	 60806	 n/a	 1	 0	 0
1990	 59037	 516267	 75841	 n/a	 1	 0	 0
1991	 56708	 527946	 71036	 n/a	 2	 3	 1
1992	 57937	 534599	 77776	 n/a	 1	 1	 0
0 Department of Air Transport, Cranfield University
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Year	 HPAX	 GDP	 CAP	 FARE LCOM WAR RECESSION
From Buenos Aires to Madrid (Iberia-Aerolineas Argentinas)
1983	 36923	 9783	 64799	 n/a	 0
	
0
	
0
1984	 38600	 9962	 62318	 n/a	 0
	
0
	
0
1985	 43795	 9303	 80102	 n/a	 0
	
0
	
0
1986	 71046	 9984	 99183	 n/a	 0
	
0
	
0
1987	 59961	 10242	 92017	 n/a	 0
	
0
	
0
1988	 32463	 10049	 39990	 n/a	 0
	
0
	
0
1989	 59018	 9424	 77091	 n/a	 0
	
0	 0
1990	 83033	 9430	 106173	 n/a	 0
	
0
1991	 74833	 10270	 121744	 n/a	 0
1992	 103899	 11159	 142189	 n/a	 0
	
0
From Madrid to Buenos Aires (Iberia-Aerolineas Argentinas)
1983	 34998	 30083	 70228	 212407
	
0
	
0
	
0
1984	 40082	 30524	 58267	 238186
	
0
	
0
	
0
1985	 40156	 31321	 74063	 260780
	
0
	
0
	
0
1986	 60971	 32324	 88052	 258638
	
0
	
0
	
0
1987	 57941	 34148	 89280	 239519
	
0
	
0
	
0
1988	 15782	 35910	 18920	 228535
	
0
	
0
	
0
1989	 46215	 37611	 64932	 224553
	
0
	
0
	
0
1990	 51607	 39018	 70871	 210503
	
0
	
0
	
1
1991	 69187	 39893	 119028	 227584
	
1
1992	 92023	 40169	 127158	 214890
	
0
	
0
From Caracas to Madrid (Iberia-Viasa)
1983	 31160	 425837	 65773	 4511
	
0
	
0
1984	 30966	 420072	 47632	 8120
	
1
	
0
	
0
1985	 26720	 420884	 40547	 1049
	
I
	
0
	
0
1986	 48896	 448285	 76874	 2889
	
0
	
0
1987	 16838	 464341	 26068	 1049
	
1
	
0
	
0
1988	 20322	 491372	 28196	 682
	
I
	
0
	
0
1989	 52081	 449262	 78968	 787
	
0
	
0
	
0
1990	 50111	 478320	 77610	 952
	
1
	
0
	
1
1991	 53741	 524860	 80670	 1030
	
1
1992	 62572	 556669	 93992	 1112
	
1
	
0
From Madrid to Caracas (Iberia-Viasa)
1983	 26548	 30083	 65899	 186667
	
1
	
0
	
0
1984	 27690	 30524	 46302	 222879
	
1
	
0
	
0
1985	 25519	 31321	 40814	 236850
	
I
	
0
	
0
1986	 49593	 32324	 75810	 224228
	
1
	
0
	
0
1987	 14610	 34148	 25536	 213151
	
1
	
0
	
0
1988	 17621	 35910	 29526	 203376
	
0
	
0
1989	 46956	 37611	 78792	 190286
	
0
	
0
1990	 48442	 39018	 79238	 170112
	
1
	
0
	
I
1991	 46929	 39893	 79098	 184283
	
I
	
1
	
1
1992	 60547	 40169	 93461	 174004
	
0
	
I
0 Department of Air Transport, Cranfield University
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Appendices
APPENDIX D: Alliance success factor computation
Data for the computation of AFIELD_A
Airline (x) Partner (y)	 RPK_x	 RPKy	 REVx	 REVj	 YIELD_A
____________ _____________ 
(g9/9l)t	 (89/91)	 (89/91)(2)	 (89/91)	 (89/91)
___________ ____________ 	 ('000)	 ('000)	 (Const. $000) (Const. $000) (US ctsfRPK)
OS	 SR	 2331958	 15390972	 475217.98	 2958790.31	 19.38
OS	 SK	 2331958	 12137500	 475217.98	 3482492.60	 27.35
SK	 SR	 12137500	 15390972	 3481265.94	 2958790.31	 23.39
BA	 US	 60757570	 40445013	 7850663.75	 4430958.37	 12.14
KL	 NW	 24930526	 50315504	 3017092.93	 6906034.77	 13.19
SK	 CO	 12137500	 62402310	 3482492.60	 5209932.56	 11.66
lB	 VA	 21034852	 2532632	 3208629.67	 n/a3	 13.61
lB	 AR	 21034852	 3555000	 3208629.67	 n/a	 13.05
lB	 LA	 21034852	 808932	 3208629.67	 115248.66	 15.22
SR	 DL	 15390972	 65224895	 2958790.31	 9113082.19	 14.97
Airline (x) Partner (p) RPK_x (94) RPKj (94) REVx (94) REVj (94) YIELD_A (94)
___________ ____________ 	 ('000)	 ('000)	 (Const. $000) (Const. $000) (US ctsIRPK)
OS	 SR	 3746915	 17138000	 683259.91	 3074610.812	 17.99
OS	 SK	 3746915	 18138000	 683259.91	 2713496.377	 15.52
SK	 SR	 18138000	 17138000	 2714315.92	 3074610.812	 16.41
BA	 US	 80086000	 56681000	 7584215.25	 5659584.087	 9.68
KL	 NW	 36807000	 93549000	 14902904.28 7296052.109	 17.03
SK	 CO	 18138000	 68114000	 2713496.38	 4320253.165	 8.15
lB	 VA	 23265000	 3244720	 2166240.41	 n/a	 8.17
lB	 AR	 23265000	 7751000	 2166240.41	 n/a	 6.98
lB	 LA	 23265000	 1724807	 2166240.41	 1055967.031	 12.89
SR	 DL	 17138000	 133346000	 3074610.72	 10917359.86	 9.30
Airline(x) Partner Cv) AFIELD_A __________ ___________ ___________ __________
__________ __________ (US cts/RPK) __________ ___________ ___________ ___________
OS	 SR	 -1.38
OS	 SK	 -11.83
SK	 SR	 -6.98
BA	 US	 -2.45
KL	 NW	 3.84
SK	 CO	 -3.51
lB	 VA	 -5.44
lB	 AR	 -6.06
lB	 LA	 -2.32
SR	 DL	 -5.68
No jes:
RPK data obtained from IATA WATS and AEA-Statistical Appendices to Yearbooks
(2)Revenue data obtained from ICAO-Financial Data and airline annual reports
(3)Not available
0 Department of Air Transport, Cranfield University 	 341
Data for the computation of SEAM
Airline	 Avge	 No. of	 Total	 Average
aircraft	 aircraft2	 capacity3	 aircraft
age"	 (no. of seats)	 capacity
(years)
Appendices
No. of	 No. of
flight	 flight
attendants 4 attendants/
seat
OS	 6.1	 32	 3617	 113.03	 719	 0.199
SR	 8.0	 62	 10827	 174.63	 2824	 0.261
SK	 6.0	 183	 22335	 122.05	 2886	 0.129
BA	 8.1	 245	 48776	 199.09	 10242	 0.210
KL	 6.2	 119	 23066	 193.83	 5300	 0.230
US	 10.4	 441	 54360	 123.27	 8473	 0.156
CO	 11.5	 305	 43138	 141.44	 5928	 0.137
NW	 10.5	 350	 60995	 174.27	 8688	 0.142
DL	 9.3	 558	 94759	 169.83	 15949	 0.168
lB	 8.2	 112	 18692	 166.89	 3014	 0.161
AR	 11.3	 45	 8118	 180.4	 1068	 0.132
VA	 10.7	 19	 3198	 168.32	 398	 0.124
Notes:
WObtained from airline reports and Dempsey and Goetz (1992)
2Obtained from airline reports and ICA 0-Fleet and Personnel, 1993
°Obtained from ABC World Airways Guide, 1994
4 Obtained from JATA WATSNo. 38, 6/94
Alliance AGE_A T_CHECK TERMINAL JADVERT S_PITCH SERVICE
OS-SR	 0.526	 1	 1	 1	 0.0162	 0.062
OS-SK	 10.000	 1	 1	 1	 0.1108	 0.070
SK-SR	 0.500	 1	 1	 1	 0.0190	 0.132
SK-CO	 0.182	 0	 1	 0	 0.0516	 0.008
5R-IDL	 0.769	 1	 1	 0	 0.2083	 0.093
BA-US	 0.435	 1	 1	 0	 0.0131	 0.054
KL-NW	 0.233	 1	 1	 1	 0.0511	 0.087
lB-AR	 0.323	 0	 1	 0	 0.0740	 0.030
lB-VA	 0.400	 0	 1	 0	 0.6993	 0.037
0 Department of Air Transport, Cranfield University
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Appendices
Validity tests for alliance performance models
Normality tests
Figure D.1 Normal Q-Q plot of residuals for the linear model of airline alliance performance
(K-S= 0.0961; level of significance: 0.2000)
Figure D.2 Normal Q-Q plot of residuals for the semi-log model of airline alliance performance
(K-S=0.1722; level of significance: 0.0085)
0 Department of Air Transport, Cranfield University
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Equality of variance tests
Figure D.3 Detection of heterodasticity in the linear model of airline alliance performance
Figure D.4 Detection of heterodasticity in the semi-log model of airline alliance performance
0 Department of Air Transport, Cranfield University 	 346
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1.277
2.198
1.794
6.795
3.197
2.199
2.693
1.365
1.383
2.969
1.433
12.182
4.408
1.825
3.304
1.647
AHCAP
NCOMP
ANSIZE
SHUB
SEAM
ATCONV
A YIELD_A
ALCOM
Multicollinearily tests
Table D.1 Correlation matrix for linear alliance performance model
Table D.2 Correlation matrix for semi-log alliance performance model
log-transformed variables)
VIF
Variable	 Linear model
	
Semi-log model
Table D.3: Variable inflation factors in linear and semi-log
alliance performance models
0 Department of Air Transport, Cranfield Univcrsity
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APPENDIX E: Data accompanying Figures 11.3-11.6, 11.8
Pre-alliance period	 Post-alliance period
H-H.	 MSHARE FARE LCOM HHJ MSHARE FARE LCOM Hill
0
7
9
10
7
9
4
4
5
0
British Airways-USAir and KLM-Northwest inter-hub markets
AMS-BOS	 0.0745	 -	 12	 0.0804
AMS-DTW	 0.2414	 -	 6	 0.1736
AMS-MSP	 0.3542	 -	 5	 0.2118
LON-BOS	 0.0449	 971.40	 14	 0.0904
LON-CLT	 0.4505	 1829.67	 4	 0.2906
LON-LAX	 0.0450	 1549.57	 31	 0.0539
LON-JFK	 0.1454	 1000.13	 26	 0.0649
LON-PHL	 0.0654	 1156.34	 14	 0.0764
LON-PIT	 0.2541	 1307.17	 10	 0.1384
EQA inter-hub markets
GVA-CPH	 1.0000
GVA-OSL	 0.4058
GVA-ARN	 0.5400
ZRH-CPH	 0.4118
ZRH-OSL	 0.5000
ZRH-ARN	 0.5161
VIE-GVA	 0.7 105
VIE-ZRH	 0.7 105
VIE-CPH	 0.9333
VIE-OSL	 0.4242
VIE-ARLN	 1.0000
530.08
0.00
718.34
472.90
665.01
665.01
388.08
301.41
486.47
0.00
644.20
1.0000
0.2216
0.3202
0. 1955
0.2804
0.296 1
0.5284
0.5284
0.8756
0.2355
1.0000
0.4286
0.644 1
0.7595
0.4667
0.6 176
0.6 180
0.5000
1.0000
0.8000
0.5692
0.7359
0.2745
0.3488
0.6111
0.0915
0.3750
0.0749
0. 1550
0.0574
0.1963
614.11
0.00
833.02
548.56
771.29
771.29
495.47
392.40
536.69
0.00
709.99
794.13
1507.50
2189.92
1456.36
1453.66
1613.84
3
	
0.3794
1
	
0.5415
3
	
0.6023
3
	
0.3994
2
	
0.4823
3
	
0.477 1
2
	
0.3889
0
	
1.0000
2
	
0.6608
2
	
0.4400
2
	
0.5646
5
	
0.60 17
5
	 0.5457
2
	
0.5247
10
	 0. 1447
3
	
0.28 13
18
	
0.0675
17
	
0. 1076
11
	
0. 1298
6
	
0. 1758
Key
MSHARE: market share
FARE: C or Y fare in constant 1990 $US
LCOM: Number of competing services
HHI: Herfindahl-Hirshman concentration index
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Appendices
APPENDIX F: Data used in alliance market share models
Sample 0JEQA O-D markets originating from Copenhagen
Destination LCTIME4 ZFREQ4 ALCOM,. i\CTIMEc EQUALITY MIHI AMSHAREA
Abidjan
Accra
Algiers
Bangkok
Barcelona
Basle
Bombay
B. Aires
Cairo
Dakar
D.E.Salaain
Douala
Dubai
H.Kong
Jeddab
J'Burg
Karachi
Kinshasa
Lagos
Lisbon
Madrid
Malaga
Malta
Manila
Milan
Nairobi
Rio
Rome
Salzburg
S. Paulo
Singapore
Tehran
Tel Aviv
-50.00
-11.67
5.00
47.62
-45.39
-33.33
-37.68
15.00
1.12
-55.00
-35.00
20.00
35.00
411.94
-100.00
80.00
80.00
-20.00
-8.33
34.44
21.25
-40.00
3.61
55.00
-26.00
70.00
27.50
17.50
-127.50
-2.50
32.46
-15.00
12.66
4.83
63.96
-176.25
15.66
7.78
-44.32
-4.84
-57.92
16.51
-28.95
5.32
-32.50
3.80
10.63
-16.42
24.91
-46.69
52.07
41.23
-8.94
16.15
-94.69
12.37
9.96
-1.37
33.26
-46.97
12.78
-35.90
-60.98
-48.20
-131.21
-22.06
0.0667
0. 1667
-0.2500
-0.0432
0.3 190
1.0000
0.6552
0.2166
0. 1036
0.4697
0.4500
1.0000
0. 1206
0.0634
0.53 64
0 .4743
0.2727
-0. 1786
0.3333
0.2307
0.8188
0.6042
0.7252
0. 1329
0.56 16
0.0467
0.4210
0.4071
0.7600
0.3095
0.4226
0. 1000
0.57 14
-0.0834
-0.0529
0.7200
-0.008 1
0.0548
-0.02 19
0.1377
0.0 107
-0.0098
0.0104
0.0341
0.1111
0.0238
0.0051
0.0382
0.0208
0.0329
0.0247
0.0667
0.0092
0. 1246
0.5607
0.0922
0.0251
0. 1996
0.0265
0.0419
0.0577
0.1590
0.0361
0.0466
-0.0755
0.1045
-0.0238
-0.0606
0.8000
-0.0491
0.0430
-0.0478
0.0161
0.0091
-0.0763
0.0154
0.0879
0.0000
-0.0 144
0.0294
0.0355
-0.0 104
-0.0369
-0.1111
0.1407
-0.0289
0.2415
0. 1279
0.0933
-0.0024
0.2935
0.0388
-0.04 12
0. 1428
0.4615
0.0256
0.0873
-0.1000
0.1624
0 Department of Air Transport, Cranfield University
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0
2
0
0
8
-1
0
4
-6
4
10
-3
0
12
2
25
0
0
0
S
0
-2
1
0
2
5
-6
20
24
18
8
5
2
-3
3
10
0
0
19
1
0
13
-4
2
-10
-14
2
-8
-60
-2
12
67
-21
21
0
-9
0
33
11
29
-4
2
-3
34
-5
-4
4
-16
11
-24
-49
11
-12
66
66
15
-8
0
0
-4
-18
-11
9
24
2
Sample 0JEQA O-D markets originating from Vienna
Destination ACTIMEA AFREQA ALCOM,. ACTIMEc LtQUALITYc huH! AMSHARE4
Abidjan
Abu Dhabi
Accra
Amman
Amsterdam
Athens
Atlanta
Bangkok
Barcelona
Beijing
Bergen
Bombay
Brazzaville
Brussels
Bucharest
Budapest
B. Aires
Cairo
Casablanca
Chicago
Dakar
Damascus
D. E. Salaam
Dharan
Dubai
Dusseldorf
Frankfurt
Genoa
Gothenburg
Graz
Helsinki
H. Kong
Izmir
Jeddah
J'Burg
Jonkoping
Karachi
Kinshasa
Klagenfurt
Lagos
Larnaca
Linz
Lisbon
London
Madrid
72.50
24.00
-5.00
-145.00
37.50
-26.25
-20.00
-29.16
20.11
30.96
-43.04
5.00
-5.00
110.00
0.00
0.00
60.00
93.04
10.00
-100.42
65.00
-69.00
-130.00
0.00
56.00
0.00
0.00
11.74
10.00
0.00
-48.61
28.61
0.00
27.50
-133.33
-56.33
-80.00
-25.00
0.00
-15.00
-46.25
56.55
40.00
-40.00
26.74
89.72
38.48
-148.00
-169.64
-98.04
54.98
10.06
0.97
-81.76
-23.45
0.00
12.64
-3.00
28.98
176.98
0.00
4.17
-37.83
5.84
-0.99
-65.35
-15.41
-10.90
-175.47
30.91
15.47
-100.93
-225.00
66.36
0.00
0.51
-14.91
43.42
-38.68
-44.14
0.00
40.96
33.58
0.00
-58.08
59.34
0.00
11.06
33.69
15.88
0.4167
0.2083
-0.8000
0.1538
0.3 148
0.0000
-0.05 18
-0.2085
0.3333
-0. 1929
0.0000
-0.1134
0.5000
0.1128
0.0000
0.0000
-0.2831
-0.1566
0.2500
-0.1157
0.4500
-0.2625
-0.29 17
0.2632
-0.3 18 1
0.2500
0.12 14
-0.5000
1.0000
-1.0000
-0.2821
-0.3674
1.0000
0.03 11
-0. 1363
0.0000
-0.1116
-0.3571
-1.0000
0.1875
0.28 12
-1.0000
0.1654
0.007 1
0.1631
0.3980
0.0944
-0. 1701
0.0617
0.4454
0.01 17
-0.0 157
-0.0 13 1
0.1598
-0.0664
0.0000
0.0600
0.0000
-0.0098
-0.2108
-0.0800
0.0390
0.0069
0.1686
-0.0227
0.0995
-0.0301
-0.0600
0.2398
0.0068
0.0309
0.2028
0.2449
-0.3732
0.4800
-0.4474
-0.0 197
-0.7346
0.0105
-0.0116
0.0000
0.0234
-0.0336
0.3750
-0.0 1 13
0.0500
0.2449
-0.0628
0.0201
-0.0037
0.3571
0. 1083
-0.1250
0.1524
0.33 10
0.0022
-0.0252
-0.0464
0.1021
0.0200
0.0000
-0.0314
0.0000
0.0714
-0.29 17
-0.2000
0.0118
-0.0072
0.1714
0.0052
0.1190
-0.0421
0.0000
0.3048
0.0245
0.0793
0.22 16
0. 1429
-0.2245
0.6000
-0.4448
0.0037
-0.8333
-0.0590
0.0705
0.0000
0.02 10
-0.0278
0.7500
0.0350
0.0759
0.1429
-0.1306
-0.0076
0.0042
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1
13
5
0
7
8
-1
2
-11
-15
12
0
-11
15
-4
-1
0
-3
5
2
6
1
4
-3
7
0
-1
9
3
3
-14
0
-9
21
0
-2
38
-22
-2
-26
0
2
-63
10
-Il
-11
3
-5
10
3
-41
9
-12
0
46
69
-6
-14
3
4
Sample ofEQA O-D markets originating from Vienna (cont 'd)
Destination LCTIMEA LFREQA ALCOMF LCTIMEc tiQUALJTY AHHJ M'ISHAREA
Malaga
Malmo
Malta
Manila
Milan
Moscow
Munich
Nairobi
N. York
Nice
Norrokoping
P. D. Mall
Paris
Prague
R. D. Janerio
Riyadh
Rome
S. Paulo
Singapore
Sofia
Stuttgart
Tehran
Tel Aviv
Thessaloniki
Tokyo
Toronto
Tunis
Venice
Warsaw
Zagreb
0.00
67.16
38.33
-92.50
40.00
31.08
0.00
-133.00
-21.84
-96.73
-29.60
-40.00
-118.42
0.00
66.82
-11.50
0.00
55.91
16.54
0.00
0.00
-62.50
124.52
-84.00
-45.32
10.00
-8.33
0.00
0.00
0.00
-7.11
0.00
-100.52
15.96
8.53
-25.32
0.00
-29.05
60.89
-69.19
0.00
-19.72
-31.90
0.00
-48.30
-12.89
103.50
-40.91
44.65
-28.03
-81.45
65.72
193.24
58.89
-24.18
18.99
-69.48
-72.50
0.00
0.00
0.4375
0.0000
0.1364
-0.2721
0.0 185
0.3056
0.0000
-0.1228
0.0381
-0.5000
0.0000
0. 1500
0.3659
0.0000
-0.3205
-0.6000
0.0000
-0.1244
-0.0324
0.2500
0.2328
0.2500
0.2692
0.0000
-0.3373
-0.38 10
0.3750
-0.7500
0.0000
0.0000
0. 1466
0.0000
0.4375
-0.0202
0.0141
0. 1627
-0. 1623
0.0594
-0.0062
0.7655
0.0000
-0.0 158
0.3057
-0.0605
-0.0023
0.2262
-0.0467
0.024 1
0.0 159
0.0 189
0.3936
-0.0669
0.1172
-0.0254
0.0030
-0.0902
0. 1770
0.6593
0.0000
-0.0526
0.2026
0.0000
0.6667
-0.0 159
0.1356
0.2039
-0.3 154
0.0986
-0.05 17
0.5909
0.0000
-0.0434
0.2734
-0.0893
-0.0666
0.2699
-0.0882
-0.0570
0.036 1
0.0 167
0.3256
-0.1460
0.2222
-0.0888
0.0252
-0.1277
0.0833
0.7368
0.0000
-0.1282
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4
3
7
22
2
0
18
-1
4
3
0
-1
0
1
9
7
-1
1
5
5
-3
1
8
8
10
0
1
4
36
16
-2
-11
-6
3
-3
3
57
-36
2
-7
-2
-5
-7
12
-8
-15
0
8
7
13
-40
48
5
0
0
-2
Sample ofEQA O-D markets originating from Zurich
Destination LCTIMEA AFREQA 1LCOMF tCTIMEc LQUALITY	 AHHJ AMS1L4RE.
Bangkok
Beijing
Bucharest
Budapest
Cairo
Damascus
Dharan
Gothenburg
Helsinki
Istanbul
Izmir
Jonkoping
Kristiansand
Larnaca
Malmo
Moscow
Norrokoping
Riyadh
Seattle
Singapore
Sofia
Stavanger
Tehran
Thessaloniki
Tokyo
Turku
Vasteras
Vaxjo
Warsaw
-17.07
4.64
-10.71
-10.02
12.00
85.50
35.00
19.77
-22.17
1.05
9.17
-2.37
-16.40
40.00
-17.04
1.91
18.21
-0.50
-20.00
-22.74
25.00
-13.96
15.00
14.21
-23.01
-55.00
-3.53
1.67
0.00
16.42
0.25
-76.67
-6.49
-18.80
23.77
63.34
23.37
11.55
-53.40
17.90
-142.86
-60.00
26.08
-48.42
15.46
-50.00
57.06
-6.85
13.90
-29.95
-30.36
49.41
46.45
16.32
116.36
0.00
0.00
-3.79
0.1146
-0.04 10
1.0000
0.25 16
0. 1744
0.1941
0.5000
0.6723
-0.1191
0.6379
0.57 14
0.0000
0.0000
0.5 100
1.0000
0.28 12
0.0000
0.5333
0.3859
0.5068
0.7000
1.0000
0.2647
0.5750
-0.0 188
-1.0000
0.0000
0.0000
-0.2667
0.0024
-0.0075
0. 1490
0.2636
0.0289
-0.0053
0.3929
0.0934
0.3433
0. 1079
0.0671
0.3725
0.2 187
0.0353
-0.0209
0.45 19
0. 1244
0.0344
0.0617
0.0247
0.17 12
-0.1896
-0.1228
0.8823
-0.5968
-0.2375
0.0000
0,0000
0.0629
-0.0006
-0.0 155
0.2333
0.3230
0.0532
0.00 19
0.0222
0. 1259
-0.2223
0.2497
0.0962
0.2692
0. 1250
0.0433
-0.0240
0.0567
0.0667
0.0833
0.06 16
0.05 11
0.1882
-0.1742
-0.1833
0.54 11
0.0220
0.2717
0.0000
0.0000
0.1185
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5
8
0
0
1
0
0
7
6
0
0
-20
0
-6
0
5
4
8
0
0
5
I
I
3
-2
-10
-14
-23
0
-11
0
-6
0
-7
0
12
-19
7
-7
8
-19
-31
0
-28
-5
-1
-17
-22
Sample of KLM-Northwest O-D markets originating from Amsterdam
Destinations LCTIMEA LFREQA ALCOMF ECTIMEc AQUALA tQUALITY AHHJ AMSHAREA
I
1
I
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
I
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
I
Atlanta
Chicago
Cleveland
Columbus
Dallas
G. Rapids
Hartford
Indianapolis
Kansas City
Las Vegas
Manchester
Memphis
Miami
Milwaukee
New Orleans
Omaha
0. County
Orlando
Philadelphia
Portland-Me.
Portland-Or.
S. L. City
San Diego
S. Francisco
Seattle
15.16
32.73
4.00
-5.00
-121.00
-20.00
40.00
-3.50
-6.87
10.00
-650
-73.89
-350
-6.75
-111.00
-40.62
-115.00
9.72
145
30
-8.75
45.00
-114.37
-28.50
6.68
-35.68
-29.82
-32.25
22.10
-24.58
106.00
-27.65
38.52
-39.17
-57.53
0.00
74.37
-46.37
28.39
-37.33
-38.00
19.63
18.17
-48.38
0.00
-9.74
-77.47
-10.99
-26.07
-34.56
-0.2991
-0.03 10
0.0257
-0.3000
0.068 1
0.0000
0.7000
0.0000
-0.1667
-0.2348
0.0000
-0.63 16
0.368 1
-0.0907
0.1143
0.0000
0. 1250
-0.2907
0.3 84 1
0.0000
0.277 1
-0.3667
-0.1551
0.2287
0.2701
0.1106
0.0320
0.0609
-0.0164
0.02 11
0.0000
0.0823
0.0 117
0.0287
0.0241
0.0000
-0.2209
0.03 13
-0.0839
0.0354
-0.0534
0.2072
0.1084
0.1020
0.0000
0. 1608
0.0456
0.0240
0.020 1
0.0492
0.1502
0.0962
0.0694
0.0000
0.0325
0.0000
0.0740
0. 13 56
-0.3911
0.0056
0.0000
-0.4979
0.0257
-0.1832
0.0371
0.2000
0.03 16
0.22 14
0.1121
0.0000
0.2575
0.0438
0.0200
-0.74 13
0.03 10
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0
0
0
1
0
2
0
1
0
3
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
2
1
2
2
0
0
-2
-2
0
0
-5
6
2
-15
15
6
-9
8
0
-9
-23
-25
-4
-18
-10
2
-7
I
4
8
8
-7
-7
-21
-3
12
-6
-14
Sample of KLM-Northwest O-D markets , originating from Boston
Destinations /CTIMEA EFREQA ALCOMF ECTIMEc AQUALA iQUALJTY MIHI EiMSJIAREA
Abu Dhabi
Accra
Antwerp
Athens
Bahrain
Barcelona
Bremen
Budapest
Conakry
Dharan
Dubai
Dusseldorf
Freetown
Geneva
Gothenburg
Hamburg
Kano
Karachi
Lagos
Lome
Malino
Munich
Muscat
Nairobi
Newcastle
Porto
Prague
Stavanger
Stockholm
Tel Aviv
Toulouse
Tunis
Zurich
130.00
50.00
95.00
-30.00
55.00
205.00
-105.00
-105.00
55.00
15.00
60.00
-105.00
45.00
-105.00
-110.00
-105.00
50.00
-110.00
85.00
-95.00
-385.00
-140.00
-240.00
-110.00
-130.00
-115.00
-85.00
-65.00
-95.00
-90.00
185.00
-75.00
-120.00
-23.60
-38.10
60.00
-31.00
63.20
10.60
-30.40
61.60
330.00
362.80
-66.30
30.10
0.00
-2.40
52.00
4.10
-175.00
-330.60
-31.10
302.50
-130.00
-52.40
33.70
201.10
-57.40
-145.00
-42.20
-163.10
-4.80
-75.70
26.80
-105.00
-14.40
0.0000
0.0000
1.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
1.0000
0.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
1.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
1.0000
1.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
1.0000
0.3877
0.3750
1.0000
0.5000
0.2074
0.0 144
0.5185
0.0874
1.0000
1.0000
-0.0027
0. 1755
0.0000
0.3750
0.5 122
0.4545
-0.5000
-0.7778
0.6000
1.0000
0.0000
0.2333
-0.0222
0.2057
0.5625
-1.0000
0.4280
-0.3333
-0.0463
0.3023
0.7368
0.5560
0. 1270
0.0798
0.0819
0.5030
-0.0811
0.0354
-0.1224
0. 1038
0.0390
-0.3750
-0.3984
0.1115
-0.0132
0.0000
-0.0 176
0.18 11
0.0452
0.6667
0.7700
-0.00 14
-0.5000
0.4970
-0.0408
-0.3 533
0.4970
-0.0349
0.486 1
0.0195
0.6250
0.0 195
-0.0058
-0.0387
0.1481
-0.0065
-0.0036
0.2273
-0.46 15
0.0362
0. 1640
0.0023
0. 1625
-0.0233
-0.2500
-0.8 125
0.0982
-0.0 173
0.0000
0.0143
0. 1911
0.0763
0.6667
0.9000
0.0595
-0.5000
0.5385
-0.00 15
0.0220
0.0167
-0.0469
0.5833
0.0556
0.7500
0.0011
-0.0408
-0.2803
0.2 182
0.0250
0 Department of Air Transport, Cranfield University
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5
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4
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Sample of KLM-Northwest O-D markets originating from Minneapolis
Destinations zC TIME4 AFREQA ALCOMF ECTiMEc EQUALA itQUALITY AHHI AMSHARE4
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
Bahrain
Bangkok
Bremen
Brussels
Cairo
Delhi
Dusseldorf
Eindhoven
Geneva
Gothenburg
Jakarta
Lagos
Luxembourg
Milan
Munich
Nice
Nuremberg
Oslo
Prague
Singapore
Stockholm
Stuttgart
Vienna
Zurich
110.00
-26.00
775.00
-61.60
150.00
-75.00
6.25
55.00
35.00
-235.00
70.00
-60.00
-215.00
-120.00
71.00
10.00
-260.00
-75.00
26.25
-20.00
15.00
35.00
167.50
-18.00
137.33
-74.48
-215.00
-33.49
-213.00
-257.00
-107.08
0.00
-82.83
-190.47
0.00
-335.00
-205.00
-72.91
-38.18
43.00
-230.00
90.34
-162.20
-55.08
-7.17
-159.38
-37.25
-61.14
0.0000
0.4318
0.0000
0.6250
0.7857
0.0000
0.5833
0.0000
0.4333
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.3000
0.3 182
0.0000
1.0000
-0.0334
0.0000
0.4167
-0.0995
-0.4615
0.3810
0. 1335
-0.1806
0.3496
0.4628
0.1568
0.2470
0.3750
0.1333
0.0000
0.0925
0.8 145
0.0000
0.2187
0.2 187
-0.0421
0.0 160
-0.0556
0.2187
0.0636
0.4274
0.2408
0.0258
0.6328
0.1772
-0.0 139
-0.4167
0.4062
0.6364
0.1244
0.3082
0.7500
0.3333
0.0000
0.22 14
0.9375
0.0000
0.8750
0.8750
0.1636
0.0990
0.1667
0.8750
0.0601
0.6824
0.3385
0.0976
0.8 125
0.3935
0.0935
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I
0
I
-6
-6
6
1
-6
7
0
0
-6
0
0
0
1
0
I
1
1
0
14
-6
1
1
6
-7
-6
14
0
8
1
0
-27
0
-59
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
-7
0
0
0
-6
-20
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
-43
0
0
0
0
-7
Sample of British Airways-USA1r O-D markets originating from London
Destinations ACTIMEA LFREQA ALCOMF ECTIMEc LQUALA LQUALITY EIHHJ LWSHAREA
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
I
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
I
1
1
0
1
I
1
1
1
Altoona
Binghamton
Bradford
Charleston
Charlottesville
Clarksburg
Dubois
Elmira
Erie
Florence
Franklin
Gainsville
Hagerstown
Hickoiy
Hilton
Huntingdon
Huntsville
Jacksonville
Jamestown
Johnstown
Kingston
Lancaster
Lynchburg
Parkesburg
Reading
R. Mountain
Savannah
S. College
Williamsport
Winston
Worcester
Youngstown
-5.00
-70.00
-200.00
-103.69
47.61
-57.50
-95.00
-89.48
-155.50
-91.00
-155.00
-70.08
-15.00
-61.00
-46.00
-210.00
-36.00
-61.00
-105.00
25.00
-46.00
-44.21
76.08
-5.00
-190.00
34.77
-78.00
-155.77
-151.84
-16.00
-46.50
-95.00
0.00
-120.20
0.00
-184.75
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
2.50
0.00
0.00
0.00
-55.00
-28.67
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
-70.52
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
-260.00
0.0000
-0.5000
0.0000
-0.7288
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.1667
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
-1.0000
0 .2439
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0. 1930
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
-0.5000
0.0000
0.7993
0.0000
0. 8 943
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0959
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.5000
0.1068
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.2208
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.4970
0.0000
0.794
0.0000
0.8194
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
-0.0491
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.5000
0.1042
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0. 136 1
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.5385
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-3
I
-6
3
0
6
7
0
7
0
6
0
-7
7
11
0
2
0
7
2
0
0
7
5
12
7
14
-1
0
0
14
0
0
7
7
0
7
0
0
17
-2
-2
0
-52
-12
0
-7
-3
10
7
16
-23
-7
-13
17
-13
0
-5
-27
-21
-25
-7
-26
16
7
-3
0
-23
-36
0
-15
-8
12
15
-9
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Sample of British Airways-USA1r O-D markets originating from Philadelphia
Destinations ECTIMEA AFREQA ALCOMF tCTJMEc AQUAL4 EQUALITYc AHHI AMSHAREA
I
I
1
I
1
1
1
I
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
I
1
1
1
1
I
1
1
1
I
1
1
1
I
1
1
Aberdeen
Amman
Amsterdam
Bahrain
Basle
Belfast
Berlin
Bilbao
Cologne
Copenhagen
Dubai
Dusseldorf
Edindurgh
Frankfurt
Geneva
Glasgow
Gothenburg
Hamburg
Helsinki
Jersey
Kuwait
London
Lyon
Madrid
Malaga
Manchester
Milan
Munich
Nairobi
Newcastle
Nice
Paris
Pisa
Prague
Rome
Stockholm
Vienna
Zurich
-123.18
160.00
-87.31
90.00
-75.71
75.00
-65.00
110.00
-220.00
52.50
45.00
-121.87
-10.00
192.50
7.50
-25.22
10.00
-140.56
110.00
45.00
328.33
0.00
120.00
-45.00
-127.00
-53.82
47.50
56.50
-42.50
-81.43
-125.00
22.50
60.00
110.00
-130.00
-183.47
-265.50
10.00
0.00
0.00
4.97
-360.00
-25.00
0.00
-155.20
-190.83
-105.54
2.46
-229.40
96.22
115.00
-35.35
-12.06
55.50
-148.46
-75.76
-109.07
0.00
-17.37
-116.70
-106.02
-16.28
-202.86
-138.41
40.93
48.43
-251.67
0.00
-64.22
-5.35
0.00
-116.17
-46.33
27.16
10.95
-40.69
0.0000
0.0000
0.064 1
-1.0000
0.0000
0.0000
-0.1787
-0.7083
-0.2500
-0.07 13
0.0000
-0.3 87 1
0.5000
-0.0308
-0. 1009
-0.5000
-0.7308
-0.1722
0.0867
0.0000
-0. 1667
0.1159
-0.5238
-0.2 157
-0.5000
-0.6346
-0.4 167
-0.357 1
-1.0000
0.0000
0.3 125
0.0000
0.0000
-0. 1296
0.0656
-0.2875
-0.2243
-0.0321
0.0000
0.0000
-0.0498
0.4444
0.0139
0.0000
0.0307
0.4654
-0.6 165
0.0383
0.2339
-0.0797
-0.5000
-0.0471
0. 1507
0.2842
0.6650
-0.0630
0. 13 11
0.0000
0.2099
0.0403
0.7908
0.0790
0.5391
0.7971
0.084 1
0.0237
0.6111
0.0000
0.2294
0.2732
0.0000
0.1902
0.0425
-0.03 11
-0.067 1
0.0348
0.0000
0.0000
-0.1276
0.3333
0.0833
0.0000
0. 1327
0.63 16
0.1815
0.0419
0.5571
-0.0449
-0.5000
-0.1250
0.28 13
0.3052
0.6500
-0.0333
0. 1496
0.0000
0.3056
0.057 1
0.7500
0.2000
0.4375
0.7879
-0.015
0. 1291
0.5000
0.0000
0.2580
0.3833
0.0000
0.1625
0.1554
0.0593
-0.1122
0.1343
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Appendix G: Evidence of relationship between alliance market share and market concentration
0 RflC)fl_
07000_
0 S 000	 ___
.
0A0fl0	 ____
0 1000 __________________________________ __________________________________
••
nnoim
0.ipoo	 0.200	 O.3b00	 0.4?00	 0.5900	 0.6000	 o.7p00	 0.8 00
__ ____ L ____ _________-0 2000 _____ ______ ____ ____ __ ________ ___ __________ ___ ___ ______ ___
Change in O-D Hill
Figure G.1 Variation of L.MSHAREA with AIIHI (Origin: Copenhagen)
(r0.78)
Figure G.2 Variation of M'ISHARE4 with LXHHI (Origin: Vienna)
(r0.94)
0 Department of Air Transport, Cranfield University 	 358
Appendices
_________	 o 000 _________________________________________________
.
_______	 0oo0 _______ _____________________________
I.
	
________ ________	 4000 ________ _________________________________
. 0 . O0O _______
.
E
	
_____ _______ 02000
-	 ________ 01000	 ________________________________
• 1	 0 00	 0.2000	 0.4000	 0.6000	 0.8000	 1.0 00
_______ -01000 _______ ______________________________
_________ _________ -.7000 _________ _______________________________________
.
_______ _______ _0000 _______ _____________________________
Change in 0-fl Hill!
Figure G.3 Variation of M'ISHAREA with zHHI (Origin: Zurich)
(r0.48)
_______________	 0 000 ______ _______________________________
___L	 02000	
________ ________
01000	 _______	 ______________
000.10001O0 0.2000 0.2
:____
- -5000 _____ j
flil_____
______ _______ 0 7000 _______ _______ _______ _______ _______
.
_______ _______ _______ -.0 R000 _______ _______ _______ _______ _______
Change in 0-fl HHI
Figure G.4 Variation of MISHAREA with AHHI (Origin: Amsterdam)
(r0.50)
(a
E
(a DO
0 Department of Air Transport, Cranfield University
Appendices
a
a
t0
Z-o.
I
'noon _______________________________
OR000___________________________________
.
06000
04000
___________	 ( 2000
00	 0.2b00	 0.400	 0.6000	 0.8 00
01.40o00.00.0_
________	
-04000 ________	 I
.
________ ________ -06000 ________ __________________________
______ ________ -0R000 ________ __________________________
__________ __________ -1 0000 __________ _______________________________
Change in O-D Hill
Figure G.5 Variation of AMSHAREA with /.iHHI (Origin: Boston)
(r 0.76)
____ 1000 ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ __________ __________
_L0_____ __
_o0—_____ __
_flnfl—_________
_QZOflO_________
0<T1000 0.0 00 0.1 00 0.200 0.3t00 0.4000 0.5trnO 0.6000 0.7 00__O.8ffO__0.9 00
______________ 	 _____________ _____________ _____________ ______________ ______________ _____________ J ______________ _____________ _____________
_ I___ _
_Qá0__J______
Change in O-D Hill
Figure G.6 Variation of E..MSHAREA with AHHI (Origin: Minneapolis)
(r0.81)
a
'I)
a
E
0
z
a
a
a
U
0 Department of Air Transport, Cranfield University
	
360
Appendices
a
a
E
C,)
a
=
a
U
0.7000
0.6000
0.5000
0.4000
0.3000
0.200C
0.1 00C
0.000(
0
-0.100(
)0.0 00	 0.1000	 O.2OO	 0.3000	 0.4000 0.500	 0.6000	 0.7000	 0.8000 0.9
a
a
E
Cl)
a
U
0.9000
0.8000
Change in 0-Dull
Figure G.7 Variation of L..MSHAREA with AHHI (Origin: London)
(r= 0.99)
Change in 0-D Hill
Figure G.8 Variation of M'ISHAREA with .HHI (Origin: Philadelphia)
(r0.86)
0 Department of Air Transport, Cranfield University
	
361
Appendices
APPENDIX H: Quantification of aircraft attractiveness
Aircraft	 Factor Aircraft	 Factor Aircraft	 Factor
A310	 1.16	 BAe146-300	 0.95	 EMB12O	 0.51
A320	 1.12	 BAe-ATP	 0.81	 EMB145	 0.66
ATR42	 0.72	 BAe146-100	 0.85	 F100	 0.93
ATR72	 0.82	 BAeI46-200	 0.90	 F27	 0.75
B1300	 0.07	 BAe748	 0.70	 F28-1000/3000	 0.84
B1900	 0.22	 CN212	 0.42	 F28-20/40/60	 0.87
B1900D	 0.33	 CN235	 0.62	 P50	 0.75
B707	 1.12	 CR.!	 0.71	 J31	 0.31
B727-100	 1.06	 DCJO	 1.50	 J41	 0.49
B727-200	 1.12	 DC9-10/20	 1.01	 Li011	 1.42
B727-300	 0.97	 DC9-30	 1.05	 LET41O	 0.33
B737-200	 1.00	 DC9-40	 1.07	 MD1I	 1.52
B737-300	 1.03	 DC9-50	 1.09	 MD8O	 1.13
8737-400	 1.06	 DHC6	 0.16	 MD87	 1.09
B737-500	 1.00	 DHC7	 0.70	 Metro	 0.24
B747-100/200	 1.61	 DHC8-100	 0.57	 S2000	 0.69
B757	 1.19	 DHC8-300	 0.66	 S340	 0.54
B767-200	 1.19	 D0228-100	 0.22	 SD330	 0.55
B99	 0.12	 D0228-200	 0.26	 SD360	 0.61
BAC-lil	 0.87	 EMB11O	 0.28	 YS11	 0.74
Source: Boeing (1989)
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